SE专业问答：北约在冒着与俄罗斯爆发热战风险的情况下，将东欧包括乌克兰纳入其扩张范围，真正的动机到底是什么？

Allure
I don't think this is a valid question here, since it's asking for motivations that none of us are privy to. Not to mention it's an awfully tendentious question... We'll just get a whole lot opinion and pointless debate.

我认为这在这里不是一个有效的问题，因为它询问的是我们都无从知晓的动机。更不用说这是一个极具倾向性的问题……我们只会得到一大堆观点和无意义的争论。

Ted Wrigley
A good question to ask first would be "Why can't Russia simply let the Eastern Europe stay (at least militarily) neutral between NATO and Russia?" They're certainly not willing to, and it is in NATO's best interest to respond to Russia's actions. Also building anything on members' territory is not "enlargement", so the part about missile defense complex seems irrelevant.

首先要问的一个好问题是“为什么俄罗斯不能让东欧在北约和俄罗斯之间保持（至少在军事上）中立呢？” 显然俄罗斯不愿意这样，而对俄罗斯的行为做出回应符合北约的最大利益。此外，在成员国领土上建造任何东西都不算是“扩张”，所以关于导弹防御系统的部分似乎不相关。

johnyu
Perhaps we should ask "Why can't Eastern Europe decide for itself whether they want to be in NATO or not, without Russian influence or bullying?"

也许我们应该问“为什么东欧不能在不受俄罗斯影响或欺凌的情况下自己决定是否想加入北约呢？”

JJJ♦
However, what NATO was doing in the recent years seemed to raise the risk of hot war with Russia. For example, NATO tried to build missile bases in Eastern Europe and even trying to include Ukraine, neighbor of Russia into their organization. What is their motivation of doing so?
The way that paragraph is phrased makes it seem as if NATO is an entity that does things. NATO expands and NATO increases military activity closer to Russia. That's one way of looking at it.
Another way of looking at it is through the scope of those individual nations which make up NATO. That way, NATO countries don't expand further east, but countries which are further east decide for themselves that they want to be part of NATO. That's actually an important principle: self determination.

原文：北约近年来的所作所为似乎增加了与俄罗斯爆发热战的风险。例如，北约试图在东欧建造导弹基地，甚至还试图将俄罗斯的邻国乌克兰纳入组织。他们这样做的动机是什么呢？
回复——你上述的表述方式让人感觉北约是一个主动行事的实体。北约在扩张，北约在靠近俄罗斯的地区增加军事活动。这是一种看待问题的角度。
另一种看待问题的角度是从组成北约的各个国家的层面出发。从这个角度看，不是北约国家向东进一步扩张，而是更靠东的国家自行决定想要成为北约的一部分。这实际上是一个重要原则：自决权。

Non-NATO members Sweden and Finland used this reasoning, according to dw.com:
Recently, the leaders of Sweden and Finland, non-member states aligned with NATO, signaled they see their decision to join NATO as their own right of self-determination in the wake of Russia's troop movements near the Ukraine border.
This isn't new though, from the NATO website:
NATO’s door has been open to new members since it was founded in 1949 – and that has never changed. This “Open Door Policy” is enshrined in Article 10 of NATO’s founding treaty, which says “any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic” can apply for membership. Decisions on membership are taken by consensus among all Allies. No treaty signed by the United States, Europe and Russia included provisions on NATO membership.
And more recently NATO's Secretary General said:
On membership and the NATO's open door all Allies are united on the core principle that each and every nation has the right to choose his own path. This is enshrined in a lot of fundamental documents, many different documents, which are the foundation for European security. And, therefore, also Allies totally agree that it is only Ukraine and 30 Allies that can decide when Ukraine is ready to become a NATO member. No one else has anything to say and of course Russia doesn't have a veto on whether Ukraine can become a NATO member. Allies are ready to support Ukraine on this path towards membership, helping to implement reforms, modernise the armed forces to meet NATO standards. And then, at the end of the day, it has to be NATO Allies and Ukraine that decides on membership.

据德国之声网站报道，非北约成员国瑞典和芬兰就运用了这种理由：
最近，与北约结盟的非成员国瑞典和芬兰的领导人表示，鉴于俄罗斯在乌克兰边境附近的军事调动，他们认为加入北约是他们自己的自决权利。
不过这并非新情况，从北约的官方网站可知：
自1949年北约成立以来，北约大门一直向新成员敞开——而且这一点从未改变。这项“门户开放政策”被载入北约创始条约的第十条，该条规定“任何其他有能力进一步推进本条约原则并为北大西洋安全做出贡献的欧洲国家”均可申请加入。关于成员资格的决定由所有盟国以协商一致的方式做出。美国、欧洲国家与俄罗斯签署的任何条约中都没有包含关于北约成员资格的条款。
最近，北约秘书长也表示：
关于成员资格以及北约的门户开放政策，所有盟国在一个核心原则上达成了一致，即每个国家都有权选择自己的发展道路。这一原则被载入许多基本文件中，众多不同的文件构成了欧洲安全的基础。因此，盟国也完全认同，只有乌克兰和北约的30个盟国能够决定乌克兰何时准备好成为北约成员国。其他任何人都无权置喙，当然，俄罗斯也无权否决乌克兰是否能成为北约成员国。盟国已准备好在乌克兰加入北约的道路上提供支持，帮助其实施改革，对武装部队进行现代化改造以达到北约标准。最终，必须由北约盟国和乌克兰来决定成员资格问题。

In other words, NATO isn't the entity that decides to expand. A third country requests to join and that decision then needs to be agreed by the existing members.
Once a country is a member of its own will, it coordinates with other NATO allies on how to defend its territory. It's not like NATO forces a country to take certain military activity it does not want.
Why can't NATO simply let the Eastern Europe stay (at least militarily) neutral between NATO and Russia? What is the motivation of their expansion in Eastern Europe, irritating Russian, and at the cost of a potential Russia-Ukraine war which could involve NATO themselves?
Because that goes against the principle of self determination upon which NATO is founded. If countries in Eastern Europe want to join NATO, then why should NATO say no? That is directly contrary to NATO's open door policy.
Continuing your line of thought, one might argue that it is in NATO's interest to leave Eastern European countries out. That way they come across as less threatening to Russia. That goes against another principle upon which NATO countries or the West more broadly is built: the liberal international order. All NATO members and candidate members are sovereign nations. That means these countries can decide for themselves and whether joining NATO upsets some third country (Russia) isn't a factor in the decision.

换句话说，不是北约这个实体决定进行扩张。而是某个第三国提出加入申请，然后这一决定需要得到现有成员国的认可。
一旦一个国家出于自身意愿成为北约成员国，它就会与其他北约盟国协调如何保卫自己的领土。并不是北约强迫一个国家进行他们不愿意的军事活动。
针对——为什么北约不能让东欧在北约和俄罗斯之间保持（至少在军事上）中立呢？他们在东欧扩张，激怒俄罗斯，并且冒着可能引发一场可能会把北约自身卷入其中的俄乌战争的风险，这样做的动机是什么呢？
回复——因为这违背了北约建立所基于的自决权原则。如果东欧国家想要加入北约，那么北约为什么要说不呢？这与北约的门户开放政策直接相悖。
顺着你的思路继续思考，有人可能会争辩说，把东欧国家排除在外符合北约的利益。这样一来，北约对俄罗斯来说就不会显得那么具有威胁性。但这又违背了北约国家乃至更广泛的西方所遵循的另一个原则：自由国际秩序。所有北约成员国和候选成员国都是主权国家。这意味着这些国家可以自行决定，而加入北约是否会让某个第三国（俄罗斯）感到不满，并不是做出这一决定时考虑的因素。

My understanding is that due to its overall economic conditions today, Russia, a country much weaker than Soviet unx, does not have enough military power to defeat NATO in a hot war without invoking nuclear weapons (e.g., the military budget of Russian is ~$70 billion, compared with ~$700 billion military budget for U.S), although they might have the motivation to start one. See here for NATO's military budget.
Why would Russia have motivation to start a war with NATO? Without using nuclear weapons they would lose and they risk NATO escalating to nuclear weapons. If Russia started a nuclear war against NATO then they guarantee themselves a nuclear response. So in the first case Russia loses, in the second both sides lose by the principle of mutual assured destruction.
As for your comparison of military budget, it's not really a fair comparison. Most countries in the West have paid military membership while Russia relies in large part on conscxtion. Though the US military is stronger than the Russian military, it's not ten times stronger.

针对——军费问题
俄罗斯为什么会有动机与北约开战呢？如果不使用核武器，他们会输掉战争，而且还冒着北约将冲突升级到核武器层面的风险。如果俄罗斯对北约发动核战争，那么他们必然会招致对方的核反击。所以，在第一种情况下俄罗斯会失败，在第二种情况下，根据相互确保摧毁的原则，双方都会失败。
所以你对军事预算的比较，这其实并不公平。西方大多数国家实行的是募兵制，而俄罗斯在很大程度上依赖征兵制。虽然美国军队比俄罗斯军队更强大，但也并非强上十倍。

Akuzminykh
It surprises me that the highest rated answer does not mention the OSCE or any OSCE document. The Russian position and demands are based on OSCE agreements and the principle of indivisible security. I think, this answer shows the problem in this conflict: The West is ignoring the Russian concerns and is only considering what suits them.

令我惊讶，得票最高的答案没有提及欧洲安全与合作组织（OSCE）或任何欧安组织的文件。俄罗斯的立场和诉求是基于欧安组织的各项协议以及不可分割的安全原则。我认为，这个答案揭示了这场冲突中的问题：西方无视俄罗斯的关切，只考虑对他们自身有利的方面。

JJJ
@akuzminykh I'm not sure what you mean by that. If you think it's important, it might be better to write it up in a new answer. This question is more focused on NATO's perspective, I think. The Russian concerns might be more relevant to a question that asks for Russia's perspective. Maybe this one?

我不太明白你这话是什么意思。如果你觉得这很重要，或许最好写一个新的答案来阐述。我认为这个问题更侧重于北约的视角。俄罗斯的关切可能更适合回答一个从俄罗斯视角出发的问题。也许是这个问题呢？
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

Matthew Christopher Bartsh
+1 This answer, it seems to me, albeit probably unintentionally, does a great job at showing the kind of hubris that played a part in causing the invitation of Ukraine into NATO.

在我看来，这个答案，尽管可能并非有意为之，但却很好地展现了那种在推动邀请乌克兰加入北约这件事上起到一定作用的傲慢态度。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

Italian Philosopher
The question with Ukraine is basically down to Ukraine not trusting Russia one bit and trying to join NATO to get under its protective umbrella.
It's like the little kid at school buddying up to you to help out against the school bully. Sure, it might feel good to be protective and a good guy and all that. But you may also get a bloody nose from fighting the bully and the lil guy won't be a big help in a fight. If only it wasn't your problem...
How did this come to be? Well, partially from Bush in 2008 who thought it would be a good idea to promise accession. Why did they do it? Probably not directly to threaten Russia, but the Bush team was always pretty hubristic in seeing everything the American way.

乌克兰问题归根结底在于乌克兰一点都不信任俄罗斯，试图加入北约以寻求北约保护伞的庇护。
这就好比学校里的小孩子找你帮忙对抗校园恶霸。当然，能保护他人并成为好人的感觉可能不错。但你可能会在与恶霸的争斗中被打得鼻青脸肿，而且那个小家伙在打斗中也帮不上什么大忙。要是这根本就不是你的问题就好了……
事情怎么会变成这样呢？部分原因在于2008年的小布什，他认为承诺让乌克兰加入北约是个好主意。他们为什么这么做呢？可能并非直接为了威胁俄罗斯，但小布什团队总是以相当傲慢的美国视角看待一切。

Diplomats and analysts say that the transatlantic split is such that today's session will produce a formula that effectively replicates the conflicting signals sent in Bucharest. They add that the Bucharest decision was a mistake that contributed to the Caucasus crisis in August.
The issue of Nato membership for the two countries is intimately lixed with western policy towards Russia, currently incoherent and contradictory. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France earlier this month backed Russian calls for a major summit next year to try to redefine Europe's "security architecture." An international foreign ministers' meeting in Helsinki later this week could see Germany, France, Russia, and Finland supporting the summit, which is also opposed by the US and Britain.

外交人士和分析家表示，跨大西洋地区存在分歧，以至于今天的会议将得出一个方案，实际上是在重复布加勒斯特会议上传达出的相互矛盾的信号。他们还补充说，布加勒斯特会议的决定是一个错误，导致了8月的高加索危机。
这两个国家（乌克兰和格鲁吉亚）加入北约的问题与西方对俄罗斯的政策密切相关，而目前西方的政策既不连贯又相互矛盾。本月早些时候，法国总统尼古拉・萨科齐支持俄罗斯提出的明年举行一次重大峰会的呼吁，以试图重新定义欧洲的“安全架构”。本周晚些时候在赫尔辛基举行的一次国际外长会议上，德国、法国、俄罗斯和芬兰可能会支持这次峰会，而美国和英国则持反对态度。

Plus ca change...
Since then, no one's really had the guts to walk it back - including the US which probably isn't that happy with the Bush promise - and doing so now would look like rewarding Putin for his aggression.
Given all the contortions NATO is going through in its statements about Ukraine:
Ukraine is free to apply if it wishes
but there are conditions that it has to meet first
and it won't happen in immediate future
and, btw, since Ukraine is not a member of NATO, we don't have to defend it.
The bulk of NATO doesn't want Ukraine aboard right now and would be happy to see the whole embarrassment shelved (yes, places like Poland or the Baltics would love to stick it to Russia, but they are smaller members).

本质都是一样的……
从那以后，实际上没人有勇气收回承诺——包括美国，它可能对小布什做出的承诺也不太满意——而现在收回承诺看起来就像是对普京的挑衅行为的奖励。
鉴于北约在关于乌克兰的声明中自相矛盾：
乌克兰如果愿意，可以自由申请加入北约；
但它首先必须满足一些条件；
而且短期内不会实现；
顺便说一下，因为乌克兰不是北约成员国，我们没有义务保卫它。
北约的大多数成员国目前并不希望乌克兰加入，并且很乐意看到整个令人尴尬的局面被搁置（是的，像波兰或波罗的海国家这样的地方很想给俄罗斯点颜色看看，但它们是北约的小成员国）。

Here are some pros and cons of accession now, articulated by some heavy hitters in international relations (not just this week's assigned Ukraine "expert" by papers needing to cover the news). Note from it that, since accession needs unanimity from existing members, Ukraine has effectively no chance under current circumstances.
The lack of enthusiasm of NATO towards Ukraine accession or the, supposed, lack of aggressive intent by NATO does not mean that Russia doesn't have security concerns about NATO's proximity. Look at the US and its serial hissy fits with regards to Cuba or its formulation of the Monroe Doctrine. Russia, like other states, is in its right to be cautious about inimical influences near its borders. Unlike most states, it is extremely capable to push back against real or perceived threats. Expecting it to "put up with it" is wishful thinking.

以下是一些国际关系中的重量级人物（不只是本周那些为报道新闻而被指定的乌克兰“专家”）阐述的现在让乌克兰加入北约的一些利弊。请注意，由于加入北约需要现有成员国的一致同意，在目前的情况下，乌克兰实际上没有机会加入。
北约对乌克兰加入缺乏热情，或者说北约所谓的没有侵略意图，并不意味着俄罗斯对北约的逼近没有安全方面的担忧。看看美国，它对古巴一连串的愤怒反应，以及它制定的门罗主义。和其他国家一样，俄罗斯有权对其边境附近的敌对势力保持谨慎。与大多数国家不同的是，它有极强的能力反击真实的或被认为存在的威胁。指望它“忍受”这种情况只是一厢情愿的想法。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

But if it was an easier neighbor to live with, as Russia, and as its predecessor state, USSR, then neighboring countries would be more willing to stick to neutrality.
Ukraine crisis is not the same thing as the Polish ABM base, which is one domain where Russia has more reasonable reasons for concerns (although it has hard to see what its 10 ABMs would do to deter Russian forces, rather than Iran's).
Russia did this to itself, starting with the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea. That annexation of Crimea? Came months after Ukraine's ousting of their corrupt leader, Yanukovich, a protege of Putin's who went straight to Moscow. Just a coincidence.
Few neighboring countries that are not totalitarian themselves trust Putin's Russia. That's why those countries want to join NATO.

但如果俄罗斯，以及它的前身苏联，是一个更容易相处的邻国，那么周边国家会更愿意保持中立。
乌克兰危机与波兰的反导基地问题不同，在反导基地问题上，俄罗斯有更合理的理由表示担忧（尽管很难看出波兰的10个反导系统除了威慑伊朗的力量之外，对威慑俄罗斯军队能起到什么作用）。
俄罗斯这是自作自受，从2008年入侵格鲁吉亚和2014年吞并克里米亚就开始了。说到吞并克里米亚？那是在乌克兰驱逐其腐败领导人亚努科维奇几个月之后发生的，亚努科维奇是普京的亲信，被驱逐后直接去了莫斯科。这只是个巧合罢了。
在那些自身不是极权主义的邻国中，几乎没有哪个信任普京领导的俄罗斯。这就是那些国家想加入北约的原因。

It is telling that amidst this brouhaha Finland, which has decades of careful real neutrality under its belt, is vaguely considering joining NATO. That's just odd. Sweden was mentioned by JJJ, but Finland seems much more fundamentally neutral than them. Again, Finland's hitherto distant collaboration with NATO warmed up after 2014 - see a pattern?
Is it NATO's wider interest to include members that have immediate borders with Russia? No, not really, unless they plan to invade Russia which our electorates would never agree to. By having direct borders with Russia NATO risks border incidents that could easily escalate. It really isn't worth the hassle and the prospective members bring negligible force projection capabilities, outside of their own territory at least.

值得注意的是，在这场喧嚣中，几十年来一直小心翼翼保持真正中立的芬兰，也在隐约考虑加入北约。这太奇怪了。JJJ提到了瑞典，但芬兰在本质上似乎比瑞典更加中立。同样，芬兰与北约此前较为疏远的合作关系在2014年后升温了——看出规律了吗？
让与俄罗斯直接接壤的国家加入北约符合北约更广泛的利益吗？不，并不是这样，除非北约计划入侵俄罗斯，而这是北约国家的选民永远不会同意的。与俄罗斯直接接壤，北约面临着边境事件的风险，而这些事件很容易升级。这实在不值得去折腾，而且这些潜在的成员国除了在本国领土范围内，至少在投射军事力量方面几乎没有什么作用。

It would be great to have a neutral Ukraine, with its security guaranteed by NATO and Russia and call it a day.
Why, it could even look like this agreement, which Russia signed in 1994 to get Ukraine's share of Soviet nukes:
The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind;

要是有一个中立的乌克兰，它的安全由北约和俄罗斯共同保障，那该多好，这样事情也就解决了。
为什么这么说呢？因为可以参照俄罗斯在1994年签署的这份协议，当时是为了让乌克兰放弃其拥有的苏联核武器：
俄罗斯联邦、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和美利坚合众国重申，有义务不对乌克兰的领土完整或政治独立进行威胁或使用武力，并且除非出于自卫或根据《联合国宪章》的其他规定，它们的任何武器永远不会对乌克兰使用；
俄罗斯联邦、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和美利坚合众国根据欧洲安全与合作会议最后文件的原则，重申对乌克兰的承诺，不进行旨在使乌克兰行使其主权所固有的权利屈从于自身利益的经济胁迫，从而获取任何形式的利益；

Now, can Ukraine believe it would solve its problem, this time? This is the problem with breaking agreements, no one believes you later.
For the record, I think it is wrong to accept Ukraine in NATO, now or later. It would be an aggressive move by NATO. However that leaves the question what exactly would provide assurances to Ukraine that they can continue to be an independent state at this point, free of military, economic or political intimidation by either the West or Russia. And free to manage their political and economic alliances as they choose.

那么现在，这次乌克兰能相信这份协议会解决它的问题吗？这就是违背协议的后果，之后就没人会相信你了。
郑重声明，我认为无论是现在还是以后让乌克兰加入北约都是错误的。这将是北约的一种侵略行为。然而，这就留下了一个问题：究竟要怎样才能让乌克兰相信，在目前的情况下，它能够继续作为一个独立的国家存在，免受西方或俄罗斯在军事、经济或政治上的恐吓，并且能够自由地按照自己的选择管理其政治和经济联盟呢。

@user24711 the exact wording doesn't change my answer all that much. NATO's senior members have limited interest in expansion. –
Italian Philosopher

你这些更具体的措辞并没有在很大程度上改变我的答案。北约的主要成员国对扩张的兴趣有限。—— 意大利哲学家
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

I'm not sure why you set that lix under word "easier neighbor". I'm pretty NATO wars list is way longer. –
Oleg V. Volkov

我不确定你为什么在“更容易相处的邻国”这个词下面设置那个链接。我很确定北约参与战争的清单要长得多。

Didn't Russia already sign a treaty saying they guaranteed Ukraine's security? The fact that they're very clearly disregarding the prior treaty they signed on the subject raises questions about what the value of a new one would be. –
Charles Duffy

俄罗斯不是已经签署了一项条约，承诺保障乌克兰的安全吗？他们显然无视了之前在这个问题上签署的条约，这就让人对新条约的价值产生了疑问。

@CharlesDuffy yes, they did. That's the wording I was quoting, from Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances signed in 1994. Which is why the option of a negotiated understanding between Ukraine and Russia is somewhat off the table. All parties can have a general understanding that Russia lays off + gets something in return OR attacks and gets sanctioned. That's a good way to make business together. But Ukraine is unlikely to re-trust them based on a treaty. That ship has sailed. –
Italian Philosopher

是的，他们签过。我引用的正是1994年签署的《布达佩斯安全保障备忘录》里的措辞。这就是为什么乌克兰和俄罗斯之间通过谈判达成谅解的这个选项在某种程度上已经不可行了。各方可以达成一个大致的共识，即俄罗斯停止行动并得到一些回报，或者发动攻击然后遭到制裁。这是一种双方合作的好方式。但乌克兰不太可能基于一项条约再次信任他们。信任的机会已经一去不复返了。

I suggest removing Iran bit in () about Polish ABM base, or briefly explain how would a Polish base actually matters for Iran. Looking at a map (rather, globe) has me completely puzzled as Poland doesn't seem useful against hypothetical Iranian missiles. It isn't in the line for most countries and for those few that is, missiles would be already descending so ABM wouldn't work as well. –
Zizy Archer

我建议删除关于波兰反导基地那段话中括号里提到伊朗的部分，或者简要解释一下波兰的基地实际上对伊朗有什么意义。看一下地图（确切地说是地球仪），我完全不明白，因为波兰似乎对假想中的伊朗导弹没什么作用。对于大多数国家来说，波兰不在导弹飞行的路线上，而对于少数在路线上的国家来说，导弹已经处于下降阶段了，所以反导系统也起不了太大作用。
（已经被删了）