二战中，日本做出糟糕军事决策的例子有哪些？
What were some examples of Japan making bad military decisions in WWII?
译文简介
开战的决定完全是出于骄傲做出的，决定的人都认为他们的胜算不高。
正文翻译
We often hear about Nazi Germany making bad military decisions out of nationalism/pride (e.g. not retreating at Stalingrad, Battle of Kursk, Battle of the Bulge and Siegfried line). What were some examples of Japan doing similar things? I'd imagine there were quite a few, given their militaristic culture. Obviously, things like attacking Pearl Harbor were bad strategic decisions, but I was more so thinking about decisions made in individual battles/theaters that ultimately harmed Japan due to their own foolish pride.
我们经常听到纳粹德国出于民族主义或骄傲而做出糟糕军事决策的例子（例如在斯大林格勒没有撤退、库尔斯克战役、阿登战役和齐格弗里德防线）。日本有哪些类似的例子？考虑到他们的军国主义文化，我认为应该有不少。显然，像袭击珍珠港这样的事情是糟糕的战略决策，但我更关心的是在个别战斗或战区做出的决策，最终因为他们自己愚蠢的骄傲而伤害了日本。
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Where to start?
Going to war at all was a decision made out of pride by men who didn't rate their chances highly.
The tactic of attacking Pearl Harbor probably foreclosed Japan's only remotely feasible victory path - compromise with US.
The Midway Operation was a fatuous plan, a step leading to nowhere that risked Japan's core military assets needlessly. That's not even hindsight - IJN HQ and the Army thought the plan was dumb, only Yamamoto's gang at Combined Fleet supported it.
Refusing to concede Guadalcanal until it had sucked far too many of Japan's limited resources into a doomed attritional struggle was also pride-based.
Near-exclusive emphasis on winning battles rather than attacking more vulnerable logistical lines also seems pride based.
Basically everyone in Japan knew the war lost after the fall of Saipan, pride again prevented rational steps towards ending the war.
从哪里开始说呢？
开战的决定完全是出于骄傲做出的，决定的人都认为他们的胜算不高。
偷袭珍珠港的战术很可能阻断了日本唯一可行的胜利之路——与美国妥协。
中途岛行动是一个愚蠢的计划，这一步毫无必要地危及了日本的核心军事资产。这甚至不是马后炮——日本海军司令部和陆军都认为这个计划是愚蠢的，只有联合舰队的山本那帮人支持它。
在瓜达尔卡纳尔岛【瓜岛】，他们将日本有限的资源大量消耗在注定要失败的消耗战中，并拒绝放弃它，也是出于骄傲。
近乎完全强调获胜，而不是攻击更脆弱的后勤防线，这似乎也是出于骄傲。
基本上，所有日本人都知道在塞班岛沦陷后，战争就失败了，骄傲又一次阻止了结束战争的理性行为。
Kuribayashi (who lead the defense of Iwo Jima) had some very prescient comments.
"I was in the United States for three years when I was a captain. I was taught how to drive by some American officers, and I bought a car. I went around the States, and I knew the close connections between the military and industry. I saw the plant area of Detroit, too. By one button push, all the industries will be mobilized for military business."
"America's productive powers are beyond our imagination. Japan has started a war with a formidable enemy and we must brace ourselves accordingly."
The Japanese bit off way more than they could ever chew, and anyone who was willing to say this got put on suicide missions.
栗林忠道（负责硫磺岛防御）有一些非常有先见之明的评论。
“在我还是一名上尉时，我在美国待了三年。一些美国军官教我如何开车，然后我买了一辆车，走遍了美国，我知道军事和工业之间的紧密联系。我也参观了底特律的工厂区。只要按下一个按钮，就可以调动各行各业为军事服务。”
“美国的生产力超出了我们的想象。日本已经与一个强大的敌人开战，我们必须做好相应的准备。”
但日本人的反应却大出寻常，任何敢说这些话的人都被安排了自杀任务。
Kuribayashi himself was seen as a defeatist by the rest of the IJA and sent to Iwo Jima to prevent him from influencing anyone else in Japan.
栗林被其他日本军人视为失败主义者，被派往硫磺岛，以防止他影响日本的其他人。
Exactly, if accurately appraising your enemy gets you sent to an island to starve as an example, you will have chronic problems with officer competency.
是的，如果准确评估你的敌人会让你被送到一个岛上挨饿，那么军官的能力就是有大问题的。
Granted that Iwo Jima was the perfect place to build a defense, but compared to the tactics employed in other island defenses, his realistic approach made it a far bloodier affair for the Americans.
诚然，硫磺岛是建立防御的最佳地点，但与其他岛屿防御所采用的战术相比，他的现实主义做法让美国觉得战争更加血腥。
Japan's bid for East Asian hegemony was only remotely viable in tandem with Germany's bid for European hegemony. Pride probably also foreclosed Japan from recognizing this fact.
That fundamental strategic truth should have made Japan more willing/eager to help Germany defeat the USSR. It should have been obvious that, unless Germany did so, the snowball's chance in hell of Japan getting an acceptable peace would melt.
I'm not certain Japan could have tipped the USSR into defeat but, had they committed sufficient resources to that effort, it seems very arguable that they could have. Alvin Coox, the preeminent expert on Japan-USSR relations in the period, certainly thought so. This would have meant scaling back some of their farther-flung Pacific moves and adopting a defensive and elastic position in China for as long as necessary.
日本对东亚霸权的争夺与德国对欧洲霸权的争夺都是遥不可及的。骄傲可能也阻止了日本承认这一事实。
这个基本战略事实本应让日本更愿意或更渴望帮助德国击败苏联。很明显，除非德国这样做，否则日本获得可接受的和平就毫无机会。
我不确定日本是否能让苏联失败，但是，如果他们投入了足够的资源，他们似乎是可以做到的。当时研究日苏关系的杰出专家阿尔文·库克斯就是这么认为的。这意味着他们将减少在太平洋地区的一些行动，并在必要时在中国采取防御性和弹性的立场。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
By the time Barbarossa happened, could Japan even have withdrawn their committed forces to attack the USSR in a meaningful way?
等到巴巴罗萨计划发动时，日本能撤回他们的部队，以有意义的方式攻击苏联吗？
A controversial take, but Japan probably could have overrun the Russian Far East with the Soviets weakened so--especially because the Soviets always had to deal with the fact their supply chain was one railway. They couldn't support a land campaign into the interior, but they could prevent lend lease from transiting the Trans Siberian, limiting it to Archangelsk and Iran, which would be a substantial impact.
It would have probably required pulling a lot of army resources from other theaters though, especially China, and the navy pulling its weight in a conflict it didn't want.
这是个有争议的观点，但因为苏联的削弱，日本很可能占领俄罗斯的远东地区，尤其是苏联的供应链是一条铁路这一事实。日本无法支持深入内陆的战役，但可以阻止租借物资穿过西伯利亚，将其限制在阿尔汉格尔斯克和伊朗，这将产生重大影响。
不过，这可能需要从其他战区（尤其是中国）抽调大量军队，而且海军会阻止一场它不想要的战争。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
More to the point, it basically ignores the political situation in which Japan made the decision to go to war (with anyone except China) in the first place - in short, they absolutely had to have oil resources, and attacking the USSR doesn't get them any oil no matter who wins.
更重要的是，这基本忽略了日本当初决定开战的政治形势，简单的说，他们必须要拥有石油资源，而攻击苏联无论输赢都无法拥有石油。
This is the issue I was referring to. How much could Japan have shifted towards the USSR without experiencing severe problems in China? If they attacked the USSR, they'd most likely be supplied through occupied Chinese territory.
这就是我提到的问题。如果不在中国遇到严重的问题，日本能以多大的力度转向苏联？如果他们攻击苏联，苏联很有可能通过被占领的中国领土获得补给。
Manchuria wasn't a huge concern, they'd probably have to give up on any offensive activity in 'China proper' and likely abandon some territory they nominally controlled though.
满洲不是个大问题，但他们可能不得不放弃在中国本土的所有进攻行动，还可能放弃一些他们名义上控制的领土。
Interesting. I guess that makes it a very good example for OP then, given that would have been politically unacceptable even if it was the militarily correct decision.
有意思。我想这对楼主来说就是一个很好的例子，即使这是军事上正确的决定，在政治上也是不可接受的。
China had already halted Japan after the battles of Changsha by that point and with the help of America and the allies, they were beginning to industrialize in locations safe from the Japanese. Japan knew it was on borrowed time before China steamrolls them and erases their race for what they've done, they were not going to divert any resources to fighting another front.
那时，中国在长沙战役后已经挡止了日本，在美国和盟军的帮助下，他们开始在远离日本人的地方进行工业化。日本知道，在中国压制他们并抹杀他们的一切成果之前，得分秒必争，他们不会转移任何资源去开辟另一条战线。
They basically committed to "go south" by taking southern French Indochina in late July '41, so on June 22 they certainly could have reversed course.
Re commitments in China, the Kuomintang Army was extremely limited in its offensive capabilities due to, eg, lack of artillery. Japan could have weakened itself in China without suffering serious strategic setbacks like the loss of Wuhan. Even losing Wuhan or Nanking wouldn't have been strategically big, as Japan could always later push up the Yangtze from a Shanghai base against a Chinese army that lacked heavy weaponry and the industrial base to produce it.
Few realize that the Kwantung Army was ~twice the size of the China armies until 1944 or so. Defeating the SU would have allowed Japan to redeploy the Kwantung Army into China, which probably ends that war or makes the Nationalists a small negligible holdout pocket somewhere in China's far interior.
基本上，他们是在41年7月下旬决定"南下"占领法属中南半岛南部的，所以在6月22日时他们完全可以改变方向。
在中国，由于缺乏火炮，国民党军队的进攻能力极为有限。日本本可以削弱在中国的力量，而不会遭受像失去武汉这样严重的战略挫折。即使失去武汉或南京，在战略上也不是大问题，因为日本以后总是可以从上海基地向长江上游推进，而中国军队缺乏重型武器和生产重型武器的工业基地的。
很少有人意识到，直到1944年左右，关东军的规模是中国军队的两倍。击败苏军可以让日本将关东军重新部署回中国，这可能会结束这场战争，或者让国民党成为中国偏远内陆一个微不足道的存在。
The IJA came around to support the Midway plan. But only because they needed a response to the Doolittle Raid, and Midway was the only thing on the table.
日本帝国陆军转而支持中途岛计划。但这仅仅是因为他们需要对东京空袭做出回应，而中途岛是唯一可能的计划。
fall of Saipan
Japan was fucked well before that
“塞班岛沦陷”
日本在那之前就实力大损了
On the point of attacking Pearl, had the Japanese destroyed the fuel dumps and the shipyard repair facilities been destroyed, there is some argument that the war may have gone differently. I don’t think it would have been to the point that the Japanese would win (we still had the A bomb), but it might have caused us to forego some of the island campaigns. Our ability to repair ships damaged at Pearl and the other campaigns would have been crippled as those ships would have to be towed to San Diego for repair. We also would have to ship fuel across the Pacific to follow the same plan. Again, I don’t think it would have affected the final outcome but the Japanese plan, had it been successful in its third wave aimed at the fuel/yards, isn’t as big of a strategic blunder as it might seem.
在偷袭珍珠港的时候，如果日本人摧毁了燃料库和造船厂维修设施，有人认为战争结果可能会有所不同。我认为还不到日本能赢的程度(我们还有原子弹)，但这可能会让我们放弃一些岛屿战役。我们修复在珍珠港和其他战役中损坏的船只的能力会被削弱，因为这些船只必须被拖到圣地亚哥进行修复。按照同样的计划，我们还必须跨越太平洋运送燃料。再说一次，我不认为这会影响最终结果，但如果日本的计划在第三波针对燃料、造船厂的攻击中取得成功，那么它并不是那么大的战略错误。
True, but I was under the impression that part of the reason the attack was abandoned before they could destroy these targets was that the commander decided to end the attack as he feared heavier losses that would taint his victory, now that he no longer had the element of surprise. If that is the case, it would still be an example of pride causing a strategic blunder
确实，但我的印象是，他们在摧毁这些目标之前放弃攻击的部分原因，是指挥官决定结束攻击，因为他担心损失更大，这样会玷污他的胜利，而现在不再有意外的因素了。如果是这样的话，这仍然是一个骄傲导致战略错误的例子。
I think we get lost in definitions at times. While I agree with that you said, I would categorize it as a tactical error that had strategic impacts. The strategy of attacking Pearl was high risk but given the situation Japan was in, but wasn’t a thoughtless or stupid decision. Could they have done something else? Of course they could have (stayed out of the South Pacific, focus on China, blockade Australia, etc…) but there’s no guarantee these options would have fared any better. With the benefit of perfect hindsight, we can pick these decisions apart but if we limit ourselves to what they likely knew at the time, Pearl makes sense even if it ended up as a failure.
我认为我们有时会迷失在定义中。虽然我同意你所说的，但我会把这归类为具有战略影响的战术错误。偷袭珍珠港的战略风险很高，但考虑到日本所处的形势，这不是一个轻率或愚蠢的决定。他们还能做别的什么吗？当然能(远离南太平洋，关注中国，封锁澳大利亚等)，但不能保证这些选择会更好。凭借完美的后见之明，我们可以指摘这些决定，但如果我们把自己局限在他们当时可能知道的事情上，偷袭珍珠港是有道理的，即使它以失败告终。
There's a smaller scale example which hasn't been brought up by anyone here so far, which is the failure of the Japanese command to recognize the importance of Guadalcanal until it was far too late. Savo Island showed just how unprepared the US Navy was in many ways to fight the kind of naval war Guadalcanal required; the Battle of the Eastern Solomons showed that, despite its success at Midway, US Naval Aviation was still a force of inexperienced amateurs.
Had the IJN put together a serious counter-strike in early August and combined it with a numerically adequate, properly motivated ground force, they might have been able to retake Henderson field early on.
还有一个规模较小的例子，到目前为止这里还没有人提到过，那就是日本司令部未能认识到瓜岛的重要性，直到为时已晚。萨沃岛海战表明，美国海军在许多方面都没有做好准备，无法进行瓜岛那样的海战；东所罗门海战表明，尽管在中途岛取得了成功，美国海军航空兵仍然是一支缺乏经验的业余部队。
如果日本帝国海军在8月初进行一次有力的反击，并与数量充足的、士气良好的地面部队相结合，他们可能会重新夺回亨德森机场。
The obvious point right off the bat is that, like Germany, Japan had chosen to fight a war that it could just never hope to win. That being said, there are a few battles and campaigns that were obvious mistakes or characterized by mistakes.
显而易见的一点是，与德国一样，日本选择了打一场它永远无望获胜的战争。话虽如此，有一些战斗和战役是明显错误的.
The biggest one is definitely Midway. People often point to the tactical mistakes at Midway, but more than that, it was a stategic failure. Not only was it strategically questionable (seizing it would have dramatically extended Japanese supply lines, and it was intended to serve as an invasion staging area for what would have been a disastrous Hawaiian campaign) to begin with, but it was almost immediately undermined by splitting Kido Butai to support the Aleutian operation. In addition to reducing the carrier force available to them at Midway - partially ensuring Japan's loss - this also reduced the available landing forces, meaning that even if the Japanese had won the naval battle, they would likely have been repulsed with heavy losses during the amphibious assault.
中途岛海战
最大的一场绝对是中途岛。人们经常指出中途岛的战术错误，但更重要的，这是一次战略错误。它不仅在战略上有问题（夺取它会极大地延长日本的补给线，而且它的目的是作为一个入侵集结地，以应对灾难性的夏威夷战役），而且它的机动部队几乎立刻就被拆分了，以支持阿留申行动。除了减少中途岛海战可用的航母部队，还减少了可用的登陆部队，这意味着即使日本在海战中获胜，他们也可能在两栖攻击中被击退，遭遇惨重损失。
The entire premise of these operations was rooted more in hope than reality. The Japanese were at the end of their supply lines, attacking through incredibly rough terrain, into well-armed British forces, while outnumbered.
英帕尔和科希马战役
这些行动的所有前提更多地是基于希望，而不是现实。日本人的补给线已经拉到了最长，他们通过极其崎岖的地形，在寡不敌众的情况下，向装备精良的英军发起进攻。
整个行动让我想起了突出部战役【阿登战役】；一场完全基于希望、而又毫无希望的进攻。就像德国人在突出部战役中一样，日本人看着他们早先的成功，似乎认为他们可以在与英国人的战争中重演，但却没有真正理解英国人在马来亚是如何惨败的。在进攻失去主动权后继续进攻，只会浪费军队和物资，毫无益处。
日本在英帕尔和科希马的部队损失，以及他们后勤能力的损失，严重到基本上削弱了他们在东南亚的所有努力。
On a macro level, the deployment of their forces in the Pacific in general was just riddled with issues. It's well known how the US used an "island hopping" strategy to bypass many key Japanese positions entirely, often only seizing those islands that offered strategic anchorages or offered the opportunity to build an airfield. This raises the question, "Why were the Japanese occupying those other islands at all?"
其部队的战略部署
从大层面上看，他们在太平洋地区的部队部署总体上充满了问题。众所周知，美国利用“跳岛”战略完全绕过日本的许多关键阵地，往往只占领那些具有战略锚地或可以建造机场的岛屿。这就引发了一个问题，“日本人占领其他岛屿来干什么？”
关于这方面我总能想到一个完美的例子。我曾经去过罗塔这个小岛，就在关岛以北，在塞班岛以南不远。第二次世界大战期间，日军在罗塔岛上驻扎了1600多名战斗人员。我探索了他们在中心山脉开凿的数英里隧道，爬过了他们建造的巨大的石灰岩壁垒和巨大的壕沟网络。这些防御工事仍然完好无损，因为美国根本就无视了罗塔。它没有值得停泊的地方，也没有飞机场。整整一营半的人都被浪费在岛上，在那挨饿。
你一定想知道，有多少日本士兵在毫无战略价值的岛屿上被浪费和挨饿，而他们本可以在有价值的战役中发挥关键作用。即使是最终说服美国采取跳岛战略的贝里琉岛，从战略角度来看也基本上是一个毫无价值的岛屿。人们批评美国登陆贝里琉岛是浪费生命，没有真正的战略价值。你一定想知道，如果岛上没有任何战略价值，为什么日本人在那里？帕劳群岛值得防守吗？是一个好的战略基地吗？可能是的。如果不在这些岛屿上保持强大的空中存在，这些岛屿值得防守吗？不值得。日本为了保卫它们是否浪费了5万多士兵？肯定的。
The good news is, there's a recent relevant report to your question published just a week ago.
This is a perspective from Chinese analysts on the Pacific front in WWII.
https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/chinese-lessons-from-the-pacific-war-implications-for-pla-warfighting
It covers Midway, Guadalcanal, and Okinawa.
Example Quote:
By contrast, to Chinese eyes, the Japanese suffered from serious intelligence shortfalls. According to one study, Japan failed to fully grasp the intentions and capabilities of the opposing side during Midway. The IJN not only underestimated the fighting power of the American fleet, but it also assumed that the enemy would be largely reactive to its initiatives. Japanese assessments of the adversary had succumbed to “subjective thinking” or “wishful thinking". These misinterpretations stood in stark contrast to the careful intelligence gathering and analysis that informed the Pearl Harbor attack and the campaigns to seize Southeast Asia. The study attributes the apparent disjuncture in assessments to victory disease. In other words, previous successes clouded Japan’s judgment. Another article argues that Japanese intelligence institutions were relatively “shabby” and severely lacked skilled intelligence personnel. Moreover, bureaucratic rivalries between various intelligence departments undermined the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence work. Finally, lax operational security hobbled Japan. According to this Chinese interpretation, Japanese leaders were overly confident in the integrity of their encrypted code. Numerous studies point to the failure to change the code in the months leading to Midway as a contributing factor to the IJN’s defeat at sea.
好消息是，就在一周前中国刚刚发布了与楼主问题相关的报道。
这是中国分析人士对二战太平洋战场的看法。【链接】
它包含了中途岛、瓜岛和冲绳岛。
引用段落：
“相比之下，在中国人看来，日本人严重缺乏情报。根据一项研究，日本在中途岛期间未能完全掌握对方的意图和能力。日本帝国海军不仅低估了美国舰队的战斗力，而且还认为敌人会对其主动行动做出很大反应。日本人对对手的评估是从“主观思维”或“一厢情愿的想法”出发。这些误解，与偷袭珍珠港和占领东南亚时所依据的、仔细的情报收集和分析形成了鲜明的对比。该研究将评估中的明显脱节归因于胜利病。换句话说，之前的成功影响了日本的判断。另一篇文章认为，日本情报机构相对“简陋”，严重缺乏熟练的情报人员。此外，各情报部门之间的官僚竞争削弱了情报工作的效率和能力。最后，松懈的行动阻碍了日本。根据中国的解释，日本领导人对他们的加密代码的完整性过于自信。许多研究指出，在中途岛战役之前的几个月里，未能更改代码是导致日本帝国海军在海上失利的一个因素。”
Upstairs-Upstairs882
Suppose you mean only strategically.
The answer is - A LOT.
But we also focus more on the mistakes and since launching a war against the US seems suicidal now, we can look from that perspective and make every decision seem bad.
如果你说的只是战略上的。那么答案是很多。
但我们也更加关注战术错误，因为对美国发动战争似乎是自杀，如果我们从这个角度来看，每个决定都很糟糕。
让我们把马来亚战役、菲律宾战役、占领缅甸作为一些非常积极的战役。海军方面，有各种机动部队突袭，当然从珍珠港开始，一直到珊瑚海，都非常成功。而在印度尼西亚的盟军海军也并不是一个笑话。
我想说除此之外，他们做了糟糕的决定。珊瑚海，中途岛，瓜岛，新几内亚，然后一直到1945年。你不能以积极的眼光看待硫磺岛、贝里琉岛、冲绳或塔拉瓦岛，因为他们的减员——它们仍然是失败的，失败一方的损失仍然要高得多，从战略上讲，他们都是一场更大的游戏的一部分，只是在等待，直到不可避免的结局。
But hindsight is always only hindsight.
不过，我仍然认为他们在两次大规模海军损失中，一些非常好的作战构想几乎实现了。在菲律宾海，小泽治三郎在射程和发动全甲板打击方面战胜了斯普鲁恩斯，如果这是在1942年，将是彻底的、压倒性的胜利。但这是1944年，没有人能预料到在飞行员和飞机的性能上会有如此大的差距。这就是它变成了马里亚纳火鸡射击的原因。
但马后炮终究只是马后炮。