拿破仑是如何轻易击溃埃及马穆鲁克军队的?
How did Napoleon manage to crush Egyptian Mamluk armies so easily?
译文简介
两个世纪前,拿破仑·波拿巴本人就用一条古老的军事历史法则解释过这一点——一支由勇士领导的士兵组成的军队,总能打败一支由勇士组成的军队。
拿破仑对马穆鲁克人的个人战斗素质给予了肯定:“马穆鲁克人英姿飒爽、气势恢宏……他们的战马昂首腾跃、猛冲向前……”
正文翻译
两个世纪前,拿破仑·波拿巴本人就用一条古老的军事历史法则解释过这一点——一支由勇士领导的士兵组成的军队,总能打败一支由勇士组成的军队。
拿破仑对马穆鲁克人的个人战斗素质给予了肯定:“马穆鲁克人英姿飒爽、气势恢宏……他们的战马昂首腾跃、猛冲向前……”
拿破仑对马穆鲁克人的个人战斗素质给予了肯定:“马穆鲁克人英姿飒爽、气势恢宏……他们的战马昂首腾跃、猛冲向前……”
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瓦伦丁·托多罗夫
Napoleon Bonaparte himself explained it two centuries ago with the old, as military history, rule - An army of soldiers led by warriors will always defeat an army of warriors.
Napoleon gave credit to the individual combat qualities of the Mamelukes: -”The Mamelukes are beautiful, magnificent… their horses rearing, plunging ...”
两个世纪前,拿破仑·波拿巴本人就用一条古老的军事历史法则解释过这一点——一支由勇士领导的士兵组成的军队,总能打败一支由勇士组成的军队。
拿破仑对马穆鲁克人的个人战斗素质给予了肯定:“马穆鲁克人英姿飒爽、气势恢宏……他们的战马昂首腾跃、猛冲向前……”
Napoleon himself recognizes their courage: “The Mamelukes charge the cannons with their sabers and their horses… They fought like lions ... “
But he stressed their incompetence in organized mass operations: - “Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a match for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500 Mamelukes,
拿破仑本人也认可他们的勇气:“马穆鲁克人挥舞着军刀,骑着马冲向大炮……他们像狮子一样战斗……”
但他强调了他们在有组织的大规模行动中的无能:“两个马穆鲁克人无疑能轻松对付三个法国人;100个马穆鲁克人能与100个法国人打成平手;300个法国人通常能击败300个马穆鲁克人,而1000个法国人总能打败1500个马穆鲁克人。”
In "The Battle of the Pyramids" Napoleon just organized his army into five gigantic squares. These are men kneeling and standing and firing so you got a continual rolling fire. The Mamelukes rode around the squares and were shot at by that square and by this square. The French lost thirty men, the Mamelukes lost probably five or six thousand.
在《金字塔战役》中,拿破仑只是将他的军队编成了五个巨大的方阵。方阵中的士兵有的跪着,有的站着,不断开火,形成持续的轮射火力。马穆鲁克骑兵在方阵周围打转,遭到各个方阵的射击。法军损失了30人,而马穆鲁克方面可能损失了五六千人。
Note: In fact, the entire military history of mankind can be described as a series of wars and battles in which armies of disciplined, manageable soldiers easily defeat even larger armies of warriors-knights, in which each warrior far surpasses any of the soldiers in combat skills and courage. Greeks against Persian, the victorious marches of the Roman legions, the English at Crécy and Agincourt against the French knights ... The difference always comes from the basic quality of the soldiers, their controllability, opposed to the warriors, usually acting according to their own decisions.
注:事实上,人类的整个军事史可以描述为一系列战争与战役,在这些战争与战役中,由纪律严明、易于指挥的士兵组成的军队,即便面对规模更大的由武士—骑士组成的军队,也能轻松取胜。这些武士在格斗技巧和勇气方面,往往远超任何一名士兵。希腊人对抗波斯人,罗马军团的胜利进军,克雷西和阿金库尔战役中英国人对抗法国骑士……差异始终源于士兵的基本素质及其可指挥性,这与通常凭自身决断行事的武士形成了鲜明对比。
Soul History
灵魂史
The army of Napoleon confronted the Mamluks in Egypt in 1798. The Mamluks were courageous and fearless warriors who believed that courage alone would do the trick. They were wrong.
The Mamluks were fabulous horsemen and murderers with the swords. However, they did not fight as a team, but as solitary fighters. All desired to become the star. It was all confusion, fast, loud, and unstructured, when they charged. It was an impressive looking one, but it was doomed.
1798年,拿破仑的军队在埃及与马穆鲁克人交锋。马穆鲁克人是英勇无畏的战士,他们认为仅凭勇气就能取胜。但他们错了。
马穆鲁克人是技艺高超的骑手,也是用剑的好手。然而,他们作战时并非团队协作,而是各自为战。每个人都渴望成为焦点。当他们发起冲锋时,场面混乱不堪、节奏飞快、喧嚣嘈杂且毫无章法。这看起来气势恢宏,却注定会失败。
The soldiers of Napoleon were the contrary. They did not struggle to have a self glorification. They did what they were instructed, and acted as a machine. Every man had a role. They could do nothing collectively.
Next came the maneuver of Napoleon; the square. French troops were organized in huge squares having their bayonets outside. The horses of the Mamluks would not run over a wall of steel. As the Mamluks were going round and about in circles, the men within the square fired continuously. It was slaughter.
拿破仑的士兵则恰恰相反。他们并不为自我吹嘘而奋斗。他们只是按指令行事,如同机器一般。每个人都有自己的角色。他们无法单独采取任何行动。
接下来是拿破仑的战术:方阵。法国军队组成巨大的方阵,刺刀朝外。马穆鲁克的马不会冲过钢铁般的人墙。当马穆鲁克们四处兜圈子时,方阵内的士兵持续射击。这简直是一场屠杀。
Thousands of Mamluks died. The French lost around 30 men. The war was a bitter experience: courage alone is mere suicide. Fighting on her own does not make heroes in war, as it does not in life. Teams do.
数千名马穆鲁克士兵丧生。法军损失约30人。这场战争是一次惨痛的经历:仅凭勇气无异于自杀。在战争中,单枪匹马作战不会造就英雄,这和在生活中一样。团队协作才能成就英雄。
Phill Richards
菲尔·理查兹
The Mameluke beys considered their army “invincible,” but its shortcomings came to the fore in the very first battle. A poorly organised feudal levy, it was, of course, quite unfitted to withstand the most modern army of the time, an army trained in the wars of the French revolution. Napoleon gave credit to the individual combat qualities of the Mamelukes, who fought like lions, but he stressed their incompetence in organised mass operations. “Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a match for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500 Mamelukes,” he remarked.
马穆鲁克贝伊们认为自己的军队“不可战胜”,但在第一场战斗中,其缺陷就暴露无遗。这是一支组织涣散的封建征兵队伍,当然完全无法抵挡当时最现代化的军队——一支在法国大革命战争中历练出来的军队。拿破仑认可马穆鲁克士兵的个人格斗素质,他们作战勇猛如狮,但他强调他们在有组织的大规模作战中能力欠缺。他曾说:“两个马穆鲁克无疑能胜过三个法国人;100个马穆鲁克能与100个法国人势均力敌;300个法国人通常能击败300个马穆鲁克,而1000个法国人总能战胜1500个马穆鲁克。”
In this connection Engels wrote: “With Napoleon a detachment of cavalry had to be of a definite minimum number in order to make it possible for the force of discipline, embodied in closed order and planned utilisation, to manifest itself and rise superior even to greater numbers of irregular cavalry, in spite of the latter being better mounted, more dexterous horsemen and fighters, and at least as brave as the former.”
对此,恩格斯写道:“在拿破仑的军队中,一支骑兵分队必须达到一定的最低人数,才能使体现在密集队形和有计划运用中的纪律力量得以发挥,并最终战胜数量更多的非正规骑兵,尽管后者骑术更精湛、更灵巧,并至少和前者一样勇敢。”
This first defeat showed the Mamelukes they were dealing with a formidable opponent. With feverish haste they set about fortifying Cairo. They built new ships and dug fortifications. The inhabitants of the city, who had no desire to submit to foreign oppression, willingly took part in the defence. Craftsmen’s guilds collected money to purchase weapons. Workers and artisans formed volunteer detachments. There were not enough weapons to go round. Patriotic demonstrations took place in the city. In the mosques, the Ulema implored God to grant them victory.
这场首次失利让马穆鲁克人意识到,他们面对的是一个强大的对手。他们急忙开始加固开罗的防御。他们建造新的船只,挖掘防御工事。这座城市的居民不愿屈服于外国压迫,人们都自愿参与防御工作。工匠行会筹集资金购买武器。工人和工匠组成了志愿分队。武器供不应求。城里举行了爱国示威活动。在清真寺里,乌里玛祈求真主赐予他们胜利。
Yet the defence was poorly organised. On July 21, Bonaparte’s army approached Giza, situated on the western bank of the Nile opposite Cairo. Here, at the foot of the ancient pyramids, a fierce battle took place. The Mamelukes and the city dwellers were crushingly defeated by the French. Out of six thousand Mamelukes only three thousand survived. Some of them fled with Murad-bey to Upper Egypt and some with Ibrahim-bey to Syria where they were pursued by the French. Thousands of city-dwellers, who fought on the approaches to Cairo, were drowned in the river while retreating. The victors broke into the city, plundered it and took brutal reprisals against those who had participated in the defence.
然而,防御组织得很差。7月21日,波拿巴的军队逼近吉萨,该地位于尼罗河西岸,与开罗隔河相对。就在古老的金字塔脚下,一场激战爆发了。马穆鲁克人与城市居民被法国人彻底击败。六千名马穆鲁克人中,仅三千人幸存。其中一些人跟随穆拉德贝伊逃往埃及上埃及地区,另一些则跟随易卜拉欣贝伊逃往叙利亚,而法国人对他们展开了追击。成千上万在开罗城郊参战的市民在撤退时溺死于河中。胜利者冲入城中,大肆劫掠,并对参与防御的人进行了残酷报复。
The Mamelukes were brave but had no organization and was not used to fighting a modern well trained army
马穆鲁克人很勇敢,但缺乏组织性,也不习惯与一支现代化的、训练有素的军队作战。
Don Hollway
唐·霍尔韦
Colonial wars of the 19th Century were usually about modern European powers inflicting their industrial might and mechanistic tactics on natives who still fought as their forefathers had, centuries in the past.
The Egyptian Mamelukes fought the old-fashioned way, with sweeping cavalry charges bringing swords to bear. The French fought in the modern manner, emphasizing gunpowder, the bayonet and strict formations.
19世纪的殖民战争通常是现代欧洲列强将其工业实力和机械战术强加于那些仍像几个世纪前的祖先一样作战的原住民身上。
埃及马穆鲁克采用传统方式作战,依靠骑兵大举冲锋,用刀剑交锋。而法国人则以现代化方式作战,强调火药、刺刀的运用和严密的阵型。
Upon learning the French had almost no cavalry, Mameluke leader Murad Bey had laughed and bragged that his horsemen would cut through them like watermelons. Each Mameluke fought in the ancient manner. “Somehow attached to his horse, which appeared to share all his possessions,” wrote a French colonel, “with the sabre hung from the wrist, he fired his carbine, his blunderbuss, his four pistols and after having discharged his six firearms, flanked the platoon of tirailleurs passing between them and the line with a marvelous dexterity. However, we soon recognized that these men, individually of an unmatchable bravery, had no idea of combined movements or mass charges.”
得知法国人几乎没有骑兵后,马穆鲁克首领穆拉德·贝伊大笑起来,还吹嘘说他的骑兵会像切西瓜一样把法国人砍倒。每个马穆鲁克都以古老的方式作战。
“不知怎的,他和他的马像是连在了一起,那匹马似乎承载着他所有的家当,”一位法国上校写道,“他手腕上挂着军刀,先开卡宾枪,再开霰弹枪,接着是四把手枪,在打完这六件火器后,他以惊人的灵巧迂回到散兵排侧面,从他们和战线之间穿了过去。然而,我们很快意识到,这些人虽然个个勇敢无比,却对协同作战或集团冲锋一窍不通。”
Mameluke leader Murad Bey
马穆鲁克领袖穆拉德贝伊
Ever the student of warfare, Bonaparte had read of the infantry squares used by the Austrians and Russians in their wars with the Ottomans a decade earlier. His French squares were in fact hollow rectangles, 300 yards across, 50 yards deep, with nine cannons at each corner for overlapping fields of fire. Captain Jean-Pierre Doguereau remembered, “Our squares were formed; the artillery on the corners and in the intervals; the cavalry and the baggage in the centre. This formation, which presented them [the Mamelukes] with masses of men and firepower on all sides, stunned them.”
作为一名战争学的研究者,波拿巴曾读过十年前奥地利人和俄国人在与奥斯曼帝国的战争中使用步兵方阵的记载。事实上,他的法军方阵是空心矩形,宽300码,深50码,每个角落都有九门大炮,形成交叉火力区。让-皮埃尔·多格雷奥上尉回忆道:“我们的方阵已经形成;炮兵部署在角落和间隙处;骑兵和行李则在中央。这种阵型在各个方向都向他们(马穆鲁克人)展示了密集的兵力和火力,让他们不知所措。”
The Egyptians had few cannons and used them poorly. The French presented solid blocks of musket and cannon protected by hedges of bayonets that slaughtered the Mamelukes before they ever came in contact.
埃及人拥有的大炮很少,而且使用得也很差劲。法国人摆出了由火枪和大炮组成的密集阵型,周围还有刺刀形成的屏障保护着,在马穆鲁克人靠近之前就将他们大量杀伤。
The Battle of the Pyramids, 21 July 1798
金字塔战役,1798年7月21日
David Kelly
戴维·凯利
The coordinated fire discipline of the new French Army was new to the Eygptian saphis. Napoleon brought more cannon than they were used to seeing in the field. The damage done to their mounted attacks rubbled the field so that mounted attack was no longer practicable. They had no other option to exercise and fled.
法国新军队协同一致的火力纪律对埃及骑兵来说是前所未见的。拿破仑带来的火炮数量远超他们在战场上常见的规模。这种火力对他们的骑兵冲锋造成了毁灭性打击,战场变得一片狼藉,使得骑兵冲锋再也无法实施。他们别无选择,只能仓皇逃窜。
Fabio Paolo Barbieri
保罗·巴比耶里指挥官
You should remember that Napoleon was hardly the first European commander to inflict crushing and decisive defeats on Muslim armies. In fact, in the long run, his invasion of Egypt was a failure, while, in the previous forty years, the British had been rampaging across the Indian subcontinent, defeating Muslim armies from five to ten times their size, and the Russians had twice defeated the Turks, the second time so decisively that Britain had to intervene to protect them from annihilation.
你应该记住,拿破仑并非首位给穆斯林军队带来毁灭性和决定性失败的欧洲指挥官。事实上,从长远来看,他对埃及的入侵是一次失败,而在之前的四十年里,英国人一直在印度次大陆横冲直撞,击败了规模是自身五到十倍的穆斯林军队,俄国人也曾两次击败土耳其人,第二次的胜利如此具有决定性,以至于英国不得不进行干预,以保护土耳其人免遭覆灭。
The difference was that this time the defeat was in a country that had not been invaded by Christians in 600 years, and then disastrously (Louis IX’ Crusade). That was what showed the Muslim world that the times, they were a-changin’.
不同之处在于,这一次的失败发生在一个六百年来未曾被基督徒入侵过的国家,上一次的入侵(路易九世的十字军东征)结局惨烈。这向穆斯林世界表明,时代正在发生变化。
David Inglis
大卫·英格利斯
The Turkish armies of this period lost every significant field battle no mattee how favorable the odds. The Russian-Turkish wars through this period, had the Russian army easily accounting for the Turks in field battles. The Turks could be tenacious in sieges. but the Ottoman army of this period seem incapable of standing up to an European army in open battle.
这一时期的土耳其军队,无论胜算多么有大,都输掉了每一场重要的野战。这一时期的俄土战争中,俄国军队在野战中轻松击败土耳其人。土耳其人在围城战中可能很顽强,但这一时期的奥斯曼军队似乎无法在公开战斗中对抗欧洲军队。
Alex Havel
亚历克斯·哈维尔
The Mamluks were masters of a type of warfare rendered obsolete by modern weapons, tactics, and military organization. What worked so well for them in the past failed because this new enemy was different, and the fierce courage of the Mamluks no longer mattered vis-a-vis the disciplined fire power of the French.
马穆鲁克人擅长的那种野战模式的武器、战术和军事组织淘汰了。过去对他们极为有效的方法之所以失效,是因为当前面对的这个新敌人有所不同,而且马穆鲁克人勇猛无畏的精神,在法军纪律严明的火力面前已无足轻重。
Mark Wedrall
马克·韦德拉尔
Superior tactics employed by smaller armed formations can, and did, overcome the greater forces of unorganized massed formations of their enemy. Napoleon is a good example while in Egypt. Look at Alexander the Great defeating Darius III and the Persians at Gaugamela in 331 B.C. The British garrison at Rorke’s Drift held off an attacking Zulu force 10 times their number. Military history is full of examples of tactics and discipline overcoming numerical superiority.
规模较小的武装编队所采用的高超战术能够并且确实战胜了敌方缺乏组织的大规模编队的优势兵力。拿破仑在埃及的经历就是一个很好的例子。再看看公元前331年,亚历山大大帝在高加米拉击败大流士三世和波斯军队的战役。英国驻军在罗克渡口抵挡住了人数是他们10倍的祖鲁军队的进攻。军事史上充满了战术和纪律战胜数量优势的例子。
Randy Selig
兰迪·塞利格
It was the 16th century versus the 19th.
Napoleon’s infantry and cavalry were disciplined, fought according to a strategy well suited to combat against a larger but less disciplined, poorly armed force wielding scimitars against the field guns, muskets and pistols of the French.
So long as Napoleon’s well chosen officers and marshalls did not break and run, their overwhelming victory was assured.
这是16世纪对19世纪的较量。
拿破仑的步兵和骑兵训练有素,他们采用的战略非常适合对抗规模更大但纪律涣散、装备简陋的敌军——这些敌军手持弯刀,对抗着法军的野战炮、滑膛枪和手枪。
只要拿破仑精心挑选的军官和元帅们没有溃散逃跑,他们的压倒性胜利就有了保证。
Anonymous
匿名
Miliary organization and morale. Napoleon summed it up in these words:
One Mamluk is the equal of three Frenchmen in a fight. Ten Mamluks would be the equal of ten Frenchmen. One hundred Frenchmen could defeat three-hundred Mamluks.
军事组织与士气。拿破仑用这样的话总结道:
一名马穆鲁克战士在战斗中能抵得上三名法国人。十名马穆鲁克战士的战力相当于十名法国人。而一百名法国人能够击败三百名马穆鲁克战士。
Arunabh Bhattacharya
阿伦巴布·巴塔查里亚
One of the factors that led to its success was the increase in the professionalism of the French army. Before the revolution, the military command had been dominated by the traditional aristocracy. Promotion had less to do with skill and more to do with who you were. After the revolution, promotion to military rank was earned on merit.
其成功的原因之一是法国军队专业性的提升。革命前,军队指挥权由传统贵族掌控,晋升更多取决于出身而非技能。革命后,军衔的晋升凭功绩获得。