Trump’s rhetoric masks a deeper instinct to disengage – and a refusal to confront Moscow on substance
 
特朗普的言论掩盖了他更深层次的脱离接触的本能——以及拒绝在实质上与莫斯科对抗
 
Donald Trump’s recent comments on Ukraine were highly anticipated, especially given his habit of surprising even those who consider themselves seasoned observers. His remarks on 14 July, delivered alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, were characteristically loud but ultimately underwhelming. That in itself should not be surprising. Over the past six months, Trump’s style on major international issues has followed a familiar pattern. Ukraine is no exception.
 
唐纳德·特朗普最近关于乌克兰的言论备受期待，尤其是考虑到他一贯的惊人作风，甚至让那些自认为经验丰富的观察家都感到意外。7月14日，他与北约秘书长马克·吕特一同发表的讲话，一如既往地高调，但最终却令人失望。这本身并不令人意外。在过去的六个月里，特朗普在重大国际问题上的风格一直遵循着一种熟悉的模式。乌克兰问题也不例外。
 
At the heart of Trump’s approach lies a calculated strategy of noise. He generates maximum bluster to create the impression of strength and decisiveness. What follows is not action, but an endless repetition of simple slogans. Clarification is deliberately avoided, the aim being to appear both consistent and unpredictable. Behind this theater lies a reluctance to become truly entangled in any foreign conflict. Trump wants short, manageable involvement with low costs and quick exit ramps. Above all, he is not willing to challenge the mainstream consensus in Washington as deeply as he claims. For all the bluster, Trump remains tethered to the very ‘Deep State’ he rails against.
 
特朗普策略的核心在于精心策划的“噪音”策略。他极力制造虚张声势，营造出强势果断的印象。然而，随之而来的不是行动，而是无休止地重复简单的口号。他刻意回避澄清，目的是展现既始终如一又难以预测的姿态。这种“舞台”的背后，是他不愿真正卷入任何外国冲突。特朗普希望短期内、可控地介入，降低成本，并迅速撤离。最重要的是，他不愿像他声称的那样深入挑战华盛顿的主流共识。尽管他如此虚张声势，但特朗普仍然被他所抨击的“深层政府”牢牢束缚。
 
The Israel-Iran confrontation earlier this year offers a textbook example. One dramatic strike on Iranian nuclear sites gave the impression of a bold move. It satisfied different parts of Trump’s base, pleased Israel, and sent a message to Tehran – without triggering a regional war. Trump got to claim a geopolitical ‘win’ and was once again floated as a Nobel Peace Prize candidate. But for all the headlines, little actually changed. Iran’s nuclear program continues, and the political dynamics of the region remain largely intact. Still, Trump presented it as a major American contribution to world peace.
 
今年早些时候的以伊对峙就是一个典型例子。对伊朗核设施的一次猛烈打击给人留下了大胆举动的印象。这一举动满足了特朗普不同阵营的选民，取悦了以色列，并向德黑兰传递了信息——而没有引发地区战争。特朗普宣称自己赢得了地缘政治“胜利”，并再次成为诺贝尔和平奖候选人。然而，尽管媒体铺天盖地地报道，但实际上几乎没有什么改变。伊朗核计划仍在继续，该地区的政治格局基本保持不变。尽管如此，特朗普仍将其描绘成美国对世界和平的重大贡献。
 
The problem is, Ukraine is not the Middle East. It is far more complex, and Trump appears to know it. His instinct is to avoid the problem altogether. But he can’t. The conflict is now a central issue in US-European relations, and Trump’s own supporters are split between isolationists and hawks. He knows he cannot ignore Ukraine outright. Nor can he allow Biden’s war to become his. This explains the repeated emphasis in his ‘It’s Not My War’ speech. He said it three times.
 
问题是，乌克兰不是中东。它远比中东复杂得多，特朗普似乎也知道这一点。他的本能是完全回避这个问题。但他做不到。这场冲突如今已成为美欧关系的核心问题，特朗普的支持者也分为孤立主义者和鹰派。他知道自己不能完全忽视乌克兰。他也不能让拜登的战争变成自己的战争。这解释了他在“这不是我的战争”演讲中反复强调这一点。他强调了三次。
 
So, what did Trump actually propose? Not much. He suggested that America’s European allies should send Ukraine their old weapons systems – especially Patriot batteries – and then buy new ones from the United States, paying “100 percent.” That, for Trump, is the core of the plan: turn war into business. The logic is simple and familiar. Europe gets rid of its aging stock, Ukraine gets support, and America gets orders. But the practicalities remain vague: what systems, what timeline, what delivery mechanisms? These were left unclear.
 
那么，特朗普究竟提出了什么建议呢？没多少。他建议美国的欧洲盟友应该将他们的旧武器系统（尤其是爱国者导弹）送给乌克兰，然后从美国购买新的，并“全额支付”。对特朗普来说，这就是该计划的核心：把战争变成生意。逻辑简单又熟悉。欧洲淘汰老化库存，乌克兰获得支持，美国获得订单。但具体细节仍然模糊：什么系统，什么样的时间表，交付机制如何？这些都不清楚。
 
Then there’s the question of exerting economic pressure on Russia. Trump approved a plan to impose 100 percent tariffs on Russian exports to third countries. This is a more moderate version of Senator Lindsey Graham’s 500 percent threat. The idea is to squeeze Russia economically without enforcing a full embargo. But here, too, the scheme is light on details. The White House will issue the duties and can cancel them at will. Implementation will be delayed by 50 days – standard Trump trade deal tactics. Nothing is final. Everything is leverage.
 
接下来是向俄罗斯施加经济压力的问题。特朗普批准了一项计划，对俄罗斯出口至第三国的产品征收100%的关税。这比参议员林赛·格雷厄姆提出的500%威胁更为温和。其目的是在不实施全面禁运的情况下对俄罗斯进行经济挤压。但该计划同样缺乏细节。白宫将发布关税，并可随时取消。实施将推迟50天——这是特朗普贸易协议的标准策略。没有什么是最终决定。一切都只是筹码。
 
The real message is that Trump is still negotiating. He can’t reach a deal with Putin, but he wants to pressure Moscow without entering into an open confrontation. He still refuses to personally attack Putin, saying only that he is “very dissatisfied” and “disappointed.” That signals he is keeping his options open. He wants credit for any peace that might emerge but is unwilling to own the risks of deeper engagement.
 
真正的信息是，特朗普仍在谈判。他无法与普京达成协议，但他想在不公开对抗的情况下向莫斯科施压。他仍然拒绝对普京进行人身攻击，只是说他“非常不满”和“失望”。这表明他保留了各种选择。他希望任何可能出现的和平都能获得赞誉，但不愿承担更深层次接触的风险。
 
Trump also repeated his claim to being the world’s premier peacemaker, listing off a string of supposed triumphs – India-Pakistan, Israel-Iran, Serbia-Kosovo, Gaza (“well, almost”), the DRC and Rwanda, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Egypt and a “neighboring country” (apparently forgetting the name of Ethiopia). These boasts reflect the core Trump method: declare success, repeat it often, and rely on public attention spans being short.
 
特朗普还重申了他作为世界顶级和平缔造者的说法，列举了一系列所谓的胜利——印度-巴基斯坦、以色列-伊朗、塞尔维亚-科索沃、加沙（“嗯，几乎”）、刚果民主共和国和卢旺达、亚美尼亚和阿塞拜疆，以及埃及和一个“邻国”（显然忘了埃塞俄比亚的名字）。这些吹嘘反映了特朗普的核心策略：宣称成功，不断重复，并依赖于公众短暂的注意力。
 
Despite the showmanship, the risk of American entanglement in Ukraine remains high. The measures Trump has announced will not meaningfully shift the military-political balance, but they may prolong the war, at increased cost. Meanwhile, the channel of negotiation opened by Trump’s call to Putin in February appears to be closing. Trump is reportedly irritated with Moscow, but Russia has not moved an inch. Nor does it plan to. Putin sees no reason to adapt his position simply to accommodate Trump’s political timetable.
 
尽管美国在乌克兰问题上有所作为，但卷入其中的风险仍然很高。特朗普宣布的措施不会对军事政治平衡产生实质性的改变，反而可能会延长战争，并增加成本。与此同时，特朗普二月份致电普京所开辟的谈判渠道似乎正在关闭。据报道，特朗普对莫斯科感到恼火，但俄罗斯却丝毫未动，也不打算这么做。普京认为没有理由仅仅为了迎合特朗普的政治时间表而调整自己的立场。
 
There are rumors that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov delivered some new proposals to Senator Marco Rubio in Malaysia. But based on past experience, these are almost certainly familiar Russian talking points in new packaging. Moscow’s approach to resolving the Ukrainian crisis has remained unchanged for over three years. Trump’s rhetoric won’t alter that.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, Washington no longer has the capacity to engage at the same level as it did in 2023–2024. The political will, financial resources, and strategic bandwidth simply aren’t there. Half-measures from the US won’t deliver results, though they may prolong the conflict. That is unfortunate, but not sufficient cause for Moscow to adjust its course.
Trump, for his part, doesn’t want to stay on the Ukraine file. He wants to move on – and fast. Many in the Pentagon share that view. But the war will not end just because Washington wants to focus elsewhere. Neither side has a clear long-term strategy. What remains is inertia – and inertia, for now, is stronger than intent.
 
有传言称，俄罗斯外长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫在马来西亚向参议员马克·卢比奥提交了一些新建议。但根据以往经验，这些几乎肯定是俄罗斯熟悉的、只是换汤不换药的论调。莫斯科解决乌克兰危机的策略三年多来始终未变。特朗普的言论不会改变这一点。
从克里姆林宫的角度来看，华盛顿已无力像2023-2024年那样积极参与。政治意愿、财政资源和战略带宽都已不复存在。美国的折衷措施不会带来任何成果，尽管它们可能会延长冲突。这令人遗憾，但不足以成为莫斯科调整路线的理由。
特朗普本人不想继续纠缠乌克兰问题。他希望尽快向前迈进。五角大楼的许多人也持这种观点。但战争不会仅仅因为华盛顿想把注意力转移到其他地方而结束。双方都没有明确的长期战略。剩下的就是惯性——而就目前而言，惯性比意图更强大。