Since 1945 the world economy has run according to a system of rules and norms underwritten by America. This brought about unprecedented economic integration that boosted growth, lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and helped the West prevail over Soviet Russia in the cold war. Today the system is in peril. Countries are racing to subsidise green industry, lure manufacturing away from friend and foe alike and restrict the flow of goods and capital. Mutual benefit is out and national gain is in. An era of zero-sum thinking has begun.

1945年以来，世界经济一直在由美国担保的规则与规范体系下运行。由此带来前所未有的经济一体化促进了经济增长，数亿人摆脱了贫困，帮助西方在冷战中战胜了苏联。现在该体系面临威胁，各国在争相补贴绿色产业，挖走朋友和敌人的制造业，限制商品与资本流动。国家利益取代了互利，零和思维时代已经到来。

The old system was already under strain, as America’s interest in maintaining it waned after the global financial crisis of 2007-09. But President Joe Biden’s abandonment of free-market rules for an aggressive industrial policy has dealt it a fresh blow. America has unleashed vast subsidies, amounting to $465bn, for green energy, electric cars and semiconductors. These are laced with requirements that production should be local. Bureaucrats tasked with scrutinising inward investments to prevent undue foreign influence over the economy now themselves hold sway over sectors making up 60% of the stockmarket. And officials are banning the flow of ever more exports—notably of high-end chips and chipmaking equipment to China.

2007-09年爆发全球金融危机后，随着美国对维持旧体系的热情消退，旧体系已经面临压力。然而，拜登总统抛弃自由市场原则，实行激进的产业政策，使旧体系再次遭受打击。美国针对绿色能源、电动汽车、半导体投入总计4650亿美元的巨额补贴，附带的要求是在本土生产。官僚负责审查外资是为了防止外国对经济的过度影响，现在控制在他们手里的行业份额占股市的60%。官员正在禁止越来越多的出口供应，尤其是销往中国的高端芯片和芯片制造设备。

For many in Washington, muscular industrial policy holds a seductive appeal. It could help seal America’s technological ascendancy over China, which has long pursued self-sufficiency in vital areas using state intervention. As carbon pricing is politically unfeasible, it could foster decarbonisation. And it reflects a hope that government intervention might succeed where private enterprise failed, and reindustrialise America’s heartlands.

对于华盛顿的许多人来说，强力的产业政策具有诱人的吸引力。这有助于确立美国对中国的技术优势，中国长期利用国家干预手段追求关键领域的自给自足。
在碳定价失去政治可行性的情况下可以加强去碳化。这也反映了一种愿望，即在私有企业失败的情况下，政府干预可能取得成功，并且对美国中部进行再工业化。

The immediate consequence, however, has been to set off a dangerous spiral into protectionism worldwide. Build a chipmaking plant in India and the government will stump up half the cost; build one in South Korea and you can avail yourself of generous tax breaks. Should seven other market economies that have announced policies for “strategic” sectors since 2020 match America’s spending as a share of gdp, total outlays would reach $1.1trn. Last year nearly a third of the cross-border business deals that came to the attention of European officials received detailed scrutiny. Countries with the raw materials needed to make batteries are eyeing export controls. Indonesia has banned nickel exports; Argentina, Bolivia and Chile may soon collaborate, opec-style, on the output of their lithium mines.

然而，这样做的直接后果是引发全球保护主义加剧的风险。如果在印度建造芯片制造厂，印度政府将承担一半费用；如果在韩国建造芯片制造厂，你可以享受丰厚的减税优惠。2020年以来，其余的七大市场经济体针对“战略性”产业出台了相关政策，如果它们与美国支出占GDP的比例相当，那么总支出将达1.1万亿美元。去年，近三分之一的跨境交易引起了欧洲官员的注意，因此受到详细审查。拥有制造蓄电池所需原材料的国家正在考虑出口管制。印尼禁止出口镍原料；阿根廷、玻利维亚、智利可能很快在锂矿产量方面进行欧佩克式合作。

Economic conflict with China looks increasingly inevitable. As China became more deeply integrated into the global economy at the turn of this century, many in the West predicted that it would become more democratic. The death of that hope—combined with the migration of a million manufacturing jobs to Chinese factories—caused America to fall out of love with globalisation. Today Mr Biden’s administration frets about the danger of depending on China for batteries the way Europe relied on Russia for gas before the invasion of Ukraine. Democrats and Republicans alike worry that the loss of America’s lead in advanced chipmaking to Taiwan will undermine its ability to develop artificial intelligence—on which, they predict, armies of the future will rely to plan strategy and guide missiles.

中美之间的经济冲突看来愈发不可避免。在世纪之交，随着中国更加深入地融入全球经济，许多西方人预测中国会变得更加民主。这种希望的破灭——再加上一百万制造业岗位流失到中国工厂——导致美国与全球化分道扬镳。如今，拜登政府抱怨在蓄电池方面依赖中国的风险，不亚于欧洲在乌克兰遭受入侵之前依赖俄罗斯天然气的风险。民主党和共和党都在担心，如果美国在先进芯片制造方面的领先地位输给台湾，这将削弱美国在人工智能领域的研发能力——他们预测未来的军队将依靠人工智能来制定军事策略和进行导弹制导。

Some simply want to stop China becoming too rich—as if impoverishing 1.4bn people were either moral or likely to ensure peace. Others, more wisely, focus on increasing America’s economic resilience and maintaining its military edge. A reindustrialisation of the heartland, they argue, will rekindle support for market capitalism. In the meantime, as the global hegemon, America can weather other countries’ complaints.

有些人只是希望阻挠中国变得太富裕——好像使14亿人变得贫穷合乎道义或可能确保和平一样。更明智的人关注增强美国经济的韧性，保持自身的军事优势。他们认为，美国中部的再工业化将重新燃起人们对市场资本主义的支持。同时，美国作为全球霸主可以承受其他国家的抱怨。

This thinking is misguided. If zero-sum policies were seen as a success, abandoning them would only become harder. In reality, even if they do remake American industry, their overall effect is more likely to cause harm by corroding global security, holding back growth and raising the cost of the green transition.

这种想法是错误的。如果零和政策被视为成功之举，那么放弃零和政策只会变得更难。事实上，即使他们真的实现了再工业化，总体效应更可能造成损害，因为这会削弱全球安全、阻碍经济增长、增加绿色转型的成本。

One problem is their extra economic costs. The Economist estimates that replicating the cumulative investments of firms in the global tech-hardware, green-energy and battery industries would cost $3.1trn-4.6trn (3.2-4.8% of global gdp). Reindustrialisation will raise prices, hurting the poor most. Duplicating green supply chains will make it costlier for America and the world to wean themselves off carbon. History suggests that vast amounts of public money could go to waste.

一个问题是额外的经济成本。《经济学人》估算，复制企业对全球硬件、绿色能源、蓄电池产业的累积投资将耗费3.1-4.6万亿美元（全球GDP的3.2-4.8%）。再工业化会使价格上涨，受损最大的是穷人。复制绿色供应链会增加美国和世界的除碳成本。历史经验表明，巨额公款可能被浪费。

Another problem is the fury of friends and potential allies. America’s genius after the second world war was to realise that its interests lay in supporting openness in global commerce. As a result it pursued globalisation despite, by 1960, making up nearly 40% of global dollar gdp.

另一个问题是朋友和潜在盟友的愤慨。二战结束后，美国高明地认识到支持全球商业开放符合它的利益。因此到1960年，尽管美国在以美元计价的全球GDP中约占40%，但它仍然追求全球化。

Today its share of output has fallen to 25% and America needs friends more than ever. Its ban on exports to China’s chipmakers will work only if the Dutch firm asml and Japan’s Tokyo Electron also refuse to supply them with equipment. Battery supply chains will likewise be more secure if the democratic world operates as one bloc. Yet America’s protectionism is irking allies in Europe and Asia.

如今美国的产量份额下滑至25%，它现在是最需要朋友的时候。只有在荷兰阿斯麦公司和日本东电电子公司拒绝向中国芯片制造商供应设备的情况下，美国对中国芯片制造商实行的出口禁令才能奏效。同样，只有在民主世界团结一致的情况下，蓄电池供应链才会更加安全。然而，美国的保护主义正在激怒欧洲和亚洲的盟友。

Integration and differentiation

一体化和差异化

America must also woo emerging powers. By 2050 India and Indonesia will be the world’s third- and fourth-largest economies, projects Goldman Sachs, a bank. Both are democracies but not close friends of America. By 2075 Nigeria and Pakistan will have gained economic clout, too. If America demands that other countries freeze out China without offering sufficient access to its own markets then it will be spurned by rising powers.

美国还必须拉拢新兴强国。高盛银行预测到2050年，印度和印尼将成为世界第三和第四大经济体。两国都是民主国家，但不是美国的密友。到2075年，尼日利亚和巴基斯坦也将拥有经济影响力。如果美国要求其他国家排挤中国，却不向它们充分开放自己的市场，那么新兴强国会拒绝美国的要求。

A final worry is that the more economic conflict proliferates, the harder it becomes to solve problems that demand global collaboration. Despite racing to secure green technology, countries are squabbling over how to help the poor world decarbonise. It is proving hard to rescue countries in debt distress, such as Sri Lanka, because of obstruction by China, a big creditor. If countries cannot co-operate to tackle some problems, these will become impossible to fix and the world will suffer accordingly.

最后一个担忧是经济冲突激增得越多，需要全球合作才能解决的问题就变得越棘手。虽然各国都在争相获取绿色技术，但在如何帮助贫穷世界除碳的问题上争论不休。事实证明，斯里兰卡这种陷入债务困境的国家很难得到拯救，因为中国这个大债权国从中作梗。如果各国不通过合作来解决某些问题，那么这些问题将无法得到解决，世界将因此而遭殃。

Nobody expects America to go back to the 1990s. It is right to seek to preserve its military pre-eminence and to avoid a dangerous dependence on China for crucial economic inputs. Yet this makes other forms of global integration all the more essential. It should seek the deepest co-operation between countries that is possible, given their respective values. Today this probably requires a number of overlapping forums and ad hoc deals. America should, for instance, join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, an Asian trade pact based on an earlier deal it helped write but then abandoned.

没有人指望美国重回20世纪90年代。美国谋求保持军事优势，避免在关键的经济投入上依赖中国的风险，这样做是对的。然而，这使其他形式的全球一体化变得更加必要。考虑到各自的价值观，美国应该尽可能地谋求各国之间最深层次的合作。如今，这可能需要一些重叠的论坛和临时性协议。例如，美国应该加入《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》，这一亚洲贸易协定基于美国先前帮忙起草但后来放弃的协议。

Saving globalisation may seem impossible, given the protectionist turn in American politics. But Congress’s aid to Ukraine shows that voters are not insular. Surveys suggest the popularity of free trade is recovering. There are signs that the Biden administration is responding to allies’ concerns about its subsidies.

考虑到美国政治转向保护主义，拯救全球化看来是不可能了。但国会对乌克兰的援助表明，选民并非思想狭隘。民调显示，自由贸易的支持率正在回升。有迹象表明，拜登政府正在就盟友对美国补贴的担忧做出回应。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处


Yet rescuing the global order will require bolder American leadership that once again rejects the false promise of zero-sum thinking. There is still time for that to happen before the system collapses completely, damaging countless livelihoods and imperilling the causes of liberal democracy and market capitalism. The task is enormous and urgent; it could hardly be more important. The clock is ticking.

然而，拯救全球秩序需要美国领导层拿出更大的勇气，再次拒绝零和思维的虚假承诺。在这一体系彻底崩溃，破坏无数人的生计、危及自由民主和市场资本主义事业之前，还有时间做到这一点。这项任务艰巨而紧迫，实在没有什么比这更重要了，抓紧时间。