QA回答：美国军队最大的资产是什么？-网帖翻译-龙腾网

Damien Leimbach
The US military’s greatest super power is the same as Bruce Wayne’s.

美国军队最强大的超能力和布鲁斯·韦恩的一样。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

Their giant ass bank account.

他们那庞大的银行账户。

They also share an almost pathological need to right wrongs, and mete out justice. That gets them both into some pretty dark territory, but it's always done with their hearts in the right place.

他们还都有一种近乎病态的纠正错误和伸张正义的需求。这让他们都陷入了一些相当黑暗的境地，但他们的出发点总是好的。

What do we buy with our superpower bank account?

我们用我们超级大国的银行账户买什么？

What that money buys is competency.

这些钱买来的是能力。

People unfamiliar with this issue often look at the size of the budget and wonder why we spend so much more than other nations, or why we always seem to need more money for the military.

不熟悉这个问题的人经常看到预算的规模，就会想知道为什么我们比其他国家花费更多，或者为什么我们似乎总是需要更多的军费。

We can talk about global force projections and the law that requires the US to have 10 operational super carriers at any one time. We can talk about the technical edge that research and development gives us. We can talk about manpower and raw numbers of tanks........but these are distractions. The real commodity purchased with that money is competency.

我们可以谈论全球力量投射以及要求美国在任何时候都拥有10艘可操作的超级航母的法律。我们可以谈论研发带来的技术优势。我们可以谈论人力和坦克的数量……但这些都是转移注意力的东西。用这些钱购买的真正商品是能力。

Even though our military spends as much money as the next 15 countries combined, the US, generally speaking, does not have as many tanks, airplanes, and soldiers as the next 15 counties combined. So where does the money go?

尽管我们的军队花费的钱相当于接下来15个国家的总和，但总的来说，美国拥有的坦克、飞机和士兵数量并没有接下来15个国家的总和多。那么钱都去哪儿了？
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

We buy practice. We buy spare parts. We buy fuel. We buy bombs to drop on a training range.

我们购买训练。我们购买备件。我们购买燃料。我们购买用于在训练场投掷的炸弹。

American fighter pilots fly more training hours in a month than most pilots from other countries will in a year. That's expensive. That cost fuel, it costs spare parts, it costs in terms of mechanics who must be trained, facilities that must be kept up.......that's where that money goes. Other nations might have a similar raw numbers of planes, but they don't have the number of trained mechanics, pilots and ready airfields around the world that we do.

美国战斗机飞行员一个月内的训练飞行小时数比大多数其他国家的飞行员一年的训练飞行小时数还要多。这很昂贵。这需要燃料、备件，还需要接受培训的机械师以及必须维护的设施……这就是钱的去向。其他国家可能拥有相似数量的飞机，但他们没有我们拥有的那么多训练有素的机械师、飞行员和遍布全球的可用机场。

Another thing we buy is the ability to deploy around the world at a moments notice. When was the last time Russia or China plopped an Air Wing or Tank Battalion off in a foreign country? Its not that they don't covet that capability or have regional territorial ambitions, its that they just don't have it (the capability) the way we do. That costs money.

我们购买的另一件事是随时在全球部署的能力。俄罗斯或中国上次在外国部署一个空军联队或坦克营是什么时候？并不是说他们不渴望这种能力或没有地区领土野心，而是他们根本没有我们拥有的那种能力。这需要钱。

Maintaining bases around the world is expensive. I can only think of a few other countries besides the US that maintains active duty combat units at military bases on foreign soil at all. The US has 38.

在全球维持军事基地是昂贵的。除了美国之外，我只能想到少数几个在外国领土的军事基地维持现役作战部队的国家。美国有38个。

Lastly, what that money buys is specialization.

最后，这些钱买来的是专业化。

Again, using planes as an example, we have air superiority fighters, we have close air support planes, we have fighter bombers, and we have reconnaissance planes. These planes are only designed for one type of mission, its the only mission they practice and they do it extremely well. This is expensive, because now you have to maintain, 4 different kinds of jets, 4 sets of parts, sometimes different fuel requirements, 4 sets of pilots, 4 different bases, different training for mechanics........ect. Expensive.

再次以飞机为例，我们有制空战斗机、近距离空中支援飞机、战斗轰炸机和侦察机。这些飞机只为一种任务而设计，这是它们唯一练习的任务，而且它们做得非常出色。这很昂贵，因为现在你必须维护4种不同的喷气式飞机、4套零部件、有时不同的燃料要求、4套飞行员、4个不同的基地、机械师的不同培训等等。昂贵。

Other countries simply can’t afford that level of specialization. So they are forced to buy fewer, more generalized aircraft that can perform all of those roles. They don't have one plane for each role, they have one plane, the recce/fighter/CAS/bomber. But it is the jack of all trades who is master of none.

其他国家根本负担不起这种程度的专业化。因此，他们被迫购买数量较少、更通用的飞机，这些飞机可以执行所有这些任务。他们不是每种角色都有一架飞机，而是一架飞机，即侦察机/战斗机/近距离空中支援飞机/轰炸机。但这正是样样通，样样松。

The planes, (not optimized for a particular role) aren't as good, and even then they still have problems finding parts and fuel for their pilots to train, who must now train 4 different kinds of missions, so their proficiency will be reduced as well.

这些飞机（没有针对特定角色进行优化）性能不够好，即便如此，他们仍然难以找到零部件和燃料供飞行员训练，而飞行员现在必须训练4种不同的任务，因此他们的熟练程度也会降低。

This is why we spend so much. It’s not that we have more tanks and planes and battleships, its that we really are that much better with the stuff we do have. That kind of specialization and training and the corresponding proficiency it brings just costs a lot.

这就是我们花费如此之多的原因。并不是我们拥有更多的坦克、飞机和战舰，而是我们确实能更好地利用我们拥有的东西。那种专业化、训练以及随之而来的熟练程度需要大量的资金。

Competency, specialization, capability, bombs, fuel and parts. We have all of these things. Everyone else has to settle for 3 out of 6 if their lucky.

能力、专业化、实力、炸弹、燃料和零部件。我们拥有所有这些。如果幸运的话，其他人只能满足于六分之三。

Now what is the result of this expertise and specialization? Sheer, raw intimidation. The USAF hasn’t shot anyone down in 20 years because literally no one will mess with us! The last time we had fighter engagements in the first gulf war, Iraq’s air force was crippled in days. Instead of flying out to meet us in battle, they were burying their planes of flying them to Iran (their mortal enemy of a recent decade long war) just so we wouldn’t destroy them. And these were their hardened, battle tested pilots with hundreds of combat hours in the aforementioned war. And they were getting absolutely wrecked by our pilots, almost none of whom had any combat hours at all.

那么这种专业知识和专业化的结果是什么呢？纯粹的、原始的威慑。美国空军20年来没有击落过任何人，因为根本没有人敢惹我们！上次我们在第一次海湾战争中有战斗机交战时，伊拉克空军在几天内就被摧毁了。他们没有起飞与我们作战，而是埋藏他们的飞机或将它们飞往伊朗（他们最近一场长达十年的战争中的死敌），只是为了不让我们摧毁它们。而这些是他们身经百战、拥有数百小时战斗经验的飞行员。他们却被我们几乎没有任何战斗经验的飞行员彻底击溃。

It was the same story with the Army taking on the vaunted Republican Guard, the supposed elite battle tested force with tons of combat experience from the Iran Iraq war. We rolled up and smashed their entire army in 100 hours, mostly with boys who had only been out of boot camp for a few years.

陆军对抗声名显赫的共和国卫队也是如此，共和国卫队是号称精锐、身经百战的部队，在两伊战争中拥有丰富的战斗经验。我们迅速出击，在100小时内摧毁了他们的整个军队，而我们的大部分士兵都只是刚从新兵训练营出来几年。

We live, they die. So badly in fact that it saves lives, because wars end quicker, or don’t start at all because our superior tactics and training we spend a ton of money to have makes the outcome of fighting the US military a predictable, foregone conclusion.

我们生，他们死。事实上，情况糟到这种程度反而能拯救生命，因为战争会更快结束，或者根本不会开始，因为我们花费巨资拥有的卓越战术和训练使得与美国军队作战的结果成为一个可预测的、早已注定的结论。

Jack Vony
This:

这个：

For Operation Desert Shield, the US military shipped hundreds of thousands of troops, millions of tons of ordnance, and tens of thousands of vehicles to Saudi Arabia, assembling a massive army in a few months. The US still keeps bases across the world operational and constantly transports troops, vehicles, and supplies almost anywhere in the world.

在沙漠盾牌行动中，美国军方向沙特阿拉伯运送了数十万士兵、数百万吨弹药和数万辆车辆，在几个月内组建了一支庞大的军队。美国仍然保持着全球基地的运转，并不断地向世界几乎任何地方运输部队、车辆和补给。

No other country has a logistical chain like the United States. Other countries may build specific weapon systems to rival ours, or have large numbers to challenge our own, but no one does force projection like the US.

没有其他国家拥有像美国这样的后勤链。其他国家可能会制造特定的武器系统来与我们匹敌，或者拥有庞大的数量来挑战我们，但没有人能像美国那样进行力量投射。

While supply trucks and cargo ships are seen as mundane by most internet military enthusiasts, they are the reason for the US’s worldwide military presence and pedigree. Like Patton emphasized in his speech to the Third Army, the truck drivers and quartermasters are just as important as the men on the front line.

虽然补给卡车和货船在大多数互联网军事爱好者看来很普通，但它们却是美国在全球军事存在和声誉的原因。正如巴顿将军在对第三集团军的讲话中强调的那样，卡车司机和军需官与前线的士兵同样重要。

Harmen Breedeveld
The US military’s greatest asset is visible from space: geography.

美国军队最大的资产从太空可见：地理位置。

A vast ocean to the East, and an even vaster ocean to the West. To the North friendly, culturally similar, stable and above all weaker Canada. To the South Mexico, a relatively friendly, less stable, but again weak country.

东边是广阔的海洋，西边是更加广阔的海洋。北边是友好、文化相似、稳定且最重要的是比我们弱小的加拿大。南边是墨西哥，一个相对友好、不太稳定、但同样弱小的国家。

In other words: America is extraordinarily safe, being far removed from most threats.

换句话说：美国非常安全，因为它远离大多数威胁。

The challenges for any would-be attacker

任何潜在攻击者面临的挑战

America’s geography creates logistical challenges for any adversary that are nearly impossible to overcome. How is this adversary even going to reach the US and sustain a campaign there?

美国的地理位置给任何对手都带来了几乎无法克服的后勤挑战。这个对手将如何到达美国并在那里维持一场战役？

Japan in World War II never seriously considered invading the American mainland. It was simply impossible.

二战中的日本从未认真考虑过入侵美国本土。这根本不可能。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

Compare America’s geography with that of Germany in World War II. Germany was surrounded by France, the UK and the USSR. It ended up into an endless two-front land war which steadily eroded its military abilities, while its cities and industries were under constant threat of allied bombers.

将美国的地理位置与二战时期德国的地理位置进行比较。德国被法国、英国和苏联包围。它最终陷入了一场无休止的两线陆地战争，这稳步削弱了它的军事能力，而它的城市和工业则受到盟军轰炸机的威胁。

America is blessed with its geography.

美国得天独厚，拥有优越的地理位置。

Advantages for the US military as a result of geography

地理位置给美国军队带来的优势
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

The American military benefits from this geography in many ways. Some examples:

美国军队从这种地理位置中受益匪浅。以下是一些例子：

1.) Most would-be attackers simply never attack. One look at the map convinces most sane leaders to let go of any scheme to attack the US. The best war for any military is the one you need not even fight.

1.) 大多数潜在的攻击者根本不会攻击。看一眼地图就能让大多数理智的领导人放弃任何攻击美国的计划。对于任何军队来说，最好的战争是不需要打的战争。

2.) Any adversary that does attack America itself, fights with near-insurmountable disadvantages. The English tried to end the American rebellion during the Revolutionary War. This meant a prolonged war across an ocean, against an enemy that fights close to its resources. England lost.

2.) 任何攻击美国本土的对手，都将面临几乎无法克服的劣势。英国在独立战争期间试图结束美国的反叛。这意味着一场跨越海洋的长期战争，对抗一个在其资源附近作战的敌人。英国输了。

Al Qaeda attacked the American mainland on 9/11. But it could not use its favoured means such as suicide bombers or roadside bombs, the distance made it impossible. Instead it had to rely on a more complicated scheme that was highly vulnerable to detection and disruption. It worked, but mostly because America was not paying attention. It is telling that Al Qaeda has not been able to repeat the attack.

基地组织在9/11袭击了美国本土。但由于距离遥远，它无法使用其惯用的手段，如自杀式炸弹或路边炸弹。相反，它不得不依赖一个更复杂的计划，该计划极易被发现和破坏。它成功了，但主要是因为美国当时没有注意。具有讽刺意味的是，基地组织一直未能重复这次袭击。

This all shows that the US military fights with huge benefits if it has to defend the mainland.

这一切都表明，如果美国军队必须保卫本土，它将拥有巨大的优势。

3.) Most attacks are not on the mainland, giving America time to respond. Geography forces adversaries to strike outside of the mainland, giving America time to respond.

3.) 大多数袭击都不是针对本土的，这给了美国时间做出反应。地理位置迫使对手在美国本土以外发动袭击，这给了美国时间做出反应。

The best example is the war with Japan in World War II. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, a devastating strike, but not one that threatened America itself. The American people, the factories, the shipyards where America was already constructing its new fleets, all were safe. No bombings, no invasions, no disruptions.

最好的例子是二战中与日本的战争。日本袭击了珍珠港，这是一次毁灭性的打击，但并没有威胁到美国本土。美国人民、工厂、美国已经开始建造新舰队的造船厂，都安然无恙。没有轰炸，没有入侵，没有破坏。

America had time to recover from the shock and to mobilize its population and industry to crank out a massive army and navy and to take the war to Japan (and to Germany).

美国有时间从震惊中恢复过来，并动员其人口和工业，制造出庞大的陆军和海军，并将战争带到日本（和德国）。

America even had the luxury of being able to spend massive resources on a wild-eyed crazy idea: a nuclear weapon.

美国甚至有奢侈的条件，能够将大量资源投入到一个异想天开的想法上：核武器。

4.) Most wars America does fight are wars of choice. Because America is so safe from enemies, most of the wars it fights are wars of choice. Usually one chooses war with a decidedly weaker, politically isolated country.

4.) 美国打的大多数战争都是选择性的战争。因为美国如此安全，免受敌人的威胁，它打的大多数战争都是选择性的战争。通常，它会选择与一个明显较弱、政治上孤立的国家开战。

And that is nice for the military and for the average soldier. Sure, fighting the Vietcong in Vietnam or Sunni extremists in Iraq is bad, but it is a hell of a lot better than sitting in a foxhole watching a Soviet armed division rolling at you.

这对军队和普通士兵来说是好事。当然，在越南与越共作战或在伊拉克与逊尼派极端分子作战很糟糕，但这比坐在散兵坑里看着一支苏联重装师向你开来要好得多。

4a.) America can walk away from its wars of choice. Even a war of choice can go spectacularly wrong. Think of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. But then the magic happens: America can end them by walking away. The Vietnam war ended because America gave up. Same for the Iraq war. And rest assured, the same will go for the Afghanistan war.

4a.) 美国可以从它选择的战争中抽身而退。即使是选择的战争也可能惨败。想想越南、伊拉克和阿富汗。但随后奇迹发生了：美国可以通过抽身而退来结束这些战争。越南战争的结束是因为美国放弃了。伊拉克战争也是如此。请放心，阿富汗战争也将如此。

Few countries can so easily walk away from war. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq could not walk away when America invaded. Nor could the Taliban’s Afghanistan. The leadership and its supporters had to choose between fighting and losing all they held dear.

很少有国家能如此轻易地从战争中抽身。当美国入侵时，萨达姆·侯赛因的伊拉克无法抽身。塔利班的阿富汗也无法抽身。其领导层和支持者不得不选择战斗，否则将失去他们珍视的一切。

Not so for America. When it walks away, its oceans again protect it, and peace returns. No need for the army to wage endless war.

美国则不然。当它抽身离去时，其海洋再次保护着它，和平也随之归来。军队无需进行无休止的战争。

So there you have it: geography. The greatest asset of America’s military.

就是这样：地理。这是美国军队最大的优势。

Karl Milhon
It is the individual soldier/Marine. Most military forces are trained and trained to follow orders. A French Soldier in Afganistan that worked with American units noted” “ In fact, is the basic philosophy of both British and Continental soldiers. 'In the absence of orders, take a defensive position.' Indeed, virtually every army in the world. The American soldier and Marine, however, are imbued from early in their training with the ethos: In the Absence of Orders: Attack! Where other forces, for good or ill, will wait for precise orders and plans to respond to an attack or any other 'incident', the American force will simply go, counting on firepower and SOP to carry the day”

是单兵/海军陆战队员。大多数军队都被训练成服从命令。一位曾在阿富汗与美军合作的法国士兵注意到：“事实上，这是英国和欧洲大陆士兵的基本理念。‘在没有命令的情况下，采取防御姿态。’的确，世界上几乎所有军队都是如此。然而，美国士兵和海军陆战队员在早期训练中就被灌输了一种信条：在没有命令的情况下：进攻！其他部队，无论好坏，都会等待明确的命令和计划来应对袭击或任何其他‘事件’，而美军则会直接行动，依靠火力和标准作业程序来取胜。”
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

So, first it appears we have a different attitude AND training. Historically also, our individualism AND core marksmanship tied to our rural background and every boy with a gun in his hand likely played a role. I can speak to that in that I grew up with a rifle in my hand and shot almost perfect in Boot Camp rifle range in the early 70’s. If you have never held a weapon in your life and then are given one it is different than growing up with one and knowing how to use it almost instinctively. I could see it in other recruits eyes, and the initially awkward way they held their weapons.

因此，首先看来我们拥有不同的态度和训练。历史上，我们的个人主义和与农村背景相关的核心射击技能，以及每个男孩手中都可能有枪，可能也发挥了作用。我对此深有体会，因为我从小就拿着步枪长大，在 70 年代初的新兵训练营射击场几乎弹无虚发。如果你一生从未拿过武器，然后才被给予一把，这与从小就拥有武器并几乎凭本能就知道如何使用它是有区别的。我可以在其他新兵的眼中看到这一点，以及他们最初握持武器的笨拙姿势。

In addition, there are myriad examples of 20th Century US units losing their officers and NCO’s and privates and lance corporals just step up. Our NCO corps are noted. Take a look at a list of medal of honor recipients and read the short summaries of what the lowest level privates to NCO’s did. Their actions reflect what I am saying. AND these were just the ones that got the medal of honor. You go down the heirarchy of medals and you will see huge numbers of examples of what I am talking about.

此外，20 世纪有无数例子表明，美国部队在失去军官和士官后，士兵和下士会挺身而出。我们的士官队伍是著名的。看看荣誉勋章获得者的名单，读一下最低级别的士兵到士官所做的事的简短总结。他们的行动反映了我所说的。而且这些仅仅是获得荣誉勋章的人。如果你查看更低级别的勋章，你会看到大量我所说的例子。

Now you could say hey, I bet there are examples of this in other armies and I would have to agree, but, in general, you see foreign troops doing what that French soldier noted as in waiting for orders, going defensive and not offensive. And yes this is a generalization but I remember being in Marines. They wanted me to do “what” they said when they said it and not question it, but they didn’t take away my ability to think and expected me to maintain situational awareness and to act on it AND even listened and adjusted their plans when I had tactical observations that improved our situation. It never occurred to me that I should “not reason why.” I made meritorious Corporal and meritorious Sergeant as a result for things they didn’t give medals for in a situation that never happened…

现在你可能会说，嘿，我敢打赌其他军队也有这样的例子，我无法否定，但是，总的来说，你会看到外国军队做那位法国士兵所说的那样，等待命令，采取防御而不是进攻。是的，这是一种概括，但我记得我在海军陆战队的时候。他们希望我在他们说的时候就做他们说的“什么”，不要质疑，但他们并没有剥夺我的思考能力，并期望我保持态势感知并采取行动，甚至在我提出能够改善我们局势的战术观察时，他们还会倾听并调整他们的计划。我从未想过我不应该“不问为什么”。结果，我因在从未发生过的情况下所做的一些没有获得勋章的事情而晋升为优秀下士和优秀中士……

AND, most of the Marines around me were not a lot different… Of course we were a group of forward observers naval gunfire liaison, kind of special forces before they had a name for it but hey, we were just regular Marines. We worked with other NATO forces for a few months at one point. One thing I noticed was a lot of looking at their NCO’s and officers in situations. The Brits were tight. The Italians seemed more interested in looking good than anything and the Turks were individually scary but looked to officers more than anyone else… This was like 1974 and we got to meet the Turks under other conditions later in Cyprus… I didn’t forget my impressions…

而且，我周围的大多数海军陆战队员也差不多……当然，我们是一群前沿观察员，海军炮火联络员，有点像在特种部队这个名称出现之前的特种部队，但嘿，我们只是普通的海军陆战队员。我们曾在某个时候与其他北约部队合作了几个月。我注意到的一件事是，在各种情况下，他们很多人都会看着他们的士官和军官。英国人很严谨。意大利人似乎更注重外表而不是其他，而土耳其人单兵作战很可怕，但比任何人都更依赖军官……那大约是 1974 年，后来我们在塞浦路斯的其他情况下遇到了土耳其人……我没有忘记我的印象……

Example: I remember one example of being in a command tent with forces from three countries in it. We all had radios and were communicating with individual units but on the same freq on one. At one point someone came on the radio and they were obviously civilians speaking broken English and then other languages and I have no idea how they got on that freq but there they were. I specifically remember the other operators from the UK, Italian and then U.S. getting it. I remember the other operators looking to their officers on what to do having to get their attention as they were talking to each other.

举例：我记得有一次，我和来自三个国家的部队在一个指挥帐篷里。我们都有无线电，并与各自的部队通信，但在一个共同的频率上。有一次，有人通过无线电讲话，他们显然是说蹩脚英语和其他语言的平民，我不知道他们是如何进入那个频率的，但他们就在那里。我特别记得来自英国、意大利和美国的其他操作员明白了情况。我记得其他操作员看着他们的军官，询问该怎么做，因为军官们正在互相交谈，他们不得不引起军官的注意。

I remember our comm Sergeant just taking the comm and responding WITHOUT looking for guidance from anyone higher and telling them they were on a restricted and incorrect frequency and to get off. I remember us all laughing at his low “official voice” with a mean tone. We were the only ones laughing as the other radio operators were looking at us as the officers started paying attention. Oh, the Sergeant then asked the Major about the need for us to change frequencies as a result. Our Light Colonel or Major can’t remember said thanks Sergeant and started talking to the other officers. This then led to a big deal as the officers conferred with their higher ups and as a result, we had to change freqs in the middle of the day for the entire operation and all the units. I still remember that NSA owned PRC (Prick) with the metal box that you poked the numbers on the back they gave you and then stuck it into the radio to code the freq. I had to carry that heavy bastard…

我记得我们的通信中士直接拿起通信设备并回复，没有向上级寻求任何指示，而是告诉他们他们在一个受限且错误的频率上，让他们离开。我记得我们都嘲笑他带着一丝刻薄的低沉“官方声音”。只有我们在笑，因为其他无线电操作员看着我们，而军官们开始注意。哦，中士随后询问少校我们是否需要因此更改频率。我们的中校或少校（记不清了）说了声谢谢中士，然后开始与其他军官交谈。这随后变成了一件大事，因为军官们与他们的上级进行了商议，结果，我们不得不在白天为整个行动和所有部队更改频率。我仍然记得那个美国国家安全局拥有的 PRC（讨厌的东西），它有一个金属盒子，你把他们给你的数字戳在后面，然后把它插到无线电里来编码频率。我不得不扛着那个沉重的家伙……

Now, you are probably going what does this have to do with the difference and the US greatest asset. Here it is. Something happened. the other forces looked to their officers, (friction) our Sergeant just handled it without thought and then observing a compromise of our secrecy triggered higher levels to address a potential strategic impact (initiative) and the officer responded like no big deal…(Job done).

现在，你可能会问这与差异和美国最大的优势有什么关系。答案就在这里。事情发生了。其他部队看着他们的军官（摩擦），我们的中士只是毫不犹豫地处理了这件事，然后观察到我们机密性的泄露触发了更高级别的人员来处理潜在的战略影响（主动性），而军官的反应就像没什么大不了的……（任务完成）。

We were definitely more casual with our officers but not disrespectful. But, the lower level Marine had no problem taking the initiative and solving the problem with zero friction in the process. We just did it and our three officers in the tent took it for granted… The other soldiers from two other countries looked to their officers for something as simple as that. What do they do in combat? But that little illustrative difference is the difference between U.S. and them in my opinion. I have thought on this very thing on what is the difference between our forces and theirs long and hard. And this example wasn’t what I did that led to my promotions. But the same dynamics were in play…

我们对待军官的态度肯定更随意，但并非不敬。但是，较低级别的海军陆战队员毫不费力地采取主动并解决了问题，整个过程没有任何摩擦。我们只是做了，而帐篷里的三位军官则认为这是理所当然的……来自其他两个国家的士兵对于如此简单的事情都依赖他们的军官。他们在战斗中会做什么？但在我看来，这个小小的说明性差异就是美国和他们之间的区别。我长期以来一直在思考我们的部队和他们的部队之间的区别。而这个例子并不是我晋升的原因。但同样的动态也在发挥作用……

Clifford Terry
In a true war situation, the greatest asset any country’s military possesses is its country’s economic base. A country possessing a strong economic base but a weak military is generally in a superior position to a country possessing a strong military but a weak economic base. The situation of the US vis-a-vis Japan in 1941 clearly demonstrates this. Though aspects of the US military at that time were strong, the overall rating was not, especially as compared to the Japanese military. The overall size of the US Navy was larger than Japan’s but was divided between two oceans thus dropping the power of the Pacific Fleet to less than that of Japan. The US Naval air arm was not only smaller than Japan’s but the Japanese airmen were well experienced having been at war since Japan invaded China years earlier. The US Army was small and divided between force allocations for the Pacific and the Atlantic regions. And so on and so forth - in 90% of all categories for consideration.

在真正的战争局势中，任何国家军队拥有的最大资产是其国家的经济基础。一个拥有强大经济基础但军事力量薄弱的国家，通常比一个拥有强大军事力量但经济基础薄弱的国家处于更有利的地位。1941 年美国与日本的局势清楚地表明了这一点。尽管当时美国军队的某些方面很强大，但整体实力并不强，尤其与日本军队相比更是如此。美国海军的总体规模大于日本，但由于分布在两个大洋，导致太平洋舰队的实力不如日本。美国海军航空兵不仅规模小于日本，而且日本飞行员经验丰富，因为日本早在几年前入侵中国时就已处于战争状态。美国陆军规模较小，兵力分配在太平洋和大西洋地区之间。诸如此类——在 90% 的考虑类别中都是如此。

However, Japan had not only NOT the economic power immediately available to the US but had a very small potential power level for future use. And this was the area that swamped Japan because the US possessed a massive potential power level - one that could only have one possible equal at that time, the Soviet unx.

然而，日本不仅没有美国当时可用的经济实力，而且未来的潜在实力也非常小。而这正是日本被击垮的领域，因为美国拥有巨大的潜在实力——当时唯一可能与之匹敌的只有苏联。

So, the US refusal to surrender immediately after Pearl Harbor doomed Japan at the point of the highest Japanese military achievement.

因此，在美国在珍珠港事件后拒绝立即投降的那一刻，日本在其军事成就的顶峰时期就注定了失败。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

However, bear in mind that in the event of a nuclear conflict the result of a massive nuclear exchange negates both immediate as well as potential economic strength. This is why studies have shown that there can be no winners in such an event.

然而，请记住，在核冲突的情况下，大规模核交换的结果会抵消即时的和潜在的经济实力。这就是为什么研究表明，在这样的事件中不会有赢家。