为什么美国会在1942年于菲律宾向日本投降？他们为何不能像日本人在1944至1945年那样在丛林中继续抵抗？
Why did the US surrender to Japan in 1942 in the Philippines? Why couldn’t they have fought on in the jungles like the Japanese did in 1944-1945?
译文简介
大多数情况下，日军指挥官的能力优于美军指挥官。
正文翻译
Mark Seeger Extensive reading over sixty years.
马克·西格尔 拥有六十年泛读经验。
The Americans were in a vastly different position in 1942 than the Japanese in 1944/1945.
The largest American force was under siege on the Bataan Peninsula without any way to breakout. The Japanese had cut off all American access to the Philippines, the U.S. Navy was not coming - as conceived under pre-war plans - to relieve them. With the surrender of the forces on Bataan (April 9 1942), Corregidor Island was in the same position and finally surrendered on May 6 1942 after the Japanese successfully assaulted the island.
1942年美军所处的局势与1944至1945年日军的局势截然不同
美军规模最大的一支部队在巴丹半岛被围困，完全没有突围的可能。日军切断了美军通往菲律宾的所有通道，而按照战前计划本应前来增援的美国海军并未现身。随着巴丹半岛的部队于1942年4月9日投降，科雷希多岛陷入了同样的困境，在日军成功攻占该岛后，最终于1942年5月6日投降。
The U.S.forces on Corregidor, under Wainwright, surrendered in part due to the fear that the Japanese would kill all the American, to include the female nurses, if they did not immediately do so. While Wainwright initially agreed to surrender only those personnel on Corregidor, the Japanese commander (Homma) insisted that the remaining U.S. forces in the southern Philippines islands (Sharp’s Visayan-Mindanao force) also be surrendered. Again, Wainwright fearing the Japanese would resume operations against his now disarmed troops and the prisoners in Japanese hands, relented and surrendered all U.S. forces in the Philippines.
在温赖特的指挥下，科雷希多岛上的美军选择投降，部分原因是担心若不立即投降，日军会杀害所有美国人，包括女护士。尽管温赖特最初只同意让科雷希多岛上的人员投降，但日军指挥官（本间雅晴）坚持要求菲律宾南部岛屿上剩余的美军（夏普指挥的米沙鄢-棉兰老部队）也一并投降。再次出于对日军会转而攻击已解除武装的己方部队及落入日军手中的战俘的担忧，温赖特做出让步，宣布菲律宾境内所有美军投降。
The American forces in the southern Philippines could have gone into hills/jungle, some did and organized guerrilla units to continue the fight. But if any substantial numbers much less complete units had, the Japanese would have taken it out on their American prisoners. It was bad enough as it was for U.S. military (and civilian) personnel.
菲律宾南部的美军本可以撤到山区或丛林中，确实有一部分人这样做了，并组建了游击队继续作战。但如果有大量人员（更不用说整支部队）这样做，日军就会拿美军战俘出气。当时美军（及平民）的处境已经非常艰难了。
The Japanese in 1944/1945 had tens of thousands of troops in the Philippines. After the Americans took the critical ground on Leyte and Luzon islands, the Japanese withdrew into the hills in Northern Luzon where the Americans bottled them up until the end of the war. It was not worth the casualties to root them out. The Japanese were no threat to the war effort. The Japanese not so much fought as existed. They were more concerned staying alive. The U.S. under took operations on other islands to mop up isolated Japanese forces however any Japanese resistance was lackluster.
1944至1945年间，日军在菲律宾部署了数万名士兵。美军攻占莱特岛和吕宋岛的关键阵地后，日军撤至吕宋岛北部的山区，美军将其围困在那里，直至战争结束。美军认为不值得付出伤亡代价去肃清这些日军，因为此时的日军已对战争进程构不成威胁。日军与其说是在抵抗，不如说是在勉强生存，他们更关心如何活下去。美军在其他岛屿开展行动，肃清孤立的日军部队，但日军连抵抗都十分微弱。
Jim Phipps Former Combat and CONUS Combat Arms Company Commander at U.S. Army
吉姆·菲普斯 前美国陆军作战及美国本土作战部队连长
The simplest answer is that MacArthur and his team in addition to the Roosevelt Administration failed miserably. MacArthur had years to train the Philippines military but never got it right.
The equipment was generally obsolete. MacArthur and company had little comprehension of AirPower and lost air superiority almost immediately due to ignorance and stupidity.
最简单的答案是，麦克阿瑟及其团队，还有罗斯福政府，都遭遇了惨痛的失败。麦克阿瑟有多年时间训练菲律宾军队，却始终未能做好。
当时的装备普遍过时。麦克阿瑟及其手下对空中力量缺乏理解，由于他的无知和愚蠢，美军几乎瞬间就丧失了制空权。
Logistics and food was always an issue. Despite having Orange Plan in place, his staff completely failed to store all classes of supplies on Bataan. Rice for example was left in Manila that should have been in Bataan.
后勤和粮食问题始终存在。尽管“橙色计划”已制定就绪，但他的参谋人员未能完全按计划在巴丹半岛储存各类物资。比如，本应运往巴丹半岛的大米却留在了马尼拉。
The Roosevelt Administration sealed the destruction of the Philippines by Pear Harbor destruction. Failing to adequately fortify Guam and Wake Island prevented and resupply to the Philippines. The U.S. Military was unprepared for WW2 despite having observed it for years.
珍珠港事件的爆发，让罗斯福政府知道菲律宾注定会沦陷。由于未能充分加固关岛和威克岛的防御，向菲律宾运送补给的通道被阻断。尽管多年来一直在关注二战局势的发展，美国军方却始终未做好参战准备。
The U.S. and Filipino troops were sick and hungry. The defenses around Manila Bay were based on WW1 thinking and not AirPower. The Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines was little more than a tripwire. It could not defend SE Asia . Most of the vessels were obsolete.
美菲联军士兵饥病交加。马尼拉湾周边的防御体系仍基于一战时期的理念，未能考虑空中力量的影响。驻菲律宾的美国亚洲舰队实力微弱，几乎仅起到预警作用，无法保卫东南亚地区，而且其大部分舰艇都已过时。
Lastly in most cases, the Japanese were better leaders than the Americans.
Everyone in the military and government knew that war was coming to Asia. Lack of preparedness was unacceptable period. It was a campaign lost before it even started.
最后，在大多数情况下，日军指挥官的能力优于美军指挥官。
军方和政府中的所有人都清楚战争即将蔓延到亚洲，所以这种毫无准备的状态是完全不可接受的。这场战役实际上在开始之前就已经失败了。
David A Hanscom
戴维·A·汉斯科姆
MacArthur
（我的答案是）麦克阿瑟
He planned to expand the Philippine Arm training and equipping it to fight the Japanese, so he recruited lots of them, instead of fortifying the Bataan peninsula as was planned, moving his supplies there, and waiting for a Navy relief force. (Said relief force sitting on the bottom at Pearl.)
Then he (or someone in his headquarters) forbade airstrikes on Japanese airbases on Formosa, using the largest force of four engine bombers in the world (65 B17s) , because “Japan had not attacked the Philippines”.
他原本计划扩大菲律宾军队的规模，对其进行训练和装备，以抗击日军，因此招募了大量菲律宾士兵。但他并未按原计划加固巴丹半岛的防御、将物资转移到那里，而是等待海军增援部队——而所谓的增援部队早已在珍珠港事件中葬身海底。
之后，他（或其总部的某人）禁止使用当时世界上规模最大的四引擎轰炸机部队（65架B-17轰炸机）对台湾（地区）岛上的日军空军基地发动空袭，理由是“日本尚未攻击菲律宾”。
When Japan did attack, MacArthur managed to get his almost his entire Air Force caught and destroyed on the ground. (Japanese air strikes had been delayed by ground fog in Formosa. The B17s would have caught hundreds of aircraft armed and fuel, just sitting on the ground.)
After the fact, when asked why no attacks had been made, MaCarthur claimed they were no reconnaissance photos of Formosa. They were sitting in the Navy reconnaissance office next door.
当日本最终发起进攻时，麦克阿瑟手下几乎全部的空军力量都被困在地面并遭到摧毁。（日军的空袭因台湾（地区）岛地面大雾而推迟，若当时美军就发动空袭，B-17轰炸机本可以趁数百架日军战机装满燃油、挂满武器停在地面时将其摧毁。）
事后，当被问及为何不发动空袭时，麦克阿瑟声称没有台湾（地区）岛的侦察照片。但实际上，这些照片就存放在隔壁的海军侦察办公室里。
With the collapse of MacArthur’s defense plan for the Philippines, he withdrew into Bataan with 60,000 Americans and 200,000 untrained Philippino soldiers who were prolific with ammunition and quickly exacerbated the supplies on Bataan (Much of the supplies were abandoned, because they had not been moved to Bataan before the Japanese invasion. (As was planned.) No attempt was made to organize and supply any of these troops for a campaign of Guerrilla warfare.
Something MacArthur and his pundits never were able or willing to explain
随着麦克阿瑟为菲律宾制定的防御计划破产，他率领6万名美军士兵和20万名未经训练的菲律宾士兵撤至巴丹半岛。这些菲律宾士兵在弹药使用上毫无节制，迅速加剧了巴丹半岛的物资短缺问题————尽管大量物资已被遗弃，但日军入侵前未按计划将物资转移到巴丹半岛。此外，美军也没有尝试将这些部队组织起来开展游击战，更没有为游击战提供物资支持。
而这一点，正是麦克阿瑟及其支持者始终无法或不愿解释的。
马克·西格尔 拥有六十年泛读经验。
The Americans were in a vastly different position in 1942 than the Japanese in 1944/1945.
The largest American force was under siege on the Bataan Peninsula without any way to breakout. The Japanese had cut off all American access to the Philippines, the U.S. Navy was not coming - as conceived under pre-war plans - to relieve them. With the surrender of the forces on Bataan (April 9 1942), Corregidor Island was in the same position and finally surrendered on May 6 1942 after the Japanese successfully assaulted the island.
1942年美军所处的局势与1944至1945年日军的局势截然不同
美军规模最大的一支部队在巴丹半岛被围困，完全没有突围的可能。日军切断了美军通往菲律宾的所有通道，而按照战前计划本应前来增援的美国海军并未现身。随着巴丹半岛的部队于1942年4月9日投降，科雷希多岛陷入了同样的困境，在日军成功攻占该岛后，最终于1942年5月6日投降。
The U.S.forces on Corregidor, under Wainwright, surrendered in part due to the fear that the Japanese would kill all the American, to include the female nurses, if they did not immediately do so. While Wainwright initially agreed to surrender only those personnel on Corregidor, the Japanese commander (Homma) insisted that the remaining U.S. forces in the southern Philippines islands (Sharp’s Visayan-Mindanao force) also be surrendered. Again, Wainwright fearing the Japanese would resume operations against his now disarmed troops and the prisoners in Japanese hands, relented and surrendered all U.S. forces in the Philippines.
在温赖特的指挥下，科雷希多岛上的美军选择投降，部分原因是担心若不立即投降，日军会杀害所有美国人，包括女护士。尽管温赖特最初只同意让科雷希多岛上的人员投降，但日军指挥官（本间雅晴）坚持要求菲律宾南部岛屿上剩余的美军（夏普指挥的米沙鄢-棉兰老部队）也一并投降。再次出于对日军会转而攻击已解除武装的己方部队及落入日军手中的战俘的担忧，温赖特做出让步，宣布菲律宾境内所有美军投降。
The American forces in the southern Philippines could have gone into hills/jungle, some did and organized guerrilla units to continue the fight. But if any substantial numbers much less complete units had, the Japanese would have taken it out on their American prisoners. It was bad enough as it was for U.S. military (and civilian) personnel.
菲律宾南部的美军本可以撤到山区或丛林中，确实有一部分人这样做了，并组建了游击队继续作战。但如果有大量人员（更不用说整支部队）这样做，日军就会拿美军战俘出气。当时美军（及平民）的处境已经非常艰难了。
The Japanese in 1944/1945 had tens of thousands of troops in the Philippines. After the Americans took the critical ground on Leyte and Luzon islands, the Japanese withdrew into the hills in Northern Luzon where the Americans bottled them up until the end of the war. It was not worth the casualties to root them out. The Japanese were no threat to the war effort. The Japanese not so much fought as existed. They were more concerned staying alive. The U.S. under took operations on other islands to mop up isolated Japanese forces however any Japanese resistance was lackluster.
1944至1945年间，日军在菲律宾部署了数万名士兵。美军攻占莱特岛和吕宋岛的关键阵地后，日军撤至吕宋岛北部的山区，美军将其围困在那里，直至战争结束。美军认为不值得付出伤亡代价去肃清这些日军，因为此时的日军已对战争进程构不成威胁。日军与其说是在抵抗，不如说是在勉强生存，他们更关心如何活下去。美军在其他岛屿开展行动，肃清孤立的日军部队，但日军连抵抗都十分微弱。
Jim Phipps Former Combat and CONUS Combat Arms Company Commander at U.S. Army
吉姆·菲普斯 前美国陆军作战及美国本土作战部队连长
The simplest answer is that MacArthur and his team in addition to the Roosevelt Administration failed miserably. MacArthur had years to train the Philippines military but never got it right.
The equipment was generally obsolete. MacArthur and company had little comprehension of AirPower and lost air superiority almost immediately due to ignorance and stupidity.
最简单的答案是，麦克阿瑟及其团队，还有罗斯福政府，都遭遇了惨痛的失败。麦克阿瑟有多年时间训练菲律宾军队，却始终未能做好。
当时的装备普遍过时。麦克阿瑟及其手下对空中力量缺乏理解，由于他的无知和愚蠢，美军几乎瞬间就丧失了制空权。
Logistics and food was always an issue. Despite having Orange Plan in place, his staff completely failed to store all classes of supplies on Bataan. Rice for example was left in Manila that should have been in Bataan.
后勤和粮食问题始终存在。尽管“橙色计划”已制定就绪，但他的参谋人员未能完全按计划在巴丹半岛储存各类物资。比如，本应运往巴丹半岛的大米却留在了马尼拉。
The Roosevelt Administration sealed the destruction of the Philippines by Pear Harbor destruction. Failing to adequately fortify Guam and Wake Island prevented and resupply to the Philippines. The U.S. Military was unprepared for WW2 despite having observed it for years.
珍珠港事件的爆发，让罗斯福政府知道菲律宾注定会沦陷。由于未能充分加固关岛和威克岛的防御，向菲律宾运送补给的通道被阻断。尽管多年来一直在关注二战局势的发展，美国军方却始终未做好参战准备。
The U.S. and Filipino troops were sick and hungry. The defenses around Manila Bay were based on WW1 thinking and not AirPower. The Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines was little more than a tripwire. It could not defend SE Asia . Most of the vessels were obsolete.
美菲联军士兵饥病交加。马尼拉湾周边的防御体系仍基于一战时期的理念，未能考虑空中力量的影响。驻菲律宾的美国亚洲舰队实力微弱，几乎仅起到预警作用，无法保卫东南亚地区，而且其大部分舰艇都已过时。
Lastly in most cases, the Japanese were better leaders than the Americans.
Everyone in the military and government knew that war was coming to Asia. Lack of preparedness was unacceptable period. It was a campaign lost before it even started.
最后，在大多数情况下，日军指挥官的能力优于美军指挥官。
军方和政府中的所有人都清楚战争即将蔓延到亚洲，所以这种毫无准备的状态是完全不可接受的。这场战役实际上在开始之前就已经失败了。
David A Hanscom
戴维·A·汉斯科姆
MacArthur
（我的答案是）麦克阿瑟
He planned to expand the Philippine Arm training and equipping it to fight the Japanese, so he recruited lots of them, instead of fortifying the Bataan peninsula as was planned, moving his supplies there, and waiting for a Navy relief force. (Said relief force sitting on the bottom at Pearl.)
Then he (or someone in his headquarters) forbade airstrikes on Japanese airbases on Formosa, using the largest force of four engine bombers in the world (65 B17s) , because “Japan had not attacked the Philippines”.
他原本计划扩大菲律宾军队的规模，对其进行训练和装备，以抗击日军，因此招募了大量菲律宾士兵。但他并未按原计划加固巴丹半岛的防御、将物资转移到那里，而是等待海军增援部队——而所谓的增援部队早已在珍珠港事件中葬身海底。
之后，他（或其总部的某人）禁止使用当时世界上规模最大的四引擎轰炸机部队（65架B-17轰炸机）对台湾（地区）岛上的日军空军基地发动空袭，理由是“日本尚未攻击菲律宾”。
When Japan did attack, MacArthur managed to get his almost his entire Air Force caught and destroyed on the ground. (Japanese air strikes had been delayed by ground fog in Formosa. The B17s would have caught hundreds of aircraft armed and fuel, just sitting on the ground.)
After the fact, when asked why no attacks had been made, MaCarthur claimed they were no reconnaissance photos of Formosa. They were sitting in the Navy reconnaissance office next door.
当日本最终发起进攻时，麦克阿瑟手下几乎全部的空军力量都被困在地面并遭到摧毁。（日军的空袭因台湾（地区）岛地面大雾而推迟，若当时美军就发动空袭，B-17轰炸机本可以趁数百架日军战机装满燃油、挂满武器停在地面时将其摧毁。）
事后，当被问及为何不发动空袭时，麦克阿瑟声称没有台湾（地区）岛的侦察照片。但实际上，这些照片就存放在隔壁的海军侦察办公室里。
With the collapse of MacArthur’s defense plan for the Philippines, he withdrew into Bataan with 60,000 Americans and 200,000 untrained Philippino soldiers who were prolific with ammunition and quickly exacerbated the supplies on Bataan (Much of the supplies were abandoned, because they had not been moved to Bataan before the Japanese invasion. (As was planned.) No attempt was made to organize and supply any of these troops for a campaign of Guerrilla warfare.
Something MacArthur and his pundits never were able or willing to explain
随着麦克阿瑟为菲律宾制定的防御计划破产，他率领6万名美军士兵和20万名未经训练的菲律宾士兵撤至巴丹半岛。这些菲律宾士兵在弹药使用上毫无节制，迅速加剧了巴丹半岛的物资短缺问题————尽管大量物资已被遗弃，但日军入侵前未按计划将物资转移到巴丹半岛。此外，美军也没有尝试将这些部队组织起来开展游击战，更没有为游击战提供物资支持。
而这一点，正是麦克阿瑟及其支持者始终无法或不愿解释的。
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