既然法国几个世纪以来都是欧洲首屈一指的强国，为何会在普法战争中一败涂地？
How did France get crushed in the Franco-Prussian War if they were the premier European power for centuries?
译文简介
法国的衰败源于内部。从表面上看，法国仍是欧洲强国，但1867年他们从墨西哥撤军，导致马克西米利安二世被处决，这在一定程度上损害了其形象。
正文翻译
How did France get crushed in the Franco-Prussian War if they were the premier European power for centuries?
既然法国几个世纪以来都是欧洲首屈一指的强国，为何会在普法战争中一败涂地？
Jihoon Seo (서지훈)，The Franco-Prussian war is a must to learn
关注普法战争研究
Oh the French were rotting from the inside. Yes, outside the French were still a premier European power even though they sort of ruined their image in 1867 when they withdrew from Mexico letting Maximillian II get executed. But, that’s a whole different conversation, so back to the main point.
So let me tell you how the French were rotting from the inside.
法国的衰败源于内部。从表面上看，法国仍是欧洲强国，但1867年他们从墨西哥撤军，导致马克西米利安二世被处决，这在一定程度上损害了其形象。不过这是另一个话题，我们还是回到重点上来。
下面我来具体说说法国内部是如何衰败的。
1. A Liberal Empire (since 1863)?
Émile Ollivier is the French statesman that introduced the concept of Empire Libérale to Napoleon III, an authoritarian Emperor back then. A Liberal Empire was rather fruitless ceding the power of the Emperor, giving excessive power to the press leaving them totally free to spread fake news and propaganda (with freedom of speech), and generally prevented Napoleon III from doing what he believed necessary.
1. 一个自由的帝国（从1863年开始）？
埃米尔·奥利维耶是法国政治家，他向当时的专制君主拿破仑三世提出了“自由帝国”的理念。然而，“自由帝国”并未起到实际作用：它削弱了皇帝的权力，却赋予媒体过大的自由，使得媒体可借助“言论自由”肆意传播虚假消息和宣传内容，这在很大程度上阻碍了拿破仑三世推行他认为必要的政策。
However, there was one huge speculated and that was the support from Republicans and Republican Bonapartists/liberal Bonapartists. Additionally, it may turn the increasing anti-Bonapartist sentiments around by showing a liberal aspect of the new Empire.
But being a liberal democratic nation for Napoleon III was nothing, but a dream.
First, this gave exclusive power to the French National Assembly to denounce whatever the Emperor wanted to propose.
不过，这一理念背后有一个重要的潜在考量，即争取共和党人、共和派波拿巴主义者以及自由派波拿巴主义者的支持。此外，通过展现新帝国的自由一面，或许能扭转日益增长的反波拿巴主义情绪。
但对拿破仑三世而言，将法国打造成自由民主国家终究只是一场空想。
首先，“自由帝国”赋予法国国民议会独有的权力，使其能够否决皇帝提出的任何提案。
In the 1869 French legislative election, the result was like below
1869年法国议会选举结果如下（参考维基百科“1869年法国议会选举”条目）：
The light and dark green are both Bonapartists. The dark being conservative Bonapartists (leader : Adolphe Vuitry), the light being liberal Bonapartists (Émile Ollivier). The red are the moderate Republicans (Léon Gambetta), the blue are Monarchists (Adolphe Thiers).
In theory, the Bonapartists should dominate, but in reality it wasn’t true. The increase in liberty for the press and anti-Bonapartists meant that their activity can expand to the public overcoming the disadvantage in their current parliamentary seats.
Leftists also used this opportunity to radicalize the Paris working class who were at first quite positive towards their Emperor into diehard Bourgeoisies.
The transformation of the French Second Empire into the Liberal Empire divided the French politically and would later result into further corruption in French politics.
浅绿和深绿代表的均为波拿巴主义者，其中深绿代表保守派波拿巴主义者（领袖：阿道夫·维特里），浅绿代表自由派波拿巴主义者（领袖：埃米尔·奥利维耶）；红色代表温和共和党人（领袖：莱昂·甘必大）；蓝色代表君主主义者（领袖：阿道夫·梯也尔）。
理论上，波拿巴主义者本应在议会中占据主导地位，但实际情况并非如此。媒体自由的扩大以及反波拿巴主义者活动空间的增加，使得他们能够突破议会席位不足的限制，将影响力扩大到公众层面。
左翼分子还借此机会，将原本对皇帝持积极态度的巴黎工人阶级激进化，使他们转变为坚定的资产阶级反对者。
法兰西第二帝国向“自由帝国”的转变，导致法国在政治上陷入分裂，随后更是加剧了法国政治的腐败。
2. Politicians Dedicated to Their Party, Not Their Nation
A good politician thinks of his nation and if necessary would cooperate with his opponents for the greater good. French politics since 1863 was far from it.
The highly anti-Bonapartist sentiments made the National Assembly be hostile to whatever the Emperor wants to propose.
2. 政客只忠于党派，而非国家
优秀的政客会以国家利益为重，必要时愿与对手合作以谋求更大福祉。但1863年之后的法国政治却远非如此。
强烈的反波拿巴主义情绪，使得国民议会对皇帝提出的任何提案都持敌视态度。
When Napoleon III proposed a military reform (increase of the regular army into 824,000 and the creation of a 400,000 Garde Mobile, general conscxtion, decrease in the years of service, etc.) after seeing the devastating defeat of the Austrians in 1866 and put this into vote to the National Assembly the reform was rejected except for the decrease in the years of service. The entire purpose of the reform was destroyed and the decrease in the years of service was proposed as the reform would increase the number of conscxts. But with only this, this only made the French army under powered.
1866年奥地利惨败后，拿破仑三世意识到军事改革的必要性，遂提出改革方案：将正规军规模扩至82.4万人，组建40万机动卫队，推行普遍征兵制，并缩短服役年限等。他将该方案提交国民议会表决，最终除“缩短服役年限”外，其余条款均被否决。改革的核心目标就此落空——“缩短服役年限”这一条款之所以能通过，仅是因为议员们认为改革会增加征兵人数，而这一条款可在一定程度上抵消这一影响。但仅靠这一项调整，只会导致法国军队实力不足。
The Assemblymen thought the military reform would be exploited by Napoleon III to use the newly reformed military into his own political guardian and persecute the opposition. However, whatever their excuses were this later proved devastating in the Franco-Prussian war.
The failure in the military reform before the Franco-Prussian war wasn’t the responsibility of Napoleon III unlike common belief (based on French Republican propaganda since they came into power), but it was the too liberal system and the excessive power of selfish politicians.
Besides that, when the war actually broke out anti-Bonapartists were busy dividing the people by destroying their support towards the Emperor, but to use these people as their own political force to achieve their power. Many socialists were busy radicalizing Paris workers with their radical beliefs and sabotaging the French army making it even more powerless.
议员们认为，拿破仑三世可能会利用军事改革，将改编后的军队变为自己的政治保护伞，并迫害反对者。但无论他们的借口是什么，这一决策在后来的普法战争中被证明是灾难性的。
与普遍观点（该观点源于共和党掌权后的宣传）不同，普法战争前军事改革的失败并非拿破仑三世之过，而是过度自由的制度以及自私政客手中过大的权力所致。
此外，战争爆发后，反波拿巴主义者一心煽动民众反对皇帝，破坏民众对皇帝的支持，目的是将民众收为己用，作为获取权力的政治资本。许多社会主义者则忙于用激进思想煽动巴黎工人，同时破坏法军行动，进一步削弱法军实力。
After the triple defeats in Wissembourg, Froeschwiller, and Spicheren, Empress Eugénie notes that France was in the moment of rebellion. That is also why the Army of Châlons formed in the military base at Châlons couldn’t retreat to Paris, but try a reckless outflanking maneuver against the Prussians which ultimately failed in the Battle of Sedan because the French public would literally riot against the army seeing the Emperor once so confident come in to the nation’s capital without the glory promised.
在维桑堡、弗罗埃斯克维莱和斯皮谢尔三场战役接连失利后，欧仁妮皇后指出法国已处于叛乱边缘。这也解释了为何在沙隆军事基地组建的沙隆军团无法撤退至巴黎，反而不得不冒险对普鲁士军队实施侧翼包抄——这一行动最终在色当战役中失败。因为一旦曾充满信心的皇帝未能带着承诺的荣耀返回首都，法国民众很可能会爆发针对军队的骚乱。
3. Excessive Confidence
The fact that the French were a premier European power also played against them in the Franco-Prussian war. Because they had such an outlandish title, it also left the army over-confident and not prepare for newer opponents nor the rapid development of technology. The French in the 1860’s acted as the standard of world armies and that is also the cornerstone of the US army in the US Civil War.
These American uniforms were also copied from the French
When the sign of war arrived in 1866 after the decisive Austrian defeat in the Austro-Prussian war and the rise of the North German Confederation in 1867, many French leaders believed the French could contain the threat by their current status(which was definitely a no no). This also worked as a factor in rejecting the military reform proposed by Napoleon III and Marshal Adolphe Niel which was like cancer in the French performance in the future war.
3. 过度自信
法国作为欧洲强国的地位，在普法战争中反而对其不利。正是这一“显赫”头衔，让法军变得过度自信，既未做好应对新对手的准备，也忽视了军事技术的快速发展。19世纪60年代，法国军队堪称世界军队的标杆，美国内战时期美军的建设也以此为基础。
美军的制服设计也借鉴了法军样式。
1866年普奥战争中奥地利惨败，1867年北德意志邦联崛起，战争的苗头已然显现。但许多法国领导人仍认为，凭借法国当时的地位足以遏制威胁（这一想法显然错误）。这种心态也成为他们否决拿破仑三世和阿道夫·尼尔元帅提出的军事改革的原因之一，而这一否决对法国在未来战争中的表现造成了致命影响。
4. Incompetent Generals
The problem wasn’t only the politicians, the generals were also a problem.
Many weren’t the most competent leaders truly understanding modern technology and the following strategy and tactics. Many just became generals by the recommendation from their friends or relatives who are in powerful positions. Others became generals in colonial wars like in Algeria, IndoChina, China or foreign campaigns like in the Crimean war, Italian campaign, Mexican campaign.
4. 将领无能
问题不仅出在政客身上，将领们也难辞其咎。
许多将领并非真正懂现代军事技术及相应战略战术的合格领导者。他们中不少人是凭借有权势的亲友推荐才升任将军；另有一些则是在阿尔及利亚、印度支那、中国等殖民地战争，或克里米亚战争、意大利战役、墨西哥战役等对外作战中积累资历后晋升的。
The Franco-Prussian war was proven to be a different generation for them to contain. Many didn’t understand the new weapon technology. Marshal Bazaine for instance had never seen a French mitrailleuse before and even among people who did know about this weapon, they got a wrong impression of their effectiveness and appropriate uses
事实证明，普法战争是一场他们难以应对的新一代战争。许多将领不了解新型武器技术，比如巴赞元帅此前从未见过法国的米特拉约塞机枪；即便有人知道这类武器，也对其效能和正确使用方法存在误解。
Reffye Mitrailleuse
（注：即雷菲耶式米特拉约塞机枪，当时法军的新型武器）
The Artillery Committee was too conservative to accept new technologies into service. The Krupp breechloading steel gun for instance was rejected due to its “safety issues” (a general perception on breechloading artillery technology during that time) and rejected the Chassepot breechloading carbine (being content with the existing muzzleloading carbine).
炮兵委员会过于保守，不愿接纳新技术投入使用。例如，克虏伯后装式钢炮因所谓的“安全问题”（这是当时人们对后装炮技术的普遍担忧）被否决；夏塞波后装卡宾枪也未被采用，委员会仍满足于现有的前装卡宾枪。
Model 1822T Artillery Carbine (17.6mm caliber)
（注：即1822T型炮兵卡宾枪，口径17.6毫米，当时法军使用的前装卡宾枪）
The cavalry was still rather ignorant with their modern wars seeing it glory-less still obsessed with the élan and shock action. These are good examples, too many cuirassiers!! The Germans in the other hand decreased the number of cuirassier and other heavy units and increased lights (hussars and uhlans) for better reconnaissance, scouting, flanking performance.
骑兵部队对现代战争认知不足，认为现代战争缺乏荣耀感，仍沉迷于“锐气冲锋”的传统战术，重型胸甲骑兵数量过多就是典型例证。反观德国，他们减少了胸甲骑兵等重型骑兵部队的数量，增加了轻骑兵（骠骑兵和枪骑兵），以提升侦察、巡逻和侧翼作战能力。
The infantry was rearmed with the Chassepot rifle which was for sure a good rifle, but the effectiveness of the Chassepot was over-emphasized in French infantry tactics. The result was the feu de bataillon basically an infantry tactic that emphasizes static field defenses (building trenches by battalion with in 15 minutes and shooting down enemies in volleys in long ranges). The tactic was a movement to adapt to modern firepower, but wasn’t a good alternative. Due to the over-emphasis on defense, the French infantry battalions were too rigid in field maneuvers and was isolated without any artillery support. If the French had good artillery, this tactic might’ve been better as the French will have a clear advantage in range with artillery and infantry. But the Germans still had the upper-hand in artillery which meant that if the French battalion didn’t move forward and end the battle, they will just get mown down by artillerymen later on.
步兵部队换装了夏塞波步枪，这款步枪确实性能优良，但法军步兵战术过度强调其效能，最终形成了“营级射击”战术——该战术以静态阵地防御为核心，要求每个营在15分钟内构筑战壕，并以排枪齐射的方式在远距离打击敌人。这种战术虽试图适应现代火力，但并非理想方案。由于过度侧重防御，法军步兵营的野外机动过于僵化，且常处于缺乏炮兵支援的孤立状态。若法军拥有精良的炮兵装备，该战术或许能发挥作用，因为步炮协同可让法军在射程上占据明显优势。但德军在炮兵方面占据上风，这意味着法军步兵营若不主动推进、速战速决，最终只会被德军炮兵击溃。
So that was about technology, but there are other incompetence shown most famously, Marshal Bazaine. Bazaine had this weird political fantasy of him getting political power. He was a general dedicated to himself not the nation. It was also due to his bad relations with general Frossard who was adored by Napoleon III and the emperor because of the Emperor’s interest on Frossard.
除了技术层面的问题，将领的无能还体现在其他方面，巴赞元帅就是最典型的例子。他对获取政治权力抱有不切实际的幻想，是一位只忠于自己而非国家的将领。此外，他与弗罗萨尔将军关系恶劣，而弗罗萨尔深受拿破仑三世赏识——皇帝对弗罗萨尔的关注是二人关系紧张的原因之一。
Charles August Frossard
（注：即夏尔·奥古斯特·弗罗萨尔，法军将领）
In the war, he wasn’t dedicated in cooperating with the Emperor, but to strengthen his political ground to achieve power. After he surrendered to the Prussians after the Siege of Metz, Bazaine didn’t order to spike the guns and destroy the weapons, but surrendered to the Prussians in good conditions. But he was no skilled politician and no patriotic marshal. His political interest and the military blunders also greatly contributed to the defeat of the Army of the Rhine (though still he wasn’t solely responsible for the French defeat as he was often times scapegoated excessively).
战争期间，巴赞并未全力配合皇帝，而是一心巩固自身政治地位以谋求权力。梅斯围城战后，他向普鲁士军队投降，却未下令破坏火炮和武器，而是让军队以良好状态投降。他既非老练的政客，也非爱国的元帅，其政治野心和军事失误是莱茵军团战败的重要原因（不过，他也常被过度当作替罪羊，法国战败并非他一人之过）。
5. Lacked Understanding the Germans
Prussia (later the North German Confederation, later the German Empire) was an innovative nation constant moving itself forward as time passes. In 1850, it was humiliated by their diplomatic defeat in the First Schleswig war (1848–49)-the Humiliation of Olmütz.
From 1858–1862, Moltke became the Prussian General Staff, Roon became the Minister of War, Bismarck became the Prime Minister of Prussia, and the king was a highly supportive Wilhelm I. This good collaboration of innovative figures were the driving force of the Prussian progress until reaching unification.
The French in the other hand, under-estimated or didn’t fully appreciate how big Prussia was a threat to the French.
5. 对德国认知不足
普鲁士（后发展为北德意志邦联，最终成为德意志帝国）是一个不断创新、持续发展的国家。1850年，普鲁士在第一次石勒苏益格战争（1848-1849年）中遭遇外交惨败，史称“奥尔米茨之辱”，蒙受了耻辱。
1858至1862年间，毛奇出任普鲁士总参谋长，罗恩担任战争大臣，俾斯麦成为普鲁士首相，而威廉一世国王对此给予了大力支持。这些具有创新精神的人物之间的良好协作，成为普鲁士直至统一过程中的发展动力。
反观法国，他们低估了普鲁士对自身的威胁，未能充分认识到这一威胁的严重性。
Bismarck met Napoleon III in Biarritz in October 1865 to assure French neutrality during the Austro-Prussian war by giving the French support to annex Belgium and Luxembourg. Surprisingly, Napoleon III denied this thinking that it was unnecessary for the French to be given a reward for letting its enemy (Austria) fight against Prussia. Here, we can see a clear misconception of Napoleon III in European geopolitics of 1865–66. Austria wasn’t a big threat, it was Prussia, but Napoleon didn’t notice and many others weren’t an exception.
Bismarck later wrote in his memoirs, ‘Napoleon III is an unknown incompetent’.
1865年10月，俾斯麦在比亚里茨与拿破仑三世会面，提出支持法国吞并比利时和卢森堡，以换取法国在普奥战争中保持中立。令人意外的是，拿破仑三世拒绝了这一提议——他认为，法国让自己的“敌人”（奥地利）与普鲁士交战，无需对方给予回报。由此可见，1865-1866年的欧洲地缘政治中，拿破仑三世存在明显误解：当时奥地利并非法国的重大威胁，普鲁士才是，但拿破仑三世未能意识到这一点，其他许多法国人也同样如此。
俾斯麦后来在回忆录中写道：“拿破仑三世是一个无能却不自知的人。”
The only major politician that truly understood the Prussian threat was Adolphe Thiers who announced that France should go to war with Prussia now and double team the Prussians in the Austro-Prussian war or the French would fall into a ditch of danger. He also was one of the few who opposed the Franco-Prussian war to be declared as the declaration of war was a direct path to make this threat a reality. If more French politicians were aware, than France would’ve prepared for a European war before 1866 to prevent the Austro-Prussian war from happening and further the North German Confederation from being created, but in 1866 there were less than 100,000 French troops and even these were under-prepared. The Prussians had three times the soldiers in Bohemia.
唯一真正认识到普鲁士威胁的主要政客是阿道夫·梯也尔。他提出，法国应立即对普鲁士开战，并在普奥战争中与奥地利联手夹击普鲁士，否则法国将陷入危险境地。他也是少数反对对普鲁士宣战的人之一，因为他认为宣战会让普鲁士的威胁变为现实。若当时更多法国政客能意识到这一点，法国本可在1866年前为欧洲战争做好准备，阻止普奥战争爆发，进而阻止北德意志邦联成立。但1866年时，法军兵力不足10万人，且即便这部分兵力也未做好充分准备，而普鲁士在波西米亚的兵力已是法军的三倍。
Adolphe Thiers (a conservative French July Monarchy supporter and a representing Orleanist)
阿道夫·梯也尔（法国保守派，七月王朝支持者，奥尔良派代表人物）
The ignorant French public went out to the streets waving their tricolor and celebrated the Prussian victory.
无知的法国民众走上街头，挥舞着三色旗，庆祝普鲁士在普奥战争中的胜利。
Conclusion
In 1870, the French were a weakened and an ill-informed power with incompetent leadership and subordinates of the leaders. The public was also not cooperative and the nation was divided.
It was only a matter of time for them to have a bitter experience.
结论
1870年的法国，国力已然衰弱，民众认知滞后，无论是领导层还是下属官员都能力不足，民众不愿配合，国家更是陷入分裂。
对法国而言，遭遇一场惨痛失败只是时间问题。
Michel Proulx，Master from Paul Valery University, Montpellier III (Graduated 1994)Upvoted by
Vlăduţ Mihai, Master`s History & Modern European History, Faculty of History, University of Bucharest (2016) and
Ravi Vaish, MA English Literature & History (1990) 蒙彼利埃第三大学保罗·瓦莱里大学硕士（1994年毕业），获弗拉杜茨·米哈伊（布加勒斯特大学历史学院，现代欧洲史硕士，2016年毕业）、拉维·瓦伊什（英语文学与历史学硕士，1990年毕业）推荐
原因有二：愚蠢与背叛。
Two things: stupidity and treason.
Stupidity because, during the American Civil War, all European military powers had sent observers, who all came back with the same conclusion: a modern war will be fought with modern weapons and modern transport. They needed to equip with machine guns and develop the railways. The German states did just that. Their railway grid soon crisscrossed the whole of Germany.
所谓“愚蠢”，是因为在美国内战期间，所有欧洲军事强国都派遣了观察员，这些观察员回国后得出了一致结论：现代战争需依靠现代武器和现代交通。各国需为军队配备机枪，并发展铁路系统。德国各邦国正是这样做的，他们的铁路网很快遍布整个德国。
Not so in France. The railway grid was essentially the Freyssinet Star, in which all lines converged upon Paris (the same being repeated today: if you want to go from Marseilles to Strasbourg, they’ll have you go through Paris.) Thus all troops from all over France had to get out of the train in one of the stations, and go through Paris on foot to the Gare de l’Est which was the only line which led to Alsace. Because there was never (and there still isn’t) any convenient way to go from one station to the other.
As for machine guns, they couldn’t decide whether they should be artillery or infantry, so they remained in the stores, unused.
法国的情况则完全不同。其铁路网本质上是“弗雷西内星型布局”，所有线路都汇聚于巴黎（如今仍是如此：若从马赛前往斯特拉斯堡，仍需经巴黎中转）。因此，法国各地的军队都需在巴黎某一车站下车，步行穿过市区前往东站——这是前往阿尔萨斯的唯一铁路线路。因为无论是当时还是现在，巴黎各车站之间都没有便捷的换乘方式。
至于机枪，法军无法确定其应归属炮兵还是步兵，最终导致机枪被闲置在仓库中，未能投入使用。
As for treason, there were the Republicans who had had enough of the Bonapartist regime, and longed to take the place and arranged with General Bazaine so that he wouldn’t move from Metz, a capital city for the defense of France, despite orders, which led to the quick defeat of the French armies.
One must remember that in any country, oligarchs are NEVER patriots. Patriotism is for the small people, the plebs.
所谓“背叛”，是指共和党人早已对波拿巴政权不满，渴望取而代之。他们与巴赞元帅勾结，让其无视命令，固守梅斯（法国防御重镇）不撤退，最终导致法军迅速溃败。
需记住的是，在任何国家，寡头阶层都绝非爱国者。爱国主义不过是底层民众的信条。
Jihoon Seo (서지훈)，The Franco-Prussian war is a must to learn
关注普法战争研究
Well, there are many answers that really has the same intentions. The answer that I’ve posted above is one of them previously answered by me.
However, I only included what the French did wrong, due to the question, not what the Germans did well. So I will list somethings the Germans did well this time.
关于这个问题，已有许多观点相似的回答，我之前发布的上述内容便是其中之一。
但由于之前的问题聚焦于“法国做错了什么”，我仅分析了法国的失误，未提及德国的优势。因此，此次我将列举德国做得好的几个方面。
1. Efficient mobilization
After the war, this became the European standard model of conscxtion. The best thing about von Moltke is that he actually develops the Prussian-later German-army through constant experience. In the war of 1866, despite the Prussians showing great speed of mobilization and transportation with railways, there were still limitations.
1. 高效的动员体系
战后，这一动员体系成为欧洲征兵制度的标准模式。冯·毛奇的过人之处在于，他能通过不断积累经验来发展普鲁士（后来的德国）军队。1866年普奥战争中，尽管普鲁士展现出了依靠铁路进行快速动员和运输的能力，但仍存在局限性。
Supplies often times ended up in havoc, some soldiers were misplaced from their units, and especially, artillery ammunition wasn’t fluently supplied. The Prussian conscxtion model was far from perfect and in this, a war with France would be quite a gamble.
The Germans used regional depot systems unlike the French which mobilization wasn’t based on region and lead to great confusion. Plus, even before the war, soldiers were constantly prep-mobilized and highly educated junior officers played a good part with the cautious demigods-a nickname of the General Staff.
当时物资供应常陷入混乱，部分士兵与所属部队失联，尤其是炮兵弹药供应不畅。普鲁士的征兵模式远非完美，若此时与法国开战，风险极大。
德军采用了区域性兵站体系，法军则截然不同 —— 其动员并非以区域为基础，因此造成了极大混乱。此外，甚至在战前，德军士兵就一直处于预备动员状态；同时，受过良好教育的下级军官发挥了重要作用，谨慎的 “半神” 们 —— 这是总参谋部的昵称 —— 也功不可没。
2. Military reform
The French Liberal Empire failed to reform where as the German succeed.
Starting from the artillery. Better Krupp guns aren’t a major factor in the German victory as I’ve clearly stated in many of my Franco-Prussian war answers, but is still a factor. The Prussian artillery in 1866 was pathetic. Not only were they predominantly muzzleloading despite the Krupp C/64 being introduced earlier, some were even smoothbore. In terms of weaponry, the primary Prussian firepower was based on the needle rifle rather than their artillery. The over-focus in infantry also awared von Moltke that there needs to be a reform in artillery. He adopted the C/64 for light and horse artillery, C/67 for the foot artillery (each being 80mm firing 4kg and 90mm firing 7kg shell). Since 1867, there was constant rehearsal of artillery drills. The regular infantry had a training period of 3 years in contrast to the 4 years of the artillery.
2. 军事改革
法兰西自由帝国未能完成的改革，德国却成功实现了。
首先看炮兵。正如我在多篇关于普法战争的回答中所明确指出的，性能更优的克虏伯火炮并非德国获胜的主要因素，但仍是因素之一。1866年的普鲁士炮兵实力孱弱：尽管克虏伯C/64后装炮早已问世，但当时普鲁士炮兵仍以前装炮为主，部分甚至是滑膛炮。在武器装备方面，普鲁士的主要火力依赖针发步枪，而非炮兵。对步兵的过度侧重让冯·毛奇意识到炮兵改革的必要性。他为轻型炮兵和骑兵炮兵配备了C/64型火炮，为徒步炮兵配备了C/67型火炮（前者口径80毫米，炮弹重4千克；后者口径90毫米，炮弹重7千克）。自1867年起，德军频繁进行炮兵演练。正规步兵的训练周期为3年，而炮兵则为4年。
The infantry was largely formed with conscxts who were previous civilians. But, in many historic sources, it is mis-stated as professionals. That isn’t very correct, but neither is entirely wrong. It isn’t an exaggeration to say, all German men are professional soldiers. In their childhood and adolescents, they were educated in mandatory schools. As soon as they became adults, they served in the regular infantry for 3 years. After that, they had a short break and than return to reserve duty for 5 years. After that, they would return to civilian life and would get married and raise a family. Since then, they would be transferred to the Landwehr, further receiving training.
步兵部队主要由曾为平民的应征士兵组成，但许多史料误将其描述为职业军队。这种说法既不完全正确，也非完全错误——毫不夸张地说，所有德国男性都是“准职业士兵”。他们在童年和青少年时期接受义务教育，成年后进入正规步兵部队服役3年；之后短暂休整，再服5年预备役；随后回归平民生活，结婚生子，并转入国土防卫军（Landwehr）继续接受训练。
The French were in a very different situation. Conscxtion was chosen in a ballot since 1868. Even after 1868 and conscxtion became universal, wealthy conscxts could buy their way out of military duty. The second line troopers, Garde Mobile, annually trained 15 days without any overnight stays.
法国的情况则截然不同。1868年起，法军通过抽签方式征兵；即便1868年后推行普遍征兵制，富裕的应征者仍可花钱免服兵役。作为二线部队的机动卫队（Garde Mobile），每年仅训练15天，且无需留宿。
The cavalry also trained 4 years in the regulars. Unlike the French still over-focused in the glories of the élan, the shock action of the Napoleonic wars of the shining cuirassiers~ they couldn’t let go the fact that the cavalry’s primary weapon was not the sword or sabre anymore. This was proven in the US Civil War. It was the carbine and the speed. The Prussian army decreased the number of shock action cuirassier regiments and increased hussars for more efficient reconnaissance duties.
骑兵在正规部队的训练周期为4年。与法军不同，德军并未过度沉迷于拿破仑战争时期“锐气冲锋”的荣耀以及胸甲骑兵的辉煌——法军始终无法接受骑兵的主要武器已不再是马刀这一事实，而美国内战早已证明，骑兵的核心优势在于卡宾枪和机动性。普鲁士军队减少了侧重冲锋的胸甲骑兵团数量，增加了骠骑兵，以提升侦察效率。
Highly educated Junior officers lead to more initiatives during combat. Though more initiatives in lower ranks doesn’t equal a better system and in fact, the Germans would be tarnished because of this in the Battle of the Marne 1914. However, compared to the highly senior French counterparts-because ranking up was largely done by starting from the private-the young, active German counterparts proved to be highly efficient.
受过良好教育的初级军官在战斗中更具主动性。尽管基层部队主动性强并不等同于整体体系更优（事实上，1914年马恩河战役中，德军就因这一点受挫），但与法军相比——法军军官晋升多从士兵做起，导致高层军官年龄偏大——年轻、活跃的德军初级军官效率显著更高。
The Prussian-later German-General Staff was largely unchanged after the formation of the North German Confederation. Most of the staffs were Prussian, the system was also identical to the Prussian system. But it was efficient. Careful preparation of war in peace time was key for a swift and decisive victory in the later wars of 1866 and 1870.
北德意志邦联成立后，普鲁士（后来的德国）总参谋部的架构基本未变：多数参谋人员为普鲁士人，制度也与普鲁士时期一致，但效率极高。和平时期对战争的周密准备，是德军在1866年和1870年战争中迅速取得决定性胜利的关键。
3. Political Integrity
To be pinpoint, the Germans were susceptible to political divergence like the French, but there was a planned reason why that didn’t happen-Bismarck always has a plan.
Since 1867, a loose confederation of Germanic states, the North German Confederation was formed with southern German states not officially in the political unx, but even loosely related. Good examples would be Bavaria, Saxony, Württemburg, Hesse-Darmstadt, Mecklenburg, etc.
3. 政治凝聚力
准确地说，德国也曾像法国一样面临政治分裂的风险，但这种情况并未发生，背后有明确的原因——俾斯麦始终有周密的计划。
1867年，由日耳曼各邦国组成的松散联盟——北德意志邦联成立，南部德国各邦国虽未正式加入这一政治联盟，但仍保持着松散联系，巴伐利亚、萨克森、符腾堡、黑森-达姆施塔特、梅克伦堡等均属此类。
The Southern German states were supporters of the Greater German solution and was generally an opposition to Prussia’s Little Germany. Additionally, they had pretty good relationships with France especially Bavaria with their Mad Ludwig II.
南部德国各邦国支持“大德意志方案”，普遍反对普鲁士主张的“小德意志方案”。此外，它们与法国关系良好，尤其是巴伐利亚——巴伐利亚国王“疯王路德维希二世”与法国往来密切。
However, one incident turned the tide. Well, actually there was a bit more. After the insult in the Ems Telegram the French declared war on 19th July 1870. There plan included the invasion of Southern German states and a sudden French aggression ricocheted into the Southern German public’s mind changing opinions more towards their German friend, Prussia, also a faithful, powerful neighbor. Bismarck was aware of this and that is also one of the reasons why he wanted the French to declare war besides international preferences.
Well, this is a very short summary of what the Germans did well. You can search more about what the French did wrong in my previous answer.
然而，一件事扭转了局势（实际上背后还有更多细节）。“埃姆斯电报”事件引发法国不满后，法国于1870年7月19日宣战，其作战计划包括入侵南部德国各邦国。法国的突然进攻让南部德国民众的态度发生转变，他们开始更倾向于支持同为日耳曼民族、且强大可靠的邻国——普鲁士。俾斯麦早已预料到这一点，这也是他希望法国率先宣战的原因之一（另一原因是争取国际社会的支持）。
以上是对德国优势的简要总结，关于法国的失误，可参考我之前的回答。
既然法国几个世纪以来都是欧洲首屈一指的强国，为何会在普法战争中一败涂地？
Jihoon Seo (서지훈)，The Franco-Prussian war is a must to learn
关注普法战争研究
Oh the French were rotting from the inside. Yes, outside the French were still a premier European power even though they sort of ruined their image in 1867 when they withdrew from Mexico letting Maximillian II get executed. But, that’s a whole different conversation, so back to the main point.
So let me tell you how the French were rotting from the inside.
法国的衰败源于内部。从表面上看，法国仍是欧洲强国，但1867年他们从墨西哥撤军，导致马克西米利安二世被处决，这在一定程度上损害了其形象。不过这是另一个话题，我们还是回到重点上来。
下面我来具体说说法国内部是如何衰败的。
1. A Liberal Empire (since 1863)?
Émile Ollivier is the French statesman that introduced the concept of Empire Libérale to Napoleon III, an authoritarian Emperor back then. A Liberal Empire was rather fruitless ceding the power of the Emperor, giving excessive power to the press leaving them totally free to spread fake news and propaganda (with freedom of speech), and generally prevented Napoleon III from doing what he believed necessary.
1. 一个自由的帝国（从1863年开始）？
埃米尔·奥利维耶是法国政治家，他向当时的专制君主拿破仑三世提出了“自由帝国”的理念。然而，“自由帝国”并未起到实际作用：它削弱了皇帝的权力，却赋予媒体过大的自由，使得媒体可借助“言论自由”肆意传播虚假消息和宣传内容，这在很大程度上阻碍了拿破仑三世推行他认为必要的政策。
However, there was one huge speculated and that was the support from Republicans and Republican Bonapartists/liberal Bonapartists. Additionally, it may turn the increasing anti-Bonapartist sentiments around by showing a liberal aspect of the new Empire.
But being a liberal democratic nation for Napoleon III was nothing, but a dream.
First, this gave exclusive power to the French National Assembly to denounce whatever the Emperor wanted to propose.
不过，这一理念背后有一个重要的潜在考量，即争取共和党人、共和派波拿巴主义者以及自由派波拿巴主义者的支持。此外，通过展现新帝国的自由一面，或许能扭转日益增长的反波拿巴主义情绪。
但对拿破仑三世而言，将法国打造成自由民主国家终究只是一场空想。
首先，“自由帝国”赋予法国国民议会独有的权力，使其能够否决皇帝提出的任何提案。
In the 1869 French legislative election, the result was like below
1869年法国议会选举结果如下（参考维基百科“1869年法国议会选举”条目）：
The light and dark green are both Bonapartists. The dark being conservative Bonapartists (leader : Adolphe Vuitry), the light being liberal Bonapartists (Émile Ollivier). The red are the moderate Republicans (Léon Gambetta), the blue are Monarchists (Adolphe Thiers).
In theory, the Bonapartists should dominate, but in reality it wasn’t true. The increase in liberty for the press and anti-Bonapartists meant that their activity can expand to the public overcoming the disadvantage in their current parliamentary seats.
Leftists also used this opportunity to radicalize the Paris working class who were at first quite positive towards their Emperor into diehard Bourgeoisies.
The transformation of the French Second Empire into the Liberal Empire divided the French politically and would later result into further corruption in French politics.
浅绿和深绿代表的均为波拿巴主义者，其中深绿代表保守派波拿巴主义者（领袖：阿道夫·维特里），浅绿代表自由派波拿巴主义者（领袖：埃米尔·奥利维耶）；红色代表温和共和党人（领袖：莱昂·甘必大）；蓝色代表君主主义者（领袖：阿道夫·梯也尔）。
理论上，波拿巴主义者本应在议会中占据主导地位，但实际情况并非如此。媒体自由的扩大以及反波拿巴主义者活动空间的增加，使得他们能够突破议会席位不足的限制，将影响力扩大到公众层面。
左翼分子还借此机会，将原本对皇帝持积极态度的巴黎工人阶级激进化，使他们转变为坚定的资产阶级反对者。
法兰西第二帝国向“自由帝国”的转变，导致法国在政治上陷入分裂，随后更是加剧了法国政治的腐败。
2. Politicians Dedicated to Their Party, Not Their Nation
A good politician thinks of his nation and if necessary would cooperate with his opponents for the greater good. French politics since 1863 was far from it.
The highly anti-Bonapartist sentiments made the National Assembly be hostile to whatever the Emperor wants to propose.
2. 政客只忠于党派，而非国家
优秀的政客会以国家利益为重，必要时愿与对手合作以谋求更大福祉。但1863年之后的法国政治却远非如此。
强烈的反波拿巴主义情绪，使得国民议会对皇帝提出的任何提案都持敌视态度。
When Napoleon III proposed a military reform (increase of the regular army into 824,000 and the creation of a 400,000 Garde Mobile, general conscxtion, decrease in the years of service, etc.) after seeing the devastating defeat of the Austrians in 1866 and put this into vote to the National Assembly the reform was rejected except for the decrease in the years of service. The entire purpose of the reform was destroyed and the decrease in the years of service was proposed as the reform would increase the number of conscxts. But with only this, this only made the French army under powered.
1866年奥地利惨败后，拿破仑三世意识到军事改革的必要性，遂提出改革方案：将正规军规模扩至82.4万人，组建40万机动卫队，推行普遍征兵制，并缩短服役年限等。他将该方案提交国民议会表决，最终除“缩短服役年限”外，其余条款均被否决。改革的核心目标就此落空——“缩短服役年限”这一条款之所以能通过，仅是因为议员们认为改革会增加征兵人数，而这一条款可在一定程度上抵消这一影响。但仅靠这一项调整，只会导致法国军队实力不足。
The Assemblymen thought the military reform would be exploited by Napoleon III to use the newly reformed military into his own political guardian and persecute the opposition. However, whatever their excuses were this later proved devastating in the Franco-Prussian war.
The failure in the military reform before the Franco-Prussian war wasn’t the responsibility of Napoleon III unlike common belief (based on French Republican propaganda since they came into power), but it was the too liberal system and the excessive power of selfish politicians.
Besides that, when the war actually broke out anti-Bonapartists were busy dividing the people by destroying their support towards the Emperor, but to use these people as their own political force to achieve their power. Many socialists were busy radicalizing Paris workers with their radical beliefs and sabotaging the French army making it even more powerless.
议员们认为，拿破仑三世可能会利用军事改革，将改编后的军队变为自己的政治保护伞，并迫害反对者。但无论他们的借口是什么，这一决策在后来的普法战争中被证明是灾难性的。
与普遍观点（该观点源于共和党掌权后的宣传）不同，普法战争前军事改革的失败并非拿破仑三世之过，而是过度自由的制度以及自私政客手中过大的权力所致。
此外，战争爆发后，反波拿巴主义者一心煽动民众反对皇帝，破坏民众对皇帝的支持，目的是将民众收为己用，作为获取权力的政治资本。许多社会主义者则忙于用激进思想煽动巴黎工人，同时破坏法军行动，进一步削弱法军实力。
After the triple defeats in Wissembourg, Froeschwiller, and Spicheren, Empress Eugénie notes that France was in the moment of rebellion. That is also why the Army of Châlons formed in the military base at Châlons couldn’t retreat to Paris, but try a reckless outflanking maneuver against the Prussians which ultimately failed in the Battle of Sedan because the French public would literally riot against the army seeing the Emperor once so confident come in to the nation’s capital without the glory promised.
在维桑堡、弗罗埃斯克维莱和斯皮谢尔三场战役接连失利后，欧仁妮皇后指出法国已处于叛乱边缘。这也解释了为何在沙隆军事基地组建的沙隆军团无法撤退至巴黎，反而不得不冒险对普鲁士军队实施侧翼包抄——这一行动最终在色当战役中失败。因为一旦曾充满信心的皇帝未能带着承诺的荣耀返回首都，法国民众很可能会爆发针对军队的骚乱。
3. Excessive Confidence
The fact that the French were a premier European power also played against them in the Franco-Prussian war. Because they had such an outlandish title, it also left the army over-confident and not prepare for newer opponents nor the rapid development of technology. The French in the 1860’s acted as the standard of world armies and that is also the cornerstone of the US army in the US Civil War.
These American uniforms were also copied from the French
When the sign of war arrived in 1866 after the decisive Austrian defeat in the Austro-Prussian war and the rise of the North German Confederation in 1867, many French leaders believed the French could contain the threat by their current status(which was definitely a no no). This also worked as a factor in rejecting the military reform proposed by Napoleon III and Marshal Adolphe Niel which was like cancer in the French performance in the future war.
3. 过度自信
法国作为欧洲强国的地位，在普法战争中反而对其不利。正是这一“显赫”头衔，让法军变得过度自信，既未做好应对新对手的准备，也忽视了军事技术的快速发展。19世纪60年代，法国军队堪称世界军队的标杆，美国内战时期美军的建设也以此为基础。
美军的制服设计也借鉴了法军样式。
1866年普奥战争中奥地利惨败，1867年北德意志邦联崛起，战争的苗头已然显现。但许多法国领导人仍认为，凭借法国当时的地位足以遏制威胁（这一想法显然错误）。这种心态也成为他们否决拿破仑三世和阿道夫·尼尔元帅提出的军事改革的原因之一，而这一否决对法国在未来战争中的表现造成了致命影响。
4. Incompetent Generals
The problem wasn’t only the politicians, the generals were also a problem.
Many weren’t the most competent leaders truly understanding modern technology and the following strategy and tactics. Many just became generals by the recommendation from their friends or relatives who are in powerful positions. Others became generals in colonial wars like in Algeria, IndoChina, China or foreign campaigns like in the Crimean war, Italian campaign, Mexican campaign.
4. 将领无能
问题不仅出在政客身上，将领们也难辞其咎。
许多将领并非真正懂现代军事技术及相应战略战术的合格领导者。他们中不少人是凭借有权势的亲友推荐才升任将军；另有一些则是在阿尔及利亚、印度支那、中国等殖民地战争，或克里米亚战争、意大利战役、墨西哥战役等对外作战中积累资历后晋升的。
The Franco-Prussian war was proven to be a different generation for them to contain. Many didn’t understand the new weapon technology. Marshal Bazaine for instance had never seen a French mitrailleuse before and even among people who did know about this weapon, they got a wrong impression of their effectiveness and appropriate uses
事实证明，普法战争是一场他们难以应对的新一代战争。许多将领不了解新型武器技术，比如巴赞元帅此前从未见过法国的米特拉约塞机枪；即便有人知道这类武器，也对其效能和正确使用方法存在误解。
Reffye Mitrailleuse
（注：即雷菲耶式米特拉约塞机枪，当时法军的新型武器）
The Artillery Committee was too conservative to accept new technologies into service. The Krupp breechloading steel gun for instance was rejected due to its “safety issues” (a general perception on breechloading artillery technology during that time) and rejected the Chassepot breechloading carbine (being content with the existing muzzleloading carbine).
炮兵委员会过于保守，不愿接纳新技术投入使用。例如，克虏伯后装式钢炮因所谓的“安全问题”（这是当时人们对后装炮技术的普遍担忧）被否决；夏塞波后装卡宾枪也未被采用，委员会仍满足于现有的前装卡宾枪。
Model 1822T Artillery Carbine (17.6mm caliber)
（注：即1822T型炮兵卡宾枪，口径17.6毫米，当时法军使用的前装卡宾枪）
The cavalry was still rather ignorant with their modern wars seeing it glory-less still obsessed with the élan and shock action. These are good examples, too many cuirassiers!! The Germans in the other hand decreased the number of cuirassier and other heavy units and increased lights (hussars and uhlans) for better reconnaissance, scouting, flanking performance.
骑兵部队对现代战争认知不足，认为现代战争缺乏荣耀感，仍沉迷于“锐气冲锋”的传统战术，重型胸甲骑兵数量过多就是典型例证。反观德国，他们减少了胸甲骑兵等重型骑兵部队的数量，增加了轻骑兵（骠骑兵和枪骑兵），以提升侦察、巡逻和侧翼作战能力。
The infantry was rearmed with the Chassepot rifle which was for sure a good rifle, but the effectiveness of the Chassepot was over-emphasized in French infantry tactics. The result was the feu de bataillon basically an infantry tactic that emphasizes static field defenses (building trenches by battalion with in 15 minutes and shooting down enemies in volleys in long ranges). The tactic was a movement to adapt to modern firepower, but wasn’t a good alternative. Due to the over-emphasis on defense, the French infantry battalions were too rigid in field maneuvers and was isolated without any artillery support. If the French had good artillery, this tactic might’ve been better as the French will have a clear advantage in range with artillery and infantry. But the Germans still had the upper-hand in artillery which meant that if the French battalion didn’t move forward and end the battle, they will just get mown down by artillerymen later on.
步兵部队换装了夏塞波步枪，这款步枪确实性能优良，但法军步兵战术过度强调其效能，最终形成了“营级射击”战术——该战术以静态阵地防御为核心，要求每个营在15分钟内构筑战壕，并以排枪齐射的方式在远距离打击敌人。这种战术虽试图适应现代火力，但并非理想方案。由于过度侧重防御，法军步兵营的野外机动过于僵化，且常处于缺乏炮兵支援的孤立状态。若法军拥有精良的炮兵装备，该战术或许能发挥作用，因为步炮协同可让法军在射程上占据明显优势。但德军在炮兵方面占据上风，这意味着法军步兵营若不主动推进、速战速决，最终只会被德军炮兵击溃。
So that was about technology, but there are other incompetence shown most famously, Marshal Bazaine. Bazaine had this weird political fantasy of him getting political power. He was a general dedicated to himself not the nation. It was also due to his bad relations with general Frossard who was adored by Napoleon III and the emperor because of the Emperor’s interest on Frossard.
除了技术层面的问题，将领的无能还体现在其他方面，巴赞元帅就是最典型的例子。他对获取政治权力抱有不切实际的幻想，是一位只忠于自己而非国家的将领。此外，他与弗罗萨尔将军关系恶劣，而弗罗萨尔深受拿破仑三世赏识——皇帝对弗罗萨尔的关注是二人关系紧张的原因之一。
Charles August Frossard
（注：即夏尔·奥古斯特·弗罗萨尔，法军将领）
In the war, he wasn’t dedicated in cooperating with the Emperor, but to strengthen his political ground to achieve power. After he surrendered to the Prussians after the Siege of Metz, Bazaine didn’t order to spike the guns and destroy the weapons, but surrendered to the Prussians in good conditions. But he was no skilled politician and no patriotic marshal. His political interest and the military blunders also greatly contributed to the defeat of the Army of the Rhine (though still he wasn’t solely responsible for the French defeat as he was often times scapegoated excessively).
战争期间，巴赞并未全力配合皇帝，而是一心巩固自身政治地位以谋求权力。梅斯围城战后，他向普鲁士军队投降，却未下令破坏火炮和武器，而是让军队以良好状态投降。他既非老练的政客，也非爱国的元帅，其政治野心和军事失误是莱茵军团战败的重要原因（不过，他也常被过度当作替罪羊，法国战败并非他一人之过）。
5. Lacked Understanding the Germans
Prussia (later the North German Confederation, later the German Empire) was an innovative nation constant moving itself forward as time passes. In 1850, it was humiliated by their diplomatic defeat in the First Schleswig war (1848–49)-the Humiliation of Olmütz.
From 1858–1862, Moltke became the Prussian General Staff, Roon became the Minister of War, Bismarck became the Prime Minister of Prussia, and the king was a highly supportive Wilhelm I. This good collaboration of innovative figures were the driving force of the Prussian progress until reaching unification.
The French in the other hand, under-estimated or didn’t fully appreciate how big Prussia was a threat to the French.
5. 对德国认知不足
普鲁士（后发展为北德意志邦联，最终成为德意志帝国）是一个不断创新、持续发展的国家。1850年，普鲁士在第一次石勒苏益格战争（1848-1849年）中遭遇外交惨败，史称“奥尔米茨之辱”，蒙受了耻辱。
1858至1862年间，毛奇出任普鲁士总参谋长，罗恩担任战争大臣，俾斯麦成为普鲁士首相，而威廉一世国王对此给予了大力支持。这些具有创新精神的人物之间的良好协作，成为普鲁士直至统一过程中的发展动力。
反观法国，他们低估了普鲁士对自身的威胁，未能充分认识到这一威胁的严重性。
Bismarck met Napoleon III in Biarritz in October 1865 to assure French neutrality during the Austro-Prussian war by giving the French support to annex Belgium and Luxembourg. Surprisingly, Napoleon III denied this thinking that it was unnecessary for the French to be given a reward for letting its enemy (Austria) fight against Prussia. Here, we can see a clear misconception of Napoleon III in European geopolitics of 1865–66. Austria wasn’t a big threat, it was Prussia, but Napoleon didn’t notice and many others weren’t an exception.
Bismarck later wrote in his memoirs, ‘Napoleon III is an unknown incompetent’.
1865年10月，俾斯麦在比亚里茨与拿破仑三世会面，提出支持法国吞并比利时和卢森堡，以换取法国在普奥战争中保持中立。令人意外的是，拿破仑三世拒绝了这一提议——他认为，法国让自己的“敌人”（奥地利）与普鲁士交战，无需对方给予回报。由此可见，1865-1866年的欧洲地缘政治中，拿破仑三世存在明显误解：当时奥地利并非法国的重大威胁，普鲁士才是，但拿破仑三世未能意识到这一点，其他许多法国人也同样如此。
俾斯麦后来在回忆录中写道：“拿破仑三世是一个无能却不自知的人。”
The only major politician that truly understood the Prussian threat was Adolphe Thiers who announced that France should go to war with Prussia now and double team the Prussians in the Austro-Prussian war or the French would fall into a ditch of danger. He also was one of the few who opposed the Franco-Prussian war to be declared as the declaration of war was a direct path to make this threat a reality. If more French politicians were aware, than France would’ve prepared for a European war before 1866 to prevent the Austro-Prussian war from happening and further the North German Confederation from being created, but in 1866 there were less than 100,000 French troops and even these were under-prepared. The Prussians had three times the soldiers in Bohemia.
唯一真正认识到普鲁士威胁的主要政客是阿道夫·梯也尔。他提出，法国应立即对普鲁士开战，并在普奥战争中与奥地利联手夹击普鲁士，否则法国将陷入危险境地。他也是少数反对对普鲁士宣战的人之一，因为他认为宣战会让普鲁士的威胁变为现实。若当时更多法国政客能意识到这一点，法国本可在1866年前为欧洲战争做好准备，阻止普奥战争爆发，进而阻止北德意志邦联成立。但1866年时，法军兵力不足10万人，且即便这部分兵力也未做好充分准备，而普鲁士在波西米亚的兵力已是法军的三倍。
Adolphe Thiers (a conservative French July Monarchy supporter and a representing Orleanist)
阿道夫·梯也尔（法国保守派，七月王朝支持者，奥尔良派代表人物）
The ignorant French public went out to the streets waving their tricolor and celebrated the Prussian victory.
无知的法国民众走上街头，挥舞着三色旗，庆祝普鲁士在普奥战争中的胜利。
Conclusion
In 1870, the French were a weakened and an ill-informed power with incompetent leadership and subordinates of the leaders. The public was also not cooperative and the nation was divided.
It was only a matter of time for them to have a bitter experience.
结论
1870年的法国，国力已然衰弱，民众认知滞后，无论是领导层还是下属官员都能力不足，民众不愿配合，国家更是陷入分裂。
对法国而言，遭遇一场惨痛失败只是时间问题。
Michel Proulx，Master from Paul Valery University, Montpellier III (Graduated 1994)Upvoted by
Vlăduţ Mihai, Master`s History & Modern European History, Faculty of History, University of Bucharest (2016) and
Ravi Vaish, MA English Literature & History (1990) 蒙彼利埃第三大学保罗·瓦莱里大学硕士（1994年毕业），获弗拉杜茨·米哈伊（布加勒斯特大学历史学院，现代欧洲史硕士，2016年毕业）、拉维·瓦伊什（英语文学与历史学硕士，1990年毕业）推荐
原因有二：愚蠢与背叛。
Two things: stupidity and treason.
Stupidity because, during the American Civil War, all European military powers had sent observers, who all came back with the same conclusion: a modern war will be fought with modern weapons and modern transport. They needed to equip with machine guns and develop the railways. The German states did just that. Their railway grid soon crisscrossed the whole of Germany.
所谓“愚蠢”，是因为在美国内战期间，所有欧洲军事强国都派遣了观察员，这些观察员回国后得出了一致结论：现代战争需依靠现代武器和现代交通。各国需为军队配备机枪，并发展铁路系统。德国各邦国正是这样做的，他们的铁路网很快遍布整个德国。
Not so in France. The railway grid was essentially the Freyssinet Star, in which all lines converged upon Paris (the same being repeated today: if you want to go from Marseilles to Strasbourg, they’ll have you go through Paris.) Thus all troops from all over France had to get out of the train in one of the stations, and go through Paris on foot to the Gare de l’Est which was the only line which led to Alsace. Because there was never (and there still isn’t) any convenient way to go from one station to the other.
As for machine guns, they couldn’t decide whether they should be artillery or infantry, so they remained in the stores, unused.
法国的情况则完全不同。其铁路网本质上是“弗雷西内星型布局”，所有线路都汇聚于巴黎（如今仍是如此：若从马赛前往斯特拉斯堡，仍需经巴黎中转）。因此，法国各地的军队都需在巴黎某一车站下车，步行穿过市区前往东站——这是前往阿尔萨斯的唯一铁路线路。因为无论是当时还是现在，巴黎各车站之间都没有便捷的换乘方式。
至于机枪，法军无法确定其应归属炮兵还是步兵，最终导致机枪被闲置在仓库中，未能投入使用。
As for treason, there were the Republicans who had had enough of the Bonapartist regime, and longed to take the place and arranged with General Bazaine so that he wouldn’t move from Metz, a capital city for the defense of France, despite orders, which led to the quick defeat of the French armies.
One must remember that in any country, oligarchs are NEVER patriots. Patriotism is for the small people, the plebs.
所谓“背叛”，是指共和党人早已对波拿巴政权不满，渴望取而代之。他们与巴赞元帅勾结，让其无视命令，固守梅斯（法国防御重镇）不撤退，最终导致法军迅速溃败。
需记住的是，在任何国家，寡头阶层都绝非爱国者。爱国主义不过是底层民众的信条。
Jihoon Seo (서지훈)，The Franco-Prussian war is a must to learn
关注普法战争研究
Well, there are many answers that really has the same intentions. The answer that I’ve posted above is one of them previously answered by me.
However, I only included what the French did wrong, due to the question, not what the Germans did well. So I will list somethings the Germans did well this time.
关于这个问题，已有许多观点相似的回答，我之前发布的上述内容便是其中之一。
但由于之前的问题聚焦于“法国做错了什么”，我仅分析了法国的失误，未提及德国的优势。因此，此次我将列举德国做得好的几个方面。
1. Efficient mobilization
After the war, this became the European standard model of conscxtion. The best thing about von Moltke is that he actually develops the Prussian-later German-army through constant experience. In the war of 1866, despite the Prussians showing great speed of mobilization and transportation with railways, there were still limitations.
1. 高效的动员体系
战后，这一动员体系成为欧洲征兵制度的标准模式。冯·毛奇的过人之处在于，他能通过不断积累经验来发展普鲁士（后来的德国）军队。1866年普奥战争中，尽管普鲁士展现出了依靠铁路进行快速动员和运输的能力，但仍存在局限性。
Supplies often times ended up in havoc, some soldiers were misplaced from their units, and especially, artillery ammunition wasn’t fluently supplied. The Prussian conscxtion model was far from perfect and in this, a war with France would be quite a gamble.
The Germans used regional depot systems unlike the French which mobilization wasn’t based on region and lead to great confusion. Plus, even before the war, soldiers were constantly prep-mobilized and highly educated junior officers played a good part with the cautious demigods-a nickname of the General Staff.
当时物资供应常陷入混乱，部分士兵与所属部队失联，尤其是炮兵弹药供应不畅。普鲁士的征兵模式远非完美，若此时与法国开战，风险极大。
德军采用了区域性兵站体系，法军则截然不同 —— 其动员并非以区域为基础，因此造成了极大混乱。此外，甚至在战前，德军士兵就一直处于预备动员状态；同时，受过良好教育的下级军官发挥了重要作用，谨慎的 “半神” 们 —— 这是总参谋部的昵称 —— 也功不可没。
2. Military reform
The French Liberal Empire failed to reform where as the German succeed.
Starting from the artillery. Better Krupp guns aren’t a major factor in the German victory as I’ve clearly stated in many of my Franco-Prussian war answers, but is still a factor. The Prussian artillery in 1866 was pathetic. Not only were they predominantly muzzleloading despite the Krupp C/64 being introduced earlier, some were even smoothbore. In terms of weaponry, the primary Prussian firepower was based on the needle rifle rather than their artillery. The over-focus in infantry also awared von Moltke that there needs to be a reform in artillery. He adopted the C/64 for light and horse artillery, C/67 for the foot artillery (each being 80mm firing 4kg and 90mm firing 7kg shell). Since 1867, there was constant rehearsal of artillery drills. The regular infantry had a training period of 3 years in contrast to the 4 years of the artillery.
2. 军事改革
法兰西自由帝国未能完成的改革，德国却成功实现了。
首先看炮兵。正如我在多篇关于普法战争的回答中所明确指出的，性能更优的克虏伯火炮并非德国获胜的主要因素，但仍是因素之一。1866年的普鲁士炮兵实力孱弱：尽管克虏伯C/64后装炮早已问世，但当时普鲁士炮兵仍以前装炮为主，部分甚至是滑膛炮。在武器装备方面，普鲁士的主要火力依赖针发步枪，而非炮兵。对步兵的过度侧重让冯·毛奇意识到炮兵改革的必要性。他为轻型炮兵和骑兵炮兵配备了C/64型火炮，为徒步炮兵配备了C/67型火炮（前者口径80毫米，炮弹重4千克；后者口径90毫米，炮弹重7千克）。自1867年起，德军频繁进行炮兵演练。正规步兵的训练周期为3年，而炮兵则为4年。
The infantry was largely formed with conscxts who were previous civilians. But, in many historic sources, it is mis-stated as professionals. That isn’t very correct, but neither is entirely wrong. It isn’t an exaggeration to say, all German men are professional soldiers. In their childhood and adolescents, they were educated in mandatory schools. As soon as they became adults, they served in the regular infantry for 3 years. After that, they had a short break and than return to reserve duty for 5 years. After that, they would return to civilian life and would get married and raise a family. Since then, they would be transferred to the Landwehr, further receiving training.
步兵部队主要由曾为平民的应征士兵组成，但许多史料误将其描述为职业军队。这种说法既不完全正确，也非完全错误——毫不夸张地说，所有德国男性都是“准职业士兵”。他们在童年和青少年时期接受义务教育，成年后进入正规步兵部队服役3年；之后短暂休整，再服5年预备役；随后回归平民生活，结婚生子，并转入国土防卫军（Landwehr）继续接受训练。
The French were in a very different situation. Conscxtion was chosen in a ballot since 1868. Even after 1868 and conscxtion became universal, wealthy conscxts could buy their way out of military duty. The second line troopers, Garde Mobile, annually trained 15 days without any overnight stays.
法国的情况则截然不同。1868年起，法军通过抽签方式征兵；即便1868年后推行普遍征兵制，富裕的应征者仍可花钱免服兵役。作为二线部队的机动卫队（Garde Mobile），每年仅训练15天，且无需留宿。
The cavalry also trained 4 years in the regulars. Unlike the French still over-focused in the glories of the élan, the shock action of the Napoleonic wars of the shining cuirassiers~ they couldn’t let go the fact that the cavalry’s primary weapon was not the sword or sabre anymore. This was proven in the US Civil War. It was the carbine and the speed. The Prussian army decreased the number of shock action cuirassier regiments and increased hussars for more efficient reconnaissance duties.
骑兵在正规部队的训练周期为4年。与法军不同，德军并未过度沉迷于拿破仑战争时期“锐气冲锋”的荣耀以及胸甲骑兵的辉煌——法军始终无法接受骑兵的主要武器已不再是马刀这一事实，而美国内战早已证明，骑兵的核心优势在于卡宾枪和机动性。普鲁士军队减少了侧重冲锋的胸甲骑兵团数量，增加了骠骑兵，以提升侦察效率。
Highly educated Junior officers lead to more initiatives during combat. Though more initiatives in lower ranks doesn’t equal a better system and in fact, the Germans would be tarnished because of this in the Battle of the Marne 1914. However, compared to the highly senior French counterparts-because ranking up was largely done by starting from the private-the young, active German counterparts proved to be highly efficient.
受过良好教育的初级军官在战斗中更具主动性。尽管基层部队主动性强并不等同于整体体系更优（事实上，1914年马恩河战役中，德军就因这一点受挫），但与法军相比——法军军官晋升多从士兵做起，导致高层军官年龄偏大——年轻、活跃的德军初级军官效率显著更高。
The Prussian-later German-General Staff was largely unchanged after the formation of the North German Confederation. Most of the staffs were Prussian, the system was also identical to the Prussian system. But it was efficient. Careful preparation of war in peace time was key for a swift and decisive victory in the later wars of 1866 and 1870.
北德意志邦联成立后，普鲁士（后来的德国）总参谋部的架构基本未变：多数参谋人员为普鲁士人，制度也与普鲁士时期一致，但效率极高。和平时期对战争的周密准备，是德军在1866年和1870年战争中迅速取得决定性胜利的关键。
3. Political Integrity
To be pinpoint, the Germans were susceptible to political divergence like the French, but there was a planned reason why that didn’t happen-Bismarck always has a plan.
Since 1867, a loose confederation of Germanic states, the North German Confederation was formed with southern German states not officially in the political unx, but even loosely related. Good examples would be Bavaria, Saxony, Württemburg, Hesse-Darmstadt, Mecklenburg, etc.
3. 政治凝聚力
准确地说，德国也曾像法国一样面临政治分裂的风险，但这种情况并未发生，背后有明确的原因——俾斯麦始终有周密的计划。
1867年，由日耳曼各邦国组成的松散联盟——北德意志邦联成立，南部德国各邦国虽未正式加入这一政治联盟，但仍保持着松散联系，巴伐利亚、萨克森、符腾堡、黑森-达姆施塔特、梅克伦堡等均属此类。
The Southern German states were supporters of the Greater German solution and was generally an opposition to Prussia’s Little Germany. Additionally, they had pretty good relationships with France especially Bavaria with their Mad Ludwig II.
南部德国各邦国支持“大德意志方案”，普遍反对普鲁士主张的“小德意志方案”。此外，它们与法国关系良好，尤其是巴伐利亚——巴伐利亚国王“疯王路德维希二世”与法国往来密切。
However, one incident turned the tide. Well, actually there was a bit more. After the insult in the Ems Telegram the French declared war on 19th July 1870. There plan included the invasion of Southern German states and a sudden French aggression ricocheted into the Southern German public’s mind changing opinions more towards their German friend, Prussia, also a faithful, powerful neighbor. Bismarck was aware of this and that is also one of the reasons why he wanted the French to declare war besides international preferences.
Well, this is a very short summary of what the Germans did well. You can search more about what the French did wrong in my previous answer.
然而，一件事扭转了局势（实际上背后还有更多细节）。“埃姆斯电报”事件引发法国不满后，法国于1870年7月19日宣战，其作战计划包括入侵南部德国各邦国。法国的突然进攻让南部德国民众的态度发生转变，他们开始更倾向于支持同为日耳曼民族、且强大可靠的邻国——普鲁士。俾斯麦早已预料到这一点，这也是他希望法国率先宣战的原因之一（另一原因是争取国际社会的支持）。
以上是对德国优势的简要总结，关于法国的失误，可参考我之前的回答。
评论翻译
应了那句老话，骄兵必败，再辉煌的过去也不能代替枕戈待旦应对危机的警惕心
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