美国知乎提问：拿破仑是如何击败普鲁士的？
How did Napoleon defeat Prussia?
译文简介
拿破仑是如何击败普鲁士的？ 这里做了详细分析和介绍
正文翻译
Jimmie Byrne, Bartender (2018–present)
吉米·伯恩，调酒师（2018年至今）
Aside from the sheer incompetence of the men running Prussia at the time, there was also another important factor in Prussia’s defeat, and that was the decline of the Prussian Army itself.
By the time Jena–Auerstedt rolled around, it had been more than 30 years since Frederick the Great’s famed Prussians had dominated the battlefields of Europe. In that time, much had changed in Europe, but unfortunately the Prussian Army had not.
During the Seven Years War, the Prussian Army’s battlefield superiority had been down to its ferocious discipline, its soldiers moving with all of the order of the parade ground on the battlefield. What worked in 1757, however, was less adequate in 1806.
Prussia’s successes in the Seven Years War had made its generals complacent. They simply sat on their laurels for 30 years and trusted that what worked for Der Alte Fritz would work for them.
So while Prussia’s armies were still training and drilling as they had since the time of Frederick, Napoleon’s armies were using a far more mobile and flexible way of making war. Their use of columns, corps formations, and combined-arms divisions gave them a decisive tactical and strategic edge over the inflexible “moving walls” of Prussia.
As well as that, Napoleon’s recruitment en masse of his citizens had vastly expanded France’s armies. Even if Prussia had kept up with the pace of military innovation, they would have been swamped by sheer numbers.
So in short, Prussia fighting Napoleon was akin to Vietnam-era US troops taking on the NATO armies that invaded Iraq.
No contest.
除了当时普鲁士统治者的极度无能外，普鲁士战败还有另一个重要因素，那就是普鲁士军队自身的衰落。耶拿-奥尔施泰特战役爆发时，距离腓特烈大帝麾下著名的普鲁士军队称霸欧洲战场已过去30多年。在此期间，欧洲发生了巨大变化，但不幸的是，普鲁士军队却一成不变。七年战争期间，普鲁士军队之所以能在战场上占据优势，靠的是其严苛的纪律，士兵们在战场上行动时，完全像在阅兵场上一样整齐有序。然而，1757年行之有效的战术，到了1806年已不再适用。普鲁士在七年战争中的胜利让其将领们变得自满，他们安于现状长达30年，坚信曾经适用于“老弗里茨”（腓特烈大帝的昵称）的战术，也会对自己奏效。因此，当普鲁士军队仍在沿用腓特烈时代的方式进行训练和演习时，拿破仑的军队却采用了机动性和灵活性远超前者的作战方式。他们运用纵队战术、军团编制以及诸兵种合成师，这使其在战术和战略上对僵化的普鲁士“移动堡垒”形成了决定性优势。此外，拿破仑在国内大规模征兵，极大地扩充了法国军队的规模。即便普鲁士能跟上军事革新的步伐，也会被法军压倒性的数量所击溃。简而言之，普鲁士与拿破仑作战，就好比越南战争时期的美军对抗入侵伊拉克的北约军队，毫无胜算可言。
Napoleon being presented with captured Prussian banners after Jena–Auerstedt.
耶拿-奥尔施泰特战役后，拿破仑接受缴获的普鲁士军旗的场景。
Ian Kummer, American Tourist in Russia
伊恩·库默，在俄罗斯的美国游客
Originally Answered: How did Napoleon beat Prussia? Wasn't Prussia famed for their military competence?
The British anti-French strategy in this period could be described as using every other continental power as a battering ram. Prussia’s case is particularly embarrassing because there was no compelling reason for them to fight France in the first place and they were defeated in large part by their own comical over-confidence.
Upon declaration of war in Autumn 1806, and Prussian officers mockingly sharpened their swords on the steps of the French embassy in Berlin. Napoleon took Berlin on October 27, not even a month into his campaign, and marched some of those same officers as prisoners past the embassy.
The Prussians’ crushing defeat in 19 days can be attributed to masterful tactics by the French army, and their own failure to adapt to the modern realities of maneuver and firepower.
原问题：拿破仑是如何击败普鲁士的？普鲁士的军事能力不是素来闻名吗？这一时期英国的反法战略，可以说是将其他所有欧洲大陆国家都当作了攻击法国的“攻城锤”。普鲁士的情况尤为尴尬，因为他们起初根本没有充分理由与法国开战，而其战败在很大程度上是源于自身可笑的过度自信。1806年秋，战争爆发后，普鲁士军官在柏林的法国大使馆台阶上嘲讽地磨着剑。然而，拿破仑在战役打响还不到一个月的10月27日就攻占了柏林，并且押着当初那些军官中的一部分人，作为战俘从大使馆前走过。普鲁士在19天内遭遇惨败，一方面是因为法国军队运用了高超的战术，另一方面则是因为普鲁士自身未能适应机动作战和火力作战的现代战争实际。
Assistant Bot
助手
Napoleon defeated Prussia through a combination of strategic surprise, operational speed, superior command and control, effective use of corps organization, and exploitation of political and military weaknesses within the Prussian system. The decisive campaign took place in 1806–1807, culminating in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstädt (14 October 1806) and the rapid follow-up that destroyed Prussian political will and armies.
拿破仑之所以能击败普鲁士，是凭借战略突袭、作战速度、卓越的指挥控制、军团编制的有效运用，以及对普鲁士体系内部政治和军事弱点的利用等多重因素的结合。决定性的战役发生在1806至1807年，最终以1806年10月14日的耶拿和奥尔施泰特双战役，以及随后迅速展开的行动摧毁普鲁士的政治意志和军队而告终。
Key factors and sequence
关键因素与事件经过
Political and strategic context
Prussia entered the War of the Fourth Coalition late (August–October 1806), believing French attention was fixed elsewhere and overestimating its own strength and the reliability of allies.
Prussian high command was divided between traditional, cautious generals and a political-military elite slow to adapt to Napoleon’s operational methods.
政治与战略背景
普鲁士很晚才加入第四次反法同盟战争（1806年8-10月），当时它认为法国的注意力集中在其他地方，同时高估了自身实力以及盟友的可靠性。普鲁士最高指挥部内部存在分歧：一方是传统谨慎的将领，另一方是迟迟未能适应拿破仑作战方式的军政精英。
Operational art and surprise
Napoleon concentrated forces rapidly in the Electorate of Saxony, using forced marches and concealed maneuvers to achieve local superiority at the point of contact.
He deliberately presented maneuvers that obscured his true main effort, fixing Prussian forces while executing a decisive envelopment.
作战艺术与突袭
拿破仑利用强行军和隐蔽机动，迅速在萨克森选侯国集结兵力，在交战点形成局部优势。他故意通过机动掩盖真实的主攻方向，牵制普鲁士军队，同时实施决定性的包围行动。
Corps system and command
The French corps system—self-sustaining, combined-arms formations under marshals—allowed flexibility, independent action, and convergent attacks.
Napoleon’s centralized strategic control combined with delegated tactical initiative in his marshals produced quick, coordinated movements that Prussian staff procedures could not match.
军团编制与指挥
法国的军团编制是由元帅指挥的、具备自给能力的诸兵种合成部队，这种编制具备灵活性、独立作战能力和协同进攻能力。拿破仑的集中战略指挥，加上赋予元帅们的战术主动权，使其军队能够实施快速、协同的机动，而普鲁士的参谋流程根本无法与之相比。
Superior reconnaissance and tempo
French cavalry reconnaissance and light infantry screens provided better operational intelligence and faster decision loops.
French forces maintained operational tempo with aggressive pursuit; Prussian units were repeatedly outmaneuvered and prevented from forming a coherent defensive front.
卓越的侦察与作战节奏
法国骑兵的侦察行动和轻步兵的掩护，提供了更优质的作战情报和更快的决策周期。法军通过积极追击保持作战节奏，普鲁士部队多次陷入机动劣势，无法形成连贯的防御阵线。
Battles of Jena and Auerstädt (14 October 1806)
At Jena, Napoleon engaged and decisively defeated the bulk of the Prussian-Saxon army through concentrated attacks, effective use of artillery, and timely commitment of infantry and cavalry.
Simultaneously at Auerstädt, Marshal Davout, commanding a smaller French force, unexpectedly ran into and defeated a larger Prussian corps under the Duke of Brunswick—an outcome owed to superior leadership, discipline, and coordination.
The twin defeats shattered organized Prussian resistance in the field; command cohesion collapsed when the Duke of Brunswick was mortally wounded.
耶拿和奥尔施泰特战役（1806年10月14日）
在耶拿战役中，拿破仑通过集中进攻、有效运用炮兵以及及时投入步兵和骑兵，与普萨联军主力交战并将其彻底击败。与此同时，在奥尔施泰特战役中，指挥规模较小法军部队的达武元帅，意外遭遇并击败了不伦瑞克公爵麾下规模更大的普鲁士军团，这一结果得益于法军卓越的领导力、纪律性和协同能力。这两场惨败摧毁了普鲁士在战场上有组织的抵抗，不伦瑞克公爵受致命伤后，普鲁士的指挥体系彻底瓦解。
Collapse, pursuit, and political consequences
French forces pursued relentlessly, capturing or forcing the surrender of Prussian garrisons (including the fall of fortress towns) and large numbers of prisoners.
The speed of the French advance prevented Prussia from stabilizing a new front or coordinating with Russian allies.
The military collapse precipitated political crisis in Prussia, leading to the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) in which Prussia suffered territorial losses, heavy indemnities, and a reduced status in German affairs.
溃败、追击与政治后果
法军展开无情追击，攻占或迫使普鲁士驻军投降（包括要塞城镇的陷落），并俘获大量战俘。法军推进速度之快，使普鲁士无法稳定新的战线，也无法与俄国盟友协同行动。军事上的溃败引发了普鲁士的政治危机，最终导致1807年《提尔西特和约》的签订。根据该条约，普鲁士丧失了大片领土，需支付巨额赔款，在德意志事务中的地位也大幅下降。
Why Prussia lost despite size and tradition
Tactical and doctrinal rigidity: Prussian tactics still emphasized linear formations and rigid staff-driven orders; they lacked the operational flexibility of the French corps system.
Leadership failures and poor staff work: senior Prussian commanders misread French intentions, dispersed forces, and failed to concentrate at critical points; orders were slow and often contradictory.
Logistical and mobilization problems: Prussian mobilization was slower and less adaptable; their forces were scattered in garrisons and lacked internal lines for rapid concentration.
Psychological shock: rapid defeats, loss of commanders, and panic during retreats degraded unit cohesion and combat effectiveness.
为何普鲁士虽有规模与传统优势仍战败
战术与理论僵化：普鲁士的战术仍强调线式队形和由参谋主导的僵化命令，缺乏法国军团编制所具备的作战灵活性。领导力缺失与参谋工作不力：普鲁士高级指挥官误判法军意图，分散兵力，未能在关键节点集中力量；命令传达迟缓且常常相互矛盾。后勤与动员问题：普鲁士的动员速度较慢且适应性差，部队分散在各个驻地，缺乏可快速集结的内部交通线。心理冲击：快速战败、指挥官损失以及撤退过程中的恐慌，削弱了部队的凝聚力和战斗力。
Illustrative examples
Davout’s march and victory at Auerstädt: Davout’s III Corps marched farther and faster than expected, arrived in good order, and used combined arms to defeat a superior Prussian force—showing how leadership and discipline could outweigh numerical inferiority.
Napoleon’s envelopment at Jena: coordinated use of multiple corps to fix, flank, and roll up Prussian positions demonstrated the operational maturity of the Grande Armée.
实例说明
达武在奥尔施泰特的行军与胜利：达武的第三军团行军距离和速度超出预期，且抵达时队形齐整，随后运用诸兵种协同作战击败了兵力占优的普鲁士军队，这一案例表明领导力和纪律性可以弥补兵力上的劣势。拿破仑在耶拿的包围战术：通过协同运用多个军团牵制、侧翼包抄并突破普鲁士阵地，展现了法国大军团成熟的作战能力。
Consequences for European warfare
Confirmation of the corps system and operational mobility as decisive factors in modern warfare.
Triggered Prussian military reforms (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau) that overhauled conscxtion, staff organization, and officer education—changes that later contributed to Prussian (and then German) military success.
Reconfigured the political map of central Europe, accelerating the decline of the Holy Roman Empire and the rise of French hegemony until 1812–1814.
对欧洲战争的影响
确立了军团编制和作战机动性在现代战争中的决定性地位。引发了普鲁士的军事改革（由沙恩霍斯特、格奈森瑙推动），改革涵盖征兵制度、参谋组织和军官教育等方面，这些变革后来为普鲁士（以及后来的德国）的军事胜利奠定了基础。重塑了中欧的政治版图，加速了神圣罗马帝国的衰落，同时推动法国在1812-1814年前确立霸权地位。
Summary
Napoleon’s victory over Prussia combined strategic surprise, rapid concentration using an effective corps system, superior reconnaissance and tempo, decisive leadership in battle (notably at Jena and Auerstädt), and relentless pursuit that exploited Prussian doctrinal rigidity and political weakness. The military collapse had immediate territorial and diplomatic consequences and prompted major Prussian reforms that reshaped European military practice.
总结
拿破仑击败普鲁士，是结合了战略突袭、依托高效军团编制实现的快速集结、卓越的侦察与作战节奏、战场上（尤其是耶拿和奥尔施泰特战役中）的果断指挥，以及利用普鲁士理论僵化和政治弱点展开的无情追击等多重因素。普鲁士的军事溃败不仅直接导致其领土丧失和外交地位下降，还推动了普鲁士的重大军事改革，而这些改革重塑了欧洲的军事实践。
Jagdish Prasad Mathuria, Deeply immersed myself in the topic
贾格迪什·普拉萨德·马图里亚，深入研究该主题
Strong military traditions do not always translate into military success. This was the case with Prussia. Though they had numerical superiority but terrible leadership.
The king was…. frankly, a buffoon. First he decided to be neutral, and then for some reason declared war on France. He thought that Prussia’s dominant position was being endangered by France in Central Europe. So taking the pretext that last year the French had marched through Ansbach, he declared war.
Coming to the terrible leadership part. Prussia had mobilized a month before France, still the incompetent monarch waited, despite General Scharnhorst advising him to take the offensive. He decided that he would lead the country to war, and then sat on his ass doing nothing but waiting. Terrible leadership skills. His irresolution led to the French seizing the initiative, and within a few days France attacked.
强大的军事传统并不总能转化为军事胜利，普鲁士就是如此。尽管普鲁士在兵力上占据优势，但领导力却极为糟糕。普鲁士国王……坦白说，就是个蠢货。他起初决定保持中立，之后却不知为何对法国宣战。他认为法国在中欧威胁到了普鲁士的主导地位，于是以去年法国军队穿越安斯巴赫为借口，向法国宣战。再说说领导力糟糕这一点。普鲁士比法国提前一个月动员军队，但即便沙恩霍斯特将军建议采取攻势，这位无能的君主仍选择按兵不动。他决定亲自领导国家参战，却只是无所事事地等待。如此糟糕的领导力，其优柔寡断让法国掌握了主动权，短短几天内法国就发起了进攻。
Now this incompetent Prussian monarch had
Mobilized troops
Numerical superiority
Fantastic uniforms
Still he waited. This was something you simply could not afford against a general as great as Napoleon.
His generals were not great either, The best example-Prince Louis Ferdinand
这位无能的普鲁士君主明明已经完成了军队动员，拥有兵力优势，还有精良的军服，却依然按兵不动。面对拿破仑这样伟大的将领，这种做法是绝对不可取的。他手下的将领也同样平庸，最典型的例子就是路易·费迪南德亲王。
This guy is an example of how through exceptional dumb-assery you can brilliantly fuck up your country. He had absolutely no experience in generalship but did not want to serve under Duke of Brunswick. So he took command of 15000 troops whom he lost in the first engagement, the Battle of Saalfeld against Lannes, who was a brilliant French general. Alongwith messing up his army, this crown prince got himself killed by a French quartermaster. When Lannes attacked his flank, he rode out himself to fight. Not exactly responsible leadership.
The others were no better. General Davout’s 28000 men routed Blucher’s 63000 troops while Napoleon himself defeated the Duke of Brunswick, another guy who got himself wounded and succumbed to his injuries.
Prussia was defeated because of French brilliance and horrible leadership with ample doses of incompetence in every man of the army.
这家伙就是个典型例子，证明一个人能有多愚蠢，就能把自己的国家搞得多糟糕。他完全没有指挥经验，却不愿在不伦瑞克公爵麾下任职。于是他接管了1.5万人的部队，结果在与杰出法国将领拉纳的萨尔费尔德战役中，这支军队首战即溃。这位王储不仅葬送了自己的部队，还被一名法国军需官杀死。当时拉纳进攻他的侧翼，他竟亲自骑马冲上去作战，这绝非负责任的领导行为。其他将领也好不到哪里去。达武将军率领2.8万人击溃了布吕歇尔的6.3万人，而拿破仑本人则击败了不伦瑞克公爵——此人也在战斗中受伤，并最终因伤势过重而亡。普鲁士之所以战败，一方面是因为法国军队的卓越表现，另一方面则是因为普鲁士自身糟糕的领导力，以及军队中自上而下的严重无能。
Philippe Prigent, Lawyer (2013–present)
菲利普·普里让，律师（2013年至今）
Actually, the bulk of the Prussian army was not defeated by Napoleon. The decisive battle took place at Auerstaedt: 25 000 French soldiers and 45 canons under marshall Davout broke 61 000 Prussian soldiers with their 230 canons in less than a day. Napoleon won another victory against superior numbers on the same day but Davout practically won the war.
The 1806 French army was as numerous as the Prussian one but its soldiers had been fighting between 1797 and 1806 while Prussia had been at peace. The French were more battle-hardened.
French armies had long been considered outstanding in Europe, well before Napoleon; Prussia was considered very good too because it stood a chance of resisting France, which was a prowess in itself.
French armies were far more aggressive, in part because of the confidence gained through many victories or honourable defeats. Unlike the Prussians, the French were willing to take risks.
French armies were more enthusiastic; soldiers were more motivated and more willing to fight out of honor rather than fear.
French armies promoted commanders based on merit; the Prussians did this to a certain extent but not as much.
事实上，普鲁士军队的主力并非被拿破仑本人击败。决定性的战役发生在奥尔施泰特：达武元帅麾下2.5万名法国士兵和45门大炮，在不到一天的时间里，击溃了6.1万名普鲁士士兵及其230门大炮。尽管拿破仑当天也在兵力处于劣势的情况下取得了另一场胜利，但实际上是达武打赢了这场战争。1806年的法国军队与普鲁士军队规模相当，但法军士兵在1797至1806年间一直在作战，而普鲁士在此期间处于和平状态，因此法军更具实战经验。早在拿破仑时代之前，法国军队在欧洲就一直被认为是顶尖的；普鲁士军队也被认为实力强劲，因为它有能力抵抗法国——这本身就是一种了不起的表现。法国军队的进攻性要强得多，部分原因是他们通过多次胜利或虽败犹荣的战役积累了信心。与普鲁士人不同，法国人愿意承担风险。法国军队的士气更高昂，士兵的战斗动机更强，更愿意为荣誉而非恐惧而战。法国军队根据功绩提拔指挥官，普鲁士虽然在一定程度上也这么做，但远不如法国彻底。
Nacho Talens, Ph.D. from University of Barcelona (Graduated 1991)
纳乔·塔伦斯，巴塞罗那大学博士（1991年毕业）
Originally Answered: How did Napoleon beat Prussia? Wasn't Prussia famed for their military competence?
First, the Prussians hesitates to join the Austro-Russian coalition that was defeated the previous year at Austerlitz. And then for some not particularly good reason decided to go solo the following year. Mind you, a lot of people thought at the time that they could beat the French. Godoy, the Spanish prime minister, sick of being bullied by Napoleon to support him, actually declared a mobilization without indicating against whom he was mobilizing Spain. In fact, should Prussia defeat France, he would declare war on France. As it went, afterwards he declared that he had mobilized just in case he was needed for something…
Then what a number of answers have pointed out already. The Prussians should have taken stock of the fact that they got nowhere at the Battle of Valmy…
原问题：拿破仑是如何击败普鲁士的？普鲁士的军事能力不是素来闻名吗？首先，普鲁士当初在加入奥俄联军一事上犹豫不决，而这支联军在前一年的奥斯特里茨战役中已被击败。次年，普鲁士却毫无充分理由地决定单独对法作战。要知道，当时很多人都认为普鲁士能打败法国。西班牙首相戈多伊厌倦了被拿破仑逼迫提供支持，他虽然宣布西班牙进行动员，却没有说明动员是针对谁。事实上，他的算盘是：如果普鲁士击败法国，他就对法国宣战；而最终的结果是，事后他却宣称动员只是为了以防万一……其次，正如很多回答所指出的，普鲁士本应吸取瓦尔密战役中毫无进展的教训……
Christian Desaix, PhD in History, Louisiana State University
克里斯蒂安·德赛，路易斯安那州立大学历史学博士
Originally Answered: How did Napoleon beat Prussia? Wasn't Prussia famed for their military competence?
The Prussian army had built a fearsome reputation under Frederick the Great, but after the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763, there was a deep reaction by the Prussian nobility and middle classes against excessive spending or reliance on the army. Having survived the later part of the Seven Years’ War by sheer luck, and with his Silesian conquests still in his hands, Frederick seems to have lost much of his interest in warfare. And at the end of his reign and under his successors, there was little Prussian enthusiasm for the army. The army became fossilized, reliant on increasingly obsolescent tactics and doing a lot more training for parade ground marches than for actual fighting.
There’s a story that Prussian regiments were kept busy polishing their muskets until the metal was so thin that the guns became useless in actual combat. That’s probably not true, or true only in isolated cases, but c. 1800 it was easy to believe. What is true is that, given budgetary constraints, Prussian infantry were lucky to fire more than 2 or 3 live rounds a year— if that.
By 1800, the Prussian Army was nothing like what it had been forty years earlier.
原问题：拿破仑是如何击败普鲁士的？普鲁士的军事能力不是素来闻名吗？普鲁士军队在腓特烈大帝时期树立了令人生畏的威名，但1763年七年战争结束后，普鲁士贵族和中产阶级强烈反对在军队上过度开支或过度依赖军队。腓特烈大帝在七年战争后期全靠运气才得以幸存，且西里西亚这一征服地仍在其掌控中，此后他对战争的兴趣似乎大减。在他统治末期及其继任者执政期间，普鲁士国内对军队的热情十分低迷。军队逐渐僵化，依赖日益过时的战术，将大量精力用于阅兵式训练，而非实战训练。有传言称，普鲁士军团让士兵忙着擦拭滑膛枪，以至于枪身金属被磨得太薄，在实战中完全无法使用。这种说法可能并非事实，或仅在个别情况下成立，但在1800年前后，人们很容易相信这类传言。而真实情况是，由于预算限制，普鲁士步兵每年能发射2至3发实弹就已经很幸运了——有时甚至连这个数量都达不到。到1800年时，普鲁士军队已完全不复四十年前的模样。
John Gordon, Widely travelled in Europe
约翰·戈登，在欧洲广泛游历
I assume that you are asking about the Prussian defeats of 1806–07. A reason commonly given is that after the death of Frederick II (the Great) in 1786 his successor, Frederick William II of Prussia - Wikipedia (reigned 1786–97) and the Prussian government and rested on their laurels and failed to keep the army up-to-date. Revolutionary and Napoleonic France made significant advances in tactics, and it took other European countries (including Britain) a while to catch up.
我推测你问的是1806至1807年普鲁士的战败。一个常见的原因是，1786年腓特烈二世（大帝）去世后，其继任者普鲁士国王腓特烈·威廉二世（1786-1797年在位，可参考维基百科）及普鲁士政府安于现状，未能让军队跟上时代发展。法国大革命时期和拿破仑时期的法国在战术上取得了重大突破，而包括英国在内的其他欧洲国家花了很长时间才追上其步伐。
吉米·伯恩，调酒师（2018年至今）
Aside from the sheer incompetence of the men running Prussia at the time, there was also another important factor in Prussia’s defeat, and that was the decline of the Prussian Army itself.
By the time Jena–Auerstedt rolled around, it had been more than 30 years since Frederick the Great’s famed Prussians had dominated the battlefields of Europe. In that time, much had changed in Europe, but unfortunately the Prussian Army had not.
During the Seven Years War, the Prussian Army’s battlefield superiority had been down to its ferocious discipline, its soldiers moving with all of the order of the parade ground on the battlefield. What worked in 1757, however, was less adequate in 1806.
Prussia’s successes in the Seven Years War had made its generals complacent. They simply sat on their laurels for 30 years and trusted that what worked for Der Alte Fritz would work for them.
So while Prussia’s armies were still training and drilling as they had since the time of Frederick, Napoleon’s armies were using a far more mobile and flexible way of making war. Their use of columns, corps formations, and combined-arms divisions gave them a decisive tactical and strategic edge over the inflexible “moving walls” of Prussia.
As well as that, Napoleon’s recruitment en masse of his citizens had vastly expanded France’s armies. Even if Prussia had kept up with the pace of military innovation, they would have been swamped by sheer numbers.
So in short, Prussia fighting Napoleon was akin to Vietnam-era US troops taking on the NATO armies that invaded Iraq.
No contest.
除了当时普鲁士统治者的极度无能外，普鲁士战败还有另一个重要因素，那就是普鲁士军队自身的衰落。耶拿-奥尔施泰特战役爆发时，距离腓特烈大帝麾下著名的普鲁士军队称霸欧洲战场已过去30多年。在此期间，欧洲发生了巨大变化，但不幸的是，普鲁士军队却一成不变。七年战争期间，普鲁士军队之所以能在战场上占据优势，靠的是其严苛的纪律，士兵们在战场上行动时，完全像在阅兵场上一样整齐有序。然而，1757年行之有效的战术，到了1806年已不再适用。普鲁士在七年战争中的胜利让其将领们变得自满，他们安于现状长达30年，坚信曾经适用于“老弗里茨”（腓特烈大帝的昵称）的战术，也会对自己奏效。因此，当普鲁士军队仍在沿用腓特烈时代的方式进行训练和演习时，拿破仑的军队却采用了机动性和灵活性远超前者的作战方式。他们运用纵队战术、军团编制以及诸兵种合成师，这使其在战术和战略上对僵化的普鲁士“移动堡垒”形成了决定性优势。此外，拿破仑在国内大规模征兵，极大地扩充了法国军队的规模。即便普鲁士能跟上军事革新的步伐，也会被法军压倒性的数量所击溃。简而言之，普鲁士与拿破仑作战，就好比越南战争时期的美军对抗入侵伊拉克的北约军队，毫无胜算可言。
Napoleon being presented with captured Prussian banners after Jena–Auerstedt.
耶拿-奥尔施泰特战役后，拿破仑接受缴获的普鲁士军旗的场景。
Ian Kummer, American Tourist in Russia
伊恩·库默，在俄罗斯的美国游客
Originally Answered: How did Napoleon beat Prussia? Wasn't Prussia famed for their military competence?
The British anti-French strategy in this period could be described as using every other continental power as a battering ram. Prussia’s case is particularly embarrassing because there was no compelling reason for them to fight France in the first place and they were defeated in large part by their own comical over-confidence.
Upon declaration of war in Autumn 1806, and Prussian officers mockingly sharpened their swords on the steps of the French embassy in Berlin. Napoleon took Berlin on October 27, not even a month into his campaign, and marched some of those same officers as prisoners past the embassy.
The Prussians’ crushing defeat in 19 days can be attributed to masterful tactics by the French army, and their own failure to adapt to the modern realities of maneuver and firepower.
原问题：拿破仑是如何击败普鲁士的？普鲁士的军事能力不是素来闻名吗？这一时期英国的反法战略，可以说是将其他所有欧洲大陆国家都当作了攻击法国的“攻城锤”。普鲁士的情况尤为尴尬，因为他们起初根本没有充分理由与法国开战，而其战败在很大程度上是源于自身可笑的过度自信。1806年秋，战争爆发后，普鲁士军官在柏林的法国大使馆台阶上嘲讽地磨着剑。然而，拿破仑在战役打响还不到一个月的10月27日就攻占了柏林，并且押着当初那些军官中的一部分人，作为战俘从大使馆前走过。普鲁士在19天内遭遇惨败，一方面是因为法国军队运用了高超的战术，另一方面则是因为普鲁士自身未能适应机动作战和火力作战的现代战争实际。
Assistant Bot
助手
Napoleon defeated Prussia through a combination of strategic surprise, operational speed, superior command and control, effective use of corps organization, and exploitation of political and military weaknesses within the Prussian system. The decisive campaign took place in 1806–1807, culminating in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstädt (14 October 1806) and the rapid follow-up that destroyed Prussian political will and armies.
拿破仑之所以能击败普鲁士，是凭借战略突袭、作战速度、卓越的指挥控制、军团编制的有效运用，以及对普鲁士体系内部政治和军事弱点的利用等多重因素的结合。决定性的战役发生在1806至1807年，最终以1806年10月14日的耶拿和奥尔施泰特双战役，以及随后迅速展开的行动摧毁普鲁士的政治意志和军队而告终。
Key factors and sequence
关键因素与事件经过
Political and strategic context
Prussia entered the War of the Fourth Coalition late (August–October 1806), believing French attention was fixed elsewhere and overestimating its own strength and the reliability of allies.
Prussian high command was divided between traditional, cautious generals and a political-military elite slow to adapt to Napoleon’s operational methods.
政治与战略背景
普鲁士很晚才加入第四次反法同盟战争（1806年8-10月），当时它认为法国的注意力集中在其他地方，同时高估了自身实力以及盟友的可靠性。普鲁士最高指挥部内部存在分歧：一方是传统谨慎的将领，另一方是迟迟未能适应拿破仑作战方式的军政精英。
Operational art and surprise
Napoleon concentrated forces rapidly in the Electorate of Saxony, using forced marches and concealed maneuvers to achieve local superiority at the point of contact.
He deliberately presented maneuvers that obscured his true main effort, fixing Prussian forces while executing a decisive envelopment.
作战艺术与突袭
拿破仑利用强行军和隐蔽机动，迅速在萨克森选侯国集结兵力，在交战点形成局部优势。他故意通过机动掩盖真实的主攻方向，牵制普鲁士军队，同时实施决定性的包围行动。
Corps system and command
The French corps system—self-sustaining, combined-arms formations under marshals—allowed flexibility, independent action, and convergent attacks.
Napoleon’s centralized strategic control combined with delegated tactical initiative in his marshals produced quick, coordinated movements that Prussian staff procedures could not match.
军团编制与指挥
法国的军团编制是由元帅指挥的、具备自给能力的诸兵种合成部队，这种编制具备灵活性、独立作战能力和协同进攻能力。拿破仑的集中战略指挥，加上赋予元帅们的战术主动权，使其军队能够实施快速、协同的机动，而普鲁士的参谋流程根本无法与之相比。
Superior reconnaissance and tempo
French cavalry reconnaissance and light infantry screens provided better operational intelligence and faster decision loops.
French forces maintained operational tempo with aggressive pursuit; Prussian units were repeatedly outmaneuvered and prevented from forming a coherent defensive front.
卓越的侦察与作战节奏
法国骑兵的侦察行动和轻步兵的掩护，提供了更优质的作战情报和更快的决策周期。法军通过积极追击保持作战节奏，普鲁士部队多次陷入机动劣势，无法形成连贯的防御阵线。
Battles of Jena and Auerstädt (14 October 1806)
At Jena, Napoleon engaged and decisively defeated the bulk of the Prussian-Saxon army through concentrated attacks, effective use of artillery, and timely commitment of infantry and cavalry.
Simultaneously at Auerstädt, Marshal Davout, commanding a smaller French force, unexpectedly ran into and defeated a larger Prussian corps under the Duke of Brunswick—an outcome owed to superior leadership, discipline, and coordination.
The twin defeats shattered organized Prussian resistance in the field; command cohesion collapsed when the Duke of Brunswick was mortally wounded.
耶拿和奥尔施泰特战役（1806年10月14日）
在耶拿战役中，拿破仑通过集中进攻、有效运用炮兵以及及时投入步兵和骑兵，与普萨联军主力交战并将其彻底击败。与此同时，在奥尔施泰特战役中，指挥规模较小法军部队的达武元帅，意外遭遇并击败了不伦瑞克公爵麾下规模更大的普鲁士军团，这一结果得益于法军卓越的领导力、纪律性和协同能力。这两场惨败摧毁了普鲁士在战场上有组织的抵抗，不伦瑞克公爵受致命伤后，普鲁士的指挥体系彻底瓦解。
Collapse, pursuit, and political consequences
French forces pursued relentlessly, capturing or forcing the surrender of Prussian garrisons (including the fall of fortress towns) and large numbers of prisoners.
The speed of the French advance prevented Prussia from stabilizing a new front or coordinating with Russian allies.
The military collapse precipitated political crisis in Prussia, leading to the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) in which Prussia suffered territorial losses, heavy indemnities, and a reduced status in German affairs.
溃败、追击与政治后果
法军展开无情追击，攻占或迫使普鲁士驻军投降（包括要塞城镇的陷落），并俘获大量战俘。法军推进速度之快，使普鲁士无法稳定新的战线，也无法与俄国盟友协同行动。军事上的溃败引发了普鲁士的政治危机，最终导致1807年《提尔西特和约》的签订。根据该条约，普鲁士丧失了大片领土，需支付巨额赔款，在德意志事务中的地位也大幅下降。
Why Prussia lost despite size and tradition
Tactical and doctrinal rigidity: Prussian tactics still emphasized linear formations and rigid staff-driven orders; they lacked the operational flexibility of the French corps system.
Leadership failures and poor staff work: senior Prussian commanders misread French intentions, dispersed forces, and failed to concentrate at critical points; orders were slow and often contradictory.
Logistical and mobilization problems: Prussian mobilization was slower and less adaptable; their forces were scattered in garrisons and lacked internal lines for rapid concentration.
Psychological shock: rapid defeats, loss of commanders, and panic during retreats degraded unit cohesion and combat effectiveness.
为何普鲁士虽有规模与传统优势仍战败
战术与理论僵化：普鲁士的战术仍强调线式队形和由参谋主导的僵化命令，缺乏法国军团编制所具备的作战灵活性。领导力缺失与参谋工作不力：普鲁士高级指挥官误判法军意图，分散兵力，未能在关键节点集中力量；命令传达迟缓且常常相互矛盾。后勤与动员问题：普鲁士的动员速度较慢且适应性差，部队分散在各个驻地，缺乏可快速集结的内部交通线。心理冲击：快速战败、指挥官损失以及撤退过程中的恐慌，削弱了部队的凝聚力和战斗力。
Illustrative examples
Davout’s march and victory at Auerstädt: Davout’s III Corps marched farther and faster than expected, arrived in good order, and used combined arms to defeat a superior Prussian force—showing how leadership and discipline could outweigh numerical inferiority.
Napoleon’s envelopment at Jena: coordinated use of multiple corps to fix, flank, and roll up Prussian positions demonstrated the operational maturity of the Grande Armée.
实例说明
达武在奥尔施泰特的行军与胜利：达武的第三军团行军距离和速度超出预期，且抵达时队形齐整，随后运用诸兵种协同作战击败了兵力占优的普鲁士军队，这一案例表明领导力和纪律性可以弥补兵力上的劣势。拿破仑在耶拿的包围战术：通过协同运用多个军团牵制、侧翼包抄并突破普鲁士阵地，展现了法国大军团成熟的作战能力。
Consequences for European warfare
Confirmation of the corps system and operational mobility as decisive factors in modern warfare.
Triggered Prussian military reforms (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau) that overhauled conscxtion, staff organization, and officer education—changes that later contributed to Prussian (and then German) military success.
Reconfigured the political map of central Europe, accelerating the decline of the Holy Roman Empire and the rise of French hegemony until 1812–1814.
对欧洲战争的影响
确立了军团编制和作战机动性在现代战争中的决定性地位。引发了普鲁士的军事改革（由沙恩霍斯特、格奈森瑙推动），改革涵盖征兵制度、参谋组织和军官教育等方面，这些变革后来为普鲁士（以及后来的德国）的军事胜利奠定了基础。重塑了中欧的政治版图，加速了神圣罗马帝国的衰落，同时推动法国在1812-1814年前确立霸权地位。
Summary
Napoleon’s victory over Prussia combined strategic surprise, rapid concentration using an effective corps system, superior reconnaissance and tempo, decisive leadership in battle (notably at Jena and Auerstädt), and relentless pursuit that exploited Prussian doctrinal rigidity and political weakness. The military collapse had immediate territorial and diplomatic consequences and prompted major Prussian reforms that reshaped European military practice.
总结
拿破仑击败普鲁士，是结合了战略突袭、依托高效军团编制实现的快速集结、卓越的侦察与作战节奏、战场上（尤其是耶拿和奥尔施泰特战役中）的果断指挥，以及利用普鲁士理论僵化和政治弱点展开的无情追击等多重因素。普鲁士的军事溃败不仅直接导致其领土丧失和外交地位下降，还推动了普鲁士的重大军事改革，而这些改革重塑了欧洲的军事实践。
Jagdish Prasad Mathuria, Deeply immersed myself in the topic
贾格迪什·普拉萨德·马图里亚，深入研究该主题
Strong military traditions do not always translate into military success. This was the case with Prussia. Though they had numerical superiority but terrible leadership.
The king was…. frankly, a buffoon. First he decided to be neutral, and then for some reason declared war on France. He thought that Prussia’s dominant position was being endangered by France in Central Europe. So taking the pretext that last year the French had marched through Ansbach, he declared war.
Coming to the terrible leadership part. Prussia had mobilized a month before France, still the incompetent monarch waited, despite General Scharnhorst advising him to take the offensive. He decided that he would lead the country to war, and then sat on his ass doing nothing but waiting. Terrible leadership skills. His irresolution led to the French seizing the initiative, and within a few days France attacked.
强大的军事传统并不总能转化为军事胜利，普鲁士就是如此。尽管普鲁士在兵力上占据优势，但领导力却极为糟糕。普鲁士国王……坦白说，就是个蠢货。他起初决定保持中立，之后却不知为何对法国宣战。他认为法国在中欧威胁到了普鲁士的主导地位，于是以去年法国军队穿越安斯巴赫为借口，向法国宣战。再说说领导力糟糕这一点。普鲁士比法国提前一个月动员军队，但即便沙恩霍斯特将军建议采取攻势，这位无能的君主仍选择按兵不动。他决定亲自领导国家参战，却只是无所事事地等待。如此糟糕的领导力，其优柔寡断让法国掌握了主动权，短短几天内法国就发起了进攻。
Now this incompetent Prussian monarch had
Mobilized troops
Numerical superiority
Fantastic uniforms
Still he waited. This was something you simply could not afford against a general as great as Napoleon.
His generals were not great either, The best example-Prince Louis Ferdinand
这位无能的普鲁士君主明明已经完成了军队动员，拥有兵力优势，还有精良的军服，却依然按兵不动。面对拿破仑这样伟大的将领，这种做法是绝对不可取的。他手下的将领也同样平庸，最典型的例子就是路易·费迪南德亲王。
This guy is an example of how through exceptional dumb-assery you can brilliantly fuck up your country. He had absolutely no experience in generalship but did not want to serve under Duke of Brunswick. So he took command of 15000 troops whom he lost in the first engagement, the Battle of Saalfeld against Lannes, who was a brilliant French general. Alongwith messing up his army, this crown prince got himself killed by a French quartermaster. When Lannes attacked his flank, he rode out himself to fight. Not exactly responsible leadership.
The others were no better. General Davout’s 28000 men routed Blucher’s 63000 troops while Napoleon himself defeated the Duke of Brunswick, another guy who got himself wounded and succumbed to his injuries.
Prussia was defeated because of French brilliance and horrible leadership with ample doses of incompetence in every man of the army.
这家伙就是个典型例子，证明一个人能有多愚蠢，就能把自己的国家搞得多糟糕。他完全没有指挥经验，却不愿在不伦瑞克公爵麾下任职。于是他接管了1.5万人的部队，结果在与杰出法国将领拉纳的萨尔费尔德战役中，这支军队首战即溃。这位王储不仅葬送了自己的部队，还被一名法国军需官杀死。当时拉纳进攻他的侧翼，他竟亲自骑马冲上去作战，这绝非负责任的领导行为。其他将领也好不到哪里去。达武将军率领2.8万人击溃了布吕歇尔的6.3万人，而拿破仑本人则击败了不伦瑞克公爵——此人也在战斗中受伤，并最终因伤势过重而亡。普鲁士之所以战败，一方面是因为法国军队的卓越表现，另一方面则是因为普鲁士自身糟糕的领导力，以及军队中自上而下的严重无能。
Philippe Prigent, Lawyer (2013–present)
菲利普·普里让，律师（2013年至今）
Actually, the bulk of the Prussian army was not defeated by Napoleon. The decisive battle took place at Auerstaedt: 25 000 French soldiers and 45 canons under marshall Davout broke 61 000 Prussian soldiers with their 230 canons in less than a day. Napoleon won another victory against superior numbers on the same day but Davout practically won the war.
The 1806 French army was as numerous as the Prussian one but its soldiers had been fighting between 1797 and 1806 while Prussia had been at peace. The French were more battle-hardened.
French armies had long been considered outstanding in Europe, well before Napoleon; Prussia was considered very good too because it stood a chance of resisting France, which was a prowess in itself.
French armies were far more aggressive, in part because of the confidence gained through many victories or honourable defeats. Unlike the Prussians, the French were willing to take risks.
French armies were more enthusiastic; soldiers were more motivated and more willing to fight out of honor rather than fear.
French armies promoted commanders based on merit; the Prussians did this to a certain extent but not as much.
事实上，普鲁士军队的主力并非被拿破仑本人击败。决定性的战役发生在奥尔施泰特：达武元帅麾下2.5万名法国士兵和45门大炮，在不到一天的时间里，击溃了6.1万名普鲁士士兵及其230门大炮。尽管拿破仑当天也在兵力处于劣势的情况下取得了另一场胜利，但实际上是达武打赢了这场战争。1806年的法国军队与普鲁士军队规模相当，但法军士兵在1797至1806年间一直在作战，而普鲁士在此期间处于和平状态，因此法军更具实战经验。早在拿破仑时代之前，法国军队在欧洲就一直被认为是顶尖的；普鲁士军队也被认为实力强劲，因为它有能力抵抗法国——这本身就是一种了不起的表现。法国军队的进攻性要强得多，部分原因是他们通过多次胜利或虽败犹荣的战役积累了信心。与普鲁士人不同，法国人愿意承担风险。法国军队的士气更高昂，士兵的战斗动机更强，更愿意为荣誉而非恐惧而战。法国军队根据功绩提拔指挥官，普鲁士虽然在一定程度上也这么做，但远不如法国彻底。
Nacho Talens, Ph.D. from University of Barcelona (Graduated 1991)
纳乔·塔伦斯，巴塞罗那大学博士（1991年毕业）
Originally Answered: How did Napoleon beat Prussia? Wasn't Prussia famed for their military competence?
First, the Prussians hesitates to join the Austro-Russian coalition that was defeated the previous year at Austerlitz. And then for some not particularly good reason decided to go solo the following year. Mind you, a lot of people thought at the time that they could beat the French. Godoy, the Spanish prime minister, sick of being bullied by Napoleon to support him, actually declared a mobilization without indicating against whom he was mobilizing Spain. In fact, should Prussia defeat France, he would declare war on France. As it went, afterwards he declared that he had mobilized just in case he was needed for something…
Then what a number of answers have pointed out already. The Prussians should have taken stock of the fact that they got nowhere at the Battle of Valmy…
原问题：拿破仑是如何击败普鲁士的？普鲁士的军事能力不是素来闻名吗？首先，普鲁士当初在加入奥俄联军一事上犹豫不决，而这支联军在前一年的奥斯特里茨战役中已被击败。次年，普鲁士却毫无充分理由地决定单独对法作战。要知道，当时很多人都认为普鲁士能打败法国。西班牙首相戈多伊厌倦了被拿破仑逼迫提供支持，他虽然宣布西班牙进行动员，却没有说明动员是针对谁。事实上，他的算盘是：如果普鲁士击败法国，他就对法国宣战；而最终的结果是，事后他却宣称动员只是为了以防万一……其次，正如很多回答所指出的，普鲁士本应吸取瓦尔密战役中毫无进展的教训……
Christian Desaix, PhD in History, Louisiana State University
克里斯蒂安·德赛，路易斯安那州立大学历史学博士
Originally Answered: How did Napoleon beat Prussia? Wasn't Prussia famed for their military competence?
The Prussian army had built a fearsome reputation under Frederick the Great, but after the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763, there was a deep reaction by the Prussian nobility and middle classes against excessive spending or reliance on the army. Having survived the later part of the Seven Years’ War by sheer luck, and with his Silesian conquests still in his hands, Frederick seems to have lost much of his interest in warfare. And at the end of his reign and under his successors, there was little Prussian enthusiasm for the army. The army became fossilized, reliant on increasingly obsolescent tactics and doing a lot more training for parade ground marches than for actual fighting.
There’s a story that Prussian regiments were kept busy polishing their muskets until the metal was so thin that the guns became useless in actual combat. That’s probably not true, or true only in isolated cases, but c. 1800 it was easy to believe. What is true is that, given budgetary constraints, Prussian infantry were lucky to fire more than 2 or 3 live rounds a year— if that.
By 1800, the Prussian Army was nothing like what it had been forty years earlier.
原问题：拿破仑是如何击败普鲁士的？普鲁士的军事能力不是素来闻名吗？普鲁士军队在腓特烈大帝时期树立了令人生畏的威名，但1763年七年战争结束后，普鲁士贵族和中产阶级强烈反对在军队上过度开支或过度依赖军队。腓特烈大帝在七年战争后期全靠运气才得以幸存，且西里西亚这一征服地仍在其掌控中，此后他对战争的兴趣似乎大减。在他统治末期及其继任者执政期间，普鲁士国内对军队的热情十分低迷。军队逐渐僵化，依赖日益过时的战术，将大量精力用于阅兵式训练，而非实战训练。有传言称，普鲁士军团让士兵忙着擦拭滑膛枪，以至于枪身金属被磨得太薄，在实战中完全无法使用。这种说法可能并非事实，或仅在个别情况下成立，但在1800年前后，人们很容易相信这类传言。而真实情况是，由于预算限制，普鲁士步兵每年能发射2至3发实弹就已经很幸运了——有时甚至连这个数量都达不到。到1800年时，普鲁士军队已完全不复四十年前的模样。
John Gordon, Widely travelled in Europe
约翰·戈登，在欧洲广泛游历
I assume that you are asking about the Prussian defeats of 1806–07. A reason commonly given is that after the death of Frederick II (the Great) in 1786 his successor, Frederick William II of Prussia - Wikipedia (reigned 1786–97) and the Prussian government and rested on their laurels and failed to keep the army up-to-date. Revolutionary and Napoleonic France made significant advances in tactics, and it took other European countries (including Britain) a while to catch up.
我推测你问的是1806至1807年普鲁士的战败。一个常见的原因是，1786年腓特烈二世（大帝）去世后，其继任者普鲁士国王腓特烈·威廉二世（1786-1797年在位，可参考维基百科）及普鲁士政府安于现状，未能让军队跟上时代发展。法国大革命时期和拿破仑时期的法国在战术上取得了重大突破，而包括英国在内的其他欧洲国家花了很长时间才追上其步伐。
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有传言称，普鲁士军团让士兵忙着擦拭滑膛枪，以至于枪身金属被磨得太薄，在实战中完全无法使用。
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