如果美国没有参战，德国会赢得第一次世界大战吗？

John Cate
Freelance Public Relations Specialist, Bethel, NC

约翰·凯特
北卡罗来纳州贝塞尔市自由公关专员

I have thought about that many times, and my conclusion has changed over the years. My original view is that the Germans would have won the war had the U.S. not actively participated. But that was based on the very narrow view of what took place on the Western Front in the last six months of the war.
Without active U.S. participation, the likely outcome of the war is still an Allied victory, but one which is far more limited in scope than the one that actually occurred in November of 1918.

这个问题我思考过很多次，这些年来我的结论也发生了变化。我最初的观点是，如果美国没有积极参战，德国本可以赢得战争。但那只是基于对战争最后六个月西线战场情况的狭隘认知。
即便没有美国的积极参战，战争的大概率结果依然是协约国获胜，只是胜利的范围会比1918年11月实际发生的情况有限得多。

The reason for that is because the war effort of the Central Powers was collapsing on every front in the late summer and fall of 1918. Even if Germany had stood fast in France and never retreated an inch, it would have still lost the war because its allies were falling apart, and the Germans couldn't continue to prop them up and hold on in the west. Continued German success on the Western Front might have brought them to the gates of Paris in the winter of 1918-19, and probably would have if there had been no hundreds of thousands of fresh American troops reinforcing the war-weary French and British. But that same winter would have seen the Allies at the gates of Vienna, given the advance through the Balkans from the Salonca Front, and an Italian advance into Austria after Vittorio Veneto.

原因在于，1918年夏末秋初，同盟国的作战体系在各个战场都已濒临崩溃。即便德军在法国战场坚守不退、寸步不让，他们仍会输掉战争——因为其盟友已经分崩离析，德军无力继续支撑盟友，同时在西线维持防线。如果没有数十万美军生力军驰援疲惫不堪的英法联军，德军在西线的持续胜利或许能让他们在1918至1919年冬季兵临巴黎城下。但与此同时，协约国军队也会从萨洛尼卡战线攻入巴尔干半岛，推进至维也纳城下；意大利军队在维托里奥威尼托战役后也会攻入奥地利境内。

This leaves a situation by say, February 1919 where Turkey and Bulgaria have already been knocked out of the war, and the Habsburg Monarchy has collapsed. Maybe some of its German-speaking forces join the Germans, maybe not. It doesn't matter much. What does matter is that Bolshevik Russia would have carried out its own plans to re-enter the war to undo the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and "export the Revolution" to a Europe that's rapidly going up in flames. The Bela Kuns and Rosa Luxemburgs of Europe would have rose up as fifth columnists against both sides.

到1919年2月左右，土耳其和保加利亚早已退出战争，哈布斯堡王朝也已土崩瓦解。或许其麾下的德语部队会加入德军，或许不会，但这无关紧要。真正关键的是，布尔什维克俄国将会执行自己的计划：重新参战，废除《布列斯特和约》，并将革命“输出”到正陷入战火的欧洲。欧洲各地的贝拉·库恩和罗莎·卢森堡式人物会纷纷崛起，作为第五纵队同时对抗交战双方。

Germany would have been in an impossible situation, but the Allies wouldn't have been much better off. Under those circumstances, it would have made sense for the Allies to conclude a favorable, negotiated peace, because: 1) the French would want to forestall a last-ditch German onslaught on Paris; and 2) everyone understood that Bolshevik Russia was a threat to all of Europe, due to communist movements throughout the continent. Germany might have escaped with little more than the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, a few colonies, and reparations to Belgium, in return for helping rid Europe of the Bolsheviks. As it was, the Allies spent several years trying to contain the communists and remove them from power after WWI ended. That perhaps has a different ending in a postwar world with a far less embittered Germany joining the Allies in supporting the Whites, rather than assisting the Whites, rather than assisting the Soviets in any way they possibly could.

届时，德国将陷入绝境，但协约国的处境也好不到哪里去。在这种情况下，协约国通过谈判达成有利的和平协议是合理的选择，原因有二：其一，法国希望阻止德军孤注一掷进攻巴黎；其二，由于共产主义运动席卷欧洲，所有人都清楚布尔什维克俄国对整个欧洲构成威胁。德国或许只需付出割让阿尔萨斯-洛林、少数殖民地以及向比利时支付赔款的代价，就能换取协约国的和平协议，作为回报，德国将协助欧洲铲除布尔什维克势力。事实上，一战结束后，协约国花费了数年时间遏制共产主义势力，试图将其赶下台。而在这样一个战后世界里，结局或许会截然不同：心怀怨恨较少的德国会加入协约国阵营，支持白军，而非尽其所能地协助苏联。

David Frigault
Novelist at Self-Employment (2016–present)

大卫·弗里戈 自由小说家（2016年至今）

The war was likely lost for Germany by the spring of 1918, when Operation Michael came to a halt, and perhaps even before this.
Not only did the British and French Empires each have nations with far greater populations in more geographically strategic locations, they could also replace their losses far more easily.

到1918年春季“米夏埃尔行动”陷入停滞时，德国就已大概率输掉了这场战争，甚至可能更早便已注定败局。
英法两国不仅拥有人口规模更为庞大、地理位置更具战略意义的殖民地，还能更轻松地补充战争中的人员和物资损失。

At best, the Germans and her allies could have hoped for a stalemate, but even this plan would have faltered by no later than 1922 had the Entente, minus the Americans, decided to slug it out to the end
American involvement pressured the German Army to surrender in 1918 instead of three or four years down the road, but the outcome would have been the same, at least in the conventional sense.
At this point, Germany’s hopes would have lied on three factors:

德国及其盟友充其量只能寄希望于陷入僵局，但即便如此，如果没有美国参与的协约国决心战斗到底，这种僵局也最迟会在1922年被打破。
美国的参战迫使德军在1918年投降，而非推迟三四年，但从常规战争的角度来看，战争结局终究是相同的。
此时，德国的希望寄托在三个因素上：

The uneasy peace secured in the Eastern Front earlier that year, which allowed for Germany to secure some of the oil and wheat regions that could fuel up her war machine while feeding her population amidst the increasing naval blockade by the Allies
The coalition of allies, including Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire, who would likely have also continued to fight on longer without the United States military getting involved
The willingness of the British, French, and Italian Empires to continue on fighting

年初在东线勉强达成的和平协议，使德国得以控制部分石油和小麦产区，在协约国日益收紧的海上封锁中，为战争机器提供燃料，保障国内民众的粮食供应。
包括奥匈帝国、保加利亚和奥斯曼帝国在内的同盟国阵营，如果没有美国军事介入，这些国家或许能坚持更久。
英法意三国继续作战的意愿。

In a game of chess or a video game where the pieces and characters are lifeless souls with no consequence, real life does not work that way.
Real people lose their lives.
Friends and families mourn them.
Labour power can be diminished for years or decades, as does human reproduction.

国际象棋或电子游戏中的棋子和角色没有生命，也不会产生现实后果，但现实并非如此。
鲜活的生命会逝去。
亲友们会为他们悲痛。
劳动力和人口再生产能力可能会衰退数年乃至数十年。

The victors could have imposed as many harsh conditions comparable if not exceeding the historical terms at Versailles and it still would not change the fact that their economies would continue to stagnate for many generations to come.
And keep in mind that at this point the British and French were themselves becoming alarmed by the emergence of the Bolshevik Empire in Russia — so much so that they sent tens of thousands of their countrymen to fight in Siberia while millions of others continued dying on the Western Front and Mediterranean.

即便协约国能施加与《凡尔赛和约》同等甚至更为苛刻的条件，也无法改变一个事实：他们的经济将在未来几代人的时间里持续停滞不前。
要知道，此时英法两国已对俄国布尔什维克政权的崛起深感警惕——他们甚至派遣了数万名士兵前往西伯利亚作战，与此同时，仍有数百万人在西线和地中海战场丧生。

Would the British and French have considered it worthwhile to destroy their own fighting pool to see Germany reduced to an unconditional surrender when an even stronger and more threatening European power was poised to rise in the near future?
Japan was also beginning to show greater ambitions in her conquest of Asia, which the British and French also knew would eventually need to be confronted.

当一个更强大、更具威胁的欧洲强权即将崛起时，英法两国是否会认为，为了迫使德国无条件投降而耗尽自身的兵源是值得的？
日本在亚洲的征服野心也日益膨胀，英法两国清楚，他们最终必将直面这一威胁。

And then there is the United States itself, which was hardly on the best of terms with the British at the time, with military schemes that would eventually manifest into War plan Red an open secret, and many members of the American public still believing that their next Great War would not be fought against the Germans, but the British.

此外，美国与英国当时的关系也绝非友好。美国的军事计划最终演变成了“红色战争计划”，这已是公开的秘密；而且许多美国民众仍认为，他们下一场大战的对手不会是德国，而是英国。

Why would the British want to sacrifice a million or two million more of its countrymen to see Germany reduced to rubble, when they could accept a conditional treaty that satisfied limited obxtives — such as returning Alsace-Lorraine to France and Belgian neutrality — and calling it a day?

既然英国可以通过一份有条件的条约达成有限目标——比如将阿尔萨斯-洛林归还法国、确保比利时中立，就此停战，那它为何还要牺牲一两百万国民，将德国彻底摧毁？

Why would the French be willing to sacrifice millions of more men when they were themselves almost worn out, when they could keep these losses and secure Alsace-Lorraine, and be on a stronger footing later down the road?

法国自身已濒临崩溃，既然可以避免更多人员损失，同时确保收回阿尔萨斯-洛林，为未来发展奠定更坚实的基础，那它为何还要愿意牺牲数百万士兵？

Most mainstream military strategists and historians estimate that the Germans had enough to last for six months with the United States entering the war, with over two million having already arrived in Europe by late 1918, and over five million additional troops intended for arrival throughout all of 1919.

大多数主流军事战略家和历史学家估计，在美国参战的情况下，德国最多还能坚持六个月。截至1918年末，已有超过200万美军抵达欧洲，而1919年全年，美国计划增派的兵力超过500万。

Keep in mind that by this period Germany and her Central European allies were also dealing with the threat of communist revolutions, so while American involvement would have made Germany collapse by the early summer of 1919 without an armistice while in a civil war, the lack of internal hostilities would have still allowed Germany to fight until late 1919 or early 1920.

需要注意的是，此时德国及其中欧盟友还面临着共产主义革命的威胁。因此，如果美国参战且德国不签订停战协议，那么德国将在1919年初夏因内战而崩溃；但若没有内部冲突，德国仍能坚持到1919年末或1920年初。

Once again, the question comes down to whether it would have been worth these additional losses.
The British and French would have seen much pressure taken off, thanks to the United States Army expected to take the brunt of the fighting by 1919, so for them, the answer may have been ‘yes’ — but not necessarily.

问题再次回到核心：这些额外的损失是否值得？
到1919年，美军预计将承担主要作战任务，英法两国的压力会大大减轻，因此对他们而言，答案或许是“值得”——但也并非绝对。

For the fresh United States troops and public back home who were only now getting their first taste of war, continuing hostilities into 1919 may have been a worthwhile cause, but as the months went on, and the combat deaths grew from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands, the mood may have changed drastically as well.

对于初尝战争滋味的美军新兵和美国国内民众来说，将战争延续至1919年或许是值得的，但随着时间推移，当阵亡人数从数万攀升至数十万时，民众的态度可能会发生巨大转变。

Winning a war by wiping out one side is one battle.
Justifying these losses to your countrymen later is another.

通过彻底消灭一方来赢得战争，这只是军事层面的胜利。
而事后向本国国民解释这些牺牲的合理性，则是另一回事。

There was little that I could see them doing after Operation Michael that may have changed this, short of coming up with some brilliant weapons’ design breakthrough that never historically materialised, because the French and British by this period were replacing their losses far faster than the Germans were able to inflict.

在我看来，“米夏埃尔行动”之后，除非德国能取得历史性的、足以改变战局的武器设计突破（而这在历史上并未发生），否则他们几乎无力回天。因为此时英法两国补充损失的速度，远超德军造成损失的速度。

But as I have expressed, there is a difference between wanting to see a war fought out until the end versus accepting a treaty that grants some obxtives without further loss of life.

但正如我之前所说，坚持战斗到底与接受一份无需更多牺牲即可达成部分目标的条约，这两者之间存在本质区别。

Modern conflicts, including the Korean and Vietnam War could both have been won by the West had they been determined enough to do so, and these losses in order to achieve that goal would have been much smaller than what would have been required to continue fighting Germany into 1919, and yet the communists “won” because the Americans and her allies decided that the losses were not worth it.

在现代战争中，比如朝鲜战争和越南战争，如果西方阵营下定决心，本可以赢得胜利，而且为达成这一目标所需付出的代价，远低于将一战延续至1919年的损失。但最终共产主义势力“获胜”，原因就在于美国及其盟友认为，这样的牺牲并不值得。

In conclusion, we can determine that even without the revolutions and the United States, Germany and her allies would have almost certainly lost the war in pure mathematical and conventional form.

总而言之，我们可以得出结论：即便没有革命爆发和美国参战，单纯从兵力、物资等常规战争的数学逻辑来看，德国及其盟友也几乎注定会输掉战争。

Much like the Allied leadership, Germany had to also decide whether or not it would have been worth losing over a million military lives and possibly as many more civilians to let the war drag on another year in hopes of getting a more favourable treaty.

与协约国领导人一样，德国也必须做出抉择：为了争取一份更有利的条约，是否值得再让战争延续一年，牺牲超过一百万军人，以及可能同样数量的平民。

At the end of the day, they decided it was not.
And so the white flag was raised.

最终，他们认为这并不值得。
于是，白旗升起，战争结束。
 
Assistant
匿名

**Short answer: Almost certainly not.** Removing U.S. entry would have made the Allied victory harder and delayed it, but Germany faced structural limits that made ultimate victory unlikely by 1918–19.
**Key reasons:**

**简短回答：几乎可以肯定不能。** 即便美国没有参战，协约国的胜利会更艰难、时间会推迟，但德国面临的结构性困境使其在1918至1919年间几乎不可能取得最终胜利。
**核心原因：**

**Strategic situation by 1917–18**
- Germany’s Spring Offensives (March–July 1918) exhausted its reserves and failed to achieve strategic breakthrough. German tactics gained ground but at unsustainable casualty rates; operational surprise faded as logistics and manpower ran out.
- The German economy and manpower were strained by four years of blockade and attrition. Food shortages, declining industrial output, and worker strikes undermined sustained offensive operations.
- Allied forces (British Empire, France) still controlled key sea lanes, colonial resources, and held interior lines, allowing them to shift reserves and maintain supply.

**1917至1918年的战略局势**
- 1918年3月至7月的德军春季攻势耗尽了预备队，未能实现战略突破。德军战术虽取得了一定进展，但伤亡率高到难以为继；随着后勤补给和兵力枯竭，战术突袭的优势逐渐消失。
- 四年的海上封锁和消耗战让德国经济与人力不堪重负。食品短缺、工业产量下降和工人罢工，严重削弱了德军持续发动攻势的能力。
- 协约国（大英帝国、法国）仍控制着关键航道、殖民地资源，并拥有内线作战优势，能够灵活调动预备队、维持补给线畅通。

**Manpower and mobilization**
- The U.S. provided about 2 million fresh troops and enormous material support; their presence accelerated Allied counteroffensives. Without U.S. troops, the Allies would have had fewer immediate reserves, possibly delaying their 1918 offensives but not eliminating the eventual counterattack.
- Germany’s manpower pool was also depleted. Conscxtion and casualties, plus influenza and malnutrition, reduced combat effectiveness. Continuing multi-front pressure (Western Front, Austro-Hungarian front, Balkan and Italian fronts) would still have bled German forces.

**兵力与动员能力**
- 美国为协约国提供了约200万生力军和大量物资支援，直接加速了协约国的反攻进程。即便没有美军，协约国的即时预备队会减少，1918年的反攻可能推迟，但最终的反击仍不可避免。
- 德国的兵力储备同样已枯竭。征兵制、战争伤亡，再加上流感和营养不良，严重削弱了德军的战斗力。来自西线、奥匈战线、巴尔干战线和意大利战线的多线压力，仍会持续消耗德军兵力。

**Economic and logistical imbalance**
- The British naval blockade severely restricted German imports (coal, food, raw materials). Germany’s war economy could not be expanded indefinitely without imports; factory output and munitions production fell in 1918.
- Allied access to global resources and shipping allowed them to replace losses more readily even without U.S. material influx, though American supplies accelerated that process.

**经济与后勤失衡**
- 英国的海上封锁严格限制了德国的煤炭、食品和原材料进口。没有外部进口，德国的战时经济无法无限扩张，1918年其工厂产量和弹药生产均出现下滑。
- 即便没有美国的物资支援，协约国凭借对全球资源和航运的掌控，仍能更迅速地补充战争损失，而美国的物资只是加速了这一进程。

**Political and social collapse inside the Central Powers**
- By late 1918 Austro-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire were fracturing ethnically and politically. German allies were collapsing politically and militarily; Germany increasingly fought alone.
- Social unrest, strikes, and the Kiel mutiny in November 1918 indicate internal breakdown that likely would have worsened through 1918–19 even absent U.S. entry.

**同盟国内部的政治与社会崩溃**
- 到1918年末，奥匈帝国和奥斯曼帝国已出现民族和政治分裂。德国的盟友在政治和军事上相继崩溃，德国逐渐陷入孤军奋战的境地。
- 社会动荡、工人罢工以及1918年11月的基尔港水兵哗变，都表明德国内部已濒临崩溃。即便没有美国参战，这种内部瓦解在1918至1919年间也会愈演愈烈。

**Alternatives and hypothetical scenarios**
- If U.S. neutrality had allowed Germany to transfer divisions from the Eastern Front earlier (after 1917) and sustain a longer campaign, a negotiated stalemate or favorable armistice might have been more plausible than outright victory. Germany might have sought a “victory peace” exploiting Allied exhaustion—diplomatic gains rather than territorial conquest.
- A longer war could have produced a negotiated settlement preserving some German gains in Belgium or France, but occupying Britain or forcing a complete Allied collapse was unrealistic given naval supremacy and empire resources.

**其他可能性与假设场景**
- 如果美国保持中立，德国或许能在1917年后更早地从东线调遣部队，维持更久的作战，相比彻底胜利，更有可能达成谈判僵局或有利的停战协议。德国可能会利用协约国的疲惫，寻求一种“胜利式和平”——通过外交手段获取利益，而非领土征服。
- 战争的延长可能会促成一份谈判协议，让德国保留在比利时或法国的部分既得利益，但鉴于协约国的制海权和帝国资源优势，占领英国或迫使协约国彻底崩溃是不现实的。

**Conclusion**
Germany’s structural weaknesses—resource shortages, overextended fronts, collapsing allies, and internal unrest—made decisive victory in 1918–19 highly unlikely even if the United States had stayed out. The likelier outcomes without U.S. entry were a prolonged war, higher Allied casualties, and a negotiated settlement more favorable to Germany than the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, but not a German military conquest of the Allies.

**结论**
即便美国没有参战，德国的结构性弱点——资源短缺、战线过长、盟友崩溃和内部动荡——使其在1918至1919年间几乎不可能取得决定性胜利。没有美国参战的更可能结果是：战争延长、协约国伤亡增加，以及达成一份比1919年《凡尔赛和约》对德国更有利的谈判协议，但德国军事征服协约国的目标仍无法实现。

Joe Great
Studied History (Graduated 2008)

乔·格雷特
历史学专业（2008年毕业）

No but Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empire didn’t lose the war because the USA entered it. The USA came late in the war on April 6, 1917 while the war ended on Nov. 11, 1918.
The USA entering the war, sped up what was already a losing war for the Central Powers but not because the Central powers were weak. They were originally too strong to be beat but a great betrayal happened turning the war in favor of the Central powers and it wasn’t for a good reason then.

不，德国和奥匈帝国并非因为美国参战才输掉战争。美国参战时间很晚，1917年4月6日才加入战局，而战争在1918年11月11日就结束了。
美国参战只是加速了同盟国的战败进程，而同盟国的失败并非因为自身实力薄弱。他们原本强大到难以被击败，但一场重大的背叛改变了战争走向，让协约国占据了上风，而这场背叛毫无正当理由。

For the Central Powers to have forced a stalemate <- and therefor win the war. (It was the only way they were going to), because the Central powers were heavily outnumbered by other Empires due to a factor that had nothing to do with the USA.

对同盟国而言，迫使战争陷入僵局就等同于赢得战争（这是他们获胜的唯一途径）。因为同盟国的兵力远少于协约国，而这一劣势与美国毫无关系。

For Germany and the Central Powers to have won by stalemate, Italy would have had to have backed out of the Triple Entent secret treaty. After about a year of neutrality Italy betrayed the Alliance treaty with the Central Powers and entered into the Triple Entent treaty at the Treaty of London in 1915.

德国和同盟国要想通过僵局取胜，意大利本应退出协约国的秘密条约。在保持中立约一年后，意大利于1915年的《伦敦条约》中背叛了与同盟国的盟约，加入了协约国阵营。

This is what put the Central Powers at a disadvantage. Now having to fight a war on 3 fronts instead of just 2 fronts. They held their ground quite well and achieved a peace treaty with the Soviet unx and put the war back into a 2 front situation with Britian & France on the West and Italy in the South but having taken heavy casualties on both sides the best they could have hoped for was a stalemate.
Why would a stalement have been a win?

正是这一背叛让同盟国陷入劣势：他们不得不从两线作战变为三线作战。尽管同盟国顽强坚守阵地，还与苏俄签订了和平条约，将战争重新拉回两线作战的态势——西线对阵英法，南线对阵意大利，但双方都已伤亡惨重，同盟国此时最多只能寄希望于僵局。
为何僵局对同盟国而言等同于胜利？

Simply because the Triple Entents obxtive was to secure territory (not make peace or some noble notion of ending an evil). It was a highly immoral treaty that didn’t have as it’s purpose any noble mission. Territory gains were mentioned as a main pay off to Italy for entering the Triple Entent in the first place. Britain and France were exploiting Italy’s ambitions. Thus forcing a stalemate was all the Central powers had to do to foil that plan and thus a stalemate would have been a win.

原因很简单：协约国的目标是夺取领土（而非实现和平，或是终结邪恶等崇高理念）。这是一项极不道德的条约，毫无崇高使命可言。条约中明确将领土割让作为意大利加入协约国的主要报酬，英法两国正是利用了意大利的野心。因此，同盟国只需迫使战争陷入僵局，就能挫败协约国的计划，从这个意义上说，僵局就是胜利。

Britian and France couldn’t abide that and plotted to try to get the USA into the war as an associated power so that they would have more reinforcements.
Without the reinforcements from the USA… a stalemate was most likely because by 1917 both sides had taken such heavy casualties that that was the most probable outcome with out the help of the USA. Consider that 40 million people died in this war and 23 millioin of them were military personnel on all sides. This was a massive catastrophe for it’s time and in just a bit more than half the time of WW2 at just over 4 years of war.

英法两国无法接受这样的结果，于是策划将美国拉进战争，使其成为协约国的关联力量，以获取更多援军。
如果没有美国的增援……僵局的可能性极大。因为到1917年，双方都已伤亡惨重，没有美国的帮助，僵局是最可能的结局。要知道，一战总死亡人数达4000万，其中2300万是各国军事人员。在短短4年多的时间里（仅为二战时长的一半多一点），这场战争就造成了当时规模空前的灾难。

^ This one depicting British/Canadian soldiers at Yypres fighting while they are wounded and in need of medical atttention.

^ 这张照片描绘了伊普尔战场上的英/加士兵，他们虽已受伤、急需医疗救助，却仍在战斗。

^ After math of any battle in WW1.

^ 一战中任何一场战役结束后的惨状。

Forcing a stalemate might have also prevented the rise of Hitler. Which would have been a win for everybody, well in Europe anyway.

迫使战争陷入僵局或许还能阻止希特勒的崛起，这对所有人来说都是一件幸事，至少对欧洲而言是如此。

In WW2 this was a major reason Hitler did the same thing and made concessions of territorial gains to Italy in exchange for loyalty to the Axis pact.

二战中，希特勒正是出于这一考量，做出了类似的举动：他向意大利出让领土，以换取意大利对轴心国条约的忠诚。

Roger Atkins, Masters Professional Ed History & Politics, Deakin University (2008)

罗杰·阿特金斯，迪肯大学历史与政治专业教育硕士（2008年）

No.
The best they could have hoped for would have been honourable peace with UK - preferably having the Churchill cabinet to fall - and then concentrate on the USSR. But as long as UK and USSR were both in the war and on the same side, Germany’s defeat was assured once the attack on Moscow 1941 had failed

不能.
德国最好的结果，莫过于与英国达成体面的和平协议——最好能让丘吉尔内阁倒台——然后集中力量对抗苏联。但只要英国和苏联继续并肩作战，1941年德军进攻莫斯科失败的那一刻，就注定了德国的败局。

The war was won with British brains, US money and Soviet blood. The US money greatly shortened the war and provided a lot of tools for defeating Germany. But there was no way Germany could have defeated UK - the Battle of Atlantic was won by Summer 1941 - and in the war of attrition, Germany would have eventually run out of oil.
Most US troops didn’t enter the front lines until July 1918 when most of the fighting was done and the German Spring Offensive had been defeated.

二战的胜利，是英国智慧、美国财力与苏联鲜血的结晶。美国的资金极大地缩短了战争进程，为击败德国提供了大量装备。但德国绝无可能击败英国——大西洋海战早在1941年夏就已分出胜负；而在消耗战中，德国最终会因石油枯竭而失败。
即便美国没有参战，战争也会演变成一场漫长、惨烈的消耗战，最终让所有参战国都遭受重创。

Thierry Etienne Joseph Rotty
Former Central planning at NATO

蒂埃里·艾蒂安·约瑟夫·罗蒂
北约前中央规划人员

No.
The US played no significant military role at all.
Most US troops didn’t enter the front lines until July 1918 when most of the fighting was done and the German Spring Offensive had been defeated.

不能。
美国在一战中根本没有发挥重要的军事作用。
大多数美军直到1918年7月才投入前线，而此时大部分战斗已经结束，德军春季攻势也已被挫败。

Of the 2 million troops of the AEF, no more than 500,000 served on the front lines (440,000 according to French sources.
The American “victories” were actually Allied victories. Of the 65,000 Allied troops in the Battle of Belleau Wood, only 26,000 were US troops, the other were French and British. The US Marines lost 60% of their effectives simply because they were poorly trained, not because the fighting was exceptionally hard.

在200万美国远征军（AEF）中，投入前线作战的兵力不超过50万（根据法国资料为44万）。
所谓的美国“胜利”，实际上都是协约国的共同胜利。在贝洛伍德战役的6.5万协约国军队中，美军仅占2.6万，其余均为英法军队。美国海军陆战队损失了60%的兵力，这纯粹是因为训练不足，而非战斗异常惨烈。

US troops were always accompanied or backup up by French and Belgian troops because the Allies didn’t think the Americans could hack it.
Engagements by US Forces were minor skirmishes compared to what Europeans were used to.

美军作战时始终有法比军队伴随或支援，因为协约国认为美军无法独立胜任作战任务。
与欧洲战场的常规战役相比，美军参与的战斗不过是小型冲突。

It was the British Naval Blockade that finished off the Germans, not the US entry into the war.
A 1919 German government study shows that even without the Hundred Day Offensive and the German Revolution, the German economy would have completely collapsed in February or March of 1919.

真正让德国走向失败的是英国的海上封锁，而非美国参战。
1919年德国政府的一项研究表明，即便没有协约国的百日攻势和德国革命，德国经济也会在1919年2月或3月彻底崩溃。

It was irresponsible of the US government to send poorly trained troops into combat and to refuse French help in additional training.
It would have been better if the US had remained neutral. It wouldn't have effected the ultimate outcome of the war and a lot of young Americans wouldn’t have died needlessly.

美国政府将训练不足的士兵投入战场，还拒绝法国提供的额外训练帮助，这是极不负责任的行为。
美国如果保持中立会更好，这既不会改变战争的最终结局，也能避免许多美国青年无谓牺牲。

DRG God of Hellfire

狱火之神

No,In fact, had the US never entered World War I at all, it would have had little effect on the outcome. More French and British casualties, in place of the Americans.

不能。
事实上，就算美国从未加入一战，对战争结局也几乎没有影响，无非是英法伤亡增加，替代美国的伤亡数字而已。

The US didn’t enter the war until April 6th, 1917. This was due to Germany resuming unrestricted submarine warfare, and sinking a number of US merchant ships bound for Europe. Prior to that Germany officially did not target neutral shipping. At the same time, German high command recognized that they risked bringing the US into the war; Americans love their boats, and the fastest way to get us into a war against you is to sink one. See War of 1812 and World War 2. So they attempted to get neutral Mexico on their side by offering US land that was lost in the Mexican-American War some decades prior. The Zimmermann Telegram was intercepted and the British handed it over to the US, but it killed any hope of diplomatic solution, inflaming war sentiment and sending American Doughboys to the front.

美国直到1917年4月6日才参战，原因是德国恢复无限制潜艇战，击沉了多艘前往欧洲的美国商船。在此之前，德国官方并未攻击中立国船只。同时，德军最高统帅部也意识到，此举可能会将美国卷入战争——美国人热爱自己的船只，击沉美国船只无疑是最快让美国与你为敌的方式，1812年战争和二战都证明了这一点。因此，德国试图拉拢中立的墨西哥，承诺将几十年前美墨战争中墨西哥丧失的美国领土归还。这份“齐默曼电报”被截获，英国将其转交给美国，彻底断绝了外交解决的可能，美国国内的战争情绪被点燃，美国大兵被派往了前线。

Except…
The US traditionally didn’t maintain a large army. In 1914 the US army was under 100,000, with another 27,000 in the National Guard. The vast majority of the AEF was drafted or volunteeered in 1917 and 1918.
A second problem was shipping; like the Army, the US Navy was relatively small for the US status as a “Great Power” of the time. It was, as always, divided as well between Atlantic and Pacific. So they were reliant on Britain and France for transport.

然而……
美国历来不维持大规模军队。1914年，美国陆军人数不足10万，国民警卫队仅2.7万人。美国远征军的绝大多数士兵都是1917年和1918年应征入伍或志愿参军的。
第二个问题是运输能力。与陆军一样，以美国当时的“大国”地位而言，海军规模相对较小，且一如既往地分驻大西洋和太平洋战区。因此，美军不得不依赖英法两国提供运输支持。

The same was said for equipment. While they had their own rifles, the M1903 and M1917, the US used French artillery and both British and French tanks, and in many cases French-produced versions as the US licensed copies weren’t able to be shipped before the war was over. No US M1917 light tanks (a copy of the Renault 1917, or FT17) made it over, nor did the US made Mark VIII.

装备方面也是如此。虽然美军有自己的M1903和M1917步枪，但火炮使用的是法国型号，坦克则采用英法两国的装备，很多情况下直接使用法国生产的版本——因为美国授权生产的仿制型号在战争结束前根本来不及运抵欧洲战场。没有一辆美国M1917轻型坦克（仿制雷诺1917型，即FT17坦克）运抵欧洲，美国生产的马克VIII型坦克也未能投入实战。

In the end, while 2 million US troops landed in Europe and they suffered over 300,000 casualties, the bulk arrived in late 1917 and 1918. World War 1 ended in November of 1918,so the actual combat was limited to a little over a year at most, and most didn’t even see combat. Half the casualties were due to disease and illness, not actual combat. Had the US never entered the war, not much would change. Germany was bottled in by the Royal Navy and starving, they lacked oil and the economy for another major push. Austro-Hungary and the Ottoman Empires were collapsing just as Russia had. It may have worn on another six months to a year, but World War I would have ended much the same without American involvement.

最终，尽管有200万美军登陆欧洲，伤亡超过30万，但大部分美军是在1917年末和1918年抵达的。一战1918年11月就结束了，因此美军实际参战时间最多只有一年多一点，而且大多数士兵根本没有参与实战。美军一半的伤亡是由疾病造成的，并非来自实战。就算美国从未参战，战争结局也不会有太大改变。德国已被英国皇家海军封锁，国内陷入饥荒，既缺乏石油，也没有支撑下一次大规模攻势的经济实力。奥匈帝国和奥斯曼帝国正像之前的俄国一样分崩离析。战争或许会再延续半年到一年，但即便没有美国参战，一战的结局也会基本相同。

Stephen Sutton Former Technical Writer

斯蒂芬·萨顿 前技术文档撰稿人

In a hypothetical situation where both nations agreed to meet on a neutral land, like say a France that doesn't assist either, then I would say Germany would surely have triumphed quickly.
Germany was on a war footing and because of the Kaiser and the Prussian style military had been so for decades, whereas the USA pre-Cold War was continuously shutting down its armed forces for budget and ideological reasons. For some reason they thought a massive army was detrimental to democracy. Crazy, right?

在一个假设场景中，如果两国在中立领土交战——比如在一个不偏袒任何一方的法国境内，那么我认为德国肯定会迅速取胜。
德国当时处于战争动员状态，在德皇统治和普鲁士军事传统影响下，这种状态已持续数十年。而冷战前的美国，却因预算和意识形态原因不断裁减武装力量。出于某种原因，他们认为大规模军队对民主有害。这听起来很荒谬，不是吗？

Pre-world war 1 Germany had already stumbled upon the future of warfare, with heavy emphasis on howitzers and machineguns, rather than French style field guns and charges. Even the early German doctrine emphased firepower over manpower - which would later become a staple of American doctrine.
Now, on the other hand, if somehow in this contest the US could hold Germany at bay for about a year or two, then the vastly superior resources and manufacturing power of the USA could be brought to bear. It took Black Jack Pershing a lot of time to build a true American Army in Europe, and even then he benefitted from the limited American experience helping. But when he had, it was a formidable opponent.

一战前的德国已经探索出了未来战争的模式，高度重视榴弹炮和机枪的运用，而非法国式的野战炮和密集冲锋。甚至早期的德军战术就强调火力优先于人力——这后来也成为了美国军事学说的核心原则。
但从另一个角度看，如果美国能在这场较量中牵制德国一两年时间，那么其远超德国的资源储备和制造能力就能发挥作用。“黑杰克”潘兴将军曾花费大量时间在欧洲打造一支真正的美国陆军，即便如此，他也借鉴了美国此前有限的军事经验。而当这支军队成型后，便成为了一支令人生畏的力量。

So, really, this is a battle of time: German readiness verses unlimited American potential.
In this highly hypothetical scenario, I bet on the Germans for the quick win against Americans who had been less organized and more dependant on doctrine based on limited experiences like the Philippines insurrection, the Great plains war, or the Spanish American War.

因此，这本质上是一场时间的较量：德国的战时准备状态，对阵美国无限的潜力。
在这个高度假设的场景中，我押注德国会快速取胜。因为当时的美军组织性较差，其战术学说更多依赖于美菲战争、大平原战争和美西战争等有限的实战经验。

Hesiode Beotien
French immigrant of German origin since 2010

赫西奥德·贝奥蒂安
2010年起定居法国的德国裔移民

No question about it, they would have. And mainly that probability led to the German “imperial” almost religious way of thinking in WW2.

毫无疑问，德国本可以获胜。而这种可能性，正是二战中德国那种近乎宗教狂热的“帝国”思维的主要根源。

First, speaking about a German victory to be achieved without an American intervention in WW1, bear in mind that such superiority is exactly what the German population with its new industrial pride, guessed to be most likely as the war started. Even after the war got longer and uglier as foreseen, did the German believe in their chance to win - until 1917. But after they lost at last, many Germans developped a terrible and irrational sense of revenge because they felt the American intervention had been just too “unfair”. (Edit: the most famous ones certainly being Adolf Hitler himself or President Hindenburg)

首先，谈到美国不干预时德国可能获胜这一话题，要知道，战争爆发时，满怀工业自豪感的德国民众就坚信这种优势是他们获胜的最大可能。即便战争如预期般变得漫长而残酷，德国人也始终相信自己有胜算——这种信念一直持续到1917年。但最终战败后，许多德国人产生了强烈且非理性的复仇情绪，因为他们觉得美国的干预太过“不公”。（补充：其中最著名的人物无疑是阿道夫·希特勒本人和兴登堡总统）

Then, try perhaps to understand from an obxtive point of view, why many Germans kept believing that till it led to WW2.

或许我们可以试着从客观角度理解，为何许多德国人一直抱有这种信念，直至它最终引发了二战。

Quite a few people dismissing today the possibility of a German victory, seem a bit confused by what is meant by “Americans entering the first world war”. Surely however, the U.S. didn’t just “enter the war” in 1917. As a matter of fact, the US Government started giving financial support in a manner never seen before to its European friends fighting abroad, long before that. The newly founded Federal Reserve had been giving tens of billions to finance war loans by the United States Government, borrowing both for itself and its European associates at the same time as soon as in 1915. The USA supplied amunitions, food and money for these armies, in huge amounts - also especially of course after sending its own troops over the ocean.

如今，不少人否定德国获胜的可能性，他们似乎对“美国加入一战”的含义有些误解。事实上，美国并非只是在1917年才“参战”。早在那之前，美国政府就以前所未有的规模，向在海外作战的欧洲盟友提供财政支持。1915年，新成立的美联储就已向美国政府提供了数百亿美元的战争贷款资金，美国政府同时为自身和欧洲盟友借贷。美国还向这些国家的军队提供了大量弹药、食品和资金——当然，在派遣军队横渡大西洋之后，这种支援力度更是大幅增加。

Initially the USA had been staying officially neutral, and all support before 1917 was agreed to be called “only” commercial transactions with no political dimension however. WW1 was mainly considered to be a European war indeed. Loans had to be paid back thus. The Germans as you can guess, didn’t see that early intervention as being quite neutral. The Lusitania episode operated a shift in mentality for the US public, but its publicity was very much instrumental in the context, as English ships packed with civilians really did carry concealed American weapons for the Allies. Churchill was desperate for help. Still after ww1, this obligation of repayment of the allied loans, led Germans to believe “true” superiority in Europe had not really been settled yet.

起初，美国官方保持中立，1917年之前的所有支援都被称为“纯粹的”商业交易，不涉及政治因素。毕竟，一战当时被普遍视为一场欧洲内战，贷款自然需要偿还。但可想而知，德国人并不认为这种早期干预是真正的中立。卢西塔尼亚号事件改变了美国公众的心态，而这一事件的宣传也起到了关键作用——事实上，这艘满载平民的英国船只确实秘密为协约国运送了美国武器。丘吉尔当时极度渴望获得援助。一战结束后，协约国偿还贷款的义务，让德国人坚信欧洲的“真正”优势地位尚未尘埃落定。

Fact is the former Allies just couldn’t pay back the loans with their own means any more after they had won. Hence, the harsh Versailles Traities conditions imposed upon Germany (but not enforced) …and new US loans. The absence of political will to honor the old loans by Europeans added to the piling of new post-war reconstruction loans contracted even by the German looser, finally led to the Wall Street crash in 1929 however and a huge blow to American self-esteem. And Hitler arrived in power just as the German industrial power had been rebuilt with American savings. Of course, he chose to rebuild a German army, as strong as ever, instead of paying back loans to his American lenders in 1933. German Nazis were decided to take revenge against the USA as in the eyes of their supporters, American intervention in WW1 had been treacherous. As the US were in a crisis, Germany was more than ever ment to rule Europe.

事实是，协约国获胜后，已无力依靠自身力量偿还贷款。于是，他们向德国强加了严苛的《凡尔赛和约》条款（但并未完全执行）……同时又向美国申请了新的贷款。欧洲国家缺乏偿还旧债的政治意愿，再加上战败国德国也签订了大量战后重建新贷款，最终导致了1929年华尔街崩盘，这对美国的自尊是沉重打击。而希特勒正是在美国资本帮助德国重建工业实力之际上台的。1933年，他理所当然地选择重建一支空前强大的德国军队，而非偿还美国的贷款。德国纳粹决心向美国复仇，因为在其支持者眼中，美国对一战的干预是背信弃义的行为。在美国陷入危机之时，德国认为自己比以往任何时候都更有资格统治欧洲。

The Saturday Evening Post mentioned in 1932 “Without credit, the war could not have continued above four months; with benefit of credit it went more than four years. Victory followed the credit. “

1932年，《星期六晚邮报》曾指出：“如果没有信贷支持，这场战争打不过四个月；正是因为有了信贷，战争才持续了四年多。胜利紧随信贷而至。”

In fact the rise of Hitler’s popularity after WW1 rested alot upon the frustrated feeling of a “deserved” German victory. Not mentioning what the German thought themselves about American instrumental support, this now widely forgotten evidence is also backed by statements of numerous prominent American figures of the time, like this one :

事实上，一战后希特勒的崛起，很大程度上正是基于德国人对“理应获得”的胜利感到挫败的情绪。暂且不论德国人自身如何看待美国的关键性支援，如今已被广泛遗忘的历史证据，也得到了当时众多美国知名人士言论的佐证，例如：

“By their own admission, at the time we came into the situation, the Allies were at their wits’ end to know which way to turn in order to obtain needed supplies. When the United States opened her pocketbook all was changed. The outcome we know. Our help ended the war. We supplied in almost unlimited volume the munitions required to enable the Allies to go on fighting while we were enrolling and training men. When the armistice was signed we had all but two million men in France. Within six months we would have had twice that number there. To conserve shipping to get these men across, we bought great quantities of munitions in Europe. We paid higher prices for these goods than we would have needed to pay at home, even with the cost of ocean transportation added, but it was better to do this and save shipping for the men.” From “The Inter-Ally Debts,” by Harvey E. Fisk, published by the Bankers Trust Company of New York, 1924.

“协约国自己也承认，当我们介入时，他们已陷入绝境，不知该如何获取必需的物资。而当美国打开钱袋，一切都改变了。结局众所周知，是我们的帮助终结了战争。在我们征召和训练士兵的同时，为协约国提供了近乎无限量的弹药，使他们能够继续作战。停战协议签署时，我们在法国的兵力已近200万，不出六个月，这个数字就能翻倍。为了节省运输船只运送士兵，我们在欧洲采购了大量弹药，即便算上海洋运输成本，这些物资的价格也比在国内采购更高，但这样做更划算，因为我们可以将船只留给士兵使用。”——摘自哈维·E·菲斯克所著的《协约国债务》，纽约银行家信托公司1924年出版。