The Old World is extremely vulnerable to an American leader who could depart from the liberal Atlantic consensus

如果美国领导人背离自由主义大西洋共识，旧世界将极易受到其影响

If I wanted to ape the mood of erstwhile Soviet political essays, I’d write something like this: “The loud echo of gunshots in Pennsylvania resounded across the Atlantic…” You can argue about the appropriateness of using a stylebook long consigned to history, but it’s the truth of the matter.

如果我想模仿昔日苏联政治论文的基调，我会写类似这样的东西：“宾夕法尼亚州的枪声回荡在大西洋彼岸……”你可以争论使用早已成为历史的样本是否合适，但这就是事实。

Across the European unx, they‘re in shock at what is happening in the United States. In the past two weeks alone, first the uproar over President Joe Biden’s embarrassment in the debate, and now the attempted assassination of Donald Trump, which has disrupted the entire election campaign and given the Republican a head start.

整个欧盟都对美国发生的事情感到震惊。仅在过去两周内，先是拜登总统在辩论中尴尬的举动引发轩然大波，现在又发生了刺杀特朗普的未遂事件，这扰乱了整个竞选活动，让共和党人占了上风。

To be fair, it should be noted that Trump has not yet won the race – the most acute phase of the struggle has yet to come, and it is impossible to predict what might happen. It’s worth remembering the lessons of 2020. In the spring, almost no one doubted the extravagant president would win a second term, but the pandemic messed up everything and cost him the White House. We must assume that Trump and his strategists have not forgotten this experience, and won’t relax. But obxtively, the conditions are now favorable.

公平地说，应该指出的是，特朗普尚未赢得竞选——斗争的最激烈阶段尚未到来，无法预测会发生什么。2020年的教训值得铭记。当年春天，几乎没有人怀疑这位挥霍无度的总统会赢得第二任期，但疫情搞砸了一切，让他失去了白宫。我们必须假设特朗普和他的战略家们没有忘记这次经历，不会松懈。但客观上，现在的条件是有利的。

The EU is at a loss. In the Old World, Trump has been demonized to the maximum extent possible. With the exception of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, no one in the Western European nomenklatura can boast productive contacts with the likely future American capo di tutti i capi. Macron once tried, but without much success. And virtually all of the bloc has joined in a general lament about Trump: God forbid he comes back!

欧盟不知所措。在旧世界，特朗普已被妖魔化到了极致。除了匈牙利总理维克托·奥尔班，西欧的权贵阶层中没有人能与未来可能的美国领导人建立富有成效的联系。马克龙曾经尝试过，但没有取得多大成功。几乎所有欧盟国家都对特朗普发出了普遍的哀叹：上帝保佑他别回来！

Why is Trump causing such consternation? After all, the four years of his presidency from 2017-2021 didn’t lead to a catastrophe in transatlantic relations. The former property developer’s very peculiar style, to put it mildly, is undoubtedly repugnant to Western Europe’s pompous and snobbish elite, but it’s their job to communicate with all partners. Trump’s demands to rebalance trade and economic relations in favor of the US and to increase military spending have been quietly incorporated into the platform of his arch-rival Biden. Under the Democrat, a blatantly protectionist law has been passed that’s hurt EU interests, and spending on the war in Ukraine has also hit pocketbooks. There seems to be no reason to expect further attacks, Trump is fixated on money issues.

特朗普为何会引起如此恐慌？毕竟，他2017年至2021年四年的总统任期并没有导致跨大西洋关系陷入灾难。这位前房地产开发商的非常独特的风格，说得客气一点，无疑令西欧傲慢势利的精英感到反感，但他们的工作就是与所有合作伙伴沟通。特朗普提出的重新平衡贸易和经济关系以有利于美国以及增加军费开支的要求，已被悄悄地纳入其主要竞​​争对手拜登的政纲中。在民主党执政期间，一项赤裸裸的保护主义法律通过，损害了欧盟的利益，乌克兰战争的开支也给美国经济造成了沉重打击。似乎没有理由期待进一步攻击特朗普执着于金钱问题。

Western Europe’s fears have to do with something else – an uncertainty of a much more general nature. In 2022, the EU bet on America by refusing to take an independent line on the Ukraine conflict. Beyond the rhetoric, NATO’s “unprecedented unity,” in practice, means that the course is set by the strongest member state, both militarily and politically. And the Old World did not do this under pressure from its senior partner, but voluntarily, because it didn’t have – and didn’t want to have – its own position. One can speculate for a long time about what options the Western Europeans had, if any, but it does not matter any more – the decision was made despite the obvious costs.

西欧的担忧与别的因素有关——一种更为普遍的不确定性。2022 年，欧盟将赌注押在美国身上，拒绝在乌克兰冲突问题上采取独立立场。除了口头上的，北约“前所未有的团结”在实践中意味着，无论在军事上还是政治上，北约的发展方向都是由最强大的成员国制定的。而且旧世界并非迫于其高级伙伴的压力而这么做，而是自愿的，因为它没有——也不想有——自己的立场。人们可以长期猜测西欧人会有什么选择，如果有的话，但这已不重要——尽管代价显而易见，他们还是做出了决定。

Scaremongering about Trump 2.0 pulling out of NATO, withdrawing American troops from Europe, or drastically cutting off Ukraine’s oxygen supply is election propaganda. Trump can’t do any of these things, even if he wanted to (which is not the case), including quickly changing his stance in support of Kiev. But a change in the system of priorities is likely, in which the broad European continent may be given a less privileged place. In practice, this means that the EU will be much more on its own. And accordingly, it will have to deal with a number of fundamental problems, including those related to the future of the Ukraine issue. But the bloc and its key countries are not ready for such strategic autonomy.

关于特朗普2.0退出北约、从欧洲撤出美国军队或彻底切断对乌克兰援助的恐吓是选举宣传。特朗普无法做任何这些事情，即使他想做（事实并非如此），包括迅速改变立场支持基辅。但优先权体系可能会发生变化，其中广阔的欧洲大陆可能会被赋予较少的特权。实际上，这意味着欧盟将更加独立。因此，欧盟将不得不处理一系列根本性问题，包括与乌克兰问题的未来有关的问题。但欧盟及其主要国家尚未准备好实现这种战略自主。

The Western European line over the past two-and-a-half years has been to prove the collective’s usefulness and necessity to Washington. Not only on the Ukraine issue, but also with regard to other US interests, for example in East Asia and the Pacific Basin as a whole. Hence the fervent desire to transform NATO into a structure with global reach, which was reaffirmed at the summit just held in the American capital.

过去两年半来，西欧的路线一直在向华盛顿证明其集体的有用性和必要性。这不仅体现在乌克兰问题上，还体现在涉及美国其他利益方面，例如在东亚和整个太平洋盆地。因此，人们热切希望将北约转变为一个具有全球影响力的组织，而刚刚在美国首都举行的北约峰会也重申了这一点。

At the same time, the EU states, especially the Germans and the French, are not enthusiastic about the economic confrontation with China that the US is pushing for. Under Trump, this policy will clearly be strengthened. Western Europe’s ability to defend its economic interests while maintaining a close geopolitical attachment with the US now seems rather limited. But even at the height of the Cold War in the past century, the region’s powers managed to go their own way when they felt some of their economic needs demanded.

与此同时，欧盟国家，尤其是德国和法国，对美国推动的与中国的经济对抗并不热衷，在特朗普上台后，这一政策显然会得到强化。西欧在与美国保持紧密的地缘政治联系的同时捍卫其经济利益的能力现在看来相当有限。但即使在上个世纪冷战最激烈的时候，当该地区的强国认为有必要满足其某些经济需求时，它们也能设法走自己的路。

The reorientation of the US began almost a quarter of a century ago. The last devoutly Atlanticist president was Bill Clinton; all the others were more or less explicitly oriented towards other goals. The EU, on the other hand, has not used the time to reorient itself towards ‘strategic autonomy’, whatever that may mean. And the Old World is not ready for a US president who could move decisively away from the hitherto set-in-stone liberal-Atlantic consensus, either in form or in substance. But it seems that this president will have to be tolerated, nevertheless.

美国的重新定位始于近四分之一世纪前。上一位虔诚的大西洋主义者总统是比尔·克林顿；其他所有总统或多或少都明确地朝着其他目标迈进。另一方面，欧盟并没有利用这段时间重新定位自己，转向“战略自主”，无论这意味着什么。而旧世界还没有准备好接受一位能够果断背离迄今为止已成定局的自由大西洋共识的美国总统，无论是形式上还是实质上。但看来，人们似乎还是要容忍这位总统。

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