For months you’ve heard warnings about the Very Bad Things that could happen if Congress fails to raise the debt ceiling. U.S. government default! Market crash! Global financial crisis!

数月来，您已经听到了有关国会未能提高债务上限可能引发的非常糟糕后果的警告。美国政府违约！股市崩盘！全球金融危机！

That probably feels abstract, maybe even hyperbolic. Worldwide financial meltdown? Really?

这可能感觉有些抽象，甚至可能是夸大其词的。全球金融崩溃？真的吗？

I spent recent days talking to financial market experts and former government officials about the potential fallout. I wanted to better understand the channels through which panic and losses could spread and precipitate“financial Armageddon,” as one former Federal Reserve official dubbed it. (Other phrases that came up in interviews: “nightmare scenario,” “bankruptcies that rival those in the Great Depression,” and “we might have to go back to trading beads.”)To be clear: There are many unknowns. Be skeptical of ultraprecise forecasts that quantify down to a tenth of a percentage point how much, say, unemployment would rise. Consequences will also vary depending on what markets think will happen. A 24-hour default during which a debt-limit deal appears imminent is different from one in which everyone believes lawmakers may have repudiated some debt forever.

最近，我与金融市场专家和前政府官员进行了对话，以更好地了解可能引发“金融末日”的恐慌和损失传播渠道。（在采访中提到的其他短语有：“噩梦情景”、“堪比大萧条的破产”和“我们可能不得不回到原始交易的时代”。）
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One useful lens for thinking through possible consequences was suggested by Richard Berner, a senior Treasury official during the 2011 debt-limit crisis: The global financial system is like an upside-down pyramid, and the tip of that pyramid is the U.S. Treasury market. “Everything else rests upon it,” he told me.

一种有用的思考可能后果的方法是由理查德·伯纳提出的，他是2011年债务上限危机期间的一位高级财政官员：全球金融系统就像一个倒置的金字塔，而这个金字塔的顶端是美国国债市场。他告诉我：“其他所有东西都依赖于它。”

With these disclaimers, here’s a summary of what market experts relayed. Our scenario assumes the U.S. government fails to pay for not only key services such as Social Security checks and military salaries but also principle or interest on at least some U.S. Treasury securities. (It’s unclear whether the government has technical capacity to effectively prioritize payments, anyway, or if ratings agencies would care.) On to the consequences, in seven terrifying steps:

在这些免责声明的基础上，以下是市场专家传达的总结。我们的情景假设美国政府不仅无法支付关键服务，如社会保障支票和军人工资，而且无法支付至少一些美国国债证券的本金或利息。(不清楚政府是否有技术能力有效地优先支付，或者评级机构是否关心。)接下来，是七个可怕的后果：

1) Treasurys get downgraded — as does virtually every other asset on earth.

1)国债被降级——几乎所有地球上的其他资产也被降级。

U.S. Treasury debt has long been considered risk-free, with the relative riskiness of other assets benchmarked against it. So the sudden realization that Treasurys are unsafe cascades through other assets, including bonds of U.S. corporations. These bonds would be downgraded, making it more expensive for companies to borrow.

美国国债债务长期以来被认为是无风险的，其他资产的相对风险性以其为基准。因此，突然意识到国债不安全会影响其他资产，包括美国公司的债券。这些债券将被降级，使公司借款更加昂贵。
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2) Interest rates rise for U.S. consumers, businesses and the government. It becomes more expensive to buy a house or invest in new equipment. Our federal debt problems — the concern supposedly motivating default threats in Congress — also worsen as debt-service costs rise. (Merely flirting with default in 2011 increased government borrowing costs by $1.3 billion that year.)

2)美国消费者、企业和政府的利率上升。购买房屋或投资新设备变得更加昂贵。我们的联邦债务问题——据称是激发国会威胁违约的关注——也会随着债务服务成本的上升而恶化。(仅仅在2011年暗示违约就使政府借款成本增加了13亿美元。)

3) Global investors likely would sell U.S. dollar-denominated assets as confidence in them evaporates; the dollar might lose value in foreign-exchange markets.

3)全球投资者可能会抛售以美元计价的资产，因为对它们的信心消失了；美元可能在外汇市场上贬值。

4) Stock markets plummet. Investments that are even slightly risky become less attractive to hold amid so much uncertainty.

4)股票市场暴跌。在如此多的不确定性中，即使是稍微有点风险的投资也变得不那么有吸引力。
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5) Companies holding Treasurys suffer hits to both revenue and balance sheets.

5)持有国债的公司的收入和资产负债表都会受到打击。

Companies reliant on interest payments for revenue might now have a cash-flow problem. They’ll try to borrow more to cover costs — but banks will want to hoard cash, not give out more loans, during a crisis. So these companies may have trouble paying payroll, rent and other expenses.
This could have knock-on effects for anyone expecting payments from these cash-strapped companies.

依赖利息收入的公司现在可能面临现金流问题。它们将尝试借更多款来支付成本，但在危机期间，银行会想要囤积现金而不是放贷。因此，这些公司可能会遇到支付工资、租金和其他费用的困难。这可能会对期望从这些财政紧张的公司获得付款的人产生连锁反应。

6) There might be a scramble to close out trades that people would otherwise hold.

6）人们可能会在本来持有交易的情况下，急于平仓。

Spurred by post-financial crisis regulations, Treasurys are increasingly used as collateral when people engage in other kinds of transactions — for example, to back borrowing when purchasing bonds or mortgages. If that oncerock-solid collateral suddenly drops in value, more collateral might be demanded right away — or the transaction might have to be “closed out” immediately; i.e., the loan would have to be repaid in full or the full purchase amount for the asset delivered — ASAP.

在后金融危机时期，由于监管规定的推动，国债在人们从事其他类型的交易时越来越被用作抵押品，例如在购买债券或抵押贷款时用作借款的后盾。如果曾经坚如磐石的抵押品突然贬值，更多的抵押品可能会立即被要求，或者交易可能不得不立即“平仓”，即贷款必须全额偿还，或者必须立即交付资产的全部购买金额。

This is known as a margin call.

这被称为保证金追缴。

Now, imagine hordes of people being told to close out at once because everyone’s collateral has lost value. This leads to a huge sell-off across other markets because everyone is racing to get the funds their broker or lender demands in time. (“It would be like a global margin call,” Berner said.)

现在，想象一下，因为每个人的抵押品都贬值了，大量人被告知立即平仓。这导致其他市场的大规模抛售，因为每个人都在争取在经纪人或贷方要求的时间内获得资金（“这将像全球保证金追缴一样，”伯纳说）。

7) If No. 6, happens, and everyone attempts to close out their trades at once, some of the infrastructure underpinning large parts of the financial system (called “central counterparty clearinghouses”) could essentially get overwhelmed and go down. Backup plans meant to kick in may not work, as they’re not really meant for a systemic shock of this kind.

7）如果第6点发生，并且每个人都试图立即平仓，一些支撑金融系统大部分基础设施的机构（称为“中央对手方清算机构”）可能会被压垮并瘫痪。备用计划可能无法起作用，因为它们并不真正适用于这种系统性的冲击。

These clearinghouses are tightly interconnected with each other and other institutions and markets; most people I interviewed said they are the fastest and scariest source of contagion to the rest of the world economy.

这些清算机构与彼此和其他机构和市场紧密相互连接；大多数我采访的人都说，它们是对世界经济的最快和最可怕的传染源。

That’s just the early-stage damage. Longer term, the United States might permanently lose its privileged economic and standing and ability to influence global affairs as we now do.

这只是早期的损害。长期而言，美国可能会永久失去其特权经济和地位，并失去我们现在所拥有的影响全球事务的能力。

If you’re not afraid yet, you should be.

如果你还没有害怕，你应该害怕了。