二战中，有哪些本应派上用场的战术或策略，却因最愚蠢的理由而未被采用？

Eugene Chia
My vote would be the IJN’s haphazard and ineffective convoy escort. First, a bit of background:

我认为日本海军散漫无效的护航行动堪称是最糟糕的。先讲些背景情况：

The Japanese military had significant numbers of officers who had studied abroad. That included the pictured officer: Isoroku Yamamoto, Marshal Admiral of the IJN. They had also observed World War 1, where the Kaiserlich Marine had tried to stop convoys crossing the Atlantic using unrestricted submarine warfare. It was thus a known factor how damaging submarine interdiction could be, and subsequently how important convoy escort was in countering it.

日本军队中有大量曾在海外留学的军官。其中包括照片中的这位：日本海军元帅山本五十六。他们还研究过第一次世界大战，当时德意志帝国海军试图通过无限制潜艇战来阻止运输船队横渡大西洋。因此他们完全清楚潜艇封锁能造成多大破坏，也明白护航对反制潜艇战的重要性。

They knew the Allies had significant submarine forces in the Pacific, including many long-range fleet boats. They knew full well what those boats were intended for. As the war progressed, those submarines started inflicting very serious losses on Japanese shipping.

他们知道盟军在太平洋部署了强大的潜艇部队，包括许多远洋舰队潜艇。他们非常清楚这些潜艇的作战目标。随着战争推进，这些潜艇开始给日本航运造成极其严重的损失。

They further knew that their empire was totally dependent on shipping for everything from fuel to raw materials critical to sustaining their war machine. For that matter, their troops were wholly dependent on sea transport to get anywhere.
And… they basically didn’t even try to do anything to protect their shipping. In the words of a former IJA officer:

他们更清楚自己的帝国完全依赖航运来维持战争机器的运转——从燃料到各类原材料无不如此。甚至他们的部队前往任何战区都完全仰仗海上运输。
而...他们基本上甚至没有尝试采取任何措施来保护自己的航运。用一位前日本陆军军官的话来说：

Nobody was dealing with the problem of convoy escort. The Navy was in charge of sea defense, and the Navy’s thinking was that the best defensive was the offensive. All navy officers were studying, training, and being organized for offensive warfare. Just a few physically unfit officers were studying defense as such. There were many civilians, particularly those identified with shipping companies, and many Army officers who were very aware of the necessity of convoy escort. Japan had three classes of ships at sea—Army, merchant shipping, and naval. The Army and merchant ship elements were highly concerned with convoy escort, but the Navy, which was responsible for escort protection, was indifferent. The 12th section of the Naval Staff did not have even a plan for escort. The members of the section did not like their job because it was on the defensive side. Nor did other officers and enlisted men of the Navy as a whole have any concern for the task for the same reason. There had been no study of convoy escort and, consequently, no organization chart, book, or specialized equipment for the project.

无人处理护航问题。海军负责海上防御，而海军的理念是进攻即是最好的防守。所有海军军官都在学习、训练，并为进攻性作战组织起来。只有少数身体素质不佳的军官在研究防御本身。有许多平民，尤其是航运公司相关人员，以及许多陆军军官，都深知护航的必要性。日本在海上拥有三类船只——陆军舰船、商船和海军舰船。陆军和商船方面对护航问题高度关注，但负责护航保护的海军却漠不关心。海军参谋部第 12 科甚至没有制定护航计划。该部门的成员不喜欢他们的工作，因为它属于防御性任务。海军整体上的其他军官和士兵出于同样的原因，对此任务也毫不关心。关于护航他们从未有过研究，因此也没有相关的组织结构图、书籍或专门设备。

The Japanese did field some dedicated escort ships from war’s start, notably ‘submarine chasers’ (essentially, corvettes).

日本确实从战争初期就开始部署专门的护航舰艇，特别是"猎潜艇"（本质上是护卫舰）。

No. 13 class sub chaser pictured.
图为第 13 级猎潜艇。

However, the general effort was grossly insufficient by any measure, and the results showed. By late 1943 the Japanese were basically out of fuel, to say nothing of all the supplies and troops they’d lost to submarine attack. This paralyzed their entire war effort.

然而，无论从哪个角度看，整体护航力度都严重不足，结果显而易见。到 1943 年底，日本基本已耗尽燃油，更不用说潜艇袭击导致的所有物资和军队损失。这使其整个战争行动陷入瘫痪。

So, why did they not try harder? As the above article notes, the reason was largely cultural- the bushido mentality prioritized offense, and the IJN’s slackers were put on defensive tasks like convoy escort.
Obedience was not just expected but demanded, and it was practically unheard of for subordinates to raise concerns to their superiors- and those that did were often summarily dismissed. Thus, even though there were some officers who realized how potentially bad the situation was, they were largely ignored. The IJA and IJN also had very poor relations in general, and moving troops and supplies around was seen as an IJA thing… but the IJN was responsible for the escort.

那么，为何他们不更加努力呢？正如上文所述，原因主要在于文化——武士道精神崇尚进攻，而日本海军中表现不佳者被分配执行护航等防御任务。
服从不仅是期望，更是要求，下级向上级提出担忧几乎闻所未闻——即便有人这样做，也常常被草率驳回。因此，尽管一些军官认识到局势可能非常糟糕，但他们大多被忽视。日本陆军和海军之间的关系也非常恶劣，调动军队和物资被视为陆军的职责……但护航却由海军负责。

As noted in the article (which is a great read) it was not until early 1944 that this issue was given the attention it needed by the IJN high command. They basically had to be dragged in front of the Emperor himself, and the enormous losses of shipping were brought to his attention which caused them to lose face and have to do something about it. Unfortunately for everyone, by then it was way too late to do anything significant about the problem.

正如文章所述（这篇文章很值得一读），日本海军司令部直到 1944 年初才开始重视这个问题。他们基本上是被迫在天皇本人面前，被指出航运损失惨重，这让他们丢尽了脸，不得不采取行动。不幸的是，对所有人来说，那时再想对此问题做出实质性改变已为时太晚。

Even then, a lot of folks simply refused to change their attitude. As the author writes:
When I had completed an address at the Military Academy, I was astounded by one senior officer’s instruction. It was to the effect that at the close of each of my talks, I should say: “Even though many ships are being sunk, Japan will never lose the war because the Japanese people have a strong fighting spirit.”

即便如此，许多人仍固执地不肯改变态度。作者写道：
在军事学院完成演讲后，一位高级军官的指示令我震惊。其大意是，每次演讲结束时，都应该说：“尽管许多船只被击沉，但日本绝不会输掉战争，因为日本人民拥有强大的战斗精神。”

Well, the guy was wrong. Japan lost the war shortly afterward. The primary reason was they simply couldn’t supply anything. And the main reason for that was… they just didn’t feel like it.

嗯，那个家伙错了。日本在此后不久就输掉了战争。主要原因是他们根本无法提供任何物资。而导致这一情况的主要原因是…… 他们就是不愿意这么做。

Charles Li
Military and history scholar for 40+ yearsNov 15
This isn't limited to just military failures or only WW2, but oftentimes, inept commanders refuse to implement new tactics, use innovation, or change an order in the field, is because they always want to take a “CYA” attitude to protect themselves instead of caring for the troops or military obxtive.

这不仅限于军事失误或仅针对二战，很多时候，无能的指挥官拒绝实施新战术、采纳创新或调整现场指令，原因在于他们总想采取“自保”的态度，优先保护自身利益，而非关心部队安危或军事目标的达成。

Commanders will often follow orders to the letter, even when they have been shown that a change was necessary because of changing conditions in the field.
This attitude is done so officers can always fall back on “I followed orders”, when a battle was lost due to ineptness.

指挥官们常常会一丝不苟地执行命令，即便战场局势的变化已清楚表明调整战术确有必要。
这种态度使得军官在因指挥不力而战败时，总能以"我执行了命令"作为托词。

An easy example is in rigid command structures, like the Russian military, where the loss of hundreds or thousands of troops does not matter, as long as loyalty and following orders is expected. So officers will follow orders and repeatedly send troops straight forward against known defenses rather than make adjustments according to the local environment. Even today, one can see Russian Federation officers repeatedly feeding soldiers into attacks along the same road that has been mined, bracketed by artillery, and fully covered by FPV kamikaze drones in their invasion of Ukraine. If you watch some of the hundreds of vids available, you will see Russian armored vehicles attacking along the same roadway or crossroads, already littered with dozens of destroyed vehicles. -But when dealing with the failure to reach an obxtive, Russian field commanders can respond with a “I carried out my orders.”

典型的例子可见于俄罗斯军队这类僵化的指挥体系——只要表现出忠诚并执行命令，损失成百上千的士兵都无足轻重。因此军官们会机械地执行命令，反复驱使部队正面冲击已知防线，却不愿根据战场环境灵活调整。时至今日，在入侵乌克兰的行动中，人们仍能看到俄联邦军官驱使士兵反复冲击同一条道路：那里早已布满地雷，被炮火覆盖，并处于 FPV 自杀式无人机的严密监控之下。观看大量战场影像即可发现，俄军装甲车总是在堆满数十辆残骸的相同道路或十字路口发动进攻。然而当进攻目标未能达成时，前线指挥官只需回应"我已执行命令"便能搪塞过去。

This isn't just the Russians of course, as plenty of newly-minted American lieutenants and captains regularly ordered troops into frontal assaults, death and certain failure. There just aren't many public records available.

当然，这不仅限于俄国人，许多初出茅庐的美国中尉和上尉也常常命令部队发起正面进攻，导致死亡与必然的失败。只是相关公开记录寥寥无几。

Jeff Rosenbury
There’s no reason dumber than no one thought to do it.
Helicopters were developed before WWII and used by most powers. Yet neither airmobile infantry nor attack roles were used in the war, though both could have been devastating.

没有比没人想到要这么做更愚蠢的理由了。

直升机在二战前便已研发出来，并为多数强国所使用。然而，在战争中既未采用空降步兵战术，也未执行攻击任务，尽管这两种方式都可能带来毁灭性效果。

The US resisted the use of helicopters because the Army Air Corps was busy separating from the Army. Bombers were favored over ground-attack roles, and the Bomber lovers forbade the army from using them in combat. They reluctantly allowed their use in medical evacuation in rough terrain. (Alaska and Burma.)

美国当初抗拒使用直升机，主要是因为陆军航空队正忙于与陆军分离。当时轰炸机比地面攻击任务更受青睐，而推崇轰炸机的人士禁止陆军将其投入战斗。他们仅勉强同意在复杂地形中用于医疗后送（如在阿拉斯加和缅甸）。

We lost 2,500 paratroopers on D-Day before they reached the ground. Nearly all of them could have been saved through air-mobile helicopter operations. The units would have landed intact and in contact with higher command.

我们在诺曼底登陆日损失了 2500 名伞兵，这些士兵甚至还未落地。若采用直升机空中机动行动，他们几乎全都能获救。部队本可以完整着陆，并与上级指挥保持联系。