英国在失去美国独立战争后，军队发生了怎样的变化？他们还能征服其他国家吗？
How did Britain's military change after losing the American Revolution? Were they still able to conquer other countries?
译文简介
我是美国人，研究过独立战争。英国并非在独立战争中惨败，更多是认为继续战争既不经济也不现实。
正文翻译
Jimmy Former Infantry Commander
吉米 前步兵指挥官
I am an American and have studied the Revolutionary war. The British did not loose the American Revolution as much as they just thought it not economical or practical to continue. For them it was a distraction within the global wars they were fighting with just about every other European country. Devoting time and resources was no longer feasible if they wanted to contend with the global super powers of the time. Bringing their forces home and committing them to other global theaters was the obvious smart move. Much like the US in Vietnam, it became unwinnable and not worth their while to continue. America just left Vietnam throwing their hands up. Sometimes you must know when to walk away, move on and leave when the people you are trying to help, no longer want your help. The British were no different.
我是美国人，研究过独立战争。英国并非在独立战争中惨败，更多是认为继续战争既不经济也不现实。对他们而言，这只是与几乎所有欧洲国家进行的全球战争中的一个干扰项。若想与当时的全球超级大国抗衡，投入时间和资源已不再可行，将部队撤回并投入其他全球战场显然是明智之举。这与美国在越南的情况类似，战争已无法取胜且不值得继续，美国最终只能无奈撤军。有时，当你试图帮助的人不再需要你的帮助时，你必须懂得适时抽身、继续前行。英国也不例外。
The concept of winning and loosing a war is a very narrow minded view of how global powers operate. War is about forcing you will on others for as long as it takes, and when this is no longer possible, its time to move on. We may have beat the British forces in America and forced an Army to surrender, we never occupied Great Britain, nor did we take anything from them we did not already have. If they had the resolve to keep the Colonies they certainly would have committed more, and eventually defeated the colonial Army and destroyed the French at sea, but again not part of the big picture. Its a case of not spreading your shit too thin. The British continually fought off revolution, to become the an empire that controlled 25% of the worlds population. For them it was just business as usually.
单纯以胜负来看待战争，是对全球大国运作方式的狭隘理解。战争的本质是尽可能长时间地将自己的意志强加于他人，当这一点不再可能时，便是时候转向其他目标了。我们或许在美国击败了英军并迫使一支军队投降，但从未占领过大不列颠，也没有从他们那里夺走我们原本没有的东西。如果他们有决心保住殖民地，肯定会投入更多资源，最终击败殖民地军队并在海上摧毁法国舰队，但这并非全局考量。关键在于不要过度分散精力。英国不断镇压革命，最终成为一个控制着全球25%人口的帝国，对他们而言，这不过是常规操作。
America should be proud that it was able to win its freedom and independence and we for sure did that and that is all that matters. I get it, a new country with no history, needs hero's and heroic deeds. But let us put it all in perspective.
美国应为赢得自由和独立而自豪，我们确实做到了，这才是最重要的。我理解，一个没有历史积淀的新国家需要英雄和英雄事迹，但我们也应客观看待这一切。
James Dignan
Freelance Writer (2000–present)
詹姆斯·迪格南 自由撰稿人（2000年至今）
They didn’t really change that much. After all, they were busy fighting a few real wars at the same time as the Americans had their temper tantrum. That’s the reason they didn’t send large numbers of their best troops over to the colonies.
英国军事并没有发生太大变化。毕竟，在美国人发脾气（指发动独立战争）的同时，他们正忙于应对几场真正的战争，这也是他们没有向殖民地派遣大量精锐部队的原因。
At around the same time as the American Revolution, Britain was fighting the Dutch in Europe, the Maratha Confederacy in Central India, the Sultanate of Mysore in southern India, had just completed the Seven Years’ War in Europe and Carnatic Wars in India, and were preparing for the rumblings of revolution in France which led to the French Revolutionary Wars. Of these six series of wars, the British was involved in four victories and two losses.
在美国独立战争前后，英国在欧洲与荷兰作战，在印度中部与马拉塔联盟交锋，在印度南部与迈索尔苏丹国对抗，刚刚结束了欧洲的七年战争和印度的卡纳蒂克战争，还在为法国即将爆发的革命动荡做准备（这场动荡后来引发了法国大革命战争）。在这六场系列战争中，英国取得了四次胜利，两次失败。
Compared to those other wars, the American revolution wasn’t a high priority, and in any case the colonies had population enough that they would simply absorb the fighting and keep going. Also, the Americans were being supported by large numbers of French and Spanish troops. Yes, the Americans won the war, but at huge cost - an estimated 50,000 war dead compared to British and Loyalist deaths of around 20,000… and that’s before you count the 150,000 Americans who died of smallpox which became an epidemic due to the squalid conditions on the battlefields and in prisoner of war camps. That count would have been far higher had George Washington not ordered the inoculation of his troops.
与这些战争相比，美国独立战争并非优先事项，而且殖民地人口众多，能够承受战争的冲击并持续抵抗。此外，美国人还得到了大量法国和西班牙军队的支持。没错，美国赢得了战争，但付出了巨大代价——估计有5万名战争死者，而英国和效忠派的死亡人数约为2万人……这还不包括因战场和战俘营的恶劣条件引发天花疫情而死亡的15万美国人。若不是乔治·华盛顿下令为部队接种疫苗，死亡人数还会高得多。
So the Americans won the war against limited British troops, while Britain was also fighting and winning far larger wars elsewhere. Overall, British military did pretty well under the circumstances.
因此，美国是在对抗兵力有限的英军时取得了胜利，而英国同时还在其他地区进行并赢得了规模大得多的战争。总体而言，英国军队在当时的情况下表现相当不错。
Stephen McParlin
Former Principal Aerodynamicist at QinetiQ (2001–2010)
斯蒂芬·麦克帕林 前奎奈蒂克公司首席空气动力学家（2001-2010年）
There’s a decent book by Mark Urban on the topic: “Fusiliers; How the British Army lost America but learned to fight.”, Faber & Faber, London, 2007. ISBN 978–0–571–22488–3.
马克·厄本有一本关于这个主题的好书：《燧发枪兵：英军如何失去美国却学会了作战》，伦敦费伯-费伯出版社2007年出版
The British Army in 1775–76 was used to fighting in classic European style, volley fire from disciplined rows of line infantry, much as they had in the days of Marlborough, and then against the Jacobites, not that long before. The Seven Years War, as fought in North America against the French and their allies had seen more use of irregular units (Rangers, locally-raised militia and Native Americans).
1775-1776年的英军习惯采用经典的欧洲作战方式，由纪律严明的线列步兵排成横队进行齐射，这与马尔博罗时代以及不久前对抗詹姆斯党人时的战术大致相同。而在北美与法国及其盟友进行的七年战争中，非正规部队（游骑兵、当地招募的民兵和美洲原住民）得到了更多运用。
It was the evolution of irregular tactics, light infantry, and dragoons that characterised operations in North America. Distance mattered, and made logistics more difficult for classic line infantry units. Saratoga was lost by the British not in a stand-up engagement, but like Dien Bien Phu, it was a hard place to resupply against guerilla tactics. Khe Sanh survived only because of the ability to resupply from the air… something that the British never forgot. Slim’s advance on Meiktila in 1945, breaking the back of a defending Japanese army, was only possible through air logistics.
非正规战术、轻步兵和龙骑兵的发展是北美战场作战的显著特征。距离因素至关重要，这使得传统线列步兵部队的后勤补给变得更加困难。英军在萨拉托加的失利并非源于正面决战，而是像奠边府战役一样，在游击战面前难以维持补给。溪山战役之所以能坚守，完全依靠空中补给能力——这一点英军从未忘记。1945年斯利姆向密铁拉推进、重创防守日军，正是得益于空中后勤保障。
The British learned to move and fight across a larger space of wooded terrain, using more appropriate logistics, and to use more complex tactics, and empowered NCOs as the core of their forces. The resulting cultural shift was to be hugely important later, in the Peninsula War, where it begat the Rifle Brigade, patrolling, skirmishing and breaking down the enemy before they came to the set-piece battle.
英军学会了在广阔的林地地形中移动和作战，采用更适宜的后勤保障方式，运用更复杂的战术，并赋予士官核心作战权力。这一文化转变在后来的半岛战争中发挥了至关重要的作用，催生出了步枪旅——他们通过巡逻、小规模冲突等方式，在决战前消耗和瓦解敌军。
The British were never particularly enthusiastic about fighting a war against people they saw as close to family. The American colonies were also a financial burden. They ran at a loss. It wasn’t difficult to walk away, and allow the financial markets to take the risks of supporting expansion there, rather than the British taxpayer (and the Crown, then as now, means the Exchequer, rather than the Monarch), however much opprobrium the hapless figure of George III attracts from Americans.
英军从未对与他们视为“亲人”的人作战表现出特别的热情，而且北美殖民地也是一个财政负担，一直处于亏损状态。因此，英国不难做出抽身的决定，让金融市场承担支持当地扩张的风险，而非由英国纳税人买单（无论当时还是现在，王室都代表财政部而非君主本人）——尽管不幸的乔治三世在美国人眼中备受指责。
What the British learned in the Americas was exactly what they needed to defeat Napoleon’s conscxt armies in Portugal and Spain… and how the rigid logistics of old-school armies across hostile territory could become a winning factor. That, and having mobile troops who could engage on a hit-and-run basis. Napoleon Bonaparte criticised Wellesley as a “Sepoy General”, fit only for operations against Indian troops. The British learned plenty about how to fight set-piece battles in India, often against far larger numbers, but America taught them about patience and tactics against less mobile opponents.
英军在美洲学到的东西，正是他们在葡萄牙和西班牙击败拿破仑征召大军所需要的——包括传统军队在敌方领土上的僵化后勤如何转化为制胜因素，以及拥有能够进行袭扰作战的机动部队的重要性。拿破仑·波拿巴曾批评威灵顿是“印度土兵将军”，只适合与印度军队作战。英军在印度学会了如何在兵力往往处于劣势的情况下进行正规决战，但美国战场教会了他们如何以耐心和战术对付机动性较差的对手。
Wesley Dry
Studied History & Political Science (Graduated 2009)
韦斯利·德赖
历史与政治学专业（2009年毕业）
They basically changed into this:
(Image courtesy of Warlord Games)
英国军事的基本变化如下：
The British Army won the Seven Years’ War in North America by “out-regularing” the regulars of France on the plains of Abraham. However, they were also occasionally dependent on colonial scouting and “ranger” forces in the small scale conflicts with Native Americans. This relationship dated back to King Phillip’s War in New England where ranger units were among the most effective forces deployed in the conflict.
英军在北美七年战争中，凭借在亚伯拉罕平原上以“更正规的战术”击败法国正规军而获胜。但在与美洲原住民的小规模冲突中，他们也偶尔依赖殖民地的侦察兵和“游骑兵”部队。这种合作关系可追溯至新英格兰的菲利普国王战争，当时游骑兵部队是冲突中部署的最有效力量之一。
The Seven Years’ War and the American Revolution combined taught many in the British Army the value of having soldiers that were trained to move and fight using their own initiative and discretion. This heralded the birth of what were termed the light infantry. By the time of the Napoleonic War, at least, every British battalion would have at least one company of light infantry.
七年战争和美国独立战争共同让英军许多人认识到，培养能够自主决策、灵活机动作战的士兵的重要性，这标志着所谓“轻步兵”的诞生。至少到拿破仑战争时期，每个英国营都至少配备了一个轻步兵连。
However, the big influence was in the development of a coherent school of thought dubbed “The American School.” This emerged in contrast to the more conventional focus on using line formations that emphasized marching in disciplined lines, and sheer volume of fire. These formations made sense in more open battlefields of Europe. However, the British Army has always been an expeditionary army that needed to be prepared to fight from the Appalachians all the way to the Hindu Kush. Additionally, France’s light infantry helped make mince-meat of the clumsier units of line infantry during the early days of the French Revolutionary War.
然而，更大的影响在于形成了一套被称为“美国学派”的完整作战理念。这一学派与传统的线列战术形成鲜明对比——传统战术强调纪律严明的队列行进和密集火力输出，这种阵型在欧洲开阔的战场上是合理的，但英军本质上是一支远征军，需要准备好在从阿巴拉契亚山脉到兴都库什山脉的各类地形作战。此外，法国大革命战争初期，法国轻步兵曾重创动作迟缓的线列步兵部队，这也给英军带来了启示。
Because of the American School, there was an entire generation of officers that were open to utilizing light infantry tactics not only at the company level, but at the battalion and regimental level. Officers of the American School, including Sir John Moore, Coote Manningham, and Robert Craufurd, helped establish a specialist training camp at Schorncliffe to train units like the 43rd light infantry, the 60th (North American) Rifles, and most famously of all, the 95th Rifles.
得益于“美国学派”，整整一代军官开始愿意在连级乃至营级、团级部队中运用轻步兵战术。包括约翰·穆尔爵士、库特·曼宁厄姆和罗伯特·克劳福德在内的“美国学派”军官，协助在肖恩克利夫建立了专门的训练营，训练第43轻步兵营、第60（北美）步枪团，以及最著名的第95步枪团等部队。
These light infantry troops became an elite force during the Peninsular War, and were often capable of stopping formations several times their size. I think the British Army would have maintained light infantry units regardless of its experience in the American War for Independence. However, without the war it might not have had an entire generation of officers ready to utilize these formations and tactics to the fullest extent.
这些轻步兵在半岛战争中成为精锐部队，常常能够阻挡数倍于己的敌军阵型。我认为，无论是否有美国独立战争的经历，英军都会保留轻步兵部队，但如果没有这场战争，他们可能不会有整整一代军官准备好充分运用这些部队和战术。
吉米 前步兵指挥官
I am an American and have studied the Revolutionary war. The British did not loose the American Revolution as much as they just thought it not economical or practical to continue. For them it was a distraction within the global wars they were fighting with just about every other European country. Devoting time and resources was no longer feasible if they wanted to contend with the global super powers of the time. Bringing their forces home and committing them to other global theaters was the obvious smart move. Much like the US in Vietnam, it became unwinnable and not worth their while to continue. America just left Vietnam throwing their hands up. Sometimes you must know when to walk away, move on and leave when the people you are trying to help, no longer want your help. The British were no different.
我是美国人，研究过独立战争。英国并非在独立战争中惨败，更多是认为继续战争既不经济也不现实。对他们而言，这只是与几乎所有欧洲国家进行的全球战争中的一个干扰项。若想与当时的全球超级大国抗衡，投入时间和资源已不再可行，将部队撤回并投入其他全球战场显然是明智之举。这与美国在越南的情况类似，战争已无法取胜且不值得继续，美国最终只能无奈撤军。有时，当你试图帮助的人不再需要你的帮助时，你必须懂得适时抽身、继续前行。英国也不例外。
The concept of winning and loosing a war is a very narrow minded view of how global powers operate. War is about forcing you will on others for as long as it takes, and when this is no longer possible, its time to move on. We may have beat the British forces in America and forced an Army to surrender, we never occupied Great Britain, nor did we take anything from them we did not already have. If they had the resolve to keep the Colonies they certainly would have committed more, and eventually defeated the colonial Army and destroyed the French at sea, but again not part of the big picture. Its a case of not spreading your shit too thin. The British continually fought off revolution, to become the an empire that controlled 25% of the worlds population. For them it was just business as usually.
单纯以胜负来看待战争，是对全球大国运作方式的狭隘理解。战争的本质是尽可能长时间地将自己的意志强加于他人，当这一点不再可能时，便是时候转向其他目标了。我们或许在美国击败了英军并迫使一支军队投降，但从未占领过大不列颠，也没有从他们那里夺走我们原本没有的东西。如果他们有决心保住殖民地，肯定会投入更多资源，最终击败殖民地军队并在海上摧毁法国舰队，但这并非全局考量。关键在于不要过度分散精力。英国不断镇压革命，最终成为一个控制着全球25%人口的帝国，对他们而言，这不过是常规操作。
America should be proud that it was able to win its freedom and independence and we for sure did that and that is all that matters. I get it, a new country with no history, needs hero's and heroic deeds. But let us put it all in perspective.
美国应为赢得自由和独立而自豪，我们确实做到了，这才是最重要的。我理解，一个没有历史积淀的新国家需要英雄和英雄事迹，但我们也应客观看待这一切。
James Dignan
Freelance Writer (2000–present)
詹姆斯·迪格南 自由撰稿人（2000年至今）
They didn’t really change that much. After all, they were busy fighting a few real wars at the same time as the Americans had their temper tantrum. That’s the reason they didn’t send large numbers of their best troops over to the colonies.
英国军事并没有发生太大变化。毕竟，在美国人发脾气（指发动独立战争）的同时，他们正忙于应对几场真正的战争，这也是他们没有向殖民地派遣大量精锐部队的原因。
At around the same time as the American Revolution, Britain was fighting the Dutch in Europe, the Maratha Confederacy in Central India, the Sultanate of Mysore in southern India, had just completed the Seven Years’ War in Europe and Carnatic Wars in India, and were preparing for the rumblings of revolution in France which led to the French Revolutionary Wars. Of these six series of wars, the British was involved in four victories and two losses.
在美国独立战争前后，英国在欧洲与荷兰作战，在印度中部与马拉塔联盟交锋，在印度南部与迈索尔苏丹国对抗，刚刚结束了欧洲的七年战争和印度的卡纳蒂克战争，还在为法国即将爆发的革命动荡做准备（这场动荡后来引发了法国大革命战争）。在这六场系列战争中，英国取得了四次胜利，两次失败。
Compared to those other wars, the American revolution wasn’t a high priority, and in any case the colonies had population enough that they would simply absorb the fighting and keep going. Also, the Americans were being supported by large numbers of French and Spanish troops. Yes, the Americans won the war, but at huge cost - an estimated 50,000 war dead compared to British and Loyalist deaths of around 20,000… and that’s before you count the 150,000 Americans who died of smallpox which became an epidemic due to the squalid conditions on the battlefields and in prisoner of war camps. That count would have been far higher had George Washington not ordered the inoculation of his troops.
与这些战争相比，美国独立战争并非优先事项，而且殖民地人口众多，能够承受战争的冲击并持续抵抗。此外，美国人还得到了大量法国和西班牙军队的支持。没错，美国赢得了战争，但付出了巨大代价——估计有5万名战争死者，而英国和效忠派的死亡人数约为2万人……这还不包括因战场和战俘营的恶劣条件引发天花疫情而死亡的15万美国人。若不是乔治·华盛顿下令为部队接种疫苗，死亡人数还会高得多。
So the Americans won the war against limited British troops, while Britain was also fighting and winning far larger wars elsewhere. Overall, British military did pretty well under the circumstances.
因此，美国是在对抗兵力有限的英军时取得了胜利，而英国同时还在其他地区进行并赢得了规模大得多的战争。总体而言，英国军队在当时的情况下表现相当不错。
Stephen McParlin
Former Principal Aerodynamicist at QinetiQ (2001–2010)
斯蒂芬·麦克帕林 前奎奈蒂克公司首席空气动力学家（2001-2010年）
There’s a decent book by Mark Urban on the topic: “Fusiliers; How the British Army lost America but learned to fight.”, Faber & Faber, London, 2007. ISBN 978–0–571–22488–3.
马克·厄本有一本关于这个主题的好书：《燧发枪兵：英军如何失去美国却学会了作战》，伦敦费伯-费伯出版社2007年出版
The British Army in 1775–76 was used to fighting in classic European style, volley fire from disciplined rows of line infantry, much as they had in the days of Marlborough, and then against the Jacobites, not that long before. The Seven Years War, as fought in North America against the French and their allies had seen more use of irregular units (Rangers, locally-raised militia and Native Americans).
1775-1776年的英军习惯采用经典的欧洲作战方式，由纪律严明的线列步兵排成横队进行齐射，这与马尔博罗时代以及不久前对抗詹姆斯党人时的战术大致相同。而在北美与法国及其盟友进行的七年战争中，非正规部队（游骑兵、当地招募的民兵和美洲原住民）得到了更多运用。
It was the evolution of irregular tactics, light infantry, and dragoons that characterised operations in North America. Distance mattered, and made logistics more difficult for classic line infantry units. Saratoga was lost by the British not in a stand-up engagement, but like Dien Bien Phu, it was a hard place to resupply against guerilla tactics. Khe Sanh survived only because of the ability to resupply from the air… something that the British never forgot. Slim’s advance on Meiktila in 1945, breaking the back of a defending Japanese army, was only possible through air logistics.
非正规战术、轻步兵和龙骑兵的发展是北美战场作战的显著特征。距离因素至关重要，这使得传统线列步兵部队的后勤补给变得更加困难。英军在萨拉托加的失利并非源于正面决战，而是像奠边府战役一样，在游击战面前难以维持补给。溪山战役之所以能坚守，完全依靠空中补给能力——这一点英军从未忘记。1945年斯利姆向密铁拉推进、重创防守日军，正是得益于空中后勤保障。
The British learned to move and fight across a larger space of wooded terrain, using more appropriate logistics, and to use more complex tactics, and empowered NCOs as the core of their forces. The resulting cultural shift was to be hugely important later, in the Peninsula War, where it begat the Rifle Brigade, patrolling, skirmishing and breaking down the enemy before they came to the set-piece battle.
英军学会了在广阔的林地地形中移动和作战，采用更适宜的后勤保障方式，运用更复杂的战术，并赋予士官核心作战权力。这一文化转变在后来的半岛战争中发挥了至关重要的作用，催生出了步枪旅——他们通过巡逻、小规模冲突等方式，在决战前消耗和瓦解敌军。
The British were never particularly enthusiastic about fighting a war against people they saw as close to family. The American colonies were also a financial burden. They ran at a loss. It wasn’t difficult to walk away, and allow the financial markets to take the risks of supporting expansion there, rather than the British taxpayer (and the Crown, then as now, means the Exchequer, rather than the Monarch), however much opprobrium the hapless figure of George III attracts from Americans.
英军从未对与他们视为“亲人”的人作战表现出特别的热情，而且北美殖民地也是一个财政负担，一直处于亏损状态。因此，英国不难做出抽身的决定，让金融市场承担支持当地扩张的风险，而非由英国纳税人买单（无论当时还是现在，王室都代表财政部而非君主本人）——尽管不幸的乔治三世在美国人眼中备受指责。
What the British learned in the Americas was exactly what they needed to defeat Napoleon’s conscxt armies in Portugal and Spain… and how the rigid logistics of old-school armies across hostile territory could become a winning factor. That, and having mobile troops who could engage on a hit-and-run basis. Napoleon Bonaparte criticised Wellesley as a “Sepoy General”, fit only for operations against Indian troops. The British learned plenty about how to fight set-piece battles in India, often against far larger numbers, but America taught them about patience and tactics against less mobile opponents.
英军在美洲学到的东西，正是他们在葡萄牙和西班牙击败拿破仑征召大军所需要的——包括传统军队在敌方领土上的僵化后勤如何转化为制胜因素，以及拥有能够进行袭扰作战的机动部队的重要性。拿破仑·波拿巴曾批评威灵顿是“印度土兵将军”，只适合与印度军队作战。英军在印度学会了如何在兵力往往处于劣势的情况下进行正规决战，但美国战场教会了他们如何以耐心和战术对付机动性较差的对手。
Wesley Dry
Studied History & Political Science (Graduated 2009)
韦斯利·德赖
历史与政治学专业（2009年毕业）
They basically changed into this:
(Image courtesy of Warlord Games)
英国军事的基本变化如下：
The British Army won the Seven Years’ War in North America by “out-regularing” the regulars of France on the plains of Abraham. However, they were also occasionally dependent on colonial scouting and “ranger” forces in the small scale conflicts with Native Americans. This relationship dated back to King Phillip’s War in New England where ranger units were among the most effective forces deployed in the conflict.
英军在北美七年战争中，凭借在亚伯拉罕平原上以“更正规的战术”击败法国正规军而获胜。但在与美洲原住民的小规模冲突中，他们也偶尔依赖殖民地的侦察兵和“游骑兵”部队。这种合作关系可追溯至新英格兰的菲利普国王战争，当时游骑兵部队是冲突中部署的最有效力量之一。
The Seven Years’ War and the American Revolution combined taught many in the British Army the value of having soldiers that were trained to move and fight using their own initiative and discretion. This heralded the birth of what were termed the light infantry. By the time of the Napoleonic War, at least, every British battalion would have at least one company of light infantry.
七年战争和美国独立战争共同让英军许多人认识到，培养能够自主决策、灵活机动作战的士兵的重要性，这标志着所谓“轻步兵”的诞生。至少到拿破仑战争时期，每个英国营都至少配备了一个轻步兵连。
However, the big influence was in the development of a coherent school of thought dubbed “The American School.” This emerged in contrast to the more conventional focus on using line formations that emphasized marching in disciplined lines, and sheer volume of fire. These formations made sense in more open battlefields of Europe. However, the British Army has always been an expeditionary army that needed to be prepared to fight from the Appalachians all the way to the Hindu Kush. Additionally, France’s light infantry helped make mince-meat of the clumsier units of line infantry during the early days of the French Revolutionary War.
然而，更大的影响在于形成了一套被称为“美国学派”的完整作战理念。这一学派与传统的线列战术形成鲜明对比——传统战术强调纪律严明的队列行进和密集火力输出，这种阵型在欧洲开阔的战场上是合理的，但英军本质上是一支远征军，需要准备好在从阿巴拉契亚山脉到兴都库什山脉的各类地形作战。此外，法国大革命战争初期，法国轻步兵曾重创动作迟缓的线列步兵部队，这也给英军带来了启示。
Because of the American School, there was an entire generation of officers that were open to utilizing light infantry tactics not only at the company level, but at the battalion and regimental level. Officers of the American School, including Sir John Moore, Coote Manningham, and Robert Craufurd, helped establish a specialist training camp at Schorncliffe to train units like the 43rd light infantry, the 60th (North American) Rifles, and most famously of all, the 95th Rifles.
得益于“美国学派”，整整一代军官开始愿意在连级乃至营级、团级部队中运用轻步兵战术。包括约翰·穆尔爵士、库特·曼宁厄姆和罗伯特·克劳福德在内的“美国学派”军官，协助在肖恩克利夫建立了专门的训练营，训练第43轻步兵营、第60（北美）步枪团，以及最著名的第95步枪团等部队。
These light infantry troops became an elite force during the Peninsular War, and were often capable of stopping formations several times their size. I think the British Army would have maintained light infantry units regardless of its experience in the American War for Independence. However, without the war it might not have had an entire generation of officers ready to utilize these formations and tactics to the fullest extent.
这些轻步兵在半岛战争中成为精锐部队，常常能够阻挡数倍于己的敌军阵型。我认为，无论是否有美国独立战争的经历，英军都会保留轻步兵部队，但如果没有这场战争，他们可能不会有整整一代军官准备好充分运用这些部队和战术。
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