在二战中，曼施坦因计划是一场冒险的赌博吗？如果法国预料到这次进攻那么会发生什么？
In WW2, is the Manstein Plan a risky gamble? What would happen if France anticipated this attack?
译文简介
这是一场冒险的赌博。然而，曼斯坦的计划并不仅仅是通过阿登的进攻，而是整个大战略。
正文翻译
In WW2, is the Manstein Plan a risky gamble? What would happen if France anticipated this attack?
在二战中，曼施坦因计划是一场冒险的赌博吗？如果法国预料到这次进攻那么会发生什么？
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Practicing atheist1y
It was a risky gamble. However the Manstain plan wasn’t just an attack through the Ardennes, it was the whole strategy.
Case Yellow
As you can see the plan was twofold. There was a smaller attack in the Netherlands and Belgium proper, these were lands France wanted to fight in. Germans first gave the French what they wanted and only attacked at Sedan three days later. This was because the Ardennes were harder and slower to cross, but it was also an integral part of the plan to draw French armies where they wanted to be anyway first and then encircle them.
The French fully anticipated an attack through the Ardennes. Their own plan however hinged on Belgian fronts in the mountains that should have slowed down the German assault (they did so in WW1 by two weeks). They figured they had more than enough time to send in reinforcements. Alas, Belgians didn’t hold up the Germans for even a single day and the German forces were able to punch through with relative ease. French HQ was typically two days behind on what was going on at the front line and needed another two days to relay their orders back to their troops. This meant by the time the French army recieved orders to respond to the German threat to Sedan the city was already secured and their forces were moving west.
This ultimately did France in in 1940. You can’t hope to wage a war against an enemy with a response time of 20 minutes if your typical response time is four days.
这是一场冒险的赌博。然而，曼斯坦的计划并不仅仅是通过阿登的进攻，而是整个大战略。
法国战役
正如你所看到的，该计划有两方面的内容。一是在荷兰和比利时本土进行一次较小的攻击，这些地方是法国想展开战斗的地方。德国人先给了法国人他们想要的东西，三天后才在色当发动进攻。这是因为阿登山脉更难穿越，行进速度更慢，但这也是计划的一个组成部分，即把法国军队吸引到他们想去的地方，然后包围他们。
法国人完全预料到了德军会通过阿登山脉进攻。然而，他们自己的计划取决于比利时在山区的战线，这些战线本应减缓德军的进攻速度（他们在一战中阻滞了德军两个星期）。法国认为他们有足够的时间来派遣增援部队。然而，比利时人没有阻挡德军哪怕一天，德军相对轻松地冲了过去。法国总部收到的消息通常要比前线的情况晚两天，而且还需要两天的时间来把他们的命令传回给部队。这意味着，当法军接到命令应对德军对色当的威胁时，该城市已经被拿下了，德军的部队也正在向西移动。
这最终使法国在1940年陷入困境。如果你的条件反应时间是四天，你就不可能在一场战争中对抗反应时间是20分钟的敌人。
This campaign perfectly shows how essential radio communications were.
这场战役完美地展示了无线电通信是多么重要。
It also shows how important some military experience can be. In WW1, Guderian spent most of his time in headquarters and communications jobs, not fighting at the front in infantry or artillery. He learned early how vital communications were between the various arms. In part that accounts for the demand that every German panzer be equipped with a radio and the German electronics industry responded with suitable designs. French armor units were still trying to use battle flags on the tanks for commanders to control their tank squadrons, just as the Russians did a year later with similar results.
这也说明了一些军事经验可以是多么重要。在一战中，古德里安的大部分时间都是在总部和通信部门工作，而不是在前线跟着步兵或炮兵作战。他很早就了解到各军种之间的通信是多么重要。这在一定程度上说明了他为何要求每辆德国装甲车都要配备一台无线电，而德国电子工业也以恰当的设计来回应。与此同时法国装甲部队仍在尝试在坦克上使用战旗沟通，让指挥官控制他们的坦克中队，就像俄国人在一年后所做的那样，结果也差不多。
One thing I fail to understand is how come the combined BEF-french-belgian armies ALSO lost against the SMALLER german Army Group C attacking right in the place where they had planned to fight the MAIN german thrust?
我不明白的是，为什么法荷比联军在面对德军C集团军群的小规模进攻时也败下阵来，而他们原本是计划在这里与德军的主力作战的？
Combined arms and speed. The Germans punched much quicker through the Dutch and Belgian defenses than anticipated.
联合军种的应用和速度。德国人比预期的要快得多地击穿了荷兰和比利时的防线。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
Failure to anticipate and counter blitzkrieg, after seeing it in action (in Poland.)
看到了对波兰的闪电战之后，依然未能对此作出预测和应对。
There was no great expectation that the Polish army would be able to offer any lasting resistance. The French, OTOH …
大家本来就没期望波兰人能抵抗多久，另一方面，对法国人...
The French held the Germans at Gembloux and the British likewise at Grez-Doiceau, fighting in unprepared positions which they had only just moved into because of Belgian neutrality, but they were forced to retreat from those because they were outflanked both to the north (where the Dutch had collapsed) and south.
法国人在让布卢抵挡住了德国人的进攻，英国人在格雷杜瓦索也是如此，他们在毫无准备的情况下与德军作战，而且由于比利时的中立性，他们才刚刚得以进入这些阵地，但最后他们被迫从这些阵地撤退，因为他们在北部（荷兰人崩溃的地方）和南部都被包抄了。
Why such terrible response times on the French part? Were they still using horse messengers or something?
为什么法国方面的反应时间如此糟糕？他们还在使用马匹信使还是什么？
Messenger pigeons and human curiers, in cars and on motorbikes. Yes, really.
They were afraid electronic communications would be intercepted by the Germans.
用的是信鸽和信使，坐汽车和摩托车。是的，这是真的。
他们担心电子通信会被德国人截获。
Because they kept taking a day to digest the info before debating on what to do. It wasn’t 1914 anymore, the spearheads weren’t on foot to slowly attack. Plus, the Germans took great chances, risking lots of casualties to keep moving. This worked in France, but it did not work in Russia where the defense could trade space for time.
因为他们要用一天的时间来消化信息，然后再争论该怎么做。现在已经不是1914年了，先头部队并不是在步行中慢慢进攻。另外，德国人冒着巨大的风险，冒着大量伤亡的危险不断前进。这在进攻法国时起了作用，但在俄罗斯却不起作用，因为那里的防御可以用空间换时间。
It actually also worked in Soviet during the first part of Barbarossa. Until Hitler devated from the plan. This is what caused things to change from the plan.
The Germans progressed on and ahead of plan on the North and Central Front incl. the capture of Smolensk at the end of August. Then things changed on the Central front. Because of Hitler’s order to halt progress and turn south to assist in the Kiev region.
Contrary the belief did they also progress according to plan on the South Front.
It was expected and planned the progress in south would/should take longer time. Simply because the main forces of the Soviet Red Army was deployed in south. And would take some longer time to defeat and/or push back.
实际上，在实行巴巴罗萨的第一部分的时候对苏联也是有效的。直到希特勒改变了计划。这就是导致事情与计划发生变化的原因。
德军在北线和中线的进展比计划提前，包括在8月底攻占斯摩棱斯克。然后，中线的情况发生了变化。因为希特勒下令停止进展，转而南下援助基辅地区的德军。
但是跟人们的想法相反，他们在南线的进展其实也是在按计划进行的。
按照计划，南线的进展将/应该花费更长的时间。因为苏联红军的主力部队被部署在南部。因此需要更长的时间来击败和/或击退。
The French may have expected an attack through the Ardennes, but they didn’t expect that attack to be the MAIN German effort. Gamelin expected the Germans to reuse some variant of the Schlieffen Plan with the main point of emphasis being much further north. The forces going through the Ardennes were expected to be limited to infantry with few tanks, which what forces the French had at Sedan could handle. Thus why the Dyle Plan focused on rushing forces and most of France’s armor to the Dyle River to blunt the expected main attack there.
法国人可能已经预料到了通过阿登的进攻，但他们并没有预料到这次进攻会是德国人的主力。甘莫林预计德国人将重新使用施利芬计划的某种变体，而主要的着力点在更北的地方。通过阿登地区的部队预计将仅限于步兵，很少有坦克，而法国人在色当的部队可以处理这些问题。因此，戴尔计划的重点是将部队和法国的大部分装甲部队赶到戴尔河，以阻断预期在那里进行的主攻。
Note that mountains might not be the right word. The highest point in Belgium is 694m[1] this is the view:
the highest point in the (mainland) Netherlands is 322m[2]
that’s not to say that the Ardennes in southeast Belgium aren’t hard to get through. They are, but mountains is not the right word.
请注意，“山”可能不是一个正确的词。比利时的最高点是694米[1]，这是那里的景观。
荷兰（本土）的最高点是322米[2] 。
这并不是说比利时东南部的阿登山脉并不难走。是挺难走的，但用"山"这个词并不恰当。
In the Ardennes, it’s not the height of the hills so much as the terrain. The grades are pretty steep, covered with trees, and wind up crossing many, many streams which have steep banks and muddy bottoms. The early WW2 tanks would have had problems crossing such streams unless they could find bridges, which were supposed to have been blown at the start of hostilities. Alas, Belgian strategy wasn’t coordinated with French needs and the Germans were on the Meuse earlier than the French would have liked.
在阿登，与其说是山的高度让其难以跋涉，不如说是地形。那里的坡度非常陡峭，被树木覆盖，底部溪流纵横，泥泞不堪。二战初期的坦克在穿越这样的溪流时会遇到问题，除非他们能找到桥梁，这些桥梁本应在敌对行动开始时被炸毁。唉，比利时的战略没有与法国的需求相协调，德国人到达默兹河的时间比法国人预期的要早。
There were so many points where the attack could have failed.
panicked French troops flee from Sedan after being bombed. If they had stayed, they might have stopped, or at least delayed the crossing
The high ground at Bulson overlooked the Sedan crossings. It was a strong fortified position but had been abandoned in the panic above. French troops and tanks moved to retake it but only minutes before they got there, lead elements of the 1st and 2nd panzer divisions got there first.
At several points, the German High command ordered the panzer advance to be halted in order to allow following infantry divisions to catch up and defend the supply lines. The lead panzer divisions disobeyed these orders and continued on. There were many occasions where gaps opened up and French troops could have cut off the German supply lines, but they didn’t take advantage of this.
德军的进攻其实很多地方都可以让他们遇挫。
1.惊慌失措的法国军队在遭到轰炸后从色当逃了出来。如果他们留下来，他们可能会阻止，或者至少会推迟德军渡河。
2.布尔松的高地俯瞰着色当的过境点。它是一个坚固的防御阵地，但上面的军队在恐慌下放弃了这里。法军部队和坦克想来夺回它，但就在他们到达前几分钟，德军第一和第二装甲师的先头部队先到了那里。
3.在一些地方，德国最高统帅部命令停止装甲部队的前进，以便让后续的步兵师赶上并保卫补给线。领先的装甲师并不服从这些命令，而是继续前进。有很多时候，缺口打开了，法国部队本可以切断德国的补给线，但他们没有利用这一点。
Was the German response time really 20 minutes? That’s amazing.
德国的反应时间真的是20分钟吗？真让人吃惊。
Sort of, German Officers led from the front and were happy to run off and do as they pleased, German high command was not happy about this, and it bit them hard later, but in France they got lucky.
In reality, a French Division General had less autonomy than a Germany Colonel.
There was huge amount of self preservation at stake, they cant shoot you if you do exactly that the written orders state, they can shoot you if you move a mile to counter attack a German river crossing and need someone to blame for a different failure.
算是吧，德国军官在前线是实际的领导，我行我素，德国高层对此很不满意，后来也狠狠地被反噬了，但在法国他们很幸运。
实际上，一个法国师长的自主权还不如一个德国上校。
这里有大量的自保的问题，如果你完全按照书面命令的要求去做，他们就不能拿你怎么样，如果你擅自移动一英里去反击德军的渡河，到了需要有人为各种失败负责的时候，他们就可以对你捏扁搓圆了。
I must disagree. First they just couldn't run off and do what they want. But yeah they got bigger operational freedom and no that didn't bit their butt. What bit their Butt was the centralization of command in the later years of the war.
我不同意你的说法。首先，他们根本不能完全我行我素。不过他们确实得到了更大的行动自由，但这并没有反噬他们。反噬他们的是战争后期的指挥集中化。
The German command structure was based around “Mission Type Tactics” or Auftragstaktik (in German) and came about when the Prussians started noticing that as armies got larger, it became more and more inefficient to micromanage every part of it to work in concert.
The underlying principle is essentially; one cannot exploit an initiatitive or advantage if you wait for orders to do so.
Mission type tactics gives officers and commanders an obxtive rather than specific orders, and the way that this obxtive is achieved is dynamic. Commanders down to the individual were expected to recognise when the battle situation has evolved such that original orders might be incompatible, and to dynamically adapt on the fly to continue to pursue the obxtive.
This is only effective if the officers making these decisions had a good picture of the battlefield before them, so the widespread adoption of the radio in the German army was absolutely crucial to their early war successes over their rather radio-less enemies, allowing officers to read the battle and dynamically adapt in real time.
The response time, then, is just the time to send a message, wait, and receive new orders. Or, if that is too slow, the time to regroup, assess the situation, and re-engage with new tactics.
Comparatively, the French (and other armies to varying degrees) were slow to react because they waited for orders before making any moves, the French compounded this issue by refusing to use radio communications, and instead relying on motorcycle messengers. In some cases, orders to cancel a planned counterattack failed to reach their units in time and they ended up advancing alone, being defeated piecemeal by German forces.
德军的指挥结构是基于"任务型战术"或Auftragstaktik（德语），是普鲁士人开始注意到，随着军队规模的扩大，对军队的每一部分进行微观管理以使其协同工作的效率越来越低时产生的。
其基本原则是：如果你等待命令，就无法利用当前主动权或优势。
任务型战术给了军官和指挥官一个目标，而不是具体的命令，而实现这个目标的方式是动态的。从指挥官直至士兵都要认识到，当战局演变到原来的命令可能不相容时，要动态地即时调整，继续追求目标。
这只有在做出这些决定的军官对他们面前的战场有一个很好的了解的情况下才会有效，所以德军广泛采用无线电对于他们早期在战争中战胜没有无线电的敌人绝对是至关重要的，它使军官们能够阅读战况并实时动态调整。
那么，响应时间就只是发送信息、等待和接收新命令的时间。或者，如果时间太慢，那就应该重新组合，评估情况，重新采用新的策略。
相对而言，法国人（和其他军队在不同程度上）反应缓慢，因为他们在做出任何行动之前都在等待命令，法国人拒绝使用无线电通讯，而是依靠摩托车信使，使这个问题更加复杂。在某些情况下，取消计划中的反击的命令未能及时到达他们的部队，他们最终独自前进，被德军各个击破了。
What would have happened in the French had heavily mined the exit points from the Ardennes?
如果法国人在阿登地区的出口处大量布雷，会发生什么？
Germans take another six hours to get through. Four if they hurry up.
德国人多花六个小时就能通过。如果他们抓紧时间，则只需要四个小时。
And I suppose the French would have squandered that window of opportunity.
而且我想法国人也会挥霍掉这个机会之窗。
Between the start of the war and the actual invasion in May 1940, the French war-gamed the upcoming fight, including a German advance through the Ardennes. The French officers playing that game were able to cross the Ardennes in four days to arrive on the Meuse to confound their compatriots playing defense. The French high command decided to ignore that possible outcome and stick with the estimate that it would take at least a week before the Germans could attack the main resistance line on the Meuse.
It didn’t help that the French probably had one their worst Class B reservist divisions being attacked by the two best panzer divisions in the German army (meaning the world). When that French division disintegrated, it opened about a six mile gap in the line which the French were never able to plug.
在战争开始和1940年5月的实际入侵之间，法国人对即将到来的战斗进行了战争演练，包括模拟德国人通过阿登山脉的推进。进行演练的法国军官在四天内穿越了阿登山脉，到达了马斯河，这让他们负责防守的同胞们感到很困惑。法国最高统帅部决定无视这种可能的结果，坚持估计德军至少需要一个星期才能攻击马斯河上的主要防线。
雪上加霜的是法国人在这里放上的是他们最差的B级预备役师，面对着德军（指世界上最好的两个装甲师）的攻击。当那个法国师解体时，它在防线上打开了一个大约6英里的缺口，而法国人永远无法填补这个缺口了。
Algorithmician, history buff, non-practicing hedonist.1y
France had anticipated an attack through the Ardennes, and had posted their Ninth and Second Armies in the region. They had not expected a powerful attack with close air support.
In planning the defence, the French had to decide between
improvised defensive positions on the Belgian side where they could have set up disjointed defended road blocks
prepared defensive positions on the French side, on the west bank of the Meuse
The former alternative seemed like a gamble, while the latter alternative was easier to supply, dominated the battlefield by high ground, and already had plenty of pillboxes to use. They chose to defend along the Meuse, while a small Franco-Belgian force attempted, and failed, to skirmish and delay the Germans in the western Ardennes.
If France had realised what was at stake and someone with an iron will and a Napoleonic grip on dispositions and deployments had been in charge, France would have called off the offensive into Belgium and tried to defend the French border instead, assigning one of their first-class armies to Sedan. This might possibly have deprived the German attack through the Ardennes of its point.
法国已经预料到了通过阿登山脉的攻击，并在该地区部署了他们的第九和第二军团。他们没有料到这是一次包含近距离空中支援的强大攻击。
在计划防御时，法国人不得不在以下几个方面做出决定
1.在比利时一侧建立临时防御阵地，他们可以在那里设置不连贯的防御路障
2.在法方一侧，在马斯河西岸建立准备好的防御阵地。
前一种选择似乎是一场赌博，而后一种选择更容易补给，在战场上以高地为主，而且已经有大量的碉堡可以使用。他们选择了沿着马斯河防守，而一支小规模的法国-比利时部队则试图在阿登西部与德军短兵相接，拖延时间，但最终失败。
如果法国意识到了这一利害关系，如果当时有一个具有铁血意志和拿破仑式的负责人，法国就会取消对比利时的进攻，而试图保卫法国边境，把他们的一支一流军队派往色当。这可能会使德军在阿登地区的进攻失去意义。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
The Ardennes are in Belgium. It was lightly defended. No French or British troops allowed. After the Germans broke through the Ardennes they advanced so fast and had enough air support the French were unable to contain them. The British and French counter attacks were poorly coordinated. It was a command failure of the generals on the part of the allies
阿登山脉在比利时境内。它的防卫很薄弱。又不允许法国或英国军队进入。德军突破阿登地区后，他们推进得非常快，而且有足够的空中支援，法国人无法遏制他们。英法两国的反攻协调得很差。这是盟国方面的将军们的指挥失败。
It was risky. If you extend this thin, this fast, this distance there are 2 possibilities
1 You win, it's called blitzkrieg and you are a hero who seized the moment
2 You lose, you are surrounded and annihilated and will be labeled a fool for out running your supply lines.
It could only happen because his opposition was weak or confused.
这确实是有风险的。如果你把战线拉得这么薄，这么快，这个距离有两种可能性：
1 你赢了，这叫闪电战，你是抓住时机的英雄
2 你输了，你被包围和歼灭，并会因为跑出你的补给上限而被贴上傻瓜的标签。
这只可能发生在他的对手很弱或很混乱的情况下。
Yes, the Mannstein Plan was extremely risky and the French could have wiped out the entire invading force when it got backlogged on a few roads. The French could have won WW2 quickly had they anticipated the attack. Alas, the opposite happened.
是的，曼斯坦计划风险极大，当法国人在几条道路上集结时，它本可以消灭整个入侵部队。如果法国人预料到这次袭击，他们本可以很快赢得二战。唉，相反的事情发生了。
Both the German and French plans were risky going into 1940, and both carried the same risk in that they were all out gambles for total victory…
Gamelin’s Dyle Plan: Remembering the previous war and carrying the expectation that the German panzers would be the lead element of the 1940 attack, Gamelin figured that the main German effort would be focused on northern Belgium where there was good tank country and where they wouldn’t be limited to a few narrow roads that would leave them vulnerable to artillery or air strikes. This would mean the Germans would have to use some variation of the Schlieffen Plan in order to break through Belgium, cut the French off from Britain and pin the French against the German border and their own lines in Paris.
From here, Gamelin did what made the most logical sense given French military doctrine. To mass his best forces at a point where the line would be narrow and let the more heavily armored French tanks take the German attack head on. Superior armor and firepower would then weaken any German advance and stop them on or around the Dyle River and then letting the army decide on what to do based on what happens.
Now, Gamelin got warnings that the Germans might actually have their main effort somewhere else, and this would even include the German resistance warning the Allies, but these warnings were either ignored as a “German trick” or from Gamelin’s belief that the Maginot Line would be too tough to assault directly and the Ardennes was not suitable for tanks. Now, in theory, Gamelin’s conclusion on the Ardennes was correct in that it wasn’t suitable ground for tanks… BUT because he committed everything to stopping the Schlieffen Plan, he had next to nothing to respond to any major attack in the region. And when the Germans broke through… he had no reserves to stem the advance.
进入1940年，德国和法国的计划都很冒险，而且都带有同样的风险，因为它们都是为了全面胜利而进行的赌博。
甘莫林的戴尔计划：考虑到了之前的战争，并预期德国装甲部队会成为1940年进攻的主角，甘莫林认为，德国的主攻方向将集中在比利时北部，那里适宜坦克运行，而且他们不会被限制在一些使他们容易受到炮击或空袭的狭窄的道路上。这意味着德国人将不得不使用"施利芬计划"的某种变体，以突破比利时，切断法国人与英国的联系，并将法国人钉在德国边境和他们自己在巴黎的防线上。
到这里，甘莫林做了最符合法国军事学说的事情。将他最好的部队集结在防线很窄的地方，让装甲更重的法国坦克与德军正面交锋。然后，卓越的装甲和火力将削弱德军的前进，并在戴尔河上或附近阻止他们，然后让军队根据发生的情况决定做什么。
不过现在，甘莫林收到警告说，德国人实际上可能将主要进攻放在其他地方，这甚至包括来自德国抵抗军给盟军的警告，但这些警告要么被视为“德国的诡计”而被忽视，要么是甘莫林认为马其诺防线固若金汤，阿登又不适合坦克穿行。理论上，甘莫林关于阿登山脉的结论是正确的，因为它确实不适合坦克的运动……但由于他将全部精力用在阻止施利芬计划上，他几乎没有办法应对该地区的任何重大袭击。而当德军突破此地时……他没有后备力量来阻止前进。
French history books say the worst inferiority of our army was not in guns, in planes or even in tanks, but in the brains of our generals. The French had always intended to let the German attack first, yet the drive into Belgium and Holland meant the Army was left with no reserve whatsoever against a possible German breakthrough. If the front was pierced for any reason, there was nothing to stop the German from driving anywhere they wanted.
On May 13th, men panicked under air bombardment. They barely fought at all, they simply abandonned their guns and fled. On May 15th, generals ordered a full retreat, but the troops didn't withdraw in good order and they were all overrun. After that it only took five more days for the German to drive 300km to the coast... By June 5th the troops had recovered enough to make a last stand on the Somme, but by then the German had such an advantage in numbers that it was over in three days.
Interesting trivia: the French 4th Armored Division, the one that did something, was commanded by then-colonel Charles de Gaulle.
法国历史书上说，我军最糟糕的劣势不在枪支、不在飞机甚至不在坦克上，而在我军将领的脑子里。法国人一直打算让德国人先进攻，然而开进比利时和荷兰意味着陆军对德国人可能的突破没有留下任何储备。如果前线因任何原因被击穿，就没有什么能阻止德国人开到他们想要的任何地方。
5月13日，人们在空中轰炸下惊慌失措。他们几乎没有任何战斗力，只是弃枪而逃。5月15日，将军们下令全面撤退，但部队没有按部就班地撤退，他们都被冲垮了。此后，德军只用了五天时间就开到了300公里开外的海岸边...... 到了6月5日，部队已经恢复到足以在索姆河上做最后的抵抗，但那时德军在人数上已经有了很大的优势，战斗三天就结束了。
有趣的小故事：法国第四装甲师，也就是那个有所作为的师，由当时的戴高乐上校指挥。
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