中国在1974年共和党人理查德·尼克松访问中国之后，一直到2000年代初，一直是美国的朋友，这是真的吗？

Sosow Nima
Yes!
是的！

First point, at that time, China was overwhelmed by the military pressure from the Soviet unx.
第一点，那时中国正承受着来自苏联的巨大军事压力。

To what extent? Let me give you some examples!
到底有多严重？让我给你举几个例子！

Because the Sino-Soviet border had no natural defenses, China had to deploy a large amount of manpower to build artificial hills, attempting to delay the Soviet tank groups in front of the Yan Mountains.
由于中苏边界缺乏天然防御屏障，中国不得不投入大量人力修筑人工土丘，试图在燕山前线拖延苏联坦克纵队的推进。

China’s entire strategic defense was structured in three lines: the first line in the north, the second line along the Yangtze River, and the third line relying on mountain ranges for guerrilla warfare. Even a figure as brilliant as Mao Zedong said at the time, “If the third line isn’t built well, I won’t be able to sleep. Only when Panzhihua (a third-line defense base) is completed can I rest easy. Even if Beijing is lost, China still has Panzhihua.”
中国的总体战略防御由三道防线构成：第一道在北部，第二道沿长江而设，第三道依托山脉进行游击战。当时连毛泽东这样卓越的领导人都说：“第三线要是没修好，我这心里没底。攀枝花一旦建成，我才能安心。即便北京丢了，中国还有攀枝花。”

The deployment back then was light in the front and heavy in the rear. On the Inner Mongolia front line, only two youth divisions—20,000 troops—were stationed, with the sole hope that they could provide early warning and hold off the Soviet army for two hours.
当时的部署是前线轻装，后方重兵。内蒙古前线仅驻扎两支青年师——共约2万人，唯一的期望是提前预警并拖住苏军两小时。

The two most elite army groups were only intended to cover the retreat of the Central Committee and cultural relics from Beijing to the second line in Wuhan.
最精锐的两个集团军则负责掩护中央机关和文物从北京撤退到武汉第二道防线。

Nationwide, more than 6 billion grenades were produced, preparing to use human lives to resist Soviet tank assaults.
全国范围内生产了超过60亿枚手榴弹，准备用人海战术抵御苏联坦克冲击。

When I was in college, the military textbooks still clearly treated the Soviet army as the hypothetical enemy.
我大学时的军事教科书仍将苏联军队明确列为假想敌。

At the height of the pressure, China’s national defense forces neared 7 million, with over 50 million militia members.
在最紧张的时期，中国的国防力量接近700万，民兵人数超过5000万。

Second point, the United States was also afraid of the Soviet unx back then, wasn’t it?
第二点，那时美国也同样惧怕苏联，不是吗？

The Soviet unx was crazy at the time—a superpower like that, putting 30% or more of its GDP into the military.
那时的苏联简直疯狂——这样一个超级大国，把30%甚至更多的GDP投入军备。


(The scale of the Soviet military exercises at that time)
（当年苏联军事演习的规模）


（China also immediately carried out exercises in response... However, to be honest, they really don't have the money... Their equipment can't compare with the Soviet unx...）
（中国也随即进行了应对演习……但老实说，他们确实没那么多钱……装备远不及苏联……）

Everyone was scared of them; they were like a lunatic. (Compare that to China today, where military spending is 1.5% of GDP.)
所有人都惧怕苏联，他们简直像个疯子。（对比今天中国的军费，仅占GDP的1.5%。）

So, at that time, cooperation between China and the United States made perfect sense—it was just everyone huddling together for warmth.
因此，当时中美合作才显得那么理所当然——大家只不过是为了取暖而抱团。


David W. Rudlin
Kinda. Sorta.
有点算是，也不完全算是。

Maybe “cordial” is more accurate than “friend.”
或许用“友好”比用“朋友”更准确。

But let’s start with the fact that Nixon went to China in 1972, which is important because we still had troops fighting in Vietnam.
但我们先说个事实：尼克松在1972年访华，这一点很重要，因为当时美军还在越南作战。

Against North Vietnamese troops who were supplied by… China.
对手是由……中国提供物资的北越军队。

So it’s probably best to describe the relationship as “complicated.”
所以，最恰当的描述大概是“复杂”。

The “reopening” of China was an idea created by Henry Kissinger, who wanted China as a counterweight to Russia/to prevent Russia from using China as a counterweight to us.
“重新接触”中国是亨利·基辛格的构想，他希望中国能制衡苏联，或者防止苏联利用中国来制衡美国。

(Pause as we reflect on how little things change.)
（暂停一下，感受下事过境迁却又似曾相识。）

It was the sort of realpolitik that we seem incapable of today, very much in the “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” school of international relations.
那种国际关系现实主义，如今我们似乎已无力而为，正是“敌人的敌人就是朋友”这一流派的典型代表。

Nixon himself said “what brought us together was not a convergence of ideas, but a convergence of interests.” And there were always times when those interests did not converge, e.g. in relation to Taiwan.
正如尼克松自己所言：“把我们拉到一起的，不是理念的契合，而是利益的契合。”而在台湾（地区）问题上，这种利益契合也曾多次破裂。

(Another pause to reflect…)
（再次暂停，细想一下……）

Researching this answer to make sure I had my facts right, I came across a Quizlet response that said the driving force was the potential for trade. I find this VERY hard to believe. China was stubbornly communist until Deng rose to power and influence (though never became the official leader of the country) in 1978.
为了确认事实，我查到一个Quizlet说访华的驱动力是贸易潜力。我很难相信这一点。直到1978年邓小平崛起并掌握影响力之前，中国一直顽固地奉行共产主义（虽然他从未成为国家正式领导人）。

I can’t put a date on when things began to change because he didn’t actually say the “To become rich is glorious” quote that’s credited to him. What I can say is that the west’s excitement about “1.2 billion pairs of shoes” era didn’t begin until the early-to-mid 1980’s, and on my first trip in 1983 I was stunned by how poor the place was.
我没法给出确切的转折年份，因为他并未真正说过那句“致富光荣”的名言。我能确定的是，西方对“中国12亿只鞋子”时代的热情要到80年代中期才开始；我1983年首访时，就被那里的贫穷震撼到了。

Moreover Kissinger wasn’t noted for his interest in economic matters.
况且基辛格也并不以关心经济事务著称。

I’d say an argument could be made that the friendship began in 2001, when China joined the WTO (after trying for more than a decade). And while the world’s two biggest economies will always have some tensions, it’s sad to see how adversarial we have become in recent years.
我认为，也可以说真正的“友好”始于2001年中国加入世贸组织（那之前尝试了十多年）。尽管世界两大经济体间难免有摩擦，但近年来我们对立得如此激烈，实在令人惋惜。

An opportunity wasted, for both countries.
对两国而言，这都是一次错失的机遇。


Steven Mak
China wants to be in a friendly term with every nation in the world, including Britain and Japan. It was the US cannot accept China’s peaceful rise.
中国希望与世界上所有国家保持友好关系，包括英国和日本。而无法接受中国和平崛起的，正是美国。

Neel Kumar
Even today, China is America’s friend.
纵使时至今日，中国仍是美国的朋友。

Chinese people labor in factories working 9am-9pm, 6 days a week (also known as 9–9–6) to produce all sorts of goods from clothes and towels to keyboards, computers, laptops, motors etc for sale in the US. What do they get back? US dollars, a fiat currency created by the US government.
中国人在工厂里实行朝九晚九、每周六天的“9–9–6”工作制，生产从衣物、毛巾到键盘、电脑、笔记本、马达等各类商品，远销美国。他们换回的是什么？是美国政府发行的法定货币——美元。

And what do the Chinese buy with these US dollars? Well, they buy oil, coal, bauxite, copper, iron ore, iron, steel, and lots of other things to make more products to sell to the US. And the rest of the US dollars? They buy US government bonds with them. The same US government that keeps increasing its debt.
中国人用这些美元买什么？他们购买石油、煤炭、铝土矿、铜、铁矿、钢铁，以及其他原材料，再生产更多商品卖给美国。至于剩余的美元？他们用来购买美国政府债券——而这些债券的发行方，正是不停加杠杆的美国政府。

If it weren’t for the Chinese selling us cheap jeans, cheap pots and pans, cheap computers, cheap furniture, and cheap toys, the American public would be doing without or going into serious debt.
若不是中国向美国出口平价牛仔裤、实惠厨具、高性价比电脑、经济型家具和物美价廉的玩具，美国民众恐怕要么捉襟见肘，要么债台高筑了。


Mike Martino
Nixon’s first term was an incredibly effective one, rather like Biden’s administration in terms of impartial “political accomplishment,” and opening diplomatic relations with “Red China” was a masterful stroke of diplomacy.
尼克松的第一个任期极其高效，就像拜登政府在“政治成就”方面看似公正一样，而与“红色中国”建交则是一记外交妙手。

But it was just the first step. It was 1979(/1980) when the USA actually established the China “Most Favored Nation” trade policy.
但那只是第一步。直到1979年（或1980年），美国才真正确立对华“最惠国待遇”贸易政策。

Both countries have been benefiting dramatically ever since, with a bit of the sort of “friendly adversarial” relationship one would expect in any major business alliance between powerful and self-interested corporations.
此后，双方互利共赢，维系着那种既“友好”又“有竞争”的关系，就像两家强势且各有私利的大公司结盟时常见的模式。