面对军事预算不足的情况，印度可以向阿塞拜疆学习如何精打细算
India can learn from Azerbaijan how to spend smart on military when budget is thin
译文简介
莫迪政府2021-22年的资本预算拨款甚至低于印度军队2014-15年要求的数量。但是，更多的开支并不是解决之道，正确的开支才是。
正文翻译
Over the past few days, India’s defence budget has come under the spotlight all over again. Former Army chief Gen V.P. Malik (retd), in ThePrint’s Off The Cuff programme, said that India is not spending much on defence. With China’s defence budget nearly four times that of India, Malik argued that India’s defence budget should be at least 3 per cent of the GDP.
在过去的几天里，印度的国防预算再次成为人们关注的焦点。前陆军总参谋长马利克(已退役)在《独立报》的Cuff计划中说，印度在国防上的开支不多。中国的国防预算是印度的近4倍，马里克认为，印度的国防预算至少应该达到GDP的3%。
Although the capital budget for the armed forces saw a significant 19 per cent jump in the Budget 2021 presented last month, the increase in the overall allocation was only 1.5 per cent, with the total defence budget now amounting to 2.14 per cent of the GDP.
尽管在上月公布的2021年预算中，军队的资本预算大幅增长了19%，但总拨款的增长仅为1.5%，目前国防预算总额占GDP的2.14%。
尽管在上月公布的2021年预算中，军队的资本预算大幅增长了19%，但总拨款的增长仅为1.5%，目前国防预算总额占GDP的2.14%。
More startling, however, are the figures submitted by the Defence Ministry in Parliament, because they brought out a growing disparity between the amount allocated by the Centre and the amount sought by the armed forces for modernisation purposes. The Narendra Modi government’s capital budget allocation for 2021-22 is lower than what the armed forces had asked for seven years ago in 2014-15.
然而，国防部向议会提交的数字更令人吃惊，因为这些数字显示出：中央政府分配的资金与军队为实现现代化而索取的资金之间的差距越来越大。莫迪政府2021-22年的资本预算拨款数字，比印度军方7年前的2014-15年所要求的数字还低。
然而，国防部向议会提交的数字更令人吃惊，因为这些数字显示出：中央政府分配的资金与军队为实现现代化而索取的资金之间的差距越来越大。莫迪政府2021-22年的资本预算拨款数字，比印度军方7年前的2014-15年所要求的数字还低。
Widening budget deficit
不断扩大的预算赤字
不断扩大的预算赤字
One might feel for the armed forces but the fact is that the money pool is limited. India has to cater to multiple demands — social, economic, infrastructural, and agricultural among others. Moreover, every armed force in the world will want to have the best, even if it may not fit their bill.
人们可能会同情军队，但事实是，资金池是有限的。印度必须满足多种需求——社会、经济、基础设施和农业等。此外，世界上的每一支武装力量都想拥有最好的东西，即使他们没钱买。
人们可能会同情军队，但事实是，资金池是有限的。印度必须满足多种需求——社会、经济、基础设施和农业等。此外，世界上的每一支武装力量都想拥有最好的东西，即使他们没钱买。
The demand of the armed forces will always be high. But can the budget accommodate it?
军队的要求总是很高。但是我们的预算能适应它吗?
军队的要求总是很高。但是我们的预算能适应它吗?
Take for instance the existing defence budget deficit. The Navy had projected a requirement of Rs 70,920.78 crore under the capital budget. What it got was not even half — Rs 33,253.55 crore. Similarly, the Army had sought Rs 51,492 crore for its modernisation budget, but got only Rs 36,531 crore. And the Air Force’s Rs 77,140 crore projection fetched only Rs 53,214.77, majority of which will go towards payment for the recently ordered Tejas and Rafale aircraft.
以现有的国防预算赤字为例。根据资本预算，海军申请了7092.078亿卢比。而它获批的金额还不到一半——3325.355亿卢比。同样，印度陆军原本要求5149.2亿卢比作为现代化预算，但只得到了3653.1亿卢比。空军要求的7714亿卢比的预算，仅得到了5321.477亿卢比，其中大部分将用于支付最近订购的光辉战机和阵风战机。
以现有的国防预算赤字为例。根据资本预算，海军申请了7092.078亿卢比。而它获批的金额还不到一半——3325.355亿卢比。同样，印度陆军原本要求5149.2亿卢比作为现代化预算，但只得到了3653.1亿卢比。空军要求的7714亿卢比的预算，仅得到了5321.477亿卢比，其中大部分将用于支付最近订购的光辉战机和阵风战机。
This comes in the backdrop of India burdened by its worst tension with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in decades.
而这一局面正值印度与中国在实控线上的关系处于几十年来最紧张的时刻。
而这一局面正值印度与中国在实控线上的关系处于几十年来最紧张的时刻。
What adds to the alarm is that, according to PRS India Legislative Research, the armed forces’ committed liabilities in 2016-17 was Rs 73,553 crore against which the budget allocation was just Rs 62,619 crore — a shortfall of 15 per cent. This drastic shortfall increased to 29 per cent in 2019-20 — when the allocation was Rs 80,959 crore against the committed liabilities of Rs 1,13, 667 crore.
让这一警报更加紧张的是，根据PRS印度立法研究的消息，印度军队2016-17年的承诺债务是7355.3亿卢比，而预算分配只有6261.9亿卢比——存在15%的缺口。而且这个严重的缺口在2019-20年度增加到29%，当时的承诺债务是11366.7亿卢比，而只分配了8095.9亿卢比。
让这一警报更加紧张的是，根据PRS印度立法研究的消息，印度军队2016-17年的承诺债务是7355.3亿卢比，而预算分配只有6261.9亿卢比——存在15%的缺口。而且这个严重的缺口在2019-20年度增加到29%，当时的承诺债务是11366.7亿卢比，而只分配了8095.9亿卢比。
Yes, under the Modi government, there has been an increased push for defence modernisation and contracts have been signed at a faster pace than the UPA era. But it is important to keep in mind that spending more is not the answer — spending right is.
是的，在莫迪政府的领导下，印度加大了国防现代化的力度，签署合同的速度比国大党时代快。但重要的是要记住，花更多的钱并不是解决问题的办法——正确地花钱才是。
是的，在莫迪政府的领导下，印度加大了国防现代化的力度，签署合同的速度比国大党时代快。但重要的是要记住，花更多的钱并不是解决问题的办法——正确地花钱才是。
And that’s why India can look at Armenia and Azerbaijan, which recently went to war against each other, to learn how to spend smartly.
：这就是为什么印度可以看看亚美尼亚和阿塞拜疆——这两个国家最近在打仗——印度应该从中学习如何明智地花钱。
：这就是为什么印度可以看看亚美尼亚和阿塞拜疆——这两个国家最近在打仗——印度应该从中学习如何明智地花钱。
Lessons on smart spending
明智开支的教训
明智开支的教训
As per the figures of Swedish think tank Stockholm International and Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2009 and 2018, Azerbaijan spent about $24 billion on defence. On the other hand, Armenia spent a little more than $4 billion during the same period. However, in terms of the share of government spending, Armenia spends much more.
根据瑞典智库斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所的数据，2009年至2018年，阿塞拜疆的国防开支约为240亿美元。另一方面，亚美尼亚在同一时期花费了40多亿美元。然而，就政府支出份额而言，亚美尼亚的支出要高得多。
根据瑞典智库斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所的数据，2009年至2018年，阿塞拜疆的国防开支约为240亿美元。另一方面，亚美尼亚在同一时期花费了40多亿美元。然而，就政府支出份额而言，亚美尼亚的支出要高得多。
In 2018, in terms of government spending, Armenia spent 21 per cent towards the military even as one-fourth of its population lives in poverty. Azerbaijan, supported by its oil revenue, spent about 11 per cent.
2018年，在政府支出方面，亚美尼亚的军费支出为21%，而该国四分之一的人口生活在贫困之中。但是在石油收入的支持下，阿塞拜疆的支出约为11%。
2018年，在政府支出方面，亚美尼亚的军费支出为21%，而该国四分之一的人口生活在贫困之中。但是在石油收入的支持下，阿塞拜疆的支出约为11%。
Another smart thing that Azerbaijan did was diversify, not just in terms of equipment but also source. Armenia focused on buying the big toys from Russia, which also supplies to Azerbaijan. But then, Azerbaijan was intelligent enough to diversify its procurement and depended on Turkey and an odd vendor – Israel.
阿塞拜疆的另一个聪明的做法是多样化，不仅在装备方面，也在来源方面。而亚美尼亚专注于从俄罗斯购买大型装备，俄罗斯也向阿塞拜疆供应这些装备。但后来，阿塞拜疆明智地将其采购多样化，并依赖于土耳其和一个奇怪的供应商——以色列。
阿塞拜疆的另一个聪明的做法是多样化，不仅在装备方面，也在来源方面。而亚美尼亚专注于从俄罗斯购买大型装备，俄罗斯也向阿塞拜疆供应这些装备。但后来，阿塞拜疆明智地将其采购多样化，并依赖于土耳其和一个奇怪的供应商——以色列。
According to the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, “Israel was Azerbaijan’s first largest military trading partner in arms imports in 2015-2019. Its share of Azerbaijan’s arms imports during that period was 60 per cent, with Russia providing 31 per cent and Turkey 3.2 per cent. The remaining 5.8 per cent was divided between Ukraine, Belarus, Pakistan and China.”
根据战争与和平报告研究所的报告，“2015-2019年，以色列是阿塞拜疆武器进口的第一大军事贸易伙伴。在此期间，它在阿塞拜疆的武器进口份额中占了60%，俄罗斯占31%，土耳其占3.2%。剩余的5.8%由乌克兰、白俄罗斯、巴基斯坦和中国瓜分。”
根据战争与和平报告研究所的报告，“2015-2019年，以色列是阿塞拜疆武器进口的第一大军事贸易伙伴。在此期间，它在阿塞拜疆的武器进口份额中占了60%，俄罗斯占31%，土耳其占3.2%。剩余的5.8%由乌克兰、白俄罗斯、巴基斯坦和中国瓜分。”
This meant that Azerbaijan diversified and it was the use of weapons such as Turkey’s weaponised drone Bayraktar TB2 and the Israeli Heron-TP drone that really swung the war in its favour.
这意味着阿塞拜疆采取了多样化策略，它使用的武器，如土耳其的武器无人机Bayraktar TB2和以色列的Heron-TP无人机，真正让那场战争转向对它有利的方向。
这意味着阿塞拜疆采取了多样化策略，它使用的武器，如土耳其的武器无人机Bayraktar TB2和以色列的Heron-TP无人机，真正让那场战争转向对它有利的方向。
The IWPR added, “The Azerbaijani government prefers current political allies when choosing partners for military trade. Thus Russia was its main partner in 2010-2015, Israel in 2015-2019, and Turkey in 2020.”
IWPR补充说:“阿塞拜疆政府在选择军事贸易伙伴时更倾向于当前的政治盟友。因此，俄罗斯是2010-2015年的主要合作伙伴，以色列是2015-2019年的主要合作伙伴，土耳其是2020年的主要合作伙伴。”
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
IWPR补充说:“阿塞拜疆政府在选择军事贸易伙伴时更倾向于当前的政治盟友。因此，俄罗斯是2010-2015年的主要合作伙伴，以色列是2015-2019年的主要合作伙伴，土耳其是2020年的主要合作伙伴。”
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
What is notable is that at one point of time, Armenia held the military edge over Azerbaijan. Back in 2010, Armenia’s first deputy defence minister David Tonoyan had said the country was “seeking a more efficient military at a relatively low cost in response to Azerbaijan’s growing military spending”. This even as in 2008, it was very clear that Azerbaijan wanted to build “a strong army to regain the contentious Nagorno-Karabakh either by improving its negotiating leverage with Armenia or going back to war”.
值得注意的是，亚美尼亚曾一度拥有对阿塞拜疆的军事优势。早在2010年，亚美尼亚第一副国防部长David Tonoyan就曾表示，该国“正在寻求以相对较低的成本建立一支更高效的军队，以应对阿塞拜疆不断增长的军事开支”。即使是在2008年，很明显，阿塞拜疆想要建立“一支强大的军队来重新夺回有争议的纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫地区，或者通过改善与亚美尼亚的谈判筹码，或者通过重新开战的方式”。
值得注意的是，亚美尼亚曾一度拥有对阿塞拜疆的军事优势。早在2010年，亚美尼亚第一副国防部长David Tonoyan就曾表示，该国“正在寻求以相对较低的成本建立一支更高效的军队，以应对阿塞拜疆不断增长的军事开支”。即使是在2008年，很明显，阿塞拜疆想要建立“一支强大的军队来重新夺回有争议的纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫地区，或者通过改善与亚美尼亚的谈判筹码，或者通过重新开战的方式”。
The message on the wall is very clear. It is not about spending big, but spending smart within what your pocket allows.
所以其中的经验是显而易见的。不是要大手大脚的花钱，而是在荷包允许的情况下明智的花钱。
所以其中的经验是显而易见的。不是要大手大脚的花钱，而是在荷包允许的情况下明智的花钱。
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We are spending more to buy 30 drones than their entire military budget.
我们在购买30架无人机上花的钱比他们全部的军事预算还多。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
Pretty much this, lol.
基本上是这样，哈哈。
We are buying drones at 100 million $ per drone, I don't know why RaGa isn't raising a big stink over this, no way those things cost that much. USAF buys them 38 million $ per (check page 22). Even if the cost of acquisition includes the most sophisticated stores, missiles, and sensor packages, there is no reasonable explanation for why the cost has risen almost 3X.
我们以每架1亿美元的价格购买无人机，我不知道为什么RaGa没有对此大发牢骚，这些东西不可能花那么多钱。美国空军以每架3800万美元购买(查看第22页)。即使采购成本包括最先进的商店、导弹和传感器套件，也无法合理解释为什么价格上涨了近三倍。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
Bayraktar TB-2 costs 2-3 million per unit, and with good EW systems have managed to greatly limit their losses.
US lost almost 30 predators to insurgents in Afghanistan in the first 3 or so years. We are paying 3 billion dollars for that number of drones, and China is infinitely more capable than poorly armed Afghani rebels.
This deal is basically more about increasing international relations than actual military power. Tapas/Rustom/Ghatak cannot come fast enough
Bayraktar TB-2每架造价为200-300万美元，并配备了良好的电子战系统，极大地限制了他们的损失。
在头三年左右的时间里，阿富汗的叛乱分子让美国损失了近30架“掠食者”。而我们为这些无人机支付了30亿美元，而中国的能力远比武装薄弱的阿富汗叛军强得多。
这笔交易基本上更多的是为了增进国际关系，而不是实际的军事力量。
Tapas/Rustom/Ghatak等无人机也无法足够快的加入军队。
This deal is basically more about increasing international relations than actual military power. Tapas/Rustom/Ghatak cannot come fast enough
Well if they really want to advance relations this way, it would have been better to buy things we actually need, more P8Is, C17s, C130-J maybe oil tankers etc. This acquisition makes no sense considering Rustom is far along the development cycle.
好吧，如果印度政府真的想以这种方式推进关系，最好采购我们真正需要的东西，更多的P8I、C17、C130-J或者加油机等。考虑到Rustom正处于开发周期中，这次采购毫无意义。
I agree. The Predator is not only 2 decades old now, most of the action it has seen has not been in the kind of theatre India will be fighting in.
We don't have the kind of insurgency where we need aerial firepower, and the small number of drones that we just wasted 3 BILLION on will not be even remotely useful against China, it's even questionable against Pakistan.
If India really wanted drone tech, could have just bought tech. 3 billion is such a silly number idek how to express my annoyance.
我同意。“掠食者”不仅已经有20年的历史了，而且我们所知的它能够执行的那些任务，都不是印度将要加入的那战场上所需要的。
印度没有出现那种需要空中火力的叛乱，我们刚刚浪费了30亿美元买的少量无人机对中国根本没用，甚至对巴基斯坦也存疑。
如果印度真的想要无人机技术，可以直接购买。30亿是一个愚蠢的数字，我不知道该如何表达我的不满。
We don't have the kind of insurgency where we need aerial firepower,
Not correct. Counter-terror ops against Pak and on border regions would become waaaay safer and quicker. Decision making would be faster and we would be able to TAKE ACTION literally within minutes of receiving fresh intel. Currently, an operation (even a simple one) needs to be planned for days or even weeks in advance. Exfil strategies, contingency plans, transport, troop availability, approach, recon, supply lines and logistics, etc... all of which become irrelevant as soon as you no longer have to worry about boots on the ground.
If Hafiz Sayeed was sunbathing in his underpants today, sitting on a hilltop, just 3-4 km from the LoC, we would need days of intensive planning on how to eliminate him.
But if we have armed drones, not only can we get excellent surveillance of what he's up to, right this minute, we can also make one phonecall, get approval from the top brass, and splatter that twat in an instant.
不对。如果有了这些无人机，针对巴基斯坦和边境地区的反恐行动将变得更加安全和快速。决策过程将会更快，我们将能够在收到最新情报的几分钟内采取行动。目前，执行一项行动(即使是简单的行动)都需要提前几天甚至几周进行计划。撤退战略，应急计划，运输，部队可用性，接近，侦察，补给线和后勤等……只要我们不再担心地面部队，所有这些都变得无关紧要。
如果某个恐怖分子今天穿着裤衩，坐在距离实际控制点3-4公里的山顶上晒太阳，我们为了消灭他，就需要几天时间制定周密的计划。
但如果我们有武装无人机，我们不仅可以准确监视他的一举一动，而且我们还可以在一分钟内打个电话，得到高层的批准，然后立刻把那混蛋干掉。
Are you referring to cross LOC ops? Because AFAIK use of air power for anything but surveillance is normally forbidden on Indian territory outside extenuating circumstance. I can only think of a handful of incidents since '71 when even attack helicopters were operated in the region.
Although true, we need to increase cross LOC power projection to punish terrorist attacks like how the surgical strikes did, but there's no reason larger orders of Rustom/Ghatak can't do the same.
你说的是跨越控制区的行动吗?因为据我所知，通常情况下，在印度领土上，除了监视之外，使用空军执行任何任务都是被禁止的。自71年以来，即便是攻击直升机在该地区执行任务的事件也屈指可数。
虽然我们确实需要增加控制区的力量投送，用外科手术式袭击那样的方式惩罚恐怖袭击，但采购更多Rustom/Ghatak同样可以做到这些。
It would be a poor use for such aircraft, though. See this instead.
“The two drones, inducted under the Navy’s emergency procurement powers granted by the defence ministry, began their ISR missions on November 21. They are doing extremely well,” said the source.
Though there is an American crew for maintenance, technical and training purposes, the Indian Navy is totally in control of the operations and the huge amount of data being generated in the ISR missions, as per the lease agreement.
“The intelligence data from the two drones is being fed into the NCO (network-centric operations) network of the Navy. General Atomics has to ensure a minimum number of flying hours by the drones every month. The Navy does not have to set up infrastructure or make provisions for spares,” said the source. With a maximum range of 5,500 nautical miles and an endurance of 35 hours, the Navy can deploy the Sea Guardians to monitor all the “choke points” from the Persian Gulf to Malacca Strait in the IOR.
不过，对于这样的飞机来说，这将是一个糟糕的用途。看到这个。
“这两架无人机是在国防部授予海军紧急采购权下服役的，于11月21日开始执行ISR任务。它们运行得非常好。”消息人士说。
尽管有一名美国人员负责维护、技术和训练，但根据租赁协议，印度海军完全控制ISR任务的操作和生成的大量数据。
“来自这两架无人机的情报数据正在被输入海军的NCO(网络中心作战)网络。通用原子公司必须确保无人机每月的最低飞行时间。海军不需要建立相关基础设施或提供备件。”这位消息人士说。“海上守护者”的最大航程5500海里，续航时间35小时，海军可以部署来监视印度洋地区从波斯湾到马六甲海峡的所有“咽喉点”。
We’re buying the sensors not the airfrx
我们买的是传感器，不是飞机本身。
The more I read about this deal, the .ore it seems like a hafta to keep caatsa sanctions away.
This is why we must refrain from being too dependent on us.
We should ptioritize direct tech purchases insead of arms deals.
我越是研究这个交易，就越觉得其核心似乎是为了避开CAATSA制裁（以制裁反击美国敌人法案）的权宜之计。
所以我们必须谨慎，以免过于依赖美国。
我们应该把重点放在直接购买技术，而不是军购上。
Comparing the TB-2 with the MQ-9 is like comparing the Rafale with the Tejas. They're in a different class. Just look at the payload capacity -- the Reaper can haul 1,700 kg. The TB-2 can manage about 150 kg.
比较TB-2和MQ-9就像比较阵风和光辉战机一样。二者不在同一水准。看看各自的有效载荷，“收割者”可以运载1700公斤。TB-2只能搭载约150公斤。
I'm not disputing that the Reaper is the vastly superior drone, I'm disputing that despite the superiority the price tag is too high.
Especially against opponents like China/Pak who have the capacity to down both drones, the cheaper, more numerous drones bring their own advantages to the war.
Can't help but feel the money is too much. Even a single billion could breath so much life into many indigenous projects.
“收割者”是一种非常优越的无人机，我并不是在争论这个，我在争论的是，尽管它具有优越性，但价格太高了。
特别是对付中国和巴基斯坦这样的对手时，他们有能力击落两种无人机，而更便宜、更多的无人机可为战争带来优势。
我忍不住觉得它的价格太高了。即使是十亿美元也能给许多本土项目带来生机。
Capability costs money; no two ways around it. If we buy a cheaper drone, it will be deficient in some respects. About indigenous projects, I do agree.
能力要花钱的；没有其他选择。如果我们买一架更便宜的无人机，在某些方面会存在缺陷。至于本土项目的说法，我同意。
I don't know why RaGa isn't raising a big stink
This is really a good question. Dude is tweeting based on some random report. But mum on things which actually look fishy.
How does he expect to get respect and votes is beyond me.
这真是个好问题。这家伙是根据一些随机报告发推特的，却对那些看起来可疑的东西保持缄默。
我不明白他如何指望能得到尊重和选票。
The Dutch bought four Reapers for $339 million in 2019. Other countries have paid similar amounts for the whole package of drones, ground stations, spare parts, weapons, etc. The $38 million that the USAF is paying are the flyaway costs.
2019年，荷兰以3.39亿美元购买了四架“死神”无人机。其他国家也为整套无人机、地面站、备件、武器等支付了类似的费用。美国空军支付的3800万美元是出厂价。
₹38mil for drone. $62 mil for buying S400
3900万买无人机，6200万买S400。
No one needs to teach us how to do things, we shall do it our own Indian way. Bharat Mata ki Jai!
我们不需要任何人教我们做事，我们应该用印度人的方式来做。印度万岁！
Might as well disband the Indian army then considering it's modelled in British structure and a big chunk of regiments trace their origin to East India company.
考虑到印度军队的结构是模仿英国的，而且很多团的起源都可以追溯到东印度连，所以最好解散印度军队。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
Yes we also need to restructure the army in an Indian way. We need to quickly decolonize. Anyway most problems of Army come from colonial regulations. Some things have been done, like appointing a CDS and theaterising the armed forces, but we need to do it quicker.
是的，我们也需要以印度的方式重组军队。我们需要迅速去殖民化。无论如何，军队的大多数问题来自殖民法规。我们已经做了一些事情，比如指定一个CDS，让军队出风头，但我们需要更快地做到这一点。
There is no Indian way, pre-colonial armies of Indian kingdoms were based around clan loyalty to the king that's why they used to fall apart whenever a clan leader died.
European styled officer corps were what makes armies of the world modern, Indian way was a feudal concept which sucked balls.
Now that doesn't mean Armies can't be reformed, there are still too many ethnic and religious regiments in this country but reforming them is one big headache.
所谓的印度方式并不存在，前殖民时期的印度王国军建立在对国王的部落忠诚之上，所以一旦部落首领死掉，他们就会分崩离析。
欧洲风格的军官团使得全世界的军队走向现代，而印度的方式只是个封建概念，烂得一批。
但这并不意味着军队不能充足，这个国家依然有太多不同民族和宗教的军团，但对其进行改革依然很让人头痛。
I don't understand why you people are always so negative about India. Why live here if you want to be so negative about everything that is Indian?
我不明白为什么你们这些人总是对印度这么消极。如果你对印度的一切都这么否定，为什么还要住在这里?
I am primarily being negative about India of the 17th century, it's a fact that armies of Indian kingdoms sucked in comparison to British. Britain often fought battles in which it used to be outnumbered in 10:1 and would still prevail over armies of India, they outmaneuvered, outfought and outgunned us in all aspects and it wasn't just because of superior fire-power, they were just better.
As for being negative about India of today, I am duty bound as a tax paying citizen of a democratic state to voice dissatisfaction, as only when problems are recognized are problems solved.
我主要对17世纪的印度持否定态度，印度王国的军队比英国的军队更糟糕，这是事实。英国经常跟十倍于己的印度军队打仗，却依然打胜仗，他们在机动性、战斗力和武器等所有方面都胜过我们，这不仅仅是因为火力优势，他们就是更好。
至于对今天的印度持负面态度，作为一个民主国家的纳税公民，我有义务表达不满，因为只有当问题得到承认时，问题才会得到解决。
Okay Mr. Intellectual
好吧，大聪明。
If this is your standard for being an intellectual, than you must be an idiot.
如果这就是你对聪明设立的标准，那你肯定是个白痴。
Wo troll kar rha hai...
他就是个喷子。
He is one
是的。
This is half-ass knowledge of history. There are also plenty of examples where the local kingdoms fought and won against the British.
And let's not forget the fact that the majority of the people fighting were Indians on both sides.
你对历史不过是一知半解。还有很多土邦对抗并战胜英国人的例子。
而且不要忘记，事实上交战双方的大部分人都是印度人。
Nobody is being negative about India, we are just acknowledging the mistakes, you can't fix mistakes without acknowledging them. Stop being a close head
没有人对印度持消极态度，我们只是在承认错误，不承认错误就不能纠正错误。别再斤两计较了。
India today is weak because it did not bother keeping up with the times and adapting "European styles."
今天的印度之所以虚弱，是因为它没有跟上时代的步伐，也没有采纳“欧洲风格”。
No need to disband. Just restructure them and upxe them. Remove old names, logos, uniforms.
The soldiers of the armed forces of India represent the Indian civilization, the current army structure doesn't acknowledge this and traces its heritage to a pathetic company. This only shows how much work we still need to do in removing the garbage of the colonial era.
没有必要解散。只需要对其进行重组和升级。取消旧的名字、标志和制服。
印度武装部队的士兵代表着印度文明，但目前的军队结构不承认这一点，并将其遗产追溯到一个可怜的公司。这只能表明，在清除殖民时代的垃圾方面，我们还有很多工作要做。
Lmao our military specially the army is hooked to ruskie imports like a drug addict is to heroin. They just dont want anything else.
哈哈，我们的军队，特别是陆军，痴迷于进口俄国货，就像瘾君子痴迷于海洛因一样。他们完全不想要别的东西。
Better ruskie than yankie, potent stuff but the dealer will demand a BJ if no payment is made.
俄国货总比美国货好，很得劲，但如果不付钱的话，经销商会让买家给吹。