1939 年和 1945 年，日本陆军在与红军的对抗中表现为何如此糟糕？
Why did the Japanese Army give such a poor account of itself against the Red Army in 1939 and 1945?
译文简介
日本帝国陆军在整个战争期间的战术往往缺乏想象力，他们极具侵略性，但更倾向于发动大规模正面进攻。
正文翻译
Eugene Chia Military history/equipment buff
尤金·谢 军事历史/装备爱好者
The Imperial Japanese Army throughout the war tended to have pretty unimaginative tactics. They were highly aggressive but preferred to just mount massive frontal assaults. This worked well against poorly armed and trained Chinese conscxts, but did not work too well against disciplined and equipped forces (including the Chinese later in the war). The Soviets too were rather straightforward in terms of tactics, but they had one key advantage: they could much more easily replace losses. As with their later battles with the Germans on the Eastern Front, they simply outlasted their enemy and wore them down. By 1945, the Japanese military was on the verge of collapse, so it was easy to beat them. On another note, the commander at the pivotal battle was Georgy Zhukov, who was later Marshal of the Soviet unx and largely responsible for defeating the Nazi offensive on the Eastern Front.
日本帝国陆军在整个战争期间的战术往往缺乏想象力，他们极具侵略性，但更倾向于发动大规模正面进攻。这种战术在对抗装备简陋、训练不足的中国士兵时效果显著，但面对纪律严明、装备精良的部队（包括战争后期的中国军队）时则收效甚微。苏联军队的战术也相当直接，但他们有一个关键优势：能够更轻松地补充损失。就像后来在东线与德军的战役一样，他们仅凭持久战拖垮了敌人。到1945年，日本军队已濒临崩溃，因此击败他们并非难事。此外，这场关键战役的指挥官是格奥尔基·朱可夫，他后来成为苏联元帅，在击败东线纳粹攻势中发挥了主要作用。
Doug Hensley I help playtest turn-based strategic wargames.
道格·亨斯利 回合制战略战争游戏测试员
A big part of it was that their weaponry was grossly inferior. Japanese tank armor was not even sufficient to withstand Soviet anti-tank rifles. Those were weapons that had fallen by the wayside in 1941 because tank armor, even that of light tanks, had been brought to a standard that shed anti-tank rounds like they were shotgun pellets. But in 1945, when the Soviets invaded the Kurile islands, they had some anxious moments when infantry, without antitank artillery or tanks, faced a Japanese counterattack led by tanks. Until the old antitank rifles they’d brought along for use against pillboxes or machine-gun nests proved sufficient against the origami armor of the Japanese machines. In 1939, for that matter, Soviet armor had run the table against even resolute Japanese infantry and artillery. They simply had no answer to it when the fighting was on terrain that allowed tanks good going and good fields of fire. Mongolia, of course, offering both. In 1945, though, those weren’t the only cause of the Japanese collapse. The Soviet blitz offensive through Manchuria had to contend with defended towns. There, even infantry that lack tanks and anti-tank weapons can make a fight of it. But the Japanese of August 9, 1945 were demoralized. Their homeland lay in ruins. Okinawa had long since fallen. The best soldiers and equipment had been sent back for homeland defense. Rations were short. Hope was next to nonexistent. Small wonder not many were eager to fight it out. Their position, details of the village layout aside, was worse than that of Lee’s army at Appomattox.
其中一个重要原因是日军武器装备极为落后，其坦克装甲甚至无法抵御苏联的反坦克步枪——这种武器在1941年本已被淘汰，因为当时即便是轻型坦克的装甲，也已达到能像弹开霰弹丸一样抵御反坦克弹药的标准。但1945年苏联入侵千岛群岛时，步兵在没有反坦克炮和坦克支援的情况下遭遇日军坦克领衔的反击，一度陷入紧张，直到他们携带的、本用于攻击碉堡或机枪巢的老式反坦克步枪被证明足以击穿日军坦克如同折纸般脆弱的装甲。事实上，早在1939年，苏联装甲部队就曾横扫意志坚定的日军步兵和炮兵；在适合坦克机动和射击的地形上，日军完全无力招架，而蒙古恰好具备这两种条件。不过到了1945年，日军崩溃的原因并非仅此一端。苏联在满洲发起的闪电攻势需要攻克设防城镇，在这类地形中，即便缺乏坦克和反坦克武器的步兵也能进行抵抗，但1945年8月9日的日军早已士气低落：本土沦为废墟，冲绳早已失守，最精锐的士兵和装备被调回本土防御，口粮短缺，希望近乎渺茫。难怪没有多少人愿意拼死抵抗，抛开村庄布局等细节不谈，他们的处境比阿波马托克斯战役中的李将军部队还要糟糕。
John Carter Former Retired Teacher, US History, World History, at Los Angeles Unified School District (1990–2018)
约翰·卡特 前退休教师，曾在洛杉矶联合学区教授美国历史、世界历史（1990–2018年）
In 1939 Japanese armor was grossly inferior to the USSR’s. Even Soviet light tanks carried a high velocity 45mm gun, while IJA tanks had low velocity guns on lightly armored tanks. The Soviets also had a higher level of heavy weapons in their infantry units and they were under the command of Zhukov, who was showing what he would become later on. The IJA had no real armor doctrine, which was a serious problem in the open tank country around Khalkin - Gol / Nomanhan. In 1945, the Soviets had grown, had even better tanks and established doctrine in the operational art. The IJA had improved only marginally. Remember an M3 Stuart was still the equivalent of IJA “Medium” tanks. In, artillery and, indeed, every category the Soviets were heavier and better trained. And there were no jungles or small coral islands to force the enemy close for suicidal tactics. All they could do was die, without doing much harm.
1939年，日军装甲部队远逊于苏联：即便是苏联轻型坦克也配备了高速45毫米火炮，而日本帝国陆军的坦克则是轻型装甲搭配低速火炮。苏联步兵单位的重武器配置水平也更高，且部队由朱可夫指挥——他在此时已初露日后的名将锋芒。日本帝国陆军没有真正的装甲作战理论，这在诺门罕/哈勒欣河周边开阔的坦克作战地形中成为严重短板。到1945年，苏联实力持续壮大，拥有了更先进的坦克并确立了成熟的战役战术理论，而日本帝国陆军仅取得微小进步——要知道，M3斯图亚特轻型坦克仍能与日军的“中型”坦克相抗衡。在火炮等所有领域，苏联都拥有更强大的火力和更精良的训练，且当时没有丛林或小型珊瑚岛这样的地形，迫使日军无法采用近距离自杀式战术。他们所能做的，只是毫无建树地战死。
Chris Schultz Former Retired newspaper reporter
克里斯·舒尔茨 前退休报社记者
From what I’ve read, the Japanese never really planned to fight an armored conflict on open terrain, and Japan, being resource-poor, could not manufacture tanks and armored vehicles comparable to those of the Red Army or the Western Allies. Their military was better suited for the mountainous jungles of Southeast Asia and the islands there, and it also performed well against the poorly supplied and poorly led Chinese infantry. The Japanese army tested the Red Army in 1939 at Khalkhin Gol in Manchuria, where Soviet armor shredded Japanese infantry formations and proved decisively superior to Japanese armor. The defeat was so severe that Japan negotiated a neutrality agreement with the Soviet unx in 1941; when the Soviets canceled the treaty in July 1945, they unleashed a massive armored offensive against an unprepared Japan.
据我所读到的资料，日本从未真正计划在开阔地形上进行坦克战，而且日本资源匮乏，根本无法制造出与红军或西方盟军相当的坦克与装甲车辆。他们的军队更适应东南亚的山地丛林与岛屿环境，对装备不足、指挥薄弱的中国步兵也有明显优势。1939 年日军在满洲的诺门坎试探红军，结果苏军装甲撕碎了日军步兵队形，并在坦克质量上展现压倒性优势。此战败绩惨重，日本于 1941 年被迫与苏联签署中立条约；当苏联在 1945 年 7 月撕毁该条约后，便向毫无准备的日本发动了大规模装甲攻势。
Bruce Killingsworth Former Blissfully Retired
布鲁斯·基林斯沃思 前退休人士
In my opinion, the main reason was leadership: the Soviet forces were commanded by one of the most brilliant military minds in history, General Georgy Zhukov, while the Japanese Kwantung Army was commanded by the incompetent and unstable Tsuji Masanobu. Meanwhile, Stalin and Hitler outmaneuvered Japan’s inexperienced geopolitical diplomacy—Germany secured the Tripartite Pact in 1940 only after Hitler had obtained Stalin’s approval for the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, shifting German–Japanese strategy away from fighting Communism and toward distracting and neutralizing the United States in Europe.
在我看来，最主要的原因是领导力：苏军由历史上最杰出的军事头脑之一朱可夫将军指挥，而日本的关东军却由无能且精神失常的辻政信掌控。同时，斯大林与希特勒在地缘政治上完全压制了日本的稚嫩外交——德国在通过三国同盟条约之前，希特勒已得到斯大林对《莫洛托夫－里宾特洛甫条约》的认可，使德日战略从“反G”转向“牵制并阻止美国介入欧洲”。
Gordon Allen Former Air Force Association Member for 40 Years
戈登·艾伦 曾任空军协会成员四十年
The Japanese army was fundamentally unsuited for high-intensity, mobile warfare except in close-quarters combat such as jungles, rugged terrain, or urban environments. It lacked the weapons, equipment, mobility, and training needed to face high-end opponents, and its land-based air forces were unable to gain air superiority. Simply put, the Japanese army was not a “high-end” European or Western-level force. Against U.S. forces in the Pacific—even in favorable terrain—Japan often suffered casualty ratios of up to 10 to 1, and firepower advantages overwhelmingly favored the Americans.
日本陆军本质上并不适合高强度、机动作战，除非是在丛林、崎岖地形或城市等近距离环境中。它缺乏面对高水平对手所需的武器、装备、机动性和训练，陆基航空力量也无法获得制空权。简单来说，日本陆军根本算不上“高端”的欧美级军队。在太平洋战场上，即便在有利地形，日本对美作战的伤亡比经常达到 1 比 10，美国在火力上拥有压倒性优势。
Raymond Sanderson Former Published Author. Atlas D'four
雷蒙德·桑德森 前出版作者
On both occasions, the Japanese were disadvantaged in both troop numbers and equipment. In 1939, they invaded unfamiliar territory against the Mongolian army, which was effectively Russian, and suffered a decisive defeat. Afterward, Japan avoided a two-front war and focused on China. In 1945, Japan fielded roughly one million troops, half of whom were auxiliaries, against 1.5 million experienced Soviet soldiers and was again thoroughly defeated. This battle, combined with the atomic bombings, played a significant role in Japan seriously considering surrender.
在这两次战役中，日本在兵力和装备上都处于劣势。1939 年，他们入侵陌生的蒙古军占领区，而蒙古军实际上由苏联提供支援，日军遭遇惨败。此后，日本避免两线作战，将精力集中在中国。1945 年，日本大约出动一百万兵力，其中一半是辅助部队，对阵 150 万经验丰富的苏联士兵，再次被彻底击溃。这场战斗连同原子弹轰炸，使日本认真考虑投降。
Clayton Green 克莱顿·格林
In 1939, because the Imperial General Headquarters did not sanction or support the Kwantung Army’s actions at Nomonhan, by August a reinforced Japanese infantry division was outnumbered, outgunned, out-supported, and outmaneuvered. While the Imperial General Headquarters wished the situation would resolve itself, the Soviet Stavka saw an opportunity to end the conflict before the upcoming combined assault on Poland. In 1945, the offensive targeted a Kwantung Army stripped of its effective combat units, while the Imperial General Headquarters considered whether to accept the Potsdam terms and capitulate.
1939 年，由于帝国总参谋部未批准或支持关东军在诺门坎的行动，到 8 月，一支强化日军步兵师在兵力、火力、支援和机动上全面处于劣势。帝国总参谋部希望局势自行解决，而苏联总参谋部则抓住机会在即将对波兰发起联合进攻前结束冲突。1945 年的进攻目标是早已丧失有效作战能力的关东军，而帝国总参谋部当时正在考虑是否接受波茨坦条款并投降。
George Dillinger
BA in Philosophy & History (college minor), Vanderbilt University (Graduated 1974)
乔治·迪林格 范德堡大学哲学与历史学学士（1974年毕业，辅修）
No, the Chinese army did not achieve significant success against the Japanese in 1939 or 1945. The period was marked by major setbacks for the Nationalist army, although Chinese forces inflicted heavy casualties and tied down large numbers of Japanese troops. Notable victories occurred, such as the repulsion of the Japanese at Changsha in 1939, but overall, the Chinese army was outmatched and lost significant territory. By 1945, Japan’s defeat was driven by atomic bombings and Soviet intervention rather than a decisive Chinese battlefield victory. China’s vast and difficult terrain, combined with an initially small and regionally divided army of under one million in 1939, limited effectiveness. By 1945, China had approximately 5.8 million troops, but suffered 3–4 million military casualties, with civilian losses unrecorded. Japan lost an estimated 480,000 soldiers, highlighting the immense imbalance and China’s poor performance in the war.
不，中国军队在 1939 年或 1945 年对日作战中并未取得显著成功。这一时期，国民党军队经历重大挫败，尽管中国军队造成了大量日军伤亡并牵制了大批日军。他们确实有显著的胜利记录，如 1939 年长沙战役中击退日军，但总体上，中国军队实力不足，失去了大量领土。到 1945 年，日本的失败主要源自原子弹轰炸和苏联干预，而非中国在战场上的决定性胜利。中国幅员辽阔、地形复杂，再加上 1939 年不足百万、分散在各地区指挥的军队，使作战效果有限。到 1945 年，中国约有 580 万兵力，但军队伤亡约 300–400 万，平民死亡更多但无确切记录。日本损失约 48 万士兵，这显示出巨大的兵力失衡，也反映中国在战争中的糟糕表现。
Alan Moore Lived in Sunnyvale, CA (1995–2019)
艾伦·摩尔 1995–2019 居住于加州桑尼维尔
Mostly it was because of inexperience. Until that time, Japanese land operations had only been against poorly trained, poorly armed, unarmed, or poorly organized opponents. The Soviets, by contrast, had experience from the civil war, foreign interventions, and World War I. This extensive combat background gave them significant advantage over the inexperienced Japanese troops.
主要原因在于经验不足。在此之前，日本陆军在陆地上的作战仅针对训练不足、装备落后、无武装或组织混乱的对手。相比之下，苏联拥有内战、外国干预及第一次世界大战的作战经验，这种丰富的作战背景使他们在面对缺乏经验的日军时拥有显著优势。
Рutin Every Day Bank Cashier Engineer
每日普京 银行出纳工程师
The Japanese army was poorly equipped in 1945. Japan relied on sheer numbers, but the USSR transferred troops from the Western Front. The Kwantung Army lacked automatic weapons, anti-tank rifles, rocket artillery, and there was a shortage of heavy artillery, with most infantry divisions and brigades possessing only 75-mm cannons in their artillery regiments and battalions. Soviet soldiers were stronger and better equipped, enabling them to push back the Germans in the West. Consequently, the war with Japan was easier and lasted less than a month.
1945 年，日本陆军装备极差。日本依赖人海战术，但苏联从西线调动了部队。关东军缺乏自动武器、反坦克步枪、火箭炮，并且重炮严重短缺，大多数步兵师和旅炮兵团仅配备 75 毫米加农炮。苏军士兵更强壮、装备更先进，这使他们能够在西线击退德国人。因此，对日作战相对轻松，战斗持续不到一个月。
尤金·谢 军事历史/装备爱好者
The Imperial Japanese Army throughout the war tended to have pretty unimaginative tactics. They were highly aggressive but preferred to just mount massive frontal assaults. This worked well against poorly armed and trained Chinese conscxts, but did not work too well against disciplined and equipped forces (including the Chinese later in the war). The Soviets too were rather straightforward in terms of tactics, but they had one key advantage: they could much more easily replace losses. As with their later battles with the Germans on the Eastern Front, they simply outlasted their enemy and wore them down. By 1945, the Japanese military was on the verge of collapse, so it was easy to beat them. On another note, the commander at the pivotal battle was Georgy Zhukov, who was later Marshal of the Soviet unx and largely responsible for defeating the Nazi offensive on the Eastern Front.
日本帝国陆军在整个战争期间的战术往往缺乏想象力，他们极具侵略性，但更倾向于发动大规模正面进攻。这种战术在对抗装备简陋、训练不足的中国士兵时效果显著，但面对纪律严明、装备精良的部队（包括战争后期的中国军队）时则收效甚微。苏联军队的战术也相当直接，但他们有一个关键优势：能够更轻松地补充损失。就像后来在东线与德军的战役一样，他们仅凭持久战拖垮了敌人。到1945年，日本军队已濒临崩溃，因此击败他们并非难事。此外，这场关键战役的指挥官是格奥尔基·朱可夫，他后来成为苏联元帅，在击败东线纳粹攻势中发挥了主要作用。
Doug Hensley I help playtest turn-based strategic wargames.
道格·亨斯利 回合制战略战争游戏测试员
A big part of it was that their weaponry was grossly inferior. Japanese tank armor was not even sufficient to withstand Soviet anti-tank rifles. Those were weapons that had fallen by the wayside in 1941 because tank armor, even that of light tanks, had been brought to a standard that shed anti-tank rounds like they were shotgun pellets. But in 1945, when the Soviets invaded the Kurile islands, they had some anxious moments when infantry, without antitank artillery or tanks, faced a Japanese counterattack led by tanks. Until the old antitank rifles they’d brought along for use against pillboxes or machine-gun nests proved sufficient against the origami armor of the Japanese machines. In 1939, for that matter, Soviet armor had run the table against even resolute Japanese infantry and artillery. They simply had no answer to it when the fighting was on terrain that allowed tanks good going and good fields of fire. Mongolia, of course, offering both. In 1945, though, those weren’t the only cause of the Japanese collapse. The Soviet blitz offensive through Manchuria had to contend with defended towns. There, even infantry that lack tanks and anti-tank weapons can make a fight of it. But the Japanese of August 9, 1945 were demoralized. Their homeland lay in ruins. Okinawa had long since fallen. The best soldiers and equipment had been sent back for homeland defense. Rations were short. Hope was next to nonexistent. Small wonder not many were eager to fight it out. Their position, details of the village layout aside, was worse than that of Lee’s army at Appomattox.
其中一个重要原因是日军武器装备极为落后，其坦克装甲甚至无法抵御苏联的反坦克步枪——这种武器在1941年本已被淘汰，因为当时即便是轻型坦克的装甲，也已达到能像弹开霰弹丸一样抵御反坦克弹药的标准。但1945年苏联入侵千岛群岛时，步兵在没有反坦克炮和坦克支援的情况下遭遇日军坦克领衔的反击，一度陷入紧张，直到他们携带的、本用于攻击碉堡或机枪巢的老式反坦克步枪被证明足以击穿日军坦克如同折纸般脆弱的装甲。事实上，早在1939年，苏联装甲部队就曾横扫意志坚定的日军步兵和炮兵；在适合坦克机动和射击的地形上，日军完全无力招架，而蒙古恰好具备这两种条件。不过到了1945年，日军崩溃的原因并非仅此一端。苏联在满洲发起的闪电攻势需要攻克设防城镇，在这类地形中，即便缺乏坦克和反坦克武器的步兵也能进行抵抗，但1945年8月9日的日军早已士气低落：本土沦为废墟，冲绳早已失守，最精锐的士兵和装备被调回本土防御，口粮短缺，希望近乎渺茫。难怪没有多少人愿意拼死抵抗，抛开村庄布局等细节不谈，他们的处境比阿波马托克斯战役中的李将军部队还要糟糕。
John Carter Former Retired Teacher, US History, World History, at Los Angeles Unified School District (1990–2018)
约翰·卡特 前退休教师，曾在洛杉矶联合学区教授美国历史、世界历史（1990–2018年）
In 1939 Japanese armor was grossly inferior to the USSR’s. Even Soviet light tanks carried a high velocity 45mm gun, while IJA tanks had low velocity guns on lightly armored tanks. The Soviets also had a higher level of heavy weapons in their infantry units and they were under the command of Zhukov, who was showing what he would become later on. The IJA had no real armor doctrine, which was a serious problem in the open tank country around Khalkin - Gol / Nomanhan. In 1945, the Soviets had grown, had even better tanks and established doctrine in the operational art. The IJA had improved only marginally. Remember an M3 Stuart was still the equivalent of IJA “Medium” tanks. In, artillery and, indeed, every category the Soviets were heavier and better trained. And there were no jungles or small coral islands to force the enemy close for suicidal tactics. All they could do was die, without doing much harm.
1939年，日军装甲部队远逊于苏联：即便是苏联轻型坦克也配备了高速45毫米火炮，而日本帝国陆军的坦克则是轻型装甲搭配低速火炮。苏联步兵单位的重武器配置水平也更高，且部队由朱可夫指挥——他在此时已初露日后的名将锋芒。日本帝国陆军没有真正的装甲作战理论，这在诺门罕/哈勒欣河周边开阔的坦克作战地形中成为严重短板。到1945年，苏联实力持续壮大，拥有了更先进的坦克并确立了成熟的战役战术理论，而日本帝国陆军仅取得微小进步——要知道，M3斯图亚特轻型坦克仍能与日军的“中型”坦克相抗衡。在火炮等所有领域，苏联都拥有更强大的火力和更精良的训练，且当时没有丛林或小型珊瑚岛这样的地形，迫使日军无法采用近距离自杀式战术。他们所能做的，只是毫无建树地战死。
Chris Schultz Former Retired newspaper reporter
克里斯·舒尔茨 前退休报社记者
From what I’ve read, the Japanese never really planned to fight an armored conflict on open terrain, and Japan, being resource-poor, could not manufacture tanks and armored vehicles comparable to those of the Red Army or the Western Allies. Their military was better suited for the mountainous jungles of Southeast Asia and the islands there, and it also performed well against the poorly supplied and poorly led Chinese infantry. The Japanese army tested the Red Army in 1939 at Khalkhin Gol in Manchuria, where Soviet armor shredded Japanese infantry formations and proved decisively superior to Japanese armor. The defeat was so severe that Japan negotiated a neutrality agreement with the Soviet unx in 1941; when the Soviets canceled the treaty in July 1945, they unleashed a massive armored offensive against an unprepared Japan.
据我所读到的资料，日本从未真正计划在开阔地形上进行坦克战，而且日本资源匮乏，根本无法制造出与红军或西方盟军相当的坦克与装甲车辆。他们的军队更适应东南亚的山地丛林与岛屿环境，对装备不足、指挥薄弱的中国步兵也有明显优势。1939 年日军在满洲的诺门坎试探红军，结果苏军装甲撕碎了日军步兵队形，并在坦克质量上展现压倒性优势。此战败绩惨重，日本于 1941 年被迫与苏联签署中立条约；当苏联在 1945 年 7 月撕毁该条约后，便向毫无准备的日本发动了大规模装甲攻势。
Bruce Killingsworth Former Blissfully Retired
布鲁斯·基林斯沃思 前退休人士
In my opinion, the main reason was leadership: the Soviet forces were commanded by one of the most brilliant military minds in history, General Georgy Zhukov, while the Japanese Kwantung Army was commanded by the incompetent and unstable Tsuji Masanobu. Meanwhile, Stalin and Hitler outmaneuvered Japan’s inexperienced geopolitical diplomacy—Germany secured the Tripartite Pact in 1940 only after Hitler had obtained Stalin’s approval for the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, shifting German–Japanese strategy away from fighting Communism and toward distracting and neutralizing the United States in Europe.
在我看来，最主要的原因是领导力：苏军由历史上最杰出的军事头脑之一朱可夫将军指挥，而日本的关东军却由无能且精神失常的辻政信掌控。同时，斯大林与希特勒在地缘政治上完全压制了日本的稚嫩外交——德国在通过三国同盟条约之前，希特勒已得到斯大林对《莫洛托夫－里宾特洛甫条约》的认可，使德日战略从“反G”转向“牵制并阻止美国介入欧洲”。
Gordon Allen Former Air Force Association Member for 40 Years
戈登·艾伦 曾任空军协会成员四十年
The Japanese army was fundamentally unsuited for high-intensity, mobile warfare except in close-quarters combat such as jungles, rugged terrain, or urban environments. It lacked the weapons, equipment, mobility, and training needed to face high-end opponents, and its land-based air forces were unable to gain air superiority. Simply put, the Japanese army was not a “high-end” European or Western-level force. Against U.S. forces in the Pacific—even in favorable terrain—Japan often suffered casualty ratios of up to 10 to 1, and firepower advantages overwhelmingly favored the Americans.
日本陆军本质上并不适合高强度、机动作战，除非是在丛林、崎岖地形或城市等近距离环境中。它缺乏面对高水平对手所需的武器、装备、机动性和训练，陆基航空力量也无法获得制空权。简单来说，日本陆军根本算不上“高端”的欧美级军队。在太平洋战场上，即便在有利地形，日本对美作战的伤亡比经常达到 1 比 10，美国在火力上拥有压倒性优势。
Raymond Sanderson Former Published Author. Atlas D'four
雷蒙德·桑德森 前出版作者
On both occasions, the Japanese were disadvantaged in both troop numbers and equipment. In 1939, they invaded unfamiliar territory against the Mongolian army, which was effectively Russian, and suffered a decisive defeat. Afterward, Japan avoided a two-front war and focused on China. In 1945, Japan fielded roughly one million troops, half of whom were auxiliaries, against 1.5 million experienced Soviet soldiers and was again thoroughly defeated. This battle, combined with the atomic bombings, played a significant role in Japan seriously considering surrender.
在这两次战役中，日本在兵力和装备上都处于劣势。1939 年，他们入侵陌生的蒙古军占领区，而蒙古军实际上由苏联提供支援，日军遭遇惨败。此后，日本避免两线作战，将精力集中在中国。1945 年，日本大约出动一百万兵力，其中一半是辅助部队，对阵 150 万经验丰富的苏联士兵，再次被彻底击溃。这场战斗连同原子弹轰炸，使日本认真考虑投降。
Clayton Green 克莱顿·格林
In 1939, because the Imperial General Headquarters did not sanction or support the Kwantung Army’s actions at Nomonhan, by August a reinforced Japanese infantry division was outnumbered, outgunned, out-supported, and outmaneuvered. While the Imperial General Headquarters wished the situation would resolve itself, the Soviet Stavka saw an opportunity to end the conflict before the upcoming combined assault on Poland. In 1945, the offensive targeted a Kwantung Army stripped of its effective combat units, while the Imperial General Headquarters considered whether to accept the Potsdam terms and capitulate.
1939 年，由于帝国总参谋部未批准或支持关东军在诺门坎的行动，到 8 月，一支强化日军步兵师在兵力、火力、支援和机动上全面处于劣势。帝国总参谋部希望局势自行解决，而苏联总参谋部则抓住机会在即将对波兰发起联合进攻前结束冲突。1945 年的进攻目标是早已丧失有效作战能力的关东军，而帝国总参谋部当时正在考虑是否接受波茨坦条款并投降。
George Dillinger
BA in Philosophy & History (college minor), Vanderbilt University (Graduated 1974)
乔治·迪林格 范德堡大学哲学与历史学学士（1974年毕业，辅修）
No, the Chinese army did not achieve significant success against the Japanese in 1939 or 1945. The period was marked by major setbacks for the Nationalist army, although Chinese forces inflicted heavy casualties and tied down large numbers of Japanese troops. Notable victories occurred, such as the repulsion of the Japanese at Changsha in 1939, but overall, the Chinese army was outmatched and lost significant territory. By 1945, Japan’s defeat was driven by atomic bombings and Soviet intervention rather than a decisive Chinese battlefield victory. China’s vast and difficult terrain, combined with an initially small and regionally divided army of under one million in 1939, limited effectiveness. By 1945, China had approximately 5.8 million troops, but suffered 3–4 million military casualties, with civilian losses unrecorded. Japan lost an estimated 480,000 soldiers, highlighting the immense imbalance and China’s poor performance in the war.
不，中国军队在 1939 年或 1945 年对日作战中并未取得显著成功。这一时期，国民党军队经历重大挫败，尽管中国军队造成了大量日军伤亡并牵制了大批日军。他们确实有显著的胜利记录，如 1939 年长沙战役中击退日军，但总体上，中国军队实力不足，失去了大量领土。到 1945 年，日本的失败主要源自原子弹轰炸和苏联干预，而非中国在战场上的决定性胜利。中国幅员辽阔、地形复杂，再加上 1939 年不足百万、分散在各地区指挥的军队，使作战效果有限。到 1945 年，中国约有 580 万兵力，但军队伤亡约 300–400 万，平民死亡更多但无确切记录。日本损失约 48 万士兵，这显示出巨大的兵力失衡，也反映中国在战争中的糟糕表现。
Alan Moore Lived in Sunnyvale, CA (1995–2019)
艾伦·摩尔 1995–2019 居住于加州桑尼维尔
Mostly it was because of inexperience. Until that time, Japanese land operations had only been against poorly trained, poorly armed, unarmed, or poorly organized opponents. The Soviets, by contrast, had experience from the civil war, foreign interventions, and World War I. This extensive combat background gave them significant advantage over the inexperienced Japanese troops.
主要原因在于经验不足。在此之前，日本陆军在陆地上的作战仅针对训练不足、装备落后、无武装或组织混乱的对手。相比之下，苏联拥有内战、外国干预及第一次世界大战的作战经验，这种丰富的作战背景使他们在面对缺乏经验的日军时拥有显著优势。
Рutin Every Day Bank Cashier Engineer
每日普京 银行出纳工程师
The Japanese army was poorly equipped in 1945. Japan relied on sheer numbers, but the USSR transferred troops from the Western Front. The Kwantung Army lacked automatic weapons, anti-tank rifles, rocket artillery, and there was a shortage of heavy artillery, with most infantry divisions and brigades possessing only 75-mm cannons in their artillery regiments and battalions. Soviet soldiers were stronger and better equipped, enabling them to push back the Germans in the West. Consequently, the war with Japan was easier and lasted less than a month.
1945 年，日本陆军装备极差。日本依赖人海战术，但苏联从西线调动了部队。关东军缺乏自动武器、反坦克步枪、火箭炮，并且重炮严重短缺，大多数步兵师和旅炮兵团仅配备 75 毫米加农炮。苏军士兵更强壮、装备更先进，这使他们能够在西线击退德国人。因此，对日作战相对轻松，战斗持续不到一个月。
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