Beijing is regrouping to adapt to the new hemispheric world order, but not retreating from Latin America
 
北京正在重新调整以适应新的半球世界秩序，但不会从拉丁美洲撤退。
 
The US military intervention in Venezuela in January 2026 – known as Operation Absolute Resolve – sent shockwaves far beyond Caracas. By striking targets in the Venezuelan capital and capturing President Nicolás Maduro, Washington signaled a decisive return to hard power in the Western Hemisphere.
 
2026年1月，美国对委内瑞拉的军事干预——代号“绝对决心行动”——其影响远远超出了加拉加斯。通过打击委内瑞拉首都的目标，并抓获总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗，华盛顿标志着其在西半球强硬实力的一次决定性回归。
 
The operation was not merely a tactical move against a hostile regime; it was a strategic message about influence, hierarchy, and control in the Americas. For China, which had invested heavily in Venezuela’s political and economic survival, the intervention raised immediate questions about the limits of its global reach and the evolving rules of great-power competition in an increasingly multipolar world.
 
这次行动不仅仅是针对敌对政权的一次战术举措，更是一项关于美洲地区影响力、等级制度和控制权的战略信号。对于曾为委内瑞拉的政治和经济生存投入巨资的中国而言，此次干预立即引发了人们对其全球影响力极限以及在日益多极化的世界中大国竞争规则演变的质疑。
 
China’s response to Operation Absolute Resolve was swift in tone but cautious in substance. Official statements from Beijing condemned the US action as a violation of international law and national sovereignty, framing it as destabilizing and emblematic of unilateral hegemony. Chinese foreign ministry officials repeatedly urged Washington to respect the UN Charter and cease interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs, positioning China as a defender of state sovereignty and multilateral norms.
 
中国对“绝对决心行动”的反应迅速，但实质上较为谨慎。北京官方声明谴责美国此举违反国际法和国家主权，并将其定性为破坏稳定和单边霸权主义的象征。
中国外交部官员多次敦促华盛顿尊重《联合国宪章》，停止干涉委内瑞拉内政，表明中国是国家主权和多边准则的捍卫者。
 
However, the rhetoric was not matched by escalation. Beijing avoided threats of retaliation or offers of direct military assistance to Caracas. Instead, it confined its response to diplomatic channels, reaffirmed opposition to unilateral sanctions, and issued travel advisories warning Chinese citizens to avoid Venezuela amid heightened instability. Chinese analysts emphasized that the priority was damage control: protecting long-standing economic and strategic interests without provoking a direct confrontation with US military power in the Western Hemisphere.
 
然而，这些言辞并未演变为实际的军事升级。北京方面避免了威胁报复或向加拉加斯提供直接军事援助。相反，中国将回应限制在外交渠道，重申反对单边制裁，并发布旅行警告，提醒中国公民在委内瑞拉局势日益动荡的情况下避免前往该国。
中国分析人士强调，首要任务是控制损失：在不与美国在西半球的军事力量发生直接对抗的情况下，维护中国长期以来的经济和战略利益。
 
This measured reaction highlights a defining feature of China’s approach to Latin America. Beijing has pursued deep economic engagement and vocal support for sovereignty, but it has consistently avoided military competition with the US in a region where American power remains overwhelming. Operation Absolute Resolve exposed both the strengths and the limits of that strategy.
 
这种审慎的反应凸显了中国对拉美政策的一个显著特点。北京一直致力于与拉美地区进行深入的经济合作，并公开支持其主权，但始终避免与美国在该地区展开军事对抗，因为美国的实力仍然占据绝对优势。“绝对决心行动”既暴露了这一战略的优势，也暴露了其局限性。
 
China’s relationship with the Maduro government was neither symbolic nor superficial. Over the past two decades, Venezuela has emerged as one of Beijing’s most important partners in the Americas. In 2023, the two countries elevated ties to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” China’s highest level of bilateral designation. This status reflected ambitions for durable cooperation across energy, finance, infrastructure, and political coordination, and placed Venezuela among a small circle of states Beijing regards as strategically significant.
 
中国与马杜罗政府的关系既非象征性的，也非流于表面的。过去二十年来，委内瑞拉已成为北京在美洲最重要的合作伙伴之一。
2023年，两国将关系提升为“全天候战略伙伴关系”，这是中国对双边关系的最高级别。这一地位体现了双方在能源、金融、基础设施和政治协调等领域开展持久合作的雄心，并将委内瑞拉推入北京视为具有战略意义的少数几个国家之列。
 
Chinese policy banks extended large-scale financing to Caracas, much of it structured as oil-backed loans that allowed Venezuela to maintain access to global markets despite US sanctions. Chinese companies became involved in energy projects, particularly in the Orinoco Belt, while bilateral trade expanded substantially. Venezuelan heavy crude, though difficult and expensive to refine, accounted for a meaningful share of China’s oil imports, contributing to Beijing’s broader strategy of supply diversification.
 
中国政策性银行向委内瑞拉提供了大规模融资，其中大部分是以石油为抵押的贷款，这使得委内瑞拉能够在遭受美国制裁的情况下继续进入全球市场。
中国企业参与了委内瑞拉的能源项目，尤其是在奥里诺科河带，双边贸易也大幅增长。委内瑞拉重质原油虽然提炼难度大、成本高，但仍占中国石油进口的相当大一部分，这有助于北京实现更广泛的供应多元化战略。
 
Security cooperation also developed, albeit cautiously. Venezuela became one of the largest buyers of Chinese military equipment in Latin America, and Chinese technicians gained access to satellite tracking facilities on Venezuelan territory. At the same time, Beijing drew clear red lines. It avoided formal defense commitments, permanent troop deployments, or the establishment of military bases – signals that China did not seek to challenge US strategic primacy in the hemisphere.
 
安全合作也在发展，尽管步履谨慎。委内瑞拉成为拉丁美洲最大的中国军事装备买家之一，中国技术人员也得以进入委内瑞拉境内的卫星跟踪设施。
与此同时，北京划定了明确的红线。它避免做出正式的防务承诺、永久性驻军或建立军事基地——这些都表明中国无意挑战美国在西半球的战略主导地位。
 
Beijing’s interests in Venezuela extended well beyond oil and arms sales. The country served as a key node in China’s wider Latin American strategy, which emphasized infrastructure development, trade expansion, financial integration, political coordination, and cultural exchange within multilateral frxworks. This model sought to build influence through connectivity and economic interdependence rather than coercion or force, reinforcing China’s image as a development partner rather than a security patron.
 
北京在委内瑞拉的利益远不止石油和武器销售。委内瑞拉是中国更广泛的拉美战略中的关键节点，该战略强调在多边框架内进行基础设施建设、扩大贸易、推进金融一体化、加强政治协调和文化交流。
这种模式力求通过互联互通和经济相互依存而非胁迫或武力来扩大影响力，从而强化中国作为发展伙伴而非安全庇护者的形象。
 
The post-intervention reality, however, has significantly altered this equation. With Maduro removed from power, the US has assumed effective control over Venezuela’s oil exports, redirecting revenues and setting the terms under which crude reaches global markets. While Washington has allowed China to continue purchasing Venezuelan oil, sales are now conducted strictly at market prices and under conditions that erode the preferential arrangements Beijing previously enjoyed. This shift directly affects China’s energy security calculations and weakens the leverage embedded in its oil-backed lending.
 
然而，干预后的现实情况显著改变了这一格局。随着马杜罗下台，美国实际上控制了委内瑞拉的石油出口，重新分配收入并设定原油进入全球市场的条件。
尽管华盛顿允许中国继续购买委内瑞拉石油，但如今的销售完全按照市场价格进行，且附加条件削弱了北京此前享有的优惠待遇。这一转变直接影响了中国的能源安全考量，并削弱了其石油贷款所蕴含的杠杆作用。
 
US control over oil flows also grants Washington influence over debt restructuring and creditor negotiations, potentially complicating China’s efforts to recover outstanding loans. The result is a sharp reduction in Beijing’s bargaining power in Caracas and a reassessment of the long-term viability of its investments. For China, the dilemma is acute: how to defend economic interests without crossing a strategic threshold that would invite confrontation with the US.
 
美国对石油流动的控制也使华盛顿得以影响债务重组和债权人谈判，这可能会使中国收回未偿贷款的努力变得更加复杂。
其结果是北京在加拉加斯的谈判筹码大幅下降，并促使其重新评估投资的长期可行性。对中国而言，这是一个棘手的难题：如何在捍卫经济利益的同时，避免越过可能引发与美国对抗的战略门槛。
 
These developments align closely with the broader direction of US policy articulated in the 2025 National Security Strategy. The document places renewed emphasis on the Western Hemisphere as a core strategic priority and reflects a clear revival of Monroe Doctrine logic. It signals Washington’s determination to assert influence in the region and to limit the military, technological, and commercial presence of external powers – particularly China.
 
这些发展与美国2025年国家安全战略中阐述的总体政策方向高度契合。该文件再次强调西半球作为核心战略重点，并明显体现了门罗主义逻辑的复兴。这表明华盛顿决心在该地区扩大影响力，并限制外部势力（尤其是中国）的军事、技术和商业存在。
 
For Beijing, this creates a structural asymmetry. Decades of investment, trade, and diplomatic engagement cannot offset the reality of US military dominance in the Americas. China’s preferred toolkit – economic statecraft, infrastructure finance, and non-interference – faces inherent constraints when confronted with decisive uses of hard power. At the same time, Beijing’s emphasis on sovereignty and multilateralism continues to resonate with segments of Latin American political opinion that are wary of external intervention and eager to preserve strategic autonomy.
 
对北京而言，这造成了一种结构性不对称。数十年的投资、贸易和外交接触无法抵消美国在美洲的军事主导地位。中国惯用的手段——经济治国、基础设施融资和不干涉内政——在面对美国果断运用硬实力时，面临着固有的制约。
与此同时，北京对主权和多边主义的强调，继续引起拉美部分政治舆论的共鸣，这些舆论对外部干预持谨慎态度，并渴望维护战略自主。
 
A comparison between US and Chinese strategies reveals different worldviews. The US approach, as outlined in the 2025 strategy, treats the hemisphere as a strategic space to be secured against external challengers through security partnerships, economic inducements, and military readiness. China’s approach prioritizes integration, development cooperation, and respect for national choice, relying on gradual influence rather than explicit enforcement.
 
中美战略的比较揭示了二者不同的世界观。美国在其《2025战略》中提出的方案，将西半球视为一个战略空间，需要通过安全伙伴关系、经济激励和军事准备来抵御外部挑战。而中国的方案则优先考虑一体化、发展合作和尊重各国自主选择，依靠渐进式影响而非直接强制手段。
 
Viewed through the lens of the ‘Donroe Doctrine’ and the transition to multipolarity, the Venezuelan episode marks a critical inflection point. The US has reasserted hemispheric dominance in unmistakable terms, while China has been forced to acknowledge the limits of its reach far from home.
 
从“唐罗主义”和向多极化格局过渡的角度来看，委内瑞拉事件标志着一个关键的转折点。美国以无可争议的方式重申了其在西半球的主导地位，而中国则被迫承认其在海外的影响力有限。
 
China may well lose ground in Venezuela, but this does not necessarily signal a retreat from the region. Instead, it suggests adaptation. Diversified partnerships with countries such as Brazil and Mexico, along with continued engagement through trade and investment, offer alternative pathways forward. More broadly, the emergence of implicit spheres of influence may align with China’s interests elsewhere, particularly in Asia, where Beijing seeks greater recognition of its own strategic space.
 
中国在委内瑞拉的影响力或许会下降，但这并不一定意味着中国会从该地区撤退。相反，这表明中国需要做出调整。与巴西和墨西哥等国建立多元化的伙伴关系，并通过贸易和投资继续保持联系，为中国提供了其他发展路径。
更广泛地说，隐性势力范围的出现可能符合中国在其他地区的利益，尤其是在亚洲，北京正寻求在亚洲获得对其战略空间的更大认可。
 
In an international system increasingly defined by negotiated boundaries rather than universal dominance, both Washington and Beijing are testing how far their power extends – and where restraint becomes strategic. The outcome will shape not only Venezuela’s future, but also the evolving architecture of global order in a multipolar age.
 
在一个日益以谈判划定的边界而非普遍主导地位来界定的国际体系中，华盛顿和北京都在试探自身力量的延伸范围，以及在何种情况下克制才具有战略意义。其结果不仅将影响委内瑞拉的未来，也将影响多极化时代全球秩序的演变。