Vladislav Antonov
I can’t say that it’s THE WORST military defeat, but personally for my family - it is.
My great grand-father, just like all men at that time, was fighting against German invaders. He never returned from war, and there were no news or any documents about him. I decided to investigate the case to figure what happened to him.
After researching scanned archives, I was finally able to find some information about him. I figured that he was killed in November 1943 during failed offensive operation called “Orshanskaya offensive operation”. I became more curios and I decided to read more archive materials about this battle.

我不能说这是“最惨”的军事失败,但对我的家人来说,的确是。
我的曾祖父,就像当时所有的人一样,在抗击德国侵略者。他再也没有从战场上回来,也没有关于他的任何消息或文件。我决定调查这个情况,弄清楚他到底怎么了。
在研究了扫描的档案后,我终于找到了一些关于他的信息。我估计他是在1943年11月的一次失败的名为“奥尔尚斯卡亚进攻行动”中牺牲的。我变得越来越好奇,我决定阅读更多关于这场战斗的档案材料。


State Defence Committee of USSR - Comission Report M-715, 11-04-1944.
Quotes:

《1944年11月4日苏联国防委员会——M-715任务报告》节选:

“In the conducted operations, our artillery did not supress the enemy's artillery, despite the concentration in large quantities and superiority over the enemy. It did not happen neither during an artillery barrage, nor during the battle. Often artillery targeted an empty sectors, did not hear infantry requests, and lost communication with infantry units. As a result, even the friendly forces were barraged. Infantry was attacking the unsupressed enemy positions and as the result suffered huge losses and did not advance. The work of our artillery, especially in the counter artillery duel part, was insufficient during all the stages of combat engagement”
“Contrary to the instructions of the HQ, which prohibited the use of special units as ordinary infantry in battle, gen. Gordov often used reconnaissance, chemical and sappers units in ordinary infantry operations.”
Instead of careful artillery and operation planning, Gordov sought to penetrate the enemy’s defenses with manpower. This is evidenced by the losses suffered by the army. The total number of losses incurred by the 33rd Army, is more than 50% of the losses of the entire front.

“我军炮兵在作战中,尽管数量集中,而且比敌人有优势,但没有压制住敌方的炮兵。无论是在炮击中,还是在战斗中,这都没有发生。炮兵经常瞄准空区,听不到步兵的请求,与步兵部队失去联系。结果,就连友军也遭到炮轰。步兵进攻未被压制的敌军阵地,结果损失惨重,无法前进。我军炮兵的工作,特别是对抗炮兵的工作,在交战的各个阶段都是不足的。”
“与总部禁止特种部队作为普通步兵在战斗中使用的指示相反,戈多夫将军在普通步兵作战中经常使用侦察、化学、工兵部队。”
戈多夫没有进行周密的火炮和作战计划,而是设法用人力穿透敌人的防线。军队遭受的损失就是明证。第33军的总损失超过了整个前线损失的50%。

WTF moment:
“In his order of September 4, 1943, addressed to the commander of the 173rd rifle division, Colonel Zaitsev and the commanders of the regiments, Lieutenant Colonel Milovanov, Lieutenant Colonel Sizov, Major Guslitzer, gen Gordov demanded:
“All officers should be put into battle formation “chain” and go through the forest to smoke machine gunners from their nests”

最佳无厘头时刻:
“1943年9月4日,戈尔多夫将军向173步枪师指挥官扎伊采夫上校和各团指挥官米洛瓦诺夫中校、西佐夫中校、古斯利策少校发出命令,要求:所有军官都应该排成战斗队形“链”,穿过森林,把巢穴里的机枪手干掉。”

On September 4, 1943, Gordov ordered Major General Ikonnikov, Chief of Staff of 70th regiment corps “Immediately send the entire command of the corps into the front-line. Leave in the headquarters only the chief of operations. "
Such inadmissible actions of Gordov led to disorganization of battle management and unreasonable losses in the officer corps. Over the past six months, in the 33rd Army, under the command of Gordov, 4 division commanders, 8 deputy division commanders and divisional chiefs, 38 regimental commanders and their deputies, and 174 battalion commanders were killed and wounded.
It gets only worse…

1943年9月4日,戈尔多夫命令第70兵团参谋长伊科尼科夫少将“立即把整个部队都派到前线去。在总部只留下行动主官。”
戈尔多夫这种不可接受的行动,导致了战斗管理的混乱和军官团的不合理损失。近6个月来,第33军在戈多夫指挥下,有4名师长、8名副师长、8名师部门主管、38名团长及副团长、174名营长伤亡。
情况甚至变得更糟糕……

“Major shortcomings occurred in the preparation and conduct of intelligence operations, and especially in the rear of the enemy. The main task — capturing captives — is not performed in many cases. So, in December, 23 reconnaissance operations were conducted in 192 platoon regiment to capture a POW. Not a single prisoner in these operations was captured, and the losses of our reconnaissance groups amounted to 26 people killed and wounded. In 192, 247 and 174 pr, hundreds of search reconnaissance operations were conducted from January 1 to February 15 and not a single prisoner was captured. In 331 and 251 pr, scouts were repeatedly killed in their minefields, since they were not indicated on map”

“情报行动的准备和实施存在重大缺陷,特别是在敌人后方。主要任务——抓俘虏——在很多情况下没有执行。因此,12月份,192排进行了23次侦察行动来抓1名俘虏。结果一个都没抓到,而我们侦察小组的损失达26人死伤。在192、247和174排的行动中,从1月1日到2月15日,进行了数百次搜查侦察行动,还是一个俘虏都没抓到。在331和251排中,侦察兵多次在他们的雷区被炸死,因为地图上没有标出这些雷区。”

“In the operation of the 33rd Army in the Vitebsk direction, on December 23, the entry of the tank corps into battle was planned after the capture of River Luchesa by the infantry (18 km deep defense). On this basis, tanks were not introduced into battle, and when the infantry was stopped by organized enemy fire from prearranged lines and the river continued to remain ahead, a tank corps, rushed into battle, lost 60 tanks and failed to succeed. In the operations on the Bogushevsky direction on January 8, the tank corps was brought into combat, when essentially the infantry had no success. Having suffered up to 70% of losses, the tank corps advanced 2-4 km with the infantry, and then was withdrawn from combat.”

“在第33军在维捷布斯克方向的作战中,12月23日,坦克兵团是在步兵占领卢切萨河(纵深18公里)后进入战斗的。在此基础上,坦克没有投入战斗,当步兵被敌军有组织的火力从预先安排好的战线上拦截下来,河流继续保持在前方时,一个坦克兵团冲进战场,损失了60辆坦克,没有成功。当步兵被有组织的敌军从预先安排好的战线上的火力拦截,河流依旧挡在前面时,一支坦克部队冲进战场,损失了60辆坦克,未能突破防线。1月8日在博古舍夫斯基方向的作战中,坦克部队被投入战斗,而步兵基本上没有取得任何胜利。坦克部队损失达70%,跟随步兵前进2-4公里后退出战斗。”

Thus, the constant attempt of commanders to achieve a breakthrough in defense through the premature entry of the tank corps into a battle did not have any results, and led to the fact that only two tanks left in the tank corps”
“Our counter-battery and counter-mine-attack groups did not suppress the enemy’s artillery and mortars, as a result of which the advance of our infantry was hampered by the enemy’s strong artillery and mortar fire, which is evidenced by the fact that in some operations the percentage of shrapnel wounds reached 70-80%”
“Within 4 months, the chief of staff and the entire headquarters were located at a distance of about 100 kilometers from the location of the front command, and during this time the commander and chief of staff met no more than 3-4 times”

因此,指挥官们不断试图通过过早地让坦克部队进入战斗来实现防御上的突破,但没有任何效果,导致坦克部队只剩下两辆坦克。
“我们的反炮兵连和反地雷攻击小组没有压制敌人的火炮和迫击炮,因此,我们步兵的推进受到敌人强大炮火和迫击炮火力的阻挡,事实证明,在某些行动中,弹片伤占70-80%。”
“在4个月内,参谋长和整个总部被安置在距离前线司令部约100公里的地方,在此期间,前线指挥官和参谋长会面不超过3-4次。”
原创翻译:龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处


HQ instructions prohibited the use of reconnaissance units as regular infantry in combat. This order was systematically violated on the Western Front. Thus, in January 1944, in 33 armies, all reconnaissance units and formations that participated in the offensive as linear units and were completely destroyed.
Results of offensive operation:
Over 26 thousands killed, and 78 thousands wounded. Offensive operation was stopped and Germans were able to retain their positions (while having 3 times less manpower and about 5 times less in artillery and tank power).
Incredible and outrageous incompetence of leadership. No wonder why my great-grand father died there.

司令部的指示禁止在战斗中使用侦察部队作为常规步兵。这一命令在西线遭到有系统地违反。因此,1944年1月,在33支军队中,所有作为直线部队参加进攻的侦察部队和编队都被彻底摧毁。
攻击行动的结果:
超过2.6万人死亡,7.8万人受伤。进攻行动被停止,德国人得以保留阵地(而兵力只有苏军三分之一,大炮和坦克数量只有苏军五分之一)。
令人难以置信的无能领导。难怪我的曾祖父死在那里。