The Russian missile at the center of an unprecedented strike on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro earlier today has been identified by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin as an alleged new weapon, named Oreshnik. After the strike, the missile had been widely — although not conclusively — identified as the RS-26 Rubezh. Development work on this mysterious strategic weapon system was supposedly halted in 2018, although the Pentagon now states that whatever missile was used today in Dnipro was based on the RS-26, suggesting the design was revived at least to a degree, and has now been used in combat.

今天早些时候，乌克兰城市第聂伯遭遇了一次前所未有的打击，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京将实施这次打击的导弹称为一种名为“奥列什尼克”（Oreshnik）的新武器。然而，大部分分析（尽管尚未完全确认）认为，这枚导弹实际上是RS-26“边界”（Rubezh）中程弹道导弹。该神秘战略武器系统的研发工作据称已于2018年停止，但五角大楼表示，这次用于第聂伯打击的导弹基于RS-26的设计，这表明其设计至少在某种程度上被重新启用，并且现在已经用于实战。

First off, it’s worth recalling that the RS-26 is widely viewed as an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), a class of weapon that has a range of somewhere between approximately 1,860 and 3,410 miles — based on the ranges it achieved in tests. However, Russia has previously described it as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a type of weapon that can hit targets at more than around 3,410 miles.

首先，需要回顾的是，RS-26通常被认为是一种中程弹道导弹（IRBM），其射程根据测试结果大约在2,993 km到5,489 km 之间。然而，俄罗斯此前将其描述为一枚洲际弹道导弹（ICBM），这类武器的射程通常超过 5,489km。
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*Ok, two reasons why I think Russia probably used a variant of the long-gestating RS-26 Rubezh IRBM: (1) Russia hinted that it resumed development of the RS-26 this summer and (2) that's what the Ukrainians predicated a day ago, down to the launch site.

*X上注解：
我认为俄罗斯很可能使用了长期研发的RS-26“边界”中程弹道导弹（IRBM）的改进型，原因有以下两点：
1.俄罗斯在今年夏天暗示已恢复RS-26的研发工作；
2.乌克兰一天前就对此进行了预测，甚至准确指出了发射地点。

The reason for this discrepancy likely lies primarily in Russia having sought to remain within the limits of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which outlawed ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers (310 and 3,410 miles). The INF collapsed in 2019.

这一差异的主要原因可能在于俄罗斯试图保持在《中程核力量条约》（INF）的限制范围内。该条约禁止射程在500至5,500公里（310至3,410英里）之间的弹道导弹和巡航导弹。然而，该条约已于2019年失效。
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However, it could explain why the Ukrainian military initially reported that the missile that struck Dnipro was an ICBM — a claim that many Western officials subsequently denied, pointing instead to the RS-26 or an RS-26 derivative.

然而，这也可能解释了为什么乌克兰军方最初报告称，袭击第聂伯的导弹是一枚洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）。这一说法随后被许多西方官员否认，他们更倾向于认为这是一枚RS-26导弹或其改进型。

Regardless, there is now a growing consensus that the missile used was a conventionally armed IRBM based on the RS-26. The launch site appears to have been Kapustin Yar, roughly 500 miles from the target.

无论如何，现在越来越多的共识认为，使用的导弹是一枚基于RS-26的常规武装中程弹道导弹（IRBM）。发射地点似乎是卡普斯廷雅尔（Kapustin Yar），距离目标大约804.67km。

As for the RS-26, this is a solid-fueled, road-mobile missile that has been described in the past as a smaller derivative of the RS-24 Yars ICBM, although the exact relationship is unclear. Development of the RS-26 began around 2008 by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology. The missile is reportedly around 39 feet long and has a diameter of just under six feet.

至于RS-26，这是一种固体燃料、可公路机动的导弹，过去曾被描述为RS-24“雅尔斯”洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）的较小改进型，尽管两者之间的具体关系尚不明确。RS-26的研发大约始于2008年，由莫斯科热技术研究所（Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology）负责。该导弹的长度约为11.89m，直径略低于1.83m。


A first, unsuccessful test launch occurred at Plesetsk in September 2011.

第一次测试发射发生在2011年9月，地点位于普列谢茨克（Plesetsk），但未成功。

In a second test in May 2012, Russia demonstrated that the RS-26 could reach an intercontinental range, although it was widely assumed that this was only achieved with a light payload or no payload at all.

在2012年5月的第二次测试中，俄罗斯展示了RS-26能够达到洲际射程，尽管普遍认为这是在轻型载荷或没有载荷的情况下实现的。

Subsequent tests strongly indicated the missile couldn’t fly beyond intermediate ranges with an actual warhead, which would have put it in contravention of the INF had it been fielded operationally prior to 2019.

随后的测试强烈表明，这枚导弹在携带实际战斗部的情况下无法超过中程射程，如果在2019年前投入使用，将违反《中程核力量条约》（INF）。

Amid this controversy, Russia had officially pulled the plug on the potentially treaty-busting RS-26 in 2018. In March of that year, only weeks after Russian President Vladimir Putin mentioned it in a provocative speech, Russia reportedly decided to shelve the development of the Rubezh, dropping it from the state armament plan for 2018 to 2027. Instead, the country would focus on fielding the nuclear-armed Avangard hypersonic boost-glide vehicle weapon. Previously, Putin had stated that the RS-26 would also serve as the primary launch vehicle for Avangard.

在这场争议中，俄罗斯在2018年正式停止了可能违反条约的RS-26的研发。那年3月，就在俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京在一次具有挑衅性的演讲中提到该导弹后不久，俄罗斯 reportedly 决定将“边界”（Rubezh）的研发搁置，并将其从2018年至2027年的国家武器计划中删除。取而代之的是，该国将重点发展核武装的“先锋”高超音速助推滑行飞行器（Avangard）。此前，普京曾表示，RS-26也将作为“先锋”系统的主要发射平台。

A Russian Ministry of Defense video reportedly showing Avangard prototypes and a computer-generated depiction of its operational concept.

据报道，俄罗斯国防部发布的一段视频展示了“先锋”系统的原型以及其作战概念的计算机生成图像。
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“The Avangard was included in the [state armament plan] program’s final version as more essential to ensure the country’s defense capability,” a Russian defense industry source said, according to state-run media outlet TASS. “All the work on the Rubezh and the Barguzin [rail-mobile ICBM] was put on hold until the end of 2027. A decision on the work’s resumption will be made after the current armament program is fulfilled.”

据国家通讯社塔斯社（TASS）报道，一位俄罗斯国防工业消息人士表示：“‘先锋’系统被纳入了[国家武器计划]的最终版本，因为它对确保国家防御能力更为关键。所有关于‘边界’（Rubezh）导弹和‘巴尔古津’（Barguzin）铁路机动洲际导弹（ICBM）的工作都被暂停，直到2027年底。是否恢复这些工作的决定将在当前武器计划完成后做出。”

Without the RS-26, the Avangard has instead been fielded in a silo-based form loaded onto repurposed rocket boosters from old UR-100N UTTKh ICBMs. The hypersonic boost-glide vehicle may also become a payload option for the silo-launched RS-28 Sarmat ICBM, which has had a troubled development. There is clear evidence that a new RS-28 test launch earlier ended in disaster.

在RS-26被取消后，“先锋”系统改为以封闭发射井的形式部署，搭载重新改造的老UR-100N UTTKh洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）助推器。高超音速助推滑行器也可能成为发射井发射的RS-28萨尔马特（Sarmat）洲际弹道导弹的有效载荷选项，而RS-28萨尔马特本身的研发过程经历了许多困难。有明显证据表明，最近一次RS-28的测试发射以灾难告终。


It was unclear exactly why Russia abandoned the RS-26, although it may simply have been a financial decision, especially with competition from a range of other advanced strategic capabilities the country is also pursuing. Cost concerns were certainly raised in the TASS reporting in 2018.

俄罗斯为何放弃RS-26的具体原因尚不明确，尽管这可能仅仅是一个财务决策，特别是在该国还在追求其他一系列先进战略能力的情况下。2018年塔斯社的报道中，成本问题确实被提出过。

“It was initially planned to include both the Avangard and the [RS-26] Rubezh in the state armament plan,” the anonymous defense industry source told TASS. “It became clear later that funds would not suffice to finance both systems at a time.”

“最初计划将‘先锋’和[RS-26]‘边界’都纳入国家武器计划，”这位匿名的国防工业消息人士告诉塔斯社。“后来显然资金不足以同时资助这两个系统。”

There may have been other issues, as well. After all, prior to being mentioned again in 2018, there had been scant official mention of the RS-26 at all for years. The Kremlin was supposed to demonstrate the system to arms control inspectors from the United States first in 2015 and then in 2016, but both of these inspections were missed.

可能还有其他问题。毕竟，在2018年再次提到之前，RS-26多年来几乎没有得到官方提及。克里姆林宫本应在2015年和2016年分别向来自美国的军控检查员展示该系统，但这两次检查都未能按计划进行。

However, in a 2021 report, the Pentagon stated that, despite the reports in the Russian press, work on the RS-26 and testing of associated equipment continued at least into 2018.

然而，在2021年的一份报告中，五角大楼表示，尽管俄罗斯媒体有相关报道，RS-26的研发工作和相关设备的测试至少持续到了2018年。

With the demise of INF and the deepening tensions between Russia and NATO, it could be that Moscow has revisited the RS-26, perhaps in the form of the Oreshnik, although there is no evidence that either missile has so far been operationally deployed.

随着《中程核力量条约》的终结以及俄罗斯与北约之间紧张局势的加剧，莫斯科可能已经重新审视了RS-26，或许以“奥列什尼克导弹”的形式出现，尽管目前没有证据表明这两种导弹已投入实际部署。

Asked for his reflections on the Dnipro strike, and prior to the Oreshnik disclosure, Pavel Podvig, a senior researcher in the WMD Program at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), told TWZ that the missile used could have been an RS-26 — employed on an experimental basis — or perhaps some new type of missile in the same class. If that were the case, the new missile, Oreshnik or otherwise, would likely be very similar to the RS-26, according to Podvig’s assessment.

在被问及对第聂伯（Dnipro）袭击的看法时，在“奥列什尼克导弹”披露之前，联合国裁军研究所（UNIDIR）大规模杀伤性武器项目的高级研究员帕维尔·波德维格（Pavel Podvig）告诉《TWZ》，此次使用的导弹可能是RS-26——以实验性方式使用——或者可能是同一类别的某种新型导弹。根据波德维格的评估，如果是这种情况，这种新导弹，无论是“奥列什尼克导弹”还是其他名称，都可能与RS-26非常相似。

As to the likelihood of Russia having returned to developing IRBMs, more generally, Podvig says it’s “entirely possible” that Russia might have revived the RS-26 program. “I wouldn’t be surprised if there was some effort to create a missile that would be kind of similar to RS-26, or SS-20 and things like that. I would not be surprised if design bureaus started putting together a project of that kind,” he added.

关于俄罗斯是否重新开始研发中程弹道导弹（IRBM）的问题，波德维格表示，“完全有可能”俄罗斯重新启动了RS-26项目。他补充道:“如果有一些努力去研发类似于RS-26、SS-20之类的导弹，我不会感到惊讶。如果设计局开始着手进行这种类型的项目，我也不会感到意外。”。

There is also the possibility that, if a version of the RS-26 was used, this was simply a case of using up one of the non-operational or even prototype rounds in a combat mission, albeit now rebranded as Oreshnik. The combination of range to target (roughly 500 miles), the ability to evade Ukrainian air defenses, and the powerful signaling may simply have been too tempting for Russia.

还有一种可能性是，如果使用了RS-26的某个版本，这只是将一个非作战状态或甚至是原型弹用于实际作战任务的情况，尽管现在可能被重新命名为“奥列什尼克导弹”。考虑到射程（大约500英里）、规避乌克兰防空能力的能力，以及强烈的信号传递，这可能对俄罗斯来说是一个过于诱人的选择。
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At the same time, using an IRBM of any kind for an operational strike will also provide Russia with very valuable information. After all, no ICBM or IRBM has ever been used in combat before.

同时，使用任何类型的中程弹道导弹（IRBM）进行实战打击，也将为俄罗斯提供非常宝贵的信息。毕竟，迄今为止，洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）和中程弹道导弹（IRBM）从未在实战中使用过。

While the precise identity of the missile used remains a mystery for now, it’s also unclear what kind of payload it was carrying.

尽管目前使用的导弹的确切身份仍然是个谜，但它所携带的弹头类型也尚不清楚。
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When it was developed, the RS-26 was expected to carry either a single nuclear warhead or a nuclear multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload — both options were tested in 2013. The Avangard was, for a while, also seen as an RS-26 payload. Clearly, the missile that targeted Dnipro was either conventionally armed or perhaps, unarmed.

在RS-26开发时，它预计将携带单一核弹头或核多弹头独立再入飞行器（MIRV）弹头——这两种选项在2013年都进行了测试。曾一度认为，Avangard也可以作为RS-26的弹头。显然，袭击第聂伯的导弹要么是常规弹头，要么可能是未装载弹头。

Videos of the strike show what appears to be six warheads hurtling toward the ground, consistent with MIRVs.

袭击的视频显示，似乎有六个弹头正快速下坠，这与多弹头独立再入飞行器（MIRV）的特征一致。

Podvig told us that an unarmed RS-26 (or similar IRBM) is “not entirely impossible,” but also raised the possibility of the missile being fitted with small explosive warheads. There is also the potential that the missile was carrying decoys or a combination of small conventional warheads and decoys.

波德维格告诉我们，未装载弹头的RS-26（或类似的中程弹道导弹）“并非完全不可能”，但他也提出了导弹可能装配小型爆炸性弹头的可能性。此外，导弹可能携带的是诱饵，或者是小型常规弹头和诱饵的组合。
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A conventionally armed IRBM is an interesting proposition and it’s not clear if this would have been developed specifically for this strike, or for use in Ukraine more generally, or if it might reflect a broader interest in Russia to field conventional versions of its strategic missiles.

常规弹头的中程弹道导弹（IRBM）是一个有趣的提议，目前尚不清楚这是否是专门为此次打击而开发，还是为了更广泛地在乌克兰使用，抑或是反映了俄罗斯有意部署其战略导弹的常规版本。

Russia is not known to have looked at developing conventionally armed IRBMs/ICBMs, although, in the past, TWZ has looked at the potential arguments for doing just that — albeit in the case of Israel.

俄罗斯并不以开发常规弹头的中程或洲际弹道导弹（IRBM/ICBM）闻名，尽管在过去，TWZ曾探讨过开发常规弹头导弹的潜在理由——尽管那是以色列的情况。

Amid a worsening crisis involving Iran, we examined the possibility of Israel launching an attack using a conventionally armed version of its Jericho IRBM — best known as a launch vehicle for the Israeli nuclear deterrent.

在涉及伊朗的危机加剧之际，我们探讨了以色列使用常规弹头版本的杰里科中程弹道导弹（Jericho IRBM）发动攻击的可能性——该导弹最著名的是作为以色列核威慑的发射平台。

The same arguments could apply to Russia, which might want to make an extremely powerful show of force in the hope of signaling to the West that it should not become more deeply involved in the war in Ukraine. This is especially true for deterring the U.S. and its partners from allowing expanded targeting for its donated weapons inside of Russian borders.

同样的理由也适用于俄罗斯，俄罗斯可能希望通过展示极为强大的力量，向西方发出信号，表明不应进一步深入介入乌克兰战争。特别是在威慑美国及其伙伴国方面，防止它们允许扩展对俄罗斯边境内目标的攻击范围。

Tellingly, soon after the United States and other allies last week allowed Ukraine to launch long-range missiles into Russia, officials in Moscow warned that they might use a weapon never previously employed on Ukrainian territory.

值得注意的是，在上周美国及其他盟国允许乌克兰向俄罗斯境内发射远程导弹后不久，莫斯科官员警告称，他们可能会使用一种此前从未在乌克兰领土上使用过的武器。

Using a conventionally armed IRBM may well be a response to that decision by the relevant Western powers. Not only is such a missile immune to Ukrainian air defenses but it also delivers a very robust message and one that will resonate across Europe. After all, this is a missile that can reach targets anywhere in the continent and which, on another day, could be topped with a nuclear warhead.

使用常规弹头的中程弹道导弹（IRBM）很可能是对相关西方国家这一决定的回应。这种导弹不仅能免疫乌克兰的防空系统，还传递了一个极具威慑力的信息，并且这一信息将在整个欧洲引起共鸣。毕竟，这是一种能够打击欧洲任何目标的导弹，而在另一天，它也可能携带核弹头。

If the missile was indeed filled with decoys and perhaps didn’t even carry highly-destructive conventional warheads, that would very much point to signaling being the desired effect.

如果该导弹确实携带了诱饵弹，甚至没有搭载高破坏性的常规弹头，这将非常明确地表明，其目的在于传递信号。

On the other hand, a high-explosive warhead would be extremely destructive and might well be sexted for a particularly important or heavily defended target. Should Russia want to target hardened or buried command centers and other key fortified sites in Ukraine, then it might call upon the same types of missiles again — provided they are available in sufficient numbers.

另一方面，高爆弹头具有极强的破坏力，可能会被用于打击特别重要或防御严密的目标。如果俄罗斯希望攻击乌克兰的加固或地下指挥中心以及其他关键的防御工事，那么可能会再次使用同类型导弹——前提是这些导弹的数量足够。

Even demonstrating such a capability is significant, since Ukraine’s air defenses mean that Russia could use such missiles to strike anywhere in the country with impunity. Again, if a conventional warhead can be used in this way, the implications of using a nuclear warhead become obvious.

即便仅是展示这种能力也具有重要意义，因为乌克兰的防空系统意味着俄罗斯可以毫无阻碍地使用此类导弹打击乌克兰境内的任何目标。同样，如果能够以这种方式使用常规弹头，其转而使用核弹头的潜在影响也显而易见。

Russian war planners would have to weigh all this up against the possibility that Ukraine and NATO might misconstrue an incoming conventionally armed IRBM as a nuclear one. However, it should be recalled that all of the ballistic and cruise missiles launched against Ukraine so far by Russia also have the capability to carry nuclear payloads. As we suspected, it is now widely understood that Russia warned the U.S. of its intended strike by a conventionally armed strategic weapon prior to launch.

俄罗斯的战争规划者必须权衡这一点，即乌克兰和北约可能会误认为来袭的常规弹头中程弹道导弹（IRBM）是核导弹的可能性。然而，需要记住的是，到目前为止，俄罗斯对乌克兰发射的所有弹道导弹和巡航导弹都具有携带核弹头的能力。正如所料，人们现在普遍认为，俄罗斯在发射常规武装战略武器之前，曾向美国发出过相关警告。

Ultimately, we will need to wait for more evidence to determine the relationship between the RS-26 and the Oreshnik.

最终，我们需要等待更多的证据来确定RS-26与奥列什尼克导弹之间的关系。

It seems certain, however, that Russia has launched an unprecedented attack — and one that does not have a historical parallel.

然而，可以肯定的是，俄罗斯发动了一次前所未有的攻击，这种行为在历史上没有先例可循。