俄罗斯通常是凭借蛮力而非巧妙战术赢得战争，这是真的吗？

Joe Bah
乔·巴

Yes and No.

是也不是

The Russians actually practices a LOT of battlefield deception. The concept is known as “maskirovka”. The idea is to mislead the enemy about the size and disposition of your forces, spread disinformation and/or create distractions to mask your intention, and using cover of darkness or fog of war to achieve surprise. Sadly, even using human shield to achieve your obxtive is not ruled out. In some case, they would go as far as denying that they are even involved in the attack - or at least continue to deny that you are going to attack until the very last minute!

俄军实际上深谙战场伪装之道，这一战术理念被称为“马斯基罗夫卡”。其核心在于向敌方谎报己方兵力规模与部署情况，散布虚假信息、制造干扰来掩盖作战意图，并借助夜色或战争迷雾达成突袭效果。令人遗憾的是，为达成作战目标，俄军甚至不排除使用人体盾牌的手段。在某些情况下，俄军会矢口否认自身参与了攻击行动，或者至少会一直否认即将发起进攻，直至行动发起前的最后一刻。

“Little Green Men” were a crucial component of Russian maskirovka tactics during the 2014 invasion of the Ukraine

“小绿人”部队是2014年俄军入侵乌克兰期间，马斯基罗夫卡战术体系中的关键组成部分。

However, once the battle is underway and the Russians can advance no further - then brute force is indeed the name of the game. The Russian military would attack on a broad front, typically using mass artillery fire and creeping barrage, all the while probing for weakness with small skirmishing force. Once a weak point has been identified, a mass assault using a large number of tanks and infantry ensues while the air force does its best to keep the sky clear - at least in that area. Any unit that manages to achieve a breakthrough gets resource priority and hence are able to exploit the breakthrough until the entire enemy front collapses - hopefully allowing the Russians to encircle the surviving enemy and destroy them. After pushing deep into the enemy territory, the Russians would consolidate their gains, prepare for possible counterattack, and repeat the process all over again. Casualties, while regrettable, are acceptable as long as the army can achieve their obxtive within the allotted time.

然而，一旦战事打响且俄军推进受阻，蛮力便会成为克敌制胜的核心手段。俄军会开展宽正面进攻，通常以大规模炮火覆盖与徐进弹幕射击为主要方式，同时派遣小规模散兵部队试探敌方防线薄弱环节。一旦锁定突破口，便会投入大量坦克与步兵发起集群冲锋，而空军则会全力夺取制空权——至少要确保该作战区域的制空权。任何成功实现突破的部队都会获得优先资源补给，进而得以扩大战果，直至敌方整条防线崩溃，最终有望实现对敌军残余力量的合围与歼灭。在向敌方纵深区域推进后，俄军会巩固既得阵地，防备敌方可能发起的反击，随后重复上述作战流程。尽管伤亡在所难免，但只要能在规定时间内达成作战目标，这些伤亡都是可以接受的。

These tactics may seem crude by Western standard. The latter relies heavily on the use of hi-tech smart weapons to launch powerful decapitation strike deep behind the enemy line to take out command centers and cut off communications with the rest of the troops. The ensuing chaos and confusion would demoralize the enemy rank and file, and increase the likelihood that the enemy will surrender before the first shot is even fired. So it’s no surprise that some people in the West may even view certain Maskirovka tactic such as spreading false information or outright lying to confuse the enemy as ‘dishonorable’ or distasteful when compared to the Western’s version (which is denial of information).

以西方的标准来看，这些战术或许显得粗陋。西方军队则高度依赖高科技精确制导武器，在敌方纵深地带发起强力“斩首”打击，摧毁指挥中心，切断其与前线部队的通讯联系。由此引发的混乱局面会瓦解敌军普通士兵的士气，甚至有可能让敌军在首枪未发之前便选择投降。因此，与西方标榜的“信息封锁”战术相比，部分西方人会将“马斯基罗夫卡”战术中诸如散布虚假信息、公然编造谎言以迷惑敌人的手段，视为“卑劣”或“令人不齿”的行径，这也不足为奇。

Western military rely heavily on shock and awe - delivered by its air force - to destroy the leadership and disrupt communication with the front line troops, in theory ending the battle before it even began

西方军队极度仰仗由空军主导实施的“震慑”战术，摧毁敌方指挥层，切断其与前线部队的通讯，理论上能实现“兵不血刃而屈人之兵”的效果。

However, the combination of maskirovka + brute force (or just maskirovka alone) is actually quite effective if executed properly and does not have to result in heavy casualties - like the 2014 invasion of Crimea (which actually involved limited use of brute force and a LOT of deception). The 2022 invasion though was very, very badly executed.

然而，若部署得当，“伪装欺敌+蛮力攻坚”的组合战术（甚至单纯的伪装欺敌战术）其实能发挥显著效果，且不一定会造成大规模伤亡——2014年的克里米亚行动便是典型案例，该行动仅动用了有限的强攻手段，却运用了大量的伪装欺敌战术。反观2022年的军事行动，则部署得极为拙劣。

Choysakanto
乔伊萨坎托

No.
并非如此。

Majority of Russia’s wars throughout history were won using ingenious tactics.
Russia used wagon forts during the Battle of Molodi because they were severely outnumbered by the Tatars who were mostly on horseback, and won.

俄罗斯历史上的绝大多数战争，都是凭借精妙绝伦的战术取胜的。
在莫洛季战役中，面对以骑兵为主、兵力占据绝对优势的鞑靼军队，俄军依托车垒工事展开防御，最终赢得了战役的胜利。

Russia was the first among European empires to use infantry squares manned entirely by musketeers with bayonets, and this was first witnessed on the Battle of Kagul, fought mere years before the American Revolution, where the Russians were greatly outnumbered by the Ottomans 4 to 1. Winning that battle meant that for the first time Russia had a free hand in interfering on the affairs in the Balkans, and unbeknownst to most, this would cost the Europeans dearly for the generations to come.

俄罗斯是欧洲列强中首个组建全刺刀火枪兵步兵方阵的国家，这一战术的首次实战运用是在卡古尔战役中。该战役爆发于美国独立战争前夕，当时俄军与奥斯曼军队的兵力对比悬殊，达到了1:4。这场战役的胜利，使俄罗斯首次得以不受掣肘地干涉巴尔干地区事务，而大多数人未曾预料到的是，这一局面将在后世给欧洲各国带来沉重的代价。

 Russia certainly refused to use brute force when France and its continental allies invaded it in 1812 with the largest invasion force in history up to that time. As a matter of fact, their extended angular battle formation in Borodino was in the expectation that the larger French army would outflank them in the north, when in fact, ironically, it was Napoleon himself who used brute force to take the heavily defended and fortified mounds, making his army perform endless frontal assaults for the job. Literally the northern half of the Russian army remained idle and intact because of such disposition, while the French army, outnumbering their Russian counterpart, was left completely drained and exhausted over the bloody frontal assaults they made. In the end, Napoleon was outsmarted by Kutusov and other Russian generals and he wound up losing the whole campaign with nothing but hundreds of thousands of frozen European corpses to show for it.

1812年，法国及其欧洲大陆盟友组建了一支空前规模的入侵大军进犯俄国，俄军在这场战争中坚决摒弃了蛮力攻坚的战术。事实上，俄军在博罗季诺战役中部署了大范围的楔形战斗阵型，其预判是兵力占优的法军会从北部发起侧翼包抄。然而颇具讽刺意味的是，最终选择以蛮力强攻俄军重兵布防、工事坚固的高地的，恰恰是拿破仑本人。他下令法军对俄军阵地展开一轮又一轮的正面猛攻。正是得益于这一战术部署，俄军北翼部队始终未投入战斗，得以保全建制；反观兵力占优的法军，在一轮轮血腥的正面冲锋中元气大伤、精疲力竭。最终，库图佐夫等俄军将领以谋略智取拿破仑，法军输掉了整场战役，只留下数十万具冻僵的欧洲士兵尸体。

Russia invented the shock tactics, infiltration tactics and blitzkrieg as we know it. First conceived by general Alexei Brusilov during the First World War, such tactics were first used during the Brusilov Offensive, named by historians as the greatest Entente victory of the war resulting in the near-total destruction of the Austrian-Hungarian armed forces and some substantial damage to the better trained and equipped German armies, wherein after a short but intense artillery bombardment an elite group of well-trained infantry and cavalry would breach a specific sector of the enemy line, creating a gap for the rest of the army to follow up and compromising the entire enemy formation. Such tactic was entirely novel and different from the tactics used by anyone else during the war prior, in that their tactics involved sustained artillery barrages followed by mass infantry attacks with no other goal but to take the enemy trenches through, ironically, brute force.

如今我们熟知的突击战术、渗透战术以及闪电战，其源头均是俄罗斯。这些战术的雏形由阿列克谢·布鲁西洛夫将军在第一次世界大战期间首创，并首次应用于布鲁西洛夫攻势。这场攻势被历史学家誉为协约国在一战中取得的最辉煌胜利，奥匈帝国军队在此战中近乎全军覆没，训练有素、装备精良的德军也遭受重创。该战术的核心流程是：先以短促而猛烈的炮火覆盖敌方阵地，随即派遣精锐步兵与骑兵部队突破敌军防线的特定区段，为后续大部队撕开缺口，进而瓦解敌军整体阵型。这种战术在当时堪称革命性创举，与此前战争中各方惯用的战术截然不同——以往的战术往往是先进行持续的炮火轰击，再发动大规模步兵冲锋，其唯一目标就是凭借蛮力攻占敌方战壕。

The Germans later copied this tactic during the Battle of Caporetto against the Italians and their Spring Offensive against Britain, France and the United States.

后来，德军在卡波雷托战役中对意大利军队，以及在春季攻势中对英、法、美三国联军，都照搬了这一战术。

The Soviets invented the maskirovka, wherein they would mislead the Axis into believing that their army existed in an area they can obviously see, not knowing they actually positioned their best and strongest forces in the forests and the elements where they remain completely hidden until the last second before they attacked. This tactic is the reason why their Operation Bagration is a success, destroying the German Army Group Center and majority of whatever remained of Germany's war engines.

“马斯基罗夫卡”伪装战术由苏联首创。该战术的核心在于诱导轴心国军队相信，苏军主力部署在其视线可及的区域；而事实上，苏军已将最精锐的部队隐蔽部署在森林等复杂地形中，直至发起进攻的最后一刻才现身。正是凭借这一战术，苏军成功实施了巴格拉季昂行动，一举歼灭了德国中央集团军群，摧毁了纳粹德国残存的大部分战争机器。

In no way Russia could have survived and lasted to this day if they fought their wars solely by brute force.

倘若俄军在历次战争中一味依赖蛮力，绝无可能存续至今。

Battle of Kagul in 1770

1770年 卡古尔战役

Carl Hamilton
卡尔·汉密尔顿

No, this is not true. What is true is that Russia won some wars, and lost some wars. No two wars are fought in the same way. Every war and every battle has conditions attached to them. It is an unfortunate tendency for many western history buffs to analyze only those they respect, and because there is no respect for Russia now, we are very willing to pretend that the Russians don’t go through all the steps we do.

这种说法并不成立。真实的情况是，俄罗斯在历史上有胜有负，没有任何两场战争的作战模式是完全相同的，每场战争、每次战役都有其特定的背景条件。令人遗憾的是，许多西方历史爱好者存在一种倾向：他们只愿意认真分析自己所推崇的国家的战争史；而如今由于对俄罗斯缺乏认同，他们便刻意无视俄军在作战中同样会遵循与西方军队相同的战术规划与部署流程。

Take for example the Battle of Poltava in 1709. During this battle the Russian army, engaged the Swedish army in eastern Ukraine, frankly very far from the Swedish borders. This was a good position to engage them, and the distance conditions for this battle which the Russians won, were so devastating that the Swedish Empire would literally collapse and Sweden would never again be a serious power.

以1709年的波尔塔瓦战役为例。在这场战役中，俄军选择在乌克兰东部与瑞典军队交战——坦白说，这里距离瑞典本土十分遥远。这是一个极为有利的交战地点。俄军最终赢得了这场战役，而漫长的战线给瑞典造成了毁灭性打击，瑞典帝国就此土崩瓦解，此后再也未能跻身欧洲强国之列。

The Swedish army was very well trained, indeed it was considered one of the most elite infantry armies in the world at the time, though it was small in size. They had the most daring assault tactics that could not easily be replicated by others, where they would weather a musket volley, then close in and fire point blank volley of their own straight into enemies lines and then follow up with a bayonet charge. This shock tactic was so effective that the gå-på-mod (go head on courage) is a common expression in Scandinavian languages even today, and saw the Swedish Empire go from victory to victory for a period of time.

瑞典军队尽管规模不大，但训练极为精良，堪称当时世界上最精锐的步兵部队之一。他们拥有一套极为果敢、难以被他国复制的突击战术：士兵们先扛住敌方一轮火枪齐射，随即逼近敌军阵地，在近距离内进行火枪齐射，紧接着发起刺刀冲锋。这种突击战术的威力极为惊人，以至于“勇往直前的勇气”这一说法至今仍是斯堪的纳维亚语系中的常用表达；也正是凭借这一战术，瑞典帝国曾在一段时期内所向披靡、连战连捷。

The thing is that the Russian army had faced this and been defeated before, and they did indeed adapt their tactics accordingly. The during the battle of Poltava, Russian infantry did not fire at long range as was the norm, or separate the volleys in lines. They waited for the Swedish infantry to do their point blank charge, and fired at 50m which is quite close, and just 20m before the Swedish would open fire. Then the entire front of the Russian infantry retreat at the same time, and ran behind their second line. The Swedish assault charge had been negated, and a fresh second line of Russian infantry were ready to repeat it. As the Swedish continued their advance they moved into terrain where the Russians could not be flanked by cavalry. The Russians sent infantry around the forest to take up redoubts that the first line had abandoned, now behind the Swedish assault infantry. The Swedish elite army, broke and retreated. The Swedish lost 12,000 men while the Russians lost 6,000.

关键在于，俄军此前曾与瑞典军队交锋并遭遇败绩，此后便针对性地调整了战术。在波尔塔瓦战役中，俄军步兵并未遵循当时常规的远距离射击战术，也没有采用分段式齐射。他们静待瑞典步兵发起近距离冲锋，在距离敌军仅50米、且距离瑞典军队开火只剩20米的极近距离内，才发起齐射。随后，俄军前线步兵全体同步后撤，退至己方二线部队身后。瑞典军队的冲锋势头就此被瓦解，而严阵以待的俄军二线步兵随即准备重复这一战术。随着瑞典军队继续推进，他们进入了一片不利于骑兵实施侧翼包抄的地形。与此同时，俄军派遣步兵绕经森林，占领了一线部队此前放弃的多面堡，而这些阵地此刻已位于瑞典突击步兵的后方。腹背受敌之下，这支瑞典精锐部队最终溃散撤退。此役瑞典军队损失1.2万人，俄军仅损失6000人。

 The Russians had a much larger force, but they didn’t overwhelm the Swedish army, they outmaneuvered it, and sustained half the amount of losses. They used a peasant army, to defeat one of the most elite armies so thoroughly it never recovered. By using superior fire and maneuver tactics.

俄军虽然兵力远胜于瑞典军队，但并未依靠兵力优势碾压对手，而是通过高超的战术机动智取敌军，最终伤亡人数仅为瑞典军队的一半。俄军正是凭借这支由农民组成的部队，依托更为精良的火力配置与战术机动，彻底击溃了这支欧洲顶尖的精锐之师，使其自此一蹶不振。

There is no such thing as brute force, there is force. And the application of force combined with intelligence, strategy, technology and other force multipliers is how wars are won. Historically, the Russians have not been the greatest innovators of small scale tactics, because they didn’t operate small lands or small forces. But they have been very good at analyzing what made other armies successful, and not copy those armies, but find a way to crush them, often by having a better understanding of grand factors like terrain, production and sustainability of fighting potential.

战争中本无“蛮力”一说，唯有“兵力”的运用之分。战争的制胜之道，在于将兵力与智谋、战略、技术以及其他兵力倍增器相结合。从历史角度来看，俄军并非小规模战术的顶尖创新者，这是因为俄罗斯从未以狭小领土或少量兵力为基础开展作战。但俄军极为擅长分析其他军队的制胜之道，他们不会照搬这些军队的战术，而是找到克敌制胜的方法——通常是凭借对地形、生产力以及作战潜力可持续性等宏观因素的深刻理解。

The Russians tend to be tenacious, as in they don’t give up, and in modern times no one has really found a way to decisively defeat them before they adapt to what ever is going on, though WW2 came close.

俄军向来以坚韧著称，他们从不轻言放弃。在近代战争中，除了第二次世界大战曾一度逼近胜利之外，没有任何势力能够在俄军完成战术调整之前，对其形成决定性的打击。

The Russians noted that Napoleon won almost all his battles, their strategy became to defeat all elements of the French army that wasn’t led by Napoleon himself, following the battle of Borodino Napoleon said:

“The French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians worthy of being invincible.”

俄军注意到拿破仑几乎赢得了他指挥的每一场战役，于是便制定了一套针对性的战略：集中力量歼灭所有非拿破仑亲自指挥的法军部队。博罗季诺战役结束后，拿破仑曾这样评价道：

“法军的表现足以配得上胜利，而俄军的表现则证明了他们当之无愧的不败之师。”

Boris Ivanov
鲍里斯·伊万诺夫

Well, we won the war with Napoleon purely strategically, without a tactical advantage. We lured him so deep inside Russia, that he had to run away, as he was in danger of losing his logistical connection to the “motherland”. Also, in our wars with the Ottoman Empire, we frequently didn’t have numerical advantage. Also, one can remember something like the Battle of Molodi (1572) against the Crimeans, when the numbers were on their side, while we had cannons. In the end, we destroyed a whole generation of Crimean men, and it took the Khanate 20 years to resume its major raids against Russia. But, yes, in the 20th and 21st centuries, we were not winning against the numerical odds.

事实上，我们能在对拿破仑的战争中取胜，完全依靠的是战略层面的优势，而非战术优势。我们将拿破仑的军队诱入俄罗斯腹地，迫使他们不得不仓皇撤退——因为再继续深入，法军的后勤补给线就会彻底断裂，与本土失去联系。此外，在我们与奥斯曼帝国的历次战争中，俄军往往并不占据兵力优势。我们不妨回顾一下1572年的莫洛季战役，当时我们面对的是克里米亚汗国的军队，敌军兵力占据绝对优势，而俄军的制胜法宝是火炮。最终，我们歼灭了整整一代克里米亚青壮男性，致使克里米亚汗国在之后的20年里，都无力再对俄罗斯发动大规模袭扰。不过确实，在20世纪与21世纪的战争中，俄军已经很难再实现以少胜多的战绩了。

Miles Goldsack
迈尔斯·戈德萨克

No, that's largely a myth created by the second world war.
Russia suffered a more casualties than the other allies but that was more due to the nature of the war in the east than Russia trying to use brute force.

这种说法并不成立，这在很大程度上是由第二次世界大战催生的误解。
俄军在二战中的伤亡人数远超其他盟国，但这主要是由东线战场的战争性质决定的，而非俄军刻意采用蛮力攻坚的战术所致。

Historically Russia won a lot of wars by running away and regrouping. Thats arguably how they beat Napoleon and Hitler. In both cases it was thought a knockout punch could be landed on the seat of power as Russian population has always been concentrated in a small area. By retreating they dragged out the invading armies and wore them down on home soil.

从历史上看，俄罗斯赢得许多战争的秘诀在于战略撤退与重整旗鼓。击败拿破仑与希特勒的战役，就是典型的例证。在这两场战争中，侵略者都认为可以凭借一场决定性的战役，一举摧毁俄罗斯的权力核心——毕竟俄罗斯的人口长期集中在少数区域。而俄军则通过战略性撤退，将入侵军队拖入漫长的消耗战，最终在本土战场上拖垮对手。

Harald Lehmann
哈拉尔德·莱曼

It is quite obvious that the Katsaps mostly waged wars through mass and ruthlessness. They usually fall back on this pattern, which seems to be their natural form of warfare. The entire expansion of Russia and the acquisition of countries was based on this. Effectiveness against smaler opponents yes - often, efficiency no - nearly never.

很明显，俄罗斯人在战争中主要依赖兵力规模与冷酷无情的作战风格。他们往往会回归这种作战模式，这似乎已成为他们与生俱来的战争形态。俄罗斯的整个扩张进程，以及对其他国家的征服，都是建立在这一基础之上的。这种模式对付弱小对手时的确有效，但几乎毫无作战效率可言。

There were exceptions here too, but the dominant image was what the question aims at. Anyone who claims otherwise can easily be refuted and is probably a Bolshevik agitator.

当然也存在一些例外情况，但主流的战争形象正如问题所描述的那样。任何持相反观点的人都很容易被反驳，而且这些人很可能是布尔什维克的煽动者。

Propaganda, lies and deception are, however, a concept that has always accompanied Russian warfare, despite its clumsiness, and gives it a certain sophistication. This is also evident in the Russians' current hybrid warfare. Whether this is a reflection of a devious Russian mentality is something that needs to be examined. I support this hypothesis.

然而，宣传、谎言与欺骗，这些手段自始至终都贯穿于俄罗斯的战争史中。尽管这些手段有时显得笨拙，但也为其战争模式增添了几分复杂性。这一点在俄罗斯当前的混合战争中也体现得淋漓尽致。这种特点是否反映了俄罗斯人狡诈的民族性格，还有待进一步研究。我个人认同这一假设。

The country has mostly relied on mass mobilization and strong armament in its warfare. Wars were started against smaller and weaker opponents, and risks were avoided wherever possible. Where this superiority was not present, combat was avoided, retreating into the distance and practicing scorched earth tactics.

在战争中，这个国家主要依赖大规模动员与强大的军备实力。他们通常选择对弱小的对手发动战争，并尽可能规避风险。在不具备兵力或军备优势的情况下，俄军会避免正面交战，转而采取战略撤退与焦土战术。

What are the underlying reasons for this?

造成这种情况的深层原因是什么？

Abundance of resources: The availability of vast natural and human resources has often allowed Russia to focus on quantity rather than efficiency. Why develop complex systems when raw mass is sufficient? Political structures: Autocratic systems, from the tsars to the Soviet unx, often favored centralized, large-scale mobilization, which was easier to control than decentralized, innovative approaches. Cultural factors: Russian history often emphasizes endurance and sacrifice (e.g., “General Winter”), leading to a mentality that accepts heavy losses in order to achieve goals. One strength of Russian warfare was the uncompromising nature it displayed.

资源丰富性：广袤的自然资源与充足的人力资源，往往使俄罗斯可以优先追求兵力规模，而非作战效率。既然单纯依靠数量优势就足以取胜，又何必耗费精力去研发复杂的战术体系呢？政治体制因素：从沙皇时代到苏联时期，专制体制往往更青睐中央集权式的大规模动员，这种模式比去中心化的创新战术更容易掌控。文化因素：俄罗斯历史向来强调坚韧与牺牲精神（例如“冬将军”的说法），这造就了一种为达成目标不惜承受巨大伤亡的战争思维。俄军作战的一大优势，就在于其展现出的绝不妥协的强硬态度。

The 18th century in particular provides examples of how Russian warfare could be different. Commanders such as Suvorov and disciplined, powerful troops were particularly prent during this period.

18世纪的战争史尤其能体现出俄军作战模式的多样性。在这一时期，以苏沃洛夫为代表的杰出将领层出不穷，俄军部队也以纪律严明、战斗力强悍而著称。

The Second World War, on the other hand, hardly serves as an example of the rozzo combat effeciency. The supposedly skilful Operation Bagration is more of a counterexample. Only after gathering exorbitant numbers of artillery, tank troops and infantry was the operation dared. The Red Army also had clear air superiority for the first time. The very high number of casualties and wounded against a vastly inferior Wehrmacht also shows here that the Red Army suffered from a lack of quality, albeit not to the same extent as in the early years of the war. The Wehrmacht had achieved its breakthroughs with far less quantitative superiority.

反观第二次世界大战，却很难被视为俄军作战效率的正面例证。被吹嘘得神乎其神的巴格拉季昂行动，反而更像是一个反面案例。苏军是在集结了数量惊人的火炮、坦克与步兵部队之后，才敢发起这场行动，而且当时红军还首次掌握了绝对制空权。即便面对实力远逊于己的德军，苏军依然付出了极为惨重的伤亡代价，这足以表明红军存在兵员素质不足的问题——尽管这一问题相较于战争初期已有所改善。而德军当年取得的数次突破，所依靠的兵力优势远不及苏军这般悬殊。

It is not so much a question of Russia not being clever enough, but rather of it making optimal use of what it has - numbers, resilience, and sometimes clever planning - depending on the war situation.

归根结底，这并非俄罗斯是否足够精明的问题，而是他们会根据战场形势，充分利用自身所拥有的一切优势——兵力规模、坚韧的作战意志，以及偶尔灵光一现的精妙战略规划。

Doug Hensley
道格·汉斯利

Not really. Brute force, if it works, is smart enough. But consider WW2. The Soviets improved on their early lackluster performance. By 1944, they had become better at the operational side of war than the Germans. They wrong-footed the Germans with Bagration, striking a sector of the front that the Germans were not expecting to be hit and destroying or capturing some fifty German divisions. It was a huge Soviet victory and it had been achieved by deception, masking, and ingenuity, as well as mass.

并非如此。如果蛮力战术能够奏效，那它本身就不失为一种明智的选择。但我们不妨以二战为例来看。苏军在战争初期的表现乏善可陈，而后却不断改进战术。到1944年时，苏军的战役指挥水平已经超越了德军。他们凭借巴格拉季昂行动成功牵制住德军，选择在德军毫无防备的战线区段发起突袭，一举歼灭或俘虏了约50个德国师。这场战役是苏军取得的一场重大胜利，其制胜关键不仅在于兵力规模，更在于战术欺骗、伪装欺敌与作战巧思的结合运用。

Then they struck toward Lvov (now Lviv) from which sector the Germans had drawn reserves to try and mitigate the consequences of the unfolding disaster to the north that was the result of Bagration. Again, they masked their intentions, brought up forces stealthily, struck with great power and violence at carefully sexted points, secured road passages through the front, and exploited with power and speed to trap German forces. Another brilliant Soviet victory. And to top it off for the summer, they attacked in Romania, having arranged with the disaffected Romanians for Romania to change sides. The result of that was that another German Army went in the sack, Romania changed sides, and the Soviets advanced right across Romania in record time.

随后，苏军转而向利沃夫（现名为卢茨克）发起进攻。此前，德军为了缓解巴格拉季昂行动在北部战线造成的灾难性后果，已从该区域抽调了大量后备兵力。苏军再次故技重施，先是隐蔽作战意图，秘密集结兵力，随后在精心选定的目标区域发起猛烈攻势，打通了贯穿前线的交通要道，并以强大的兵力和迅捷的推进速度，成功合围德军。这又是一场苏军缔造的辉煌胜利。同年夏末，苏军的攻势达到顶峰，他们与心怀不满的罗马尼亚人达成协议，策动罗马尼亚倒戈后，顺势向罗马尼亚境内发起进攻。此战的最终结果是，德军又一支集团军全军覆没，罗马尼亚正式倒向同盟国阵营，苏军则以破纪录的速度横扫整个罗马尼亚。

Now at the smaller level of tactics, the Germans were still as good as or better than the Soviets. But the Soviets were the best in the world at planning and organizing the efforts of multiple divisions toward a wider purpose than taking this or that village or hill.

在小规模战术层面，德军的水平此时依旧与苏军不相上下，甚至更胜一筹。但在战役规划与指挥方面，苏军堪称当时的世界顶尖——他们能够统筹协调多个师的兵力，为夺取村庄、攻占高地这类战术目标之外的宏大战略目标协同作战。

Thierry Etienne Joseph Rotty
蒂埃里·艾蒂安·约瑟夫·罗蒂

Mostly yes.
The reason is simple though: language barrier.
The Russian Empire and later the Soviet unx were multi-ethnic and multi-cultural countries.

基本是这样的。
不过原因很简单：语言障碍。
无论是昔日的俄罗斯帝国，还是后来的苏联，都是一个多民族、多元文化的国家。

It isn’t until the 1960s that almost everyone in the Soviet unx knew Russian and used the Cyrillic alphabet.
The problem is obvious: if about half of the troops in your army don’t understand Russian and can’t read anything in Cyrillic, you need to stick to very simple tactics and there is nothing simpler than a brute assault.

直到20世纪60年代，苏联境内的民众才基本普及俄语，掌握西里尔字母的读写。
问题的症结显而易见：如果一支军队中有近半数士兵听不懂俄语、看不懂西里尔字母书写的指令，那么军队就只能采用最简单的战术，而再没有比蛮力冲锋更简单的战术了。

Jim Grup
吉姆·格鲁佩

Is it true that Russia usually won their wars through brute force and not smart tactics?

俄罗斯是否真的经常依靠蛮力而非精妙战术赢得战争？

Not all, but Russia is famous for some instances where they overwhelmed the enemy with numbers, particularly in WWII when it seemed all was lost and suddenly thousands of Russian tanks or guns or men appeared seemingly from nowhere. These became well-known because they were so dramatic.

并非完全如此，但俄罗斯确实有不少依靠兵力优势碾压敌人的经典战例，尤其是在二战期间。每当战局看似陷入绝境时，总会有数千辆俄军坦克、火炮或是数万名士兵如同从天而降般突然出现。这些场面因极具戏剧性而广为人知。

Russia is also famous for sending waves of unarmed men into battle merely to distract the enemy from the soldiers who actually had weapons. They were there to soak up bullets.

俄军还有一个广为人知的做法，就是派遣大批手无寸铁的士兵投入战场，他们的唯一作用就是吸引敌人的火力，掩护携带武器的己方士兵发起进攻。这些人无异于战场上的“人肉盾牌”。

Of course they would have preferred everyone to have a weapon, but they didn’t have enough. The Russian aristocracy regard peasants as having approximately the same value as typical farm animals, but less than a good horse. Thus, Russian commanders have little regard for the lives of the soldiers. They are expendable resources, of lower value than the rifles they carry. That’s one reason Soviet Losses in WWII were so high, and why Russian losses against Ukraine are so high. Russia has a large pool of peasants who are eager to join the battle for a few rubles, even if they have to bring their own gun and buy a uniform. Maybe they can bring home a Ukrainian washing machine or TV set. Most never get paid.

当然，俄军原本希望每名士兵都能配备武器，但他们根本没有足够的装备。在俄罗斯贵族眼中，农民的价值与普通家畜相差无几，甚至还比不上一匹良种马。正因如此，俄军指挥官向来漠视士兵的生命，将他们视为可以随意牺牲的消耗品，其价值甚至低于手中的步枪。这正是苏军在二战中伤亡惨重的原因之一，也是如今俄军在对乌作战中损失居高不下的根源。俄罗斯有大量贫苦农民，他们为了赚取微薄的卢布，即便需要自带武器、自费购买军装，也甘愿奔赴战场。或许他们还幻想着能从乌克兰带回一台洗衣机或电视机，但最终大多数人都没能拿到应得的报酬。

Paweł Borowik
帕维尔·博罗维克

The Russians often win against stronger opponents – for example, Napoleon or Hitler (approximately 90% of the Wehrmacht divisions fought on the Eastern Front. Americans, British, Free French, Poles, and Czechs fought 10% of the German Army).

俄罗斯人常常能够战胜实力更为强大的对手——比如拿破仑和希特勒领导的军队（二战期间，德军约90%的师都部署在东线战场，而与美军、英军、自由法国部队、波兰军队以及捷克军队交战的德军，仅占其总兵力的10%）。

By comparison, the Americans almost always fought against weaker opponents – for example, killing approximately 40 million Native american Indians in the US, conquering Iraq, or escaping from Afghanistan were significantly weaker opponents. Even Japan was weaker. The question is, how would the Americans have fared fighting not just a tribe, but someone, lets say, two or three times more powerful than them?

相比之下，美国人几乎总是与实力远逊于自己的对手作战——比如，屠杀了美国境内约4000万印第安原住民，入侵伊拉克，或是从阿富汗撤军，这些对手的实力都远不及美军。即便是二战中的日本，实力也比不上美国。由此引发的问题是：如果美国人面对的对手不再是一个部落，而是一个实力比他们强上两三倍的国家，他们又会有怎样的表现？

LIKE Napolen for Russia?

就像当年俄罗斯面对拿破仑那样？