Patrick Sullivan
Studied Debauchery at Wossamotta U
Upvoted by Joshua Alexander, Military Historian, Veteran of US Marine Corps and Christian Desaix, PhD History, Louisiana State University
帕特里克·沙利文
曾就读于沃萨莫塔大学,研究“放纵行为”
获约书亚·亚历山大(军事历史学家、美国海军陆战队退伍军人)和克里斯蒂安·德赛(路易斯安那州立大学历史学博士)点赞

I going to let you in on a secret.
Afghanistan is absurdly easy to conquer. No. Really. Conquerors have been wiping their feet on Afghanistan for thousands of years. The list of countries, past and present, that have absolutely mauled whoever was living in Afghanistan in open warfare is like a who’s who. And in some cases a who is that?

我要告诉你一个秘密:征服阿富汗其实简单得离谱。真的,千真万确。数千年来,征服者们一直在阿富汗这片土地上“随意践踏”。无论是过去还是现在,那些在公开战争中把阿富汗原住民打得落花流水的国家,名单长得就像一份“名人录”,有些国家甚至你都得想半天“这是哪个国家来着”?

Pretty much everything important in the county is on more or less flat terrain and the Afghans, over the millennia, have been the drizzling poo when it comes to a stand up fight. They aren’t good at it, they tend to lose, and lose badly.

阿富汗国内几乎所有重要的地方都位于多少有些平坦的地形上,而数千年来,说到正面交锋,阿富汗人简直糟糕透顶。他们不擅长正面作战,往往会战败,而且败得很惨。

The thing is, kicking hell out of the Afghans is easy. Holding onto Afghanistan is where you run into issues. Socially speaking it has always been one of the most primitive areas in the world. Some group might crawl their way into “control” of the country but really everything is tribal or clan based. Sure, whoever is running Kabul at the moment might be the “ruler” of the country but the withered old husk of a clan leader in a specific village has vastly more power in day to day affairs.

但问题在于,把阿富汗人打得屁滚尿流很容易,要守住阿富汗才是真正的难题。从社会层面来说,阿富汗一直是世界上最原始的地区之一。某个团体或许能费力地“掌控”这个国家,但实际上,这里的一切都以部落或氏族为基础。诚然,当下掌控喀布尔的人可能被视为这个国家的“统治者”,但在某个特定村庄里,一位年迈体衰的氏族首领,在日常事务中拥有的权力却要大得多。

So you can’t defeat just one government. You’ve got to subdue hundreds of them. It can be done, but it takes a lot of time and effort and frankly… it isn’t worth it. It isn’t that the US, the USSR, Great Britain, and all the rest were crushed in a decisive battle. It is that they just got tired of playing whack a mole.

所以,你不能只打败一个政府,你得征服上百个“政府”。这并非无法做到,但需要投入大量的时间和精力,而且坦白说……这不值得。并不是美国、苏联、英国以及其他所有国家在某场决定性战役中被击溃了,而是他们实在厌倦了这种“打地鼠”式的游戏。

Yes, the Afghans were able to defeat poor Elphinstone, who was criminally incompetent, but they defeated him the same way they defeated everyone. They simply outlasted British interest in Afghanistan. The same way they outlasted most country’s interest in the region. Those countries that did decide “No, I think we are going to stay here” actually pulled it off and ruled Afghanistan for centuries at a time.

没错,阿富汗人确实打败了可怜的埃尔芬斯通——他的无能简直称得上是“犯罪”——但他们打败他的方式,和打败其他人的方式如出一辙:只是熬到英国人对阿富汗失去了兴趣而已。他们对大多数对该地区感兴趣的国家,用的都是这一招。而那些真正下定决心“不,我们要留在这里”的国家,其实真的成功了,并且一度统治了阿富汗数百年。

Simply put, what you put into Afghanistan isn’t worth what you get out of it.

简而言之,你在阿富汗投入的一切,和你能从中得到的回报根本不成正比。


on Diplomacy & Warfare
Answered by Alec Cawley
亚历克·考利
外交与战争领域

Because most of it is very mountainous and hence very unsuitable for mechanised armies. It is fairly straightforward to conquer the cities and the flat areas. But the Afghans retreat to mountain villages. They do not wear uniforms so you cannot tell fighters from innocent villagers so, short of killing or abducting the entire village population, invaders cannot touch the defenders off the actual battlefield. And while remote, these villages are not far from the roads joining those flat areas, so can easily organise ambushes on weak targets, while looking innocent when the army looks for them.

因为阿富汗大部分地区都是山地,所以非常不适合机械化部队作战。征服城市和平原地区相对容易,但阿富汗人会撤退到山村。他们不穿军装,你根本分不清谁是战斗人员、谁是无辜村民,所以除非把整个村庄的人都杀掉或抓走,否则入侵者在实际战场之外根本无法对付这些防御者。而且,这些村庄虽然偏僻,却离连接平原地区的道路不远,因此很容易组织起来伏击薄弱目标,而当军队搜捕时,他们又能装作无辜的样子。

It doesn't help that Afghanistan is not really one country but an overlapping patchwork of tribal areas. Everybody owes loyalty to their village first, their tribe second, and the county a distant third. So the President, King or whatever only speaks for his own tribe. So there is nobody to speak to to get the country to obey orders.

更棘手的是,阿富汗其实算不上一个真正的国家,而是由相互交错的部落区域拼凑而成的。每个人首先效忠的是自己的村庄,其次是部落,对国家的效忠则远远排在第三位。所以,无论是总统、国王还是其他什么身份的领导者,都只能代表自己的部落。因此,根本没有人能站出来让整个国家服从命令。

The terrain plays a big role but not the main one. The main one is simple. You cannot conquer a country whose citizens refuse to be subjugated unless you kill every last one of them. Hitler knew this and is the reason the Nazi’s systematically eliminated anyone and everyone who opposed them no matter what the cost to them in men or material. Many countries have tried to tame Afghanistan. The British twice, the Soviets and lastly, the United States. Russia found this out the hard way and will be in deep do-do if they try to occupy Ukraine. They would face endless guerrilla warfare and insurgencies. This is the last stanza of Rudyard Kipling's famous poem on the subject. Rudyard Kipling would have had fun with American policymakers and their critics. He wrote a basic truth about Afghanistan. Then again, I don’t believe President Bush had any choice but to invade after 9/11. He would have been impeached if he hadn’t. But staying there over two decades was a big mistake. And the way we withdrew was disgraceful.

地形因素影响很大,但并非主要原因。主要原因其实很简单:你无法征服一个其国民拒绝被征服的国家,除非你把他们赶尽杀绝。希特勒明白这一点,这也是纳粹会不惜一切人力物力代价,系统性地清除所有反对者的原因。很多国家都曾试图“驯服”阿富汗:英国两次尝试,然后是苏联,最后是美国。俄罗斯已经惨痛地吸取了这个教训,如果他们试图占领乌克兰,必将陷入大麻烦——他们会面临无休止的游击战和叛乱。这是拉迪亚德·吉卜林关于这个主题的著名诗歌的最后一节。拉迪亚德·吉卜林要是看到美国的政策制定者和批评者们的表现,想必会觉得很有趣。他写下了关于阿富汗的一个基本事实。话又说回来,我认为小布什总统在“9·11”事件后除了入侵阿富汗别无选择,要是他不这么做,恐怕会被弹劾。但在那里驻军超过二十年,就是个巨大的错误了,而且我们撤军的方式也很不光彩。

Russian soldiers on patrol in Afghanistan.
俄罗斯士兵在阿富汗巡逻。


Michael Mayes
Former US Army (Retired) (1991–2015)

迈克尔·梅斯
前美国陆军士兵(已退役,1991-2015年服役)

Three things I’ve heard cited:
Supply lines of the invaders have to stretch, and the longer they stretch, the more difficult it is to keep the troops at the “front end” of things supplied. This is true in any conflict, and Germany surely learned this in WWII as did Napoleon, who both failed when they marched on Moscow.

我听过人们提到三个原因:首先,入侵者的补给线必须拉长,而补给线越长,要给处于“前线”的部队持续供应物资就越困难。这在任何冲突中都成立,德国在二战中肯定吸取了这个教训,拿破仑也是如此——他们进军莫斯科时都因此失败了。

Anytime you fight someone on THEIR turf, THEY have what folks in the sports world like to refer to as “home field advantage.” It may well be an “intangible”, but it’s real; people are harder to beat when they’re fighting to save their homes.

其次,只要你在别人的地盘上作战,对方就拥有体育界人士常说的“主场优势”。这或许是一种“无形的优势”,但它真实存在——当人们为保卫家园而战时,会更难被击败。

Geography. Makes it hard to maneuver in many parts of Afghanistan. Early coalition efforts saw Special Forces and Northern Alliance troops, literally, using pack animals to move equipment and supplies. A good bit of the region just doesn’t lend itself readily to vehicle usage. Helicopters are great, but mile plus elevations significantly limit some rotary wing aircraft. Incidentally, geography also makes it difficult to forge and maintain a government that unites everyone. Tribes spread across the region are often separated from one another in such a manner that they have language and cultural differences that make unity and common bond difficult if not impossible to achieve. Makes it kinda challenging to forge alliances once you’re on the ground, too.

第三是地理因素。阿富汗很多地区的地形都不利于部队机动。在联军行动初期,特种部队和北方联盟的士兵们,真的是靠驮畜来运输装备和物资。该地区的很大一部分地方根本不适合车辆通行。直升机固然好用,但超过一英里的海拔高度会严重限制某些旋翼机的性能。顺带一提,地理因素也使得建立和维持一个能团结所有人的政府变得困难。散布在该地区的各个部落往往彼此隔绝,这导致他们在语言和文化上存在差异,即便不是完全不可能,也很难实现团结和建立共同联系。这也使得你一旦进入当地,要建立联盟就变得相当有挑战性。