为什么阿拉伯人在近代战争中表现如此糟糕
Why are Arabs so poor at warfare in recent history
译文简介
总而言之，主要原因在于部落社会。阿拉伯社会宗族观念极强，人们首要效忠的是大家庭和部落，而非王室或民族国家。这一点也体现在他们的宗教中——伊斯兰教分裂为众多敌对教派，这些教派大体上与部落界限一致。阿拉伯军队面临的大多数问题都源于这一因素。
正文翻译
Jānis Šnepsts military history enthusiast
亚尼斯·斯内普茨 军事历史爱好者
There’s an entire study about it.
To sum it up, the main reason is tribal society. Arab society is very clannish - one’s primary allegiance is to one’s extended family and tribe rather than the Crown or the nation-state. This is also reflected in their religion - Islam is divided into numerous feuding sects which broadly align along tribal lines. From this factor derives most problems faced by Arab militaries.
关于这一问题已有完整研究。
总而言之，主要原因在于部落社会。阿拉伯社会宗族观念极强，人们首要效忠的是大家庭和部落，而非王室或民族国家。这一点也体现在他们的宗教中——伊斯兰教分裂为众多敌对教派，这些教派大体上与部落界限一致。阿拉伯军队面临的大多数问题都源于这一因素。
Because of tribalism, any prominent office, be it political, religious or military, comes with a degree of political influence and social obligations. Any Arab who has attained a position of power and authority has a sacrosanct obligation to use that influence for the benefit of his extended family and tribe, including appointing other members to subordinate positions, ideally at the expense of rival tribes. What is considered corruption and nepotism in the West is only natural and logical in Arab society.
由于部落主义，任何显赫职位——无论是政治、宗教还是军事领域——都伴随着一定的政治影响力和社会义务。任何获得权力和权威的阿拉伯人都有一项神圣不可侵犯的义务，即利用这种影响力为自己的大家庭和部落谋利，包括任命其他成员担任下属职位，且最好是以牺牲敌对部落的利益为代价。在西方被视为腐败和裙带关系的行为，在阿拉伯社会中却被认为是理所当然、合乎逻辑的。
For this reason, there exists an innate distrust between different branches of the government and military. Since few tribes are so powerful as to control all aspects of society, Arab nation-states are usually built on an explicit or implicit agreement of power-sharing between tribes and sects (see Lebanon, Iraq or Syria). That, however, does not do away with tribal rivalries that also translate to public services and the military. Commanders of different affiliations will refuse to share intel and information, and will often actively sabotage each other as they vie for more political power for themselves and their tribe.
因此，政府和军队的不同部门之间存在着固有的不信任。由于很少有部落强大到能够控制社会的各个方面，阿拉伯民族国家通常建立在部落和教派之间明确或隐含的权力分享协议之上（参见黎巴嫩、伊拉克或叙利亚）。然而，这并没有消除部落间的竞争，这种竞争也延伸到了公共服务和军队领域。不同派系的指挥官会拒绝分享情报和信息，并且在为自己和部落争夺更多政治权力时，往往会积极地相互破坏。
On a lower level this leads to a refusal to share skills. Any mid-level officer or NCO who has secured a “warm place” (usually owing to patronage) will be loath to share his expertise in order to avoid competition. Western advisors have observed this as hoarding of instructional material - rather than being dispensed among the troops, it is often kept concealed by those whose comfortable positions the proliferation of such knowledge could threaten. Senior officers will often sabotage and hold back younger officers with innovative ideas simply because they threaten their position.
在较低层级，这导致了技能共享的拒绝。任何获得“安稳职位”（通常是由于庇护）的中级军官或士官都不愿分享自己的专业知识，以避免竞争。西方顾问观察到这一现象表现为对教学材料的囤积——这些材料没有分发给士兵，反而常常被那些担心此类知识普及会威胁其舒适职位的人隐藏起来。高级军官往往会破坏和压制有创新想法的年轻军官，仅仅因为他们威胁到了自己的地位。
Distrust between services and members of society in general leads to paranoid secrecy and extreme top-down management. Information that would be posted on a Western unit’s group chat or barracks billboard (such as the birthdays of unit members) is routinely considered classified in Arab militaries. An Arab battalion commander has about as much leeway to act on his own accord as a Western sergeant, things resolved by in-unit SOPs in Western armies requiring approval of the Ministry of Defense in Arab states.
各军种之间以及社会成员之间的普遍不信任导致了偏执的保密行为和极端的自上而下的管理模式。在西方部队中会发布在群聊或军营布告栏上的信息（如部队成员的生日），在阿拉伯军队中通常被视为机密。阿拉伯营指挥官的自主行动权限大约相当于西方的中士，而西方军队中通过部队内部标准操作程序就能解决的事情，在阿拉伯国家则需要国防部的批准。
Because Arab society is also very hierarchic, social class difference affects military as well. There is little in the way of a professional NCO corps - only officers and enlisted men, and those enlisted who have managed to become officers tend to be loath to look back. Consequently, enlisted soldiers tend to be treated as expendable scum by their own officers. The author of the study on which I base this post mentioned a particular instance of American dignitaries visiting an Egyptian army base. When a sudden sandstorm broke out, the Egyptian officer accompanying the visitors ordered his soldiers to form a living windbreak and accompany the guests for the duration of their excursion. Such attitude obviously leads to morale issues, exacerbated by tribal and religious rivalries - imagine a Shiite officer of one tribe bossing around soldiers of a Sunnite tribe like this.
由于阿拉伯社会等级制度森严，社会阶层差异也影响着军队。专业的士官队伍几乎不存在——只有军官和士兵，而那些从士兵晋升为军官的人往往不愿回望过去的身份。因此，士兵往往被自己的军官视为可牺牲的渣滓。我撰写这篇文章所依据的研究的作者提到了一个具体事例：美国政要访问埃及军事基地时，突然爆发沙尘暴，陪同的埃及军官命令士兵组成人墙挡风，并在整个行程中护送客人。这种态度显然会导致士气问题，而部落和宗教竞争则加剧了这一问题——试想一下，一个部落的什叶派军官如此支使另一个部落的逊尼派士兵会是什么情景。
Arab militaries are also prone to overspecialization. Individually, their specialist skills are good, oftentimes excellent and even better than their Western counterparts. However, they tend to be very narrowly specialized and know little else outside it, because doing otherwise would infringe on the irreplacability of another soldier. For example, an Arab tank gunner will likely be an excellent gunner - but at the same time unable to take over as a commander or driver, where the standard Western practice is to train vehicle crews to be at least somewhat proficient in all roles.
阿拉伯军队还倾向于过度专业化。就个人而言，他们的专业技能不错，有时甚至非常出色，超过西方同行。然而，他们的专业领域往往非常狭窄，对之外的知识知之甚少，因为不这样会侵犯到其他士兵的不可替代性。例如，阿拉伯坦克炮手可能是一名优秀的炮手，但同时却无法胜任指挥官或驾驶员的角色，而西方的标准做法是训练车辆乘员至少在所有角色上都具备一定的熟练度。
All of the above factors lead Arabs to be reasonably competent in particular types of warfare, but hopelessly outclassed in combined arms warfare that requires inter-service cooperation and inter-branch competence.
Russian military culture shares most of these elements, therefore it is no surprise that Arabs and Soviets were able to develop a quite successful military advisory relationship during the Cold War.
上述所有因素导致阿拉伯人在特定类型的战争中表现尚可，但在需要军种间合作和跨部门能力的联合作战中则远远落后。
俄罗斯军事文化也具备大部分这些特征，因此冷战期间阿拉伯人和苏联人能够发展出相当成功的军事顾问关系也就不足为奇了。
Adam Gurowski Played a few games of Tropico Upvoted by Christian Desaix, PhD History, Louisiana State University
亚当·古罗夫斯基 玩过几款《海岛大亨》游戏 获路易斯安那州立大学历史学博士克里斯蒂安·德赛克斯点赞
Because their militaries aren’t designed to win wars.
This is a map of the middle east with bluer countries being more democratic and blacker countries being less democratic. The bluest country is also one with the one that has won the most wars in the past 80 years.
因为他们的军队并非为赢得战争而设计。
这是一张中东地图，颜色越蓝的国家越民主，颜色越黑的国家越不民主。颜色最蓝的国家也是过去80年中赢得战争最多的国家。
A big part of that run of victories is that they can trust their military. Mossad may be going out and blowing up Hezbollah operatives with exploding pagers but as unpopular as he might be, Netanyahu doesn’t have to worry about a pager in his hands going boom. The threats to his rule are from rival civilian politicians, not from ambitious generals.
这一系列胜利的很大一部分原因是他们能够信任自己的军队。摩萨德可能会用爆炸传呼机炸死真主党特工，但尽管内塔尼亚胡可能不受欢迎，他却不必担心自己手中的传呼机会爆炸。对他统治的威胁来自敌对的文职政客，而非野心勃勃的将军。
That’s not the case in much of the Arab world. Quite a few Arab leaders over the past 80 years have come to power via a military coup. To ensure some younger military leader doesn’t do the same to them, they have to do “coup proofing” where they weed out cabable but potentially disloyal generals.
They need to ensure their armed services don’t have a habit of working together. In Sudan, the two main factions in their ongoing civil war are two separate armed services that served under their former dictator that went to war with each other before democracy had a chance to take root.
但阿拉伯世界的大部分地区并非如此。过去80年中，不少阿拉伯领导人通过军事政变上台。为了确保某个年轻的军事领导人不会对自己采取同样的行动，他们必须进行“防政变”操作，清除有能力但可能不忠诚的将军。他们需要确保自己的武装部队没有协同作战的习惯。在苏丹，持续内战中的两个主要派系是曾效力于前独裁者的两支独立武装部队，它们在民主有机会扎根之前就相互开战。
In most Arab countries, coups are a distinct possibility so leaders must weaken their militaries to ensure their own reign can continue. In countries where the military can be trusted to stay out of civilian affairs and where the civilians can be trusted not to use the military to solve their own political issues, the military can be strong and capable of winning wars.
Hopefully, we in American will be able to continue with that proud tradition.
在大多数阿拉伯国家，政变是一种明显的可能性，因此领导人必须削弱军队以确保自己的统治能够继续。而在那些军队可以被信任不干预民事事务、文职人员可以被信任不利用军队解决自身政治问题的国家，军队才能强大且有能力赢得战争。
希望我们美国人能够继续保持这一光荣传统。
Susanna Viljanen Knows Finnish Upvoted by Mariusz Szlanta, Master of Arts History & Geopolitics, Jagiellonian University (2001)
苏珊娜·维尔亚宁 懂芬兰语 获雅盖隆大学历史与地缘政治学文学硕士马里乌什·斯兰塔（2001届）点赞
This has been analyzed and answered rather well, and the underlying root cause is the tribal nature of the Arab countries.
这一问题已得到相当充分的分析和解答，根本原因在于阿拉伯国家的部落性质。
Why Arabs Lose Wars
Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4 No. 1/March 2000 Why Arabs Lose Wars * By Norville de Atkine ** Abstract The author argues that the reasons for Arab armies perpetual ineffectiveness are rooted in Arab culture. Social factors that prohibit success include: secrecy and paranoia, pride, class structure, a lack of coordination on all levels, and little individual freedom or initiative. Arabic-speaking armies have been generally ineffective in the modern era. Egyptian regular forces did poorly against Yemeni irregulars in the 1960s. 1 Syrians could only impose their will in Lebanon during the mid-1970s by the use of overwhelming weaponry and numbers. 2 Iraqis showed ineptness against an Iranian military ripped apart by revolutionary turmoil in the 1980s and could not win a three-decades-long war against the Kurds.
《阿拉伯人为何战败》
《中东国际事务评论》第4卷第1期/2000年3月 《阿拉伯人为何战败》 作者：诺维尔·德·阿特金 摘要：作者认为，阿拉伯军队长期低效的原因根植于阿拉伯文化。阻碍其成功的社会因素包括：保密与偏执、傲慢、阶级结构、各级缺乏协调以及个人自由和主动性不足。在现代，阿拉伯语国家的军队总体上表现低效。20世纪60年代，埃及正规军在与也门非正规军的对抗中表现不佳。20世纪70年代中期，叙利亚人只能通过压倒性的武器装备和兵力在黎巴嫩强加自己的意志。20世纪80年代，伊拉克军队在与因革命动荡而四分五裂的伊朗军队对抗中表现无能，且未能赢得长达三十年的对库尔德人的战争。
3 The Arab military performance on both sides of the 1990 Kuwait war was mediocre. 3 And the Arabs have done poorly in nearly all the military confrontations with Israel. Why this unimpressive record? There are many factors--economic, ideological, technical--but perhaps the most important has to do with culture and certain societal attributes which inhibit Arabs from producing an effective military force. It is a truism of military life that an army fights as it trains, and so I draw on my many years of firsthand observation of Arabs in training to draw conclusions about the ways in which they go into combat. The following impressions derive from personal experience with Arab military establishments in the capacity of U.S. military attaché and security assistance officer, observer officer with the British-officer Trucial Oman Scouts (the security force in the emirates prior to the establishment of the United Arab Emirates), as well as some thirty years study of the Middle East.
1990年海湾战争中，双方阿拉伯军队的表现都很平庸。此外，阿拉伯人在几乎所有与以色列的军事对抗中都表现糟糕。为何会有这样不起眼的记录？原因有很多——经济、意识形态、技术等，但最重要的或许与文化及某些社会特质有关，这些因素阻碍了阿拉伯人组建一支高效的军事力量。军队训练方式决定作战表现，这是军事领域的一条真理，因此我基于多年来对阿拉伯人训练情况的第一手观察，得出了关于他们作战方式的结论。以下看法源于我作为美国武官和安全援助官员、英国军官指挥的特鲁西尔阿曼侦察队（阿拉伯联合酋长国成立前各酋长国的安全部队）观察员的个人经历，以及对中东地区约三十年的研究。
False Starts Including culture in strategic assessments has a poor legacy, for it has often been spun from an ugly brew of ignorance, wishful thinking, and mythology. Thus, the U.S. army in the 1930s uated the Japanese national character as lacking originality and drew the unwarranted conclusion that the country would be permanently disadvantaged in technology. 5 Hitler dismissed the United States as a mongrel society 6 and consequently underestimated the impact of America s entry into the war. As these examples suggest, when culture is considered in calculating the relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing forces, it tends to lead to wild distortions, especially when it is a matter of understanding why states unprepared for war enter into combat flushed with confidence. The temptation is to impute cultural attributes to the enemy state that negate its superior numbers or weaponry. Or the opposite: to view the potential enemy through the prism of one s own cultural norms. American strategists assumed that the pain threshold of the North Vietnamese approximated their own and that the air bombardment of the North would bring it to its knees.
误区：将文化纳入战略评估的做法有着不良先例，因为它往往源于无知、一厢情愿和神话的糟糕混合。例如，20世纪30年代，美国军队认为日本民族缺乏独创性，并得出了该国在技术上会永远处于劣势的无根据结论。希特勒将美国斥为“混血社会”，因此低估了美国参战的影响。正如这些例子所示，当在计算敌对双方的相对优势和劣势时考虑文化因素，往往会导致严重扭曲，尤其是在试图理解为何未做好战争准备的国家会满怀信心地投入战斗时。人们倾向于将否定敌方数量或武器优势的文化属性强加给敌方，或者相反，通过自身文化规范的视角看待潜在敌人。美国战略家曾假设北越人的痛苦阈值与自己相近，认为对北越的空中轰炸会使其屈服。
This tribalism - which has effectively prevented the Arabic world from unifying and creating a culture of trust instead of culture of honour - effectively also poisons any attempts to build a disciplined, well-performing and effective military.
Any loyalty lies always and only within one’s own tribe. The other tribes are seen as rivals at best and enemies at worst, and there is no national sense among the Arabs. This is also why the generals fear their own subordinates more than the enemy, and why military coups are a perpetual curse in the Arab countries.
这种部落主义实际上阻碍了阿拉伯世界的统一，使其未能形成信任文化而非荣誉文化，同时也破坏了任何组建纪律严明、表现出色且高效军队的尝试。
忠诚始终且只存在于自己的部落内部。其他部落往好里说是竞争对手，往坏里说就是敌人，阿拉伯人之间没有民族认同感。这也是将军们更害怕自己的下属而非敌人的原因，也是军事政变成为阿拉伯国家永久诅咒的原因。
This tribal society was crushed in the Dark Ages’ Europe by the Catholic church. By prohibiting marriages of closer relatives than second cousins, the underlying tribal structure went haywire, and instead was replaced by a national identity. When Catholicism then spred to formerly Pagan countries in the Early and High Middle Ages, the same happened - the tribalism disappeared and was substituted by national identity. The Duke of Somewhereshire could be in bad terms with Duke of Nowhereshire, but the Somewhereshireans considered to belong in the same nation as the Nowhereshireans, and the dukes’ disputes were no longer their issued, but rather let the King resolve it.
这种部落社会在欧洲黑暗时代被天主教会瓦解。天主教会禁止二等表亲以内的近亲结婚，导致原本的部落结构混乱，取而代之的是民族认同感。当中世纪早期和盛期天主教传播到以前的异教国家时，同样的事情发生了——部落主义消失，被民族认同感取代。某个郡的公爵可能与另一个郡的公爵关系不和，但这两个郡的人仍认为彼此同属一个国家，公爵之间的争端不再是他们的事，而是由国王来解决。
This never happened in the Arab countries. Conversely, the cousin marriages are a curse of the Arabic world - up to 58% of all marriages can be between first cousins. The idea of the cousin marriages is to keep the property in the family and strenghten relative ties - which in turn both is dexerious to the gene pool and prevents any sense of nationality from emerging. If the Sheikh of Somewherestan gets irate with Sheikh of Nowherestan, all Somewherestanis rise together against the Nowherestanis and result is a civil war. This issue - why the Christian countries never fell into civil wars when their kings died - was a source of amazement during the Crusades.
这一点在阿拉伯国家从未发生过。相反，表亲婚姻是阿拉伯世界的一个诅咒——高达58%的婚姻是近亲结婚。表亲婚姻的目的是将财产保留在家族内部并加强亲属关系，但这反过来既对基因库有害，又阻碍了民族认同感的形成。如果某个地区的酋长与另一个地区的酋长发生冲突，该地区的所有人都会一起对抗另一个地区的人，结果就是内战。在十字军东征期间，基督教国家在国王去世后从未陷入内战这一现象，令人感到惊讶。
This tribalism also prevents effectively any rise of a middle class or intelligentsia. All Arab countries are remarkably thin with the middle class and intelligentsia, and instead there are the filthy rich rulers, the dirt poor fellahs, and a middleman minority consisting of Jews or Christians. Since there is no middle class, this also prevents the rise of the NCOs and reserve officers. The Arab armies have brains (the officers) and muscles (the privates), but they have no backbone (NCOs and reserve officers).
这种部落主义还有效地阻碍了中产阶级或知识分子阶层的崛起。所有阿拉伯国家的中产阶级和知识分子都非常稀少，取而代之的是腰缠万贯的统治者、一贫如洗的农民，以及由犹太人或基督徒组成的少数中间人阶层。由于没有中产阶级，士官和预备役军官也无法崛起。阿拉伯军队有头脑（军官）和肌肉（士兵），但没有脊梁骨（士官和预备役军官）。
The lack of trust means also there is very little cooperation with the various arms. The air forcce will not cooperate with the army, the infantry will not cooperate with the tanks, and the artillery will shoot just anywhere if coordinates are given, be it friend or foe. When things go pear-shaped, it is always more important to find the one who is guilty and crucify him rather to analyze why things went wrong and what could be done.
缺乏信任也意味着各兵种之间几乎没有合作。空军不会与陆军合作，步兵不会与坦克部队合作，炮兵如果得到坐标就会随意射击，无论是友军还是敌军。当事情出错时，找到罪魁祸首并严惩他总是比分析出错原因和解决办法更重要。
亚尼斯·斯内普茨 军事历史爱好者
There’s an entire study about it.
To sum it up, the main reason is tribal society. Arab society is very clannish - one’s primary allegiance is to one’s extended family and tribe rather than the Crown or the nation-state. This is also reflected in their religion - Islam is divided into numerous feuding sects which broadly align along tribal lines. From this factor derives most problems faced by Arab militaries.
关于这一问题已有完整研究。
总而言之，主要原因在于部落社会。阿拉伯社会宗族观念极强，人们首要效忠的是大家庭和部落，而非王室或民族国家。这一点也体现在他们的宗教中——伊斯兰教分裂为众多敌对教派，这些教派大体上与部落界限一致。阿拉伯军队面临的大多数问题都源于这一因素。
Because of tribalism, any prominent office, be it political, religious or military, comes with a degree of political influence and social obligations. Any Arab who has attained a position of power and authority has a sacrosanct obligation to use that influence for the benefit of his extended family and tribe, including appointing other members to subordinate positions, ideally at the expense of rival tribes. What is considered corruption and nepotism in the West is only natural and logical in Arab society.
由于部落主义，任何显赫职位——无论是政治、宗教还是军事领域——都伴随着一定的政治影响力和社会义务。任何获得权力和权威的阿拉伯人都有一项神圣不可侵犯的义务，即利用这种影响力为自己的大家庭和部落谋利，包括任命其他成员担任下属职位，且最好是以牺牲敌对部落的利益为代价。在西方被视为腐败和裙带关系的行为，在阿拉伯社会中却被认为是理所当然、合乎逻辑的。
For this reason, there exists an innate distrust between different branches of the government and military. Since few tribes are so powerful as to control all aspects of society, Arab nation-states are usually built on an explicit or implicit agreement of power-sharing between tribes and sects (see Lebanon, Iraq or Syria). That, however, does not do away with tribal rivalries that also translate to public services and the military. Commanders of different affiliations will refuse to share intel and information, and will often actively sabotage each other as they vie for more political power for themselves and their tribe.
因此，政府和军队的不同部门之间存在着固有的不信任。由于很少有部落强大到能够控制社会的各个方面，阿拉伯民族国家通常建立在部落和教派之间明确或隐含的权力分享协议之上（参见黎巴嫩、伊拉克或叙利亚）。然而，这并没有消除部落间的竞争，这种竞争也延伸到了公共服务和军队领域。不同派系的指挥官会拒绝分享情报和信息，并且在为自己和部落争夺更多政治权力时，往往会积极地相互破坏。
On a lower level this leads to a refusal to share skills. Any mid-level officer or NCO who has secured a “warm place” (usually owing to patronage) will be loath to share his expertise in order to avoid competition. Western advisors have observed this as hoarding of instructional material - rather than being dispensed among the troops, it is often kept concealed by those whose comfortable positions the proliferation of such knowledge could threaten. Senior officers will often sabotage and hold back younger officers with innovative ideas simply because they threaten their position.
在较低层级，这导致了技能共享的拒绝。任何获得“安稳职位”（通常是由于庇护）的中级军官或士官都不愿分享自己的专业知识，以避免竞争。西方顾问观察到这一现象表现为对教学材料的囤积——这些材料没有分发给士兵，反而常常被那些担心此类知识普及会威胁其舒适职位的人隐藏起来。高级军官往往会破坏和压制有创新想法的年轻军官，仅仅因为他们威胁到了自己的地位。
Distrust between services and members of society in general leads to paranoid secrecy and extreme top-down management. Information that would be posted on a Western unit’s group chat or barracks billboard (such as the birthdays of unit members) is routinely considered classified in Arab militaries. An Arab battalion commander has about as much leeway to act on his own accord as a Western sergeant, things resolved by in-unit SOPs in Western armies requiring approval of the Ministry of Defense in Arab states.
各军种之间以及社会成员之间的普遍不信任导致了偏执的保密行为和极端的自上而下的管理模式。在西方部队中会发布在群聊或军营布告栏上的信息（如部队成员的生日），在阿拉伯军队中通常被视为机密。阿拉伯营指挥官的自主行动权限大约相当于西方的中士，而西方军队中通过部队内部标准操作程序就能解决的事情，在阿拉伯国家则需要国防部的批准。
Because Arab society is also very hierarchic, social class difference affects military as well. There is little in the way of a professional NCO corps - only officers and enlisted men, and those enlisted who have managed to become officers tend to be loath to look back. Consequently, enlisted soldiers tend to be treated as expendable scum by their own officers. The author of the study on which I base this post mentioned a particular instance of American dignitaries visiting an Egyptian army base. When a sudden sandstorm broke out, the Egyptian officer accompanying the visitors ordered his soldiers to form a living windbreak and accompany the guests for the duration of their excursion. Such attitude obviously leads to morale issues, exacerbated by tribal and religious rivalries - imagine a Shiite officer of one tribe bossing around soldiers of a Sunnite tribe like this.
由于阿拉伯社会等级制度森严，社会阶层差异也影响着军队。专业的士官队伍几乎不存在——只有军官和士兵，而那些从士兵晋升为军官的人往往不愿回望过去的身份。因此，士兵往往被自己的军官视为可牺牲的渣滓。我撰写这篇文章所依据的研究的作者提到了一个具体事例：美国政要访问埃及军事基地时，突然爆发沙尘暴，陪同的埃及军官命令士兵组成人墙挡风，并在整个行程中护送客人。这种态度显然会导致士气问题，而部落和宗教竞争则加剧了这一问题——试想一下，一个部落的什叶派军官如此支使另一个部落的逊尼派士兵会是什么情景。
Arab militaries are also prone to overspecialization. Individually, their specialist skills are good, oftentimes excellent and even better than their Western counterparts. However, they tend to be very narrowly specialized and know little else outside it, because doing otherwise would infringe on the irreplacability of another soldier. For example, an Arab tank gunner will likely be an excellent gunner - but at the same time unable to take over as a commander or driver, where the standard Western practice is to train vehicle crews to be at least somewhat proficient in all roles.
阿拉伯军队还倾向于过度专业化。就个人而言，他们的专业技能不错，有时甚至非常出色，超过西方同行。然而，他们的专业领域往往非常狭窄，对之外的知识知之甚少，因为不这样会侵犯到其他士兵的不可替代性。例如，阿拉伯坦克炮手可能是一名优秀的炮手，但同时却无法胜任指挥官或驾驶员的角色，而西方的标准做法是训练车辆乘员至少在所有角色上都具备一定的熟练度。
All of the above factors lead Arabs to be reasonably competent in particular types of warfare, but hopelessly outclassed in combined arms warfare that requires inter-service cooperation and inter-branch competence.
Russian military culture shares most of these elements, therefore it is no surprise that Arabs and Soviets were able to develop a quite successful military advisory relationship during the Cold War.
上述所有因素导致阿拉伯人在特定类型的战争中表现尚可，但在需要军种间合作和跨部门能力的联合作战中则远远落后。
俄罗斯军事文化也具备大部分这些特征，因此冷战期间阿拉伯人和苏联人能够发展出相当成功的军事顾问关系也就不足为奇了。
Adam Gurowski Played a few games of Tropico Upvoted by Christian Desaix, PhD History, Louisiana State University
亚当·古罗夫斯基 玩过几款《海岛大亨》游戏 获路易斯安那州立大学历史学博士克里斯蒂安·德赛克斯点赞
Because their militaries aren’t designed to win wars.
This is a map of the middle east with bluer countries being more democratic and blacker countries being less democratic. The bluest country is also one with the one that has won the most wars in the past 80 years.
因为他们的军队并非为赢得战争而设计。
这是一张中东地图，颜色越蓝的国家越民主，颜色越黑的国家越不民主。颜色最蓝的国家也是过去80年中赢得战争最多的国家。
A big part of that run of victories is that they can trust their military. Mossad may be going out and blowing up Hezbollah operatives with exploding pagers but as unpopular as he might be, Netanyahu doesn’t have to worry about a pager in his hands going boom. The threats to his rule are from rival civilian politicians, not from ambitious generals.
这一系列胜利的很大一部分原因是他们能够信任自己的军队。摩萨德可能会用爆炸传呼机炸死真主党特工，但尽管内塔尼亚胡可能不受欢迎，他却不必担心自己手中的传呼机会爆炸。对他统治的威胁来自敌对的文职政客，而非野心勃勃的将军。
That’s not the case in much of the Arab world. Quite a few Arab leaders over the past 80 years have come to power via a military coup. To ensure some younger military leader doesn’t do the same to them, they have to do “coup proofing” where they weed out cabable but potentially disloyal generals.
They need to ensure their armed services don’t have a habit of working together. In Sudan, the two main factions in their ongoing civil war are two separate armed services that served under their former dictator that went to war with each other before democracy had a chance to take root.
但阿拉伯世界的大部分地区并非如此。过去80年中，不少阿拉伯领导人通过军事政变上台。为了确保某个年轻的军事领导人不会对自己采取同样的行动，他们必须进行“防政变”操作，清除有能力但可能不忠诚的将军。他们需要确保自己的武装部队没有协同作战的习惯。在苏丹，持续内战中的两个主要派系是曾效力于前独裁者的两支独立武装部队，它们在民主有机会扎根之前就相互开战。
In most Arab countries, coups are a distinct possibility so leaders must weaken their militaries to ensure their own reign can continue. In countries where the military can be trusted to stay out of civilian affairs and where the civilians can be trusted not to use the military to solve their own political issues, the military can be strong and capable of winning wars.
Hopefully, we in American will be able to continue with that proud tradition.
在大多数阿拉伯国家，政变是一种明显的可能性，因此领导人必须削弱军队以确保自己的统治能够继续。而在那些军队可以被信任不干预民事事务、文职人员可以被信任不利用军队解决自身政治问题的国家，军队才能强大且有能力赢得战争。
希望我们美国人能够继续保持这一光荣传统。
Susanna Viljanen Knows Finnish Upvoted by Mariusz Szlanta, Master of Arts History & Geopolitics, Jagiellonian University (2001)
苏珊娜·维尔亚宁 懂芬兰语 获雅盖隆大学历史与地缘政治学文学硕士马里乌什·斯兰塔（2001届）点赞
This has been analyzed and answered rather well, and the underlying root cause is the tribal nature of the Arab countries.
这一问题已得到相当充分的分析和解答，根本原因在于阿拉伯国家的部落性质。
Why Arabs Lose Wars
Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4 No. 1/March 2000 Why Arabs Lose Wars * By Norville de Atkine ** Abstract The author argues that the reasons for Arab armies perpetual ineffectiveness are rooted in Arab culture. Social factors that prohibit success include: secrecy and paranoia, pride, class structure, a lack of coordination on all levels, and little individual freedom or initiative. Arabic-speaking armies have been generally ineffective in the modern era. Egyptian regular forces did poorly against Yemeni irregulars in the 1960s. 1 Syrians could only impose their will in Lebanon during the mid-1970s by the use of overwhelming weaponry and numbers. 2 Iraqis showed ineptness against an Iranian military ripped apart by revolutionary turmoil in the 1980s and could not win a three-decades-long war against the Kurds.
《阿拉伯人为何战败》
《中东国际事务评论》第4卷第1期/2000年3月 《阿拉伯人为何战败》 作者：诺维尔·德·阿特金 摘要：作者认为，阿拉伯军队长期低效的原因根植于阿拉伯文化。阻碍其成功的社会因素包括：保密与偏执、傲慢、阶级结构、各级缺乏协调以及个人自由和主动性不足。在现代，阿拉伯语国家的军队总体上表现低效。20世纪60年代，埃及正规军在与也门非正规军的对抗中表现不佳。20世纪70年代中期，叙利亚人只能通过压倒性的武器装备和兵力在黎巴嫩强加自己的意志。20世纪80年代，伊拉克军队在与因革命动荡而四分五裂的伊朗军队对抗中表现无能，且未能赢得长达三十年的对库尔德人的战争。
3 The Arab military performance on both sides of the 1990 Kuwait war was mediocre. 3 And the Arabs have done poorly in nearly all the military confrontations with Israel. Why this unimpressive record? There are many factors--economic, ideological, technical--but perhaps the most important has to do with culture and certain societal attributes which inhibit Arabs from producing an effective military force. It is a truism of military life that an army fights as it trains, and so I draw on my many years of firsthand observation of Arabs in training to draw conclusions about the ways in which they go into combat. The following impressions derive from personal experience with Arab military establishments in the capacity of U.S. military attaché and security assistance officer, observer officer with the British-officer Trucial Oman Scouts (the security force in the emirates prior to the establishment of the United Arab Emirates), as well as some thirty years study of the Middle East.
1990年海湾战争中，双方阿拉伯军队的表现都很平庸。此外，阿拉伯人在几乎所有与以色列的军事对抗中都表现糟糕。为何会有这样不起眼的记录？原因有很多——经济、意识形态、技术等，但最重要的或许与文化及某些社会特质有关，这些因素阻碍了阿拉伯人组建一支高效的军事力量。军队训练方式决定作战表现，这是军事领域的一条真理，因此我基于多年来对阿拉伯人训练情况的第一手观察，得出了关于他们作战方式的结论。以下看法源于我作为美国武官和安全援助官员、英国军官指挥的特鲁西尔阿曼侦察队（阿拉伯联合酋长国成立前各酋长国的安全部队）观察员的个人经历，以及对中东地区约三十年的研究。
False Starts Including culture in strategic assessments has a poor legacy, for it has often been spun from an ugly brew of ignorance, wishful thinking, and mythology. Thus, the U.S. army in the 1930s uated the Japanese national character as lacking originality and drew the unwarranted conclusion that the country would be permanently disadvantaged in technology. 5 Hitler dismissed the United States as a mongrel society 6 and consequently underestimated the impact of America s entry into the war. As these examples suggest, when culture is considered in calculating the relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing forces, it tends to lead to wild distortions, especially when it is a matter of understanding why states unprepared for war enter into combat flushed with confidence. The temptation is to impute cultural attributes to the enemy state that negate its superior numbers or weaponry. Or the opposite: to view the potential enemy through the prism of one s own cultural norms. American strategists assumed that the pain threshold of the North Vietnamese approximated their own and that the air bombardment of the North would bring it to its knees.
误区：将文化纳入战略评估的做法有着不良先例，因为它往往源于无知、一厢情愿和神话的糟糕混合。例如，20世纪30年代，美国军队认为日本民族缺乏独创性，并得出了该国在技术上会永远处于劣势的无根据结论。希特勒将美国斥为“混血社会”，因此低估了美国参战的影响。正如这些例子所示，当在计算敌对双方的相对优势和劣势时考虑文化因素，往往会导致严重扭曲，尤其是在试图理解为何未做好战争准备的国家会满怀信心地投入战斗时。人们倾向于将否定敌方数量或武器优势的文化属性强加给敌方，或者相反，通过自身文化规范的视角看待潜在敌人。美国战略家曾假设北越人的痛苦阈值与自己相近，认为对北越的空中轰炸会使其屈服。
This tribalism - which has effectively prevented the Arabic world from unifying and creating a culture of trust instead of culture of honour - effectively also poisons any attempts to build a disciplined, well-performing and effective military.
Any loyalty lies always and only within one’s own tribe. The other tribes are seen as rivals at best and enemies at worst, and there is no national sense among the Arabs. This is also why the generals fear their own subordinates more than the enemy, and why military coups are a perpetual curse in the Arab countries.
这种部落主义实际上阻碍了阿拉伯世界的统一，使其未能形成信任文化而非荣誉文化，同时也破坏了任何组建纪律严明、表现出色且高效军队的尝试。
忠诚始终且只存在于自己的部落内部。其他部落往好里说是竞争对手，往坏里说就是敌人，阿拉伯人之间没有民族认同感。这也是将军们更害怕自己的下属而非敌人的原因，也是军事政变成为阿拉伯国家永久诅咒的原因。
This tribal society was crushed in the Dark Ages’ Europe by the Catholic church. By prohibiting marriages of closer relatives than second cousins, the underlying tribal structure went haywire, and instead was replaced by a national identity. When Catholicism then spred to formerly Pagan countries in the Early and High Middle Ages, the same happened - the tribalism disappeared and was substituted by national identity. The Duke of Somewhereshire could be in bad terms with Duke of Nowhereshire, but the Somewhereshireans considered to belong in the same nation as the Nowhereshireans, and the dukes’ disputes were no longer their issued, but rather let the King resolve it.
这种部落社会在欧洲黑暗时代被天主教会瓦解。天主教会禁止二等表亲以内的近亲结婚，导致原本的部落结构混乱，取而代之的是民族认同感。当中世纪早期和盛期天主教传播到以前的异教国家时，同样的事情发生了——部落主义消失，被民族认同感取代。某个郡的公爵可能与另一个郡的公爵关系不和，但这两个郡的人仍认为彼此同属一个国家，公爵之间的争端不再是他们的事，而是由国王来解决。
This never happened in the Arab countries. Conversely, the cousin marriages are a curse of the Arabic world - up to 58% of all marriages can be between first cousins. The idea of the cousin marriages is to keep the property in the family and strenghten relative ties - which in turn both is dexerious to the gene pool and prevents any sense of nationality from emerging. If the Sheikh of Somewherestan gets irate with Sheikh of Nowherestan, all Somewherestanis rise together against the Nowherestanis and result is a civil war. This issue - why the Christian countries never fell into civil wars when their kings died - was a source of amazement during the Crusades.
这一点在阿拉伯国家从未发生过。相反，表亲婚姻是阿拉伯世界的一个诅咒——高达58%的婚姻是近亲结婚。表亲婚姻的目的是将财产保留在家族内部并加强亲属关系，但这反过来既对基因库有害，又阻碍了民族认同感的形成。如果某个地区的酋长与另一个地区的酋长发生冲突，该地区的所有人都会一起对抗另一个地区的人，结果就是内战。在十字军东征期间，基督教国家在国王去世后从未陷入内战这一现象，令人感到惊讶。
This tribalism also prevents effectively any rise of a middle class or intelligentsia. All Arab countries are remarkably thin with the middle class and intelligentsia, and instead there are the filthy rich rulers, the dirt poor fellahs, and a middleman minority consisting of Jews or Christians. Since there is no middle class, this also prevents the rise of the NCOs and reserve officers. The Arab armies have brains (the officers) and muscles (the privates), but they have no backbone (NCOs and reserve officers).
这种部落主义还有效地阻碍了中产阶级或知识分子阶层的崛起。所有阿拉伯国家的中产阶级和知识分子都非常稀少，取而代之的是腰缠万贯的统治者、一贫如洗的农民，以及由犹太人或基督徒组成的少数中间人阶层。由于没有中产阶级，士官和预备役军官也无法崛起。阿拉伯军队有头脑（军官）和肌肉（士兵），但没有脊梁骨（士官和预备役军官）。
The lack of trust means also there is very little cooperation with the various arms. The air forcce will not cooperate with the army, the infantry will not cooperate with the tanks, and the artillery will shoot just anywhere if coordinates are given, be it friend or foe. When things go pear-shaped, it is always more important to find the one who is guilty and crucify him rather to analyze why things went wrong and what could be done.
缺乏信任也意味着各兵种之间几乎没有合作。空军不会与陆军合作，步兵不会与坦克部队合作，炮兵如果得到坐标就会随意射击，无论是友军还是敌军。当事情出错时，找到罪魁祸首并严惩他总是比分析出错原因和解决办法更重要。
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